Well not dealing with Britain springs to mind. As it is well known, without Britain as a enemy then Germany's cities are safe from bombing (from the west). No potential Allied invasion Potentially no war with the USA until a lot further down the line No sideshows like Africa drawing German and Italian forces & materials away from Russia With no need to build a huge UBoat fleet (until later) more material resources can go into tanks & planes No need for the huge expense in men & material for the Atlantic Wall
In Speer's "Inside the Third Reich" he makes the point that Hitler never completely lost his corporal mindset and thus never had a thorough understanding of tactical matters such as supply and logistics - which in the case of the Eastern front would have assumed greater importance as the war progressed. (also in Speer) The Nazi hierarchy was also a set of disjointed fiefdoms and the random power-grabbing nature of senior figures was actively encouraged by Hitler. Of course this is a very inefficient way to conduct a war. So I think Hitler's inability to leave the conduct of the war to the Generals and the purposely shambolic government structure were two big mistakes.
In Speer's "Inside the Third Reich" he makes the point that Hitler never completely lost his corporal mindset and thus never had a thorough understanding of tactical matters such as supply and logistics - which in the case of the Eastern front would have assumed greater importance as the war progressed. It was a Prussian tradition of the General Staff, not corporals' tradition… Ever read Von Clausewitz? There you find how the General Staff thought: brute force is the only thing that matters, to destroy the enemy.
Richard Overy notes in "Why the Allies Won" that the Generalstab never did their logistics planning first. The logistics and quartermaster guys were expected to simply meet the needs of the operational plan, regardless of the situation, circumstances, or realities. Logistics was not as important as arrows on a map. Eric Bergurud put the difference between the American and German way of war better in "Touched With Fire," which is about the ground war in the Pacific, but has vastly useful information about the US Army and its background. He wrote that if the US Army worked for Hitler, the documents for Barbarossa would have been heavy material on railroad timetables, road and truck capacities, high-viscosity oil, and other dull but critical topics. The Americans always approached war starting with logistics. The Germans did not. The Germans planned to fight a series of short, quick, victorious, violent wars. Between them, they would take time off from campaigning to re-stock and re-supply for the next war. Once Britain refused to give in, the Germans were in for a long and continuous war, and soon found they did not have the economic and logistical framework to support a long and continuous war. They used the French oil stocks, for example, to fuel the invasion of Russia. By 1945, German aircraft would be dragged by horsecarts from hangar to flight line, to save avgas.
Originally posted by Kiwiwriter@Jun 15 2005, 01:39 PM Richard Overy notes in "Why the Allies Won" that the Generalstab never did their logistics planning first. The logistics and quartermaster guys were expected to simply meet the needs of the operational plan, regardless of the situation, circumstances, or realities. Logistics was not as important as arrows on a map. Eric Bergurud put the difference between the American and German way of war better in "Touched With Fire," which is about the ground war in the Pacific, but has vastly useful information about the US Army and its background. He wrote that if the US Army worked for Hitler, the documents for Barbarossa would have been heavy material on railroad timetables, road and truck capacities, high-viscosity oil, and other dull but critical topics. The Americans always approached war starting with logistics. The Germans did not. The Germans planned to fight a series of short, quick, victorious, violent wars. Between them, they would take time off from campaigning to re-stock and re-supply for the next war. Once Britain refused to give in, the Germans were in for a long and continuous war, and soon found they did not have the economic and logistical framework to support a long and continuous war. They used the French oil stocks, for example, to fuel the invasion of Russia. By 1945, German aircraft would be dragged by horsecarts from hangar to flight line, to save avgas. [post=35393]Quoted post[/post] This also explains why the Germans were doomed to lose North Africa too. Whilst the addition of one or two extra divisions seem to be a logical idea when talking about what Could have happened in North Africa, the sad fact is that the German's inability to supply its Army properly in the Med. proved critical. This gives Malta and their inability to subdue it a whole new importance. The Germans never got their logistics right from 1941 when they entered a prolonged conflict. From the inability to use the Soviet Railways with their rolling stock to the dependancy on the Rumanian oilfields at Ploesti it all smacked of Haphazard planning. Which pretty much goes to show that the Germans were soo not prepared and for all their efficiency in their fighting ability it was all for naught. Is it any wonder that the Russians believed that of all the Lend Lease items supplied, the most cherished was the American Trucks? such is the power of logistics.
