Hitler's Biggest Mistake

Discussion in 'General' started by paulyb102, Feb 14, 2005.

  1. L J

    L J Senior Member

    well let me quote this ..
    ''most historians regard the campaign in greece as decisive in
    determining the course of world war 2 ,, maintaining that it fately
    delayed the axis invasion of the soviet union .''...... i agree ...so there
    The campaign in Grece (operation Marita ) was planned in the winter of 1940-41 ,so it could not be a reason for the delaying of Barbarossa,while the attack on Yugoslavia (in april 1941) was an improvisation and was one of the reasons for delaying Barbarossa ;an other reason was the weather :due to the late thaw,it was impossible in april to build bridges across the rivers in the West of the Soviet Union .
     
  2. Za Rodinu

    Za Rodinu Hot air manufacturer

    Anyway, this is slowly sliding into speculation of doubtful use, if the Germans did or didn't this or that. The usual pointless (and frowned upon here, thank goodness) what-iffing. Nazi moonbase anyone?
     
  3. Smudger Jnr

    Smudger Jnr Our Man in Berlin

    Miguel,

    I could think of a few names to call that website, but I would probably get banned from the forum :D.

    Regards
    Tom
     
  4. Gerard

    Gerard Seelow/Prora

    If they had gone six weeks earlier, the same problems would have happened. An over-extended supply line, massive strain on the transportation system, still appalling casualties, 3 army groups fighting eah other to keep moving. It still would have ended in disaster. I still maintain that the Wehrmacht was severely weakened by the massive encirclement battles it fought trying to destroy the Red Army at Minsk, Kiev and Smolensk. These would have happened earlier and the Germans still would have taken the same number of casualties trying to seal them off. James S makes the correct assumption that it was one thing to reach Moscow but quite another to take it. Germany's best Army couldnt take Stalingrad and they were equipped better than the forces crawling towards Moscow. It all depends whether or not you believe that the Soviets were responsible for the casualties to the Wehrmacht or whether you believe that "General Winter" was responsible. If you do believe in the power of cold weather I have two questions to ask:

    1. what type of weather was on the Russian side of the Front?

    2. How was it that the Germans incurred so many casualties up to the End of September 1941?
     
    L J likes this.
  5. Za Rodinu

    Za Rodinu Hot air manufacturer

  6. James S

    James S Very Senior Member

     
  7. hitler made a lot of mistakes and none more so than barbarossa
     
  8. Za Rodinu

    Za Rodinu Hot air manufacturer

    I suppose we can all agree on that.
     
  9. Gerard

    Gerard Seelow/Prora

    Indeed we can Za, Barbarossa was the one chance the Germans had to annihalate the Soviet Army so it would be very important.
     
  10. Owen

    Owen -- --- -.. MOD

    Just thought I'd move this thread from the NW Europe Section to the EASTERN FRONT section.
     
  11. L J

    L J Senior Member

    I suppose we can all agree on that.
    Not all of us :huh:
     
  12. Za Rodinu

    Za Rodinu Hot air manufacturer

    Alright, an indeterminate number of us who will be subjectively assessed as "a lot". Care to explain?
     
  13. Gerard

    Gerard Seelow/Prora

    Just thought I'd move this thread from the NW Europe Section to the EASTERN FRONT section.
    Moved it to the General Section as it isnt specifically Eastern Front. :lol: This thread is very mobile!! Anywaysd please continue.
     
