Years ago, I spoke at length with a sailor aboard the USS Hornet about the Doolittle Raid and the rest of the aircraft carrier's short life. https://ww2thebigone.com/2016/04/18/uss-hornet-launching-the-doolittle-raid/
Years ago, I spoke at length with a sailor aboard the USS Hornet about the Doolittle Raid and the rest of the aircraft carrier's short life. https://ww2thebigone.com/2016/04/18/uss-hornet-launching-the-doolittle-raid/ (I also posted this in the "War at Sea" section. If it is considered bad form to post identical threads in more than one section, someone who is in charge please tell me and I won't do it again.)
Hi I've merged your threads. Discussing a particular topic under different sections- if it's the exact same post/link - might lead to confusion when people respond. If, however, you wished e.g. to discuss different aspects of the same operation, there'd be no problem in running two different threads but it'd be best to highlight any differences within the title. All the best
I remember having Ted Lawson's account of the raid....was in my kit bag library but lent to a chap on the squadron and never got it back......a distinctive problem with loaning out books. While the raid was token,it was a surprise to the Japanese,it thrust home to them that the Japan homeland was vulnerable to air attack at the time when the Japanese thought that their early successes meant ultimate victory. Some of those aircrew captured met with brutal treatment and worse from their captors.The plan after the raid was to divert to friendly forces in China....some did and Ted Lawson was one of them but if I remember correctly,he was injured and from the injury, lost a leg. There was a newsreel showing the B 25s taking off from the Hornet in difficult seas...a formidable operation from start to finish...good example of good military lateral thinking.
I've read varying casualty figures on the Chinese population 'due to the Doolittle Raid'. I have some skepticism - the Japanese brutalized villages and landscapes for a decade before, and for years later. "Any port in the storm" or, in that excuse, I have a feeling "any excuse will do". The timing of the raid was important in the Tokyo HQ - the Army vs Navy rivalries, the Old Navy vs New rivalries. There was a powerful debate on which direction to go with the primary war effort. There were rumors that Yamamoto's long-standing pro-Western affinity made his reliability questionable. In fact, he'd be attune to this and stayed at sea, aboard ship, for most of the war AS IF he believed he might be a target for assassination. At points, he seemed to say, "Oh yeah? Well, I'll show you how committed I am! I'll attack Pearl Harbor!!" During March and April, 1942, he was facing the argument that Japan didn't need to capture more sea and islands, they needed resources, and only in SE Asia did those resources exist. Agriculture, rubber, chemicals, petroleum. I've wondered if he wasn't smarting from the past insults and stood by his "We need to continue to strike at the Americans towards Hawaii. We must invade Midway and force their navy into one last battle - the mythical Decisive Battle!" The Army scoffed at this - "We don't need islands! We don't need ocean. WE NEED RESOURCES." (How true they were!) But here comes Doolittle, in the middle of this showdown, and the next day, all leaders signed off on the attack and invasion of Midway.
Quick précis video of the raid and its importance here: https://video-icn1-1.xx.fbcdn.net/v...=668ef60763666155d08b38ac741cfb1a&oe=582DD5CE