Originally posted by Gotthard Heinrici+Jun 15 2005, 11:10 AM-->(Gotthard Heinrici @ Jun 15 2005, 11:10 AM)</div><div class='quotemain'><!--QuoteBegin-Kiwiwriter@Jun 15 2005, 01:39 PM Richard Overy notes in "Why the Allies Won" that the Generalstab never did their logistics planning first. The logistics and quartermaster guys were expected to simply meet the needs of the operational plan, regardless of the situation, circumstances, or realities. Logistics was not as important as arrows on a map. Eric Bergurud put the difference between the American and German way of war better in "Touched With Fire," which is about the ground war in the Pacific, but has vastly useful information about the US Army and its background. He wrote that if the US Army worked for Hitler, the documents for Barbarossa would have been heavy material on railroad timetables, road and truck capacities, high-viscosity oil, and other dull but critical topics. The Americans always approached war starting with logistics. The Germans did not. The Germans planned to fight a series of short, quick, victorious, violent wars. Between them, they would take time off from campaigning to re-stock and re-supply for the next war. Once Britain refused to give in, the Germans were in for a long and continuous war, and soon found they did not have the economic and logistical framework to support a long and continuous war. They used the French oil stocks, for example, to fuel the invasion of Russia. By 1945, German aircraft would be dragged by horsecarts from hangar to flight line, to save avgas. [post=35393]Quoted post[/post] This also explains why the Germans were doomed to lose North Africa too. Whilst the addition of one or two extra divisions seem to be a logical idea when talking about what Could have happened in North Africa, the sad fact is that the German's inability to supply its Army properly in the Med. proved critical. This gives Malta and their inability to subdue it a whole new importance. The Germans never got their logistics right from 1941 when they entered a prolonged conflict. From the inability to use the Soviet Railways with their rolling stock to the dependancy on the Rumanian oilfields at Ploesti it all smacked of Haphazard planning. Which pretty much goes to show that the Germans were soo not prepared and for all their efficiency in their fighting ability it was all for naught. Is it any wonder that the Russians believed that of all the Lend Lease items supplied, the most cherished was the American Trucks? such is the power of logistics. [post=35396]Quoted post[/post] [/b]This is why the cliche is true: "Amateurs study tactics. Professionals study logistics."
Originally posted by Juanra@Apr 25 2005, 02:46 AM BBC says that the errors were that hitler believed the red army was primitive, [post=33460]Quoted post[/post] Of course invading the Soviet Union was an error. But I think Hitler might have been correct in his view that the Red Army was primitive... especially in 1941.... but his miscalculation was on its resilience, and the fact that Stalin was quite prepared to wipe out an entire generation fighting the Nazi threat. I'm sure that if Hitler had been aware that the Soviet Union was prepared to suffer 15 million military casualties (possibly more than the total men of military age in Germany itself) then he might have reconsidered.
Hitler made many mistakes over the course of his reign but the one that really came back and bit him was his failure to reinforce Paulus' Sixth Army when they were in dire need of supplies in Stalingrad. Paulus had pleaded Hitler for the Luftwaffe to drop a constant amount supplies to help feed the Sixth Army breakout. But the problem was that in order to feed Paulus' Sixth Army there would have needed to be 165 air drops a day. These planes were not in supply and more than half of the Ju52 supply plains were picked off. Now Paulus was surrounded and his troops were dieing and freezing in scores, the chance for the final victory in Russia was lost and Hitlers crucial mistake to under supply Paulus was a pivital point in the Russian victory.
Hitler made many mistakes over the course of his reign but the one that really came back and bit him was his failure to reinforce Paulus' Sixth Army when they were in dire need of supplies in Stalingrad. Paulus had pleaded Hitler for the Luftwaffe to drop a constant amount supplies to help feed the Sixth Army breakout. But the problem was that in order to feed Paulus' Sixth Army there would have needed to be 165 air drops a day. These planes were not in supply and more than half of the Ju52 supply plains were picked off. Now Paulus was surrounded and his troops were dieing and freezing in scores, the chance for the final victory in Russia was lost and Hitlers crucial mistake to under supply Paulus was a pivital point in the Russian victory. Well, this is not entirely Hitler's mistake. This is one example of Hitler actually listening to his advisors and generals. The Luftwaffe High Command, Reichsmarschall Göring (C.-in-C.) and Generaloberst Jeschonnek (Chief of Staff), told Hitler that it could be done, that Paulus would get his 300 tons a-day. Then, the Führer gave green light and ordered Paulus to stay where he was (though it is very dubtious that, if given the order to withdraw, his forces would have been capable of doing so successfully).