  14. L J

    L J Senior Member

    Alright, an indeterminate number of us who will be subjectively assessed as "a lot". Care to explain?
    1)If it wasa mistake,why ?
    2)Was there an alternative that was giving a chance to win the war ? I think that al the alternatives have been debunked .
    3) I think it was the only possible choice he had
    4)I think the planning was good,reckoning with the situation of the German army,that was a mainly WW I army .
    5) Was the plan good executed ? I think it was .
    6)Why did the plan fail ? The Geermand,knowing the situation of their army,knowing the climate,the distances,the bad roeads and railways of the SU,having only fragmentary information about the Red Army,remembered one thing of WW I :that it took time for the enormous Russian army to mobilize (1O weeks ):thus they decided that they had to defeat the Russian Army before it was fully mobilised,otherwise they would have only very little chances to defeat the SU in 1941 and even less afterwards .They knew the SU had some 2.7 million men in the West and if they could eliminate them (and they did !) and the SU could only send 1 million as replacements ,they had won because with 1 million,the Russian front would collapse .
    What FHO did not knew,was that the SU possessed a system of cadre divisions ,making it possible to send enormous reinforcements from in the beginning .In september the Soviet frontstrength was 3.5 million and they had lost 2.7 . Thus in september it was already very unlikely for the Germans to defeat the SU in 1941 .
    My conclusion:the decision was good,the planning was good the execution of the plan was good,but all was subordinate to a flawed assumption :that they could defeat the SU before it was mobilised .
    On the other hand,FHO can be excused :if they knew that the SU could mobilise from the first day on and that the chances of Barbarossa were insignificant,what could the head of FHO (I think it was colonel Kinzel) do ? Go to Hitler and say 'You have to cancel Barbarossa (the only plan for the Germans having a possibility to win the war )? That would be saying :the only thing you can do is to capitulate or to shoot yourself . Would you be the messenger with the bad news ? I wouldn't .
    Most my points are relating to what happened after 22 june ,because ALL the other alternatives have been discussed on this forum(and on others ) ad nauseam,and the conclusion had always been that they were unsuccessfull .
    That Barbarossa failed does not mean that the decision was a blunder .
    Cheers.
     
  15. Za Rodinu

    Za Rodinu Hot air manufacturer

    An interesting reasoning. May I summarise it by saying the plan was a good one considering the information available, the problem being that execution was troubled with a different reality?
     
  16. L J

    L J Senior Member

    An interesting reasoning. May I summarise it by saying the plan was a good one considering the information available, the problem being that execution was troubled with a different reality?
    That is a good summary :)
     
  17. Heimbrent

    Heimbrent Well-Known Member

    6)Why did the plan fail ? The Geermand,knowing the situation of their army,knowing the climate,the distances,the bad roeads and railways of the SU,having only fragmentary information about the Red Army,remembered one thing of WW I :that it took time for the enormous Russian army to mobilize (1O weeks ):thus they decided that they had to defeat the Russian Army before it was fully mobilised,otherwise they would have only very little chances to defeat the SU in 1941 and even less afterwards .They knew the SU had some 2.7 million men in the West and if they could eliminate them (and they did !) and the SU could only send 1 million as replacements ,they had won because with 1 million,the Russian front would collapse .
    What FHO did not knew,was that the SU possessed a system of cadre divisions ,making it possible to send enormous reinforcements from in the beginning .In september the Soviet frontstrength was 3.5 million and they had lost 2.7 . Thus in september it was already very unlikely for the Germans to defeat the SU in 1941 .
    My conclusion:the decision was good,the planning was good the execution of the plan was good,but all was subordinate to a flawed assumption :that they could defeat the SU before it was mobilised .
    On the other hand,FHO can be excused :if they knew that the SU could mobilise from the first day on and that the chances of Barbarossa were insignificant,what could the head of FHO (I think it was colonel Kinzel) do ? Go to Hitler and say 'You have to cancel Barbarossa (the only plan for the Germans having a possibility to win the war )? That would be saying :the only thing you can do is to capitulate or to shoot yourself . Would you be the messenger with the bad news ? I wouldn't .


    Your argument nr. 6 has one big flaw: The Germans didn't care to know much about the Red Army or the Soviet Union. Their expectations were based on experience from WW1 (when the huge Red Army collapsed very fast), on their experience in the war against France (which had been a feared opponent. Yet beaten in a few weeks) and on their ideology (SU was a Koloss auf tönernen Füssen - see the paradox? SU was weak, had to be weak, because they were slavs. Well, at the same time they were "ruled by the Jews" which the Germans (among others) considered a fierce, cunning and dangerous enemy).

    And you seem to forget one part of the equation: Hitler. Hitler had announced the war against the Soviet Union already in Mein Kampf - and the reason wasn't "winning the war" (Nazi-Germany couldn't lose the war anyway).

    Do you have any proof on what you say about the German assumptions on Soviet mobilisation? Did it once get from thought to paper and can be checked somewhere? (That's a neutral question, I'm not attacking you. Just curious, because so far I haven't seen any document covering that question.)
     
  18. L J

    L J Senior Member

    Your argument nr. 6 has one big flaw: The Germans didn't care to know much about the Red Army or the Soviet Union. Their expectations were based on experience from WW1 (when the huge Red Army collapsed very fast), on their experience in the war against France (which had been a feared opponent. Yet beaten in a few weeks) and on their ideology (SU was a Koloss auf tönernen Füssen - see the paradox? SU was weak, had to be weak, because they were slavs. Well, at the same time they were "ruled by the Jews" which the Germans (among others) considered a fierce, cunning and dangerous enemy).

    And you seem to forget one part of the equation: Hitler. Hitler had announced the war against the Soviet Union already in Mein Kampf - and the reason wasn't "winning the war" (Nazi-Germany couldn't lose the war anyway).

    Do you have any proof on what you say about the German assumptions on Soviet mobilisation? Did it once get from thought to paper and can be checked somewhere? (That's a neutral question, I'm not attacking you. Just curious, because so far I haven't seen any document covering that question.)
    The decision to attack the SU in 1941 had nothing to do with Mein Kampf :that there would be in the future a war with the SU,yes (see Mein Kampf ),but that it happened in 1941 was caused by the strategic impasse of Germany .After the British decided to continue the war in june 1944,what was the situation :the possibilities to eliminate Britain in the short time were very small (I think every one is convinced that Sea Lion was impossible );a Uboat War would not be decisive (shortage of UBoats )and a unrestricted UBoat War would be increasing the entry of the US in the war .
    Why did Britain decide to continue the war ? Whithout allies ,they had no chance . They were hoping on allies .And these were :the US and the SU .In ww I it took a coalition of 4 to defeat Germany (Russia fell of in 1917 ),but in one of those 3 remaining adversaries in 1940 (UK,US ,SU )fell of,what were the chances of the other 2 ?Whithout the UK,no Overlord .(the UK was considered as a unsinkable carrier .Without the US ?Could Brittain survive without the supply line from the US ? Without the SU ? Overlord possible with the bulk of the German army in Normandy ?
    Thus Hitler had to eliminate or neutralise one of the 3.
    He could do nothing against the US.
    There was no possibility to eliminate Britain .
    The SU was the only remaining :Hitler had to neutralise the SU .The SU was neutral,but that was not enough,the SU had to be an ally (and that failed when Molotov visited Berlin )or had to be eliminated .The SU was potentially the most dangerous adversary (the US would not be ready before 1943 ):Stalin could at any moment stop selling oil and food to Germany,no food from the SU was a risk for the morale of the population and Hitler was afraid of a situation as in 1918 when food shortages caused the collaps of the morale of the population .
    At any moment,Stalin could capture the Rumanian oil wells,what would be catastrophic for Germany .
    At any moment,Stalin could blackmail Hitler .
    In 1942 :the SU would be stronger and the chances to defeat her would be smaller and in 1942 Germany would be probably at war with the US and would be more dependent on the SU.
    But if Hitler could eliminate the SU in 1941? No danger in the East ,food and raw materials enough and a big chance to sustain a war with the UK and the SU .
    I will post later on the Russian mobilisation
    Cheers
     
  19. Heimbrent

    Heimbrent Well-Known Member

    The decision to attack the SU in 1941 had nothing to do with Mein Kampf :that there would be in the future a war with the SU,yes (see Mein Kampf ),but that it happened in 1941 was caused by the strategic impasse of Germany

    That's indeed how the Germans felt? What do you mean with "future war" - Hitler didn't want to wait years to finish his war. And let's face it, destroying the SU was one of Hitler's key points (I have read Mein Kampf btw, the whole rotten book). Can you please give some documents stating that the German militaries were keen on attacking the SU because they felt the war would otherwise not be finished?