I believe that from an ideological standpoint Hitler (or indeed the whole National Socialist Ideology) was doomed to failure from the outset. Whilst Hitler came to power democratically (in theory) and was popular in Germany, this would not (and did not) continue. The entire Goverment of Germany and its ever increasing empire was ruled by oppression and fear and not by consent and this situation was worsoning as the war progressed, as witnessed perhaps by the attempts on his life. Very many of the sycophants that surrounded Hitler were morally flawed or possibly psychopathic and fled from the "bunker" when things started going wrong - and indeed were not prepared to die for their ideology and would I believe have deserted him sooner or later. If Hitler made a mistake it was believing that an ideology based on such morally flawed principles would endure, a mistake which left him with no choice other than to take his own life at 56! Chris.
The entire Goverment of Germany and its ever increasing empire was ruled by oppression and fear and not by consent and this situation was worsoning as the war progressed, as witnessed perhaps by the attempts on his life. Well, not entirely. At least, not after 1943, when the Stalingrad débâcle couldn't be disguised and when material hardships and the bombings started affecting the bulk of the population, the régime's only support was its repression machinery. The 'Hitler Myth' didn't entirely crumbled until this date, but from 1938 until 1942 it remained at its peak. That's why the German 'resistance' didn't attempt anything back then. But the German totalitarian State was based on popular consent and wide collaboration. Otherwise, how could the Gestapo with its 35.000-50.000 men watch over 60.000.000 people and effectively isolate the Jewish population, get rid of the political opposition and closely guard the population's sexual behaviour? The truth is that the enormous wave of massive denunciation and delation of 'crimes' did the job. Only until late 1943 the number of denounces decreased (but didn't stop at all, even if by the time, the punishments had became far harsher). Totalitarian societies are ruled from above, but work from below.
In my opinion Hitlers biggest mistake was invading Poland in September 1939 which started World War II. Obviously another mistake was stabbing the Soviets in the back with Operation "Barbarossa" the invasion of The Soviet Union which meant The Germans were fighting a war on two fronts West and now East. Hitler got too greedy too fast.
Originally posted by Friedrich H@Jul 5 2005, 06:59 PM The entire Goverment of Germany and its ever increasing empire was ruled by oppression and fear and not by consent and this situation was worsoning as the war progressed, as witnessed perhaps by the attempts on his life. Well, not entirely. At least, not after 1943, when the Stalingrad débâcle couldn't be disguised and when material hardships and the bombings started affecting the bulk of the population, the régime's only support was its repression machinery. The 'Hitler Myth' didn't entirely crumbled until this date, but from 1938 until 1942 it remained at its peak. That's why the German 'resistance' didn't attempt anything back then. But the German totalitarian State was based on popular consent and wide collaboration. Otherwise, how could the Gestapo with its 35.000-50.000 men watch over 60.000.000 people and effectively isolate the Jewish population, get rid of the political opposition and closely guard the population's sexual behaviour? The truth is that the enormous wave of massive denunciation and delation of 'crimes' did the job. Only until late 1943 the number of denounces decreased (but didn't stop at all, even if by the time, the punishments had became far harsher). Totalitarian societies are ruled from above, but work from below. [post=36152]Quoted post[/post] Very much so. I would add that many people continued to believe the "Hitler Myth until 1945. The invaders found heavy resistance right up to the Reichstag, mostly from three groups: Hitler Youth/cadets, who had been infused with Nazi propaganda from the start; SS men, who were also fanatics by definition; and renegade members of the German "Foreign Legions" who had nowhere to go. They could die in battle, die in a Russian POW camp, or die on the gallows after being found guilty of treason by their rejected homelands. Many of them chose to die in the ruins of Berlin.
(was Hitler a fan of Plato, by any chance?) Not so much a fan of Plato more a fan of Nietzsche, who was classically trained and therefore would have both studied and absorbed in the teachings contained in platonic texts. However, Hitler and the nazis took two basic ideas of Nietzsche "Will to Power" and Obermench" and corrupted them to suit there own needs
Not so much a fan of Plato more a fan of Nietzsche, who was classically trained and therefore would have both studied and absorbed in the teachings contained in platonic texts. However, Hitler and the nazis took two basic ideas of Nietzsche "Will to Power" and Obermench" and corrupted them to suit there own needs Of course, they absorbed the most megalomaniac ideas of Nietzsche. But they just ignored that in which he said that Germany would conquer the world with the help of the Slav's brute force and the Jewish's capital… I highly recommend T. L. Jarman's Rise and Fall of Nazi Germany for a ideological-philosophical analysis of the III Reich.
"Hitler, now there was a painter. He could paint an entire apartment in one afternoon, TWO COATS!" - The Producers