    After the British decided to continue the war in june 1944,what was the situation :the possibilities to eliminate Britain in the short time were very small (I think every one is convinced that Sea Lion was impossible );a Uboat War would not be decisive (shortage of UBoats )and a unrestricted UBoat War would be increasing the entry of the US in the war .
    Why did Britain decide to continue the war ? Whithout allies ,they had no chance . They were hoping on allies .And these were :the US and the SU
    I guess you are talking about 1940, not 1944. Hitler wasn't really convinced that sea lion was an impossible operation. And that's what counts for the context, not the post-war view. Apart from that he was hoping for a peace with Britain - after all they were "allies in blood".
    I admit I don't know the facts (no means to check right now either) but it seems very strange that the SU would be an ally of Britain when it was at the same time Hitler's ally and an enemy of Poland, which was an ally of Britain...

    .In ww I it took a coalition of 4 to defeat Germany (Russia fell of in 1917 ),
    I am by no means expert of WW1. Besides I was talking of how the fall of the Red Army was perceived by the German generals.

    Whithout the UK,no Overlord .(the UK was considered as a unsinkable carrier .Without the US ?Could Brittain survive without the supply line from the US ? Without the SU ? Overlord possible with the bulk of the German army in Normandy ?
    I wonder whether Hitler was indeed thinking that far. After all Germany was only at war with the US in December 1941, hence after the attack on the SU.

    The SU was the only remaining :Hitler had to neutralise the SU .The SU was neutral,but that was not enough,the SU had to be an ally (and that failed when Molotov visited Berlin )or had to be eliminated .The SU was potentially the most dangerous adversary (the US would not be ready before 1943 ):Stalin could at any moment stop selling oil and food to Germany,no food from the SU was a risk for the morale of the population and Hitler was afraid of a situation as in 1918 when food shortages caused the collaps of the morale of the population .
    At any moment,Stalin could capture the Rumanian oil wells,what would be catastrophic for Germany .
    At any moment,Stalin could blackmail Hitler .
    Again, Hitler did not feel threatened by the SU in 1941, he didn't expect a Soviet Attack!

    In 1942 :the SU would be stronger and the chances to defeat her would be smaller and in 1942 Germany would be probably at war with the US and would be more dependent on the SU.
    "Probably"? It wasn't Hitlers plan to strike against the US first. And how could it have, after all he needed to conquer Europe, esp. the SU first. Other than that it was the SU he regarded as enemy nr. 1 at that time.

    But if Hitler could eliminate the SU in 1941? No danger in the East ,food and raw materials enough and a big chance to sustain a war with the UK and the SU .
    I guess you mean the US, not the eliminated Soviet Union. Yes, that's correct, the SU was the base for a war against the US. But the Germans weren't planning a war against the US before they were planning the attack on the Soviet Union. Assuming so would be suggesting the Germans had no idea of military planning at all and at the same time planned a very far future in detail.
     
  20. L J

    L J Senior Member

    That's indeed how the Germans felt? What do you mean with "future war" - Hitler didn't want to wait years to finish his war. And let's face it, destroying the SU was one of Hitler's key points (I have read Mein Kampf btw, the whole rotten book). Can you please give some documents stating that the German militaries were keen on attacking the SU because they felt the war would otherwise not be finished?

    I guess you are talking about 1940, not 1944. Hitler wasn't really convinced that sea lion was an impossible operation. And that's what counts for the context, not the post-war view. Apart from that he was hoping for a peace with Britain - after all they were "allies in blood".
    I admit I don't know the facts (no means to check right now either) but it seems very strange that the SU would be an ally of Britain when it was at the same time Hitler's ally and an enemy of Poland, which was an ally of Britain...

    I am by no means expert of WW1. Besides I was talking of how the fall of the Red Army was perceived by the German generals.

    I wonder whether Hitler was indeed thinking that far. After all Germany was only at war with the US in December 1941, hence after the attack on the SU.

    Again, Hitler did not feel threatened by the SU in 1941, he didn't expect a Soviet Attack!

    "Probably"? It wasn't Hitlers plan to strike against the US first. And how could it have, after all he needed to conquer Europe, esp. the SU first. Other than that it was the SU he regarded as enemy nr. 1 at that time.

    I guess you mean the US, not the eliminated Soviet Union. Yes, that's correct, the SU was the base for a war against the US. But the Germans weren't planning a war against the US before they were planning the attack on the Soviet Union. Assuming so would be suggesting the Germans had no idea of military planning at all and at the same time planned a very far future in detail.
    About Mein Kampf :about Mein Kampf :eek:ne can not explain Hitler's decision to attack the SU with a undefeated Britain and a hostile US as adversaries ,by what Hitler had written in 1925 .It was probably,that when Britain had made peace,that there would be a war with the SU.Others are argumenting that there would be a Cold War between the two countries with an Iron Curtain .
    What do we know :in june 1940 the LW got priority concerning the arms production,that points out that Hitler was reckoning with a British decision to continue the war .It's only in december that the Army got a relative priority ,with as result that neither the Army nor the Luftwaffe were strong enough .
    A lot of people make the mistake that,because the war in the east was fought out in the way we know (Einzatsgruppen,etc ),this war was caused by Hitler's racial policy . No :the origin of the war was the precarious situation of Germany in 1940,situation that(in Hitler's opinion )only could became worse,and for which there was (in Hitler's opinion )only one solution :attacking the SU . That such a war would be foughted out in a barbarious way is a fact,but that would be in any case,it was the logical consequence of Hitler's racial policy .
    You asked for a document that the German militaries (I think you mean Hitler ) were keen on attacking the SU because they felt otherwise the war would not be finished :well :at key meetings with military leaders on 5 december 1940,on 9 january 1941 and again in his speech to the commanders of the future eastern armies on 30 march 1941,he stressed that the central issue was to eliminate the SU as Britains 'continental sword' . In regard to this speech,FM von Bock noted in his diary :Constant threat to our back,constant communist danger,possibility for England and America to build a new front against us in Russia (von Bock diaries :P 181 )The same in his speech of 14 june 1941 (Bock diaries P 193 ) About Sealion :it was only possible (in Hitler's mind ) after the German's won the Battle of Britain ,when the BOB was lost in september 1940,Sealion was postponed and later cancelled .
    About the SU and Poland :the SU was not an ally of Germany,that was one of the reasons for Barbarossa:at the visit of Molotov in Berlin the SU refused to become an ally,preferring to be neutral and selling raw materials to Germany . The SU was hostile to Poland and did occupy eastern Poland,that did not prevent them to become an ally of the UK
    About the Us :after selling destroyers they ceased to be neutral,and there was Lend Lease,the US navy helping the British in the Battle of the Atlantic,the US navy hunting German UBoats .......
    About anSoviet Attack in 1941 (Suvurov these ) :I never mentioned it,because there is no proof for it,btw Hitler never believed it . The danger of the SU was they could at any moment block the German Warmachine .
    If the SU was eliminated,Hitler felt he was secure for a blockade by the US and the UK .
    Hitler's conviction was that Germany was defeated in WWI by a combination of France,Russia,the UK and the US AND by a blockade preventing Germany to obtain raw materials and food,with as result famine . The only possibility for Germany to have enough raw materials and food after 1940 was to buy from the SU,but the SU refused to enter the war at the side of Germany and was rearming;that were indications for Hitler that the SU would choose side,soon or later ,and he had to eliminate the SU before it was to late .
     

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