Originally posted by Gotthard Heinrici@Sep 23 2005, 03:18 PM Jimbo, I understand your reference and am glad of this discussion but it might be useful to check out further references that support your posts and present them. I am enjoying this discussion!! Alright folks, follow the bouncing ball. I didn't come up with this "view" (although I stand corrected, it was not an “SS” Panzer division, still is this material to the point?). I even posted the link to the History Channel documentary that will air again and you can contend with it. That part is not Jimbo's opinion, but rather the folks that carried out the missions. I think I did fair for having to remember the details of a documentary I had seen over a year and a half prior. As far as the recent viewing of the documentary, I had the benefit of watching it with my tail still smoking from the lashes it took from those that identified themselves as experts. If the documentary interviews one of the pilots that flew the mission, and shows the footage of the bombing mission as he voiceovers, and tells the audience their object was for the mission was to break communications and access to the beachhead through Caen, and that Ike ordered it, I am inclined to take him at his word, more so than another historian that is writing it as a retrospective as a composite of hearsay. When one of the commanders of 21st Panzer describes the fact that they had to climb under their tanks for being attacked by fighter/bombers because they were forced to go around the city, and it says they did not arrive at the beaches until 16:00 hours and that it was “too late”, then I am inclined to believe that too. It’s true that the B-26 is not a heavy bomber (it’s a medium bomber) but I was closer calling them B-17s than the folks that were there claiming they were Halifaxes. They were the same color and had a white star on the sides. Also, in the footage, the voiceover of the Panzer commander said “we were very disappointed, we thought our tanks were very good, but we lost 5 in less than ten minutes”, then I am also inclined to believe his tanks were not French tanks. Especially since they show what appears to be him standing near a Panther (Panzer V) in some footage. My mistakes on secondary details (like the fact they were not SS Panzers or were medium bombers instead of heavies) not withstanding, what I have posted here was what the History Channel has presented on the D-Day invasion, not my imagination. 21st Panzer was not sent because of the airborne drop but the airborne drop was sent because of 21st Panzer. The panzer commander said they retreated behind Caen because they were afraid of encirclement, not because of their destuction by Monty. Monty and his troops (what I referred to as “Monty and the gang”) would probably have been decimated if the Panzers had gotten to them on the beach in time. Bradley states that in "A Soldiers Story". So, you put two and two together and you can see they reason they didn’t get to the beach in time is because of the bombing of Caen, ergo making the bombing in Normandy “not" counterproductive, which was the original question posted on this thread right? Am I not at least partially vindicated here?
I thought that i would add this to the debate, it comes from Harris's own war dispatch PP26-7 Attacks on Troop and Armour Concentrations in the Battle Area 130. It was at this stage, also, that for the first time my heavy bombers were called upon to give direct support to the army by striking at enemy troop concentrations in the battle area. On the night of 14/I5th June, 1,168 tons of bombs were dropped on the road junction of Aunay-sur-Odon, 18 miles south of Bayeux, where Army Intelligence reported a concentration of enemy motor transport and troops. The road junction, the village, and anything of military importance which it may have contained, were entirely obliterated. Equal success was achieved at Evrecy on the same night. 131. Further operations of this type were called for at critical periods throughout the battle in Normandy. On 30th June, for instance, it was reported that 2nd and 9th S.S. Panzer Divisions were moving up to the fighting zone through Villers Bocage. This locality was the enemy's general supply point for the area and a road centre very difficult to by-pass. More than 1,100 tons of bombs dropped with great accuracy in a daylight attack by this Command blocked all roads and cratered the whole target area, preventing the attack by the S.S. Divisions which had been planned for that night. 132. A week later, in spite of pressure from the 1st Canadian and 2nd British Armies, the enemy still maintained his " hinge " position at Caen. A further Bomber Command attack was therefore called for against troop positions and strongpoints in the Caen area on 7th July. Four hundred and fifty-seven heavy bombers dropped in daylight 2,350 tons of H.E. in the space of 38 minutes. 133. The number of enemy troops killed in this attack was apparently not great, but all reports from prisoners showed that the morale effect was shattering. There was great confusion in the enemy lines and complete loss of offensive power. (After one such bombing attack it was said that a division was without food or supplies for a whole day.) It cannot be doubted that if the army had been able to follow up immediately this air bombardment in the Caen area the enemy would have been found in a state of chaos. As it was, even though our armour did not begin their limited advance until the following morning, the opposition was still so broken and confused that the first objectives were taken with the minimum loss of life to the attackers. 134. It was soon after this attack that the Chief of Ops. and Plans, A.E.A.F., expressed the view (13th July, 1944) that the Army had in the past rarely taken advantage on the immediate front of heavy bombing assistance, and that it also appeared, from enemy reports, that they were failing to exploit our continuing air attacks on enemy rail communications. The latter were depriving the enemy's fighting troops of fuel and motor transport, seriously delaying his reinforcements, and causing a serious wastage of his armour by compelling it to make long road journeys. The Chief of Ops. and Plans considered that, unless the Army took advantage of these attacks, the air effort expended might be better employed on a return to attacks on German industries and the main bottle-necks of his flying-bomb organisation. (A.E.A.F. Operations Record Book.) Nevertheless Bomber Command was required to continue attacks on French rail communications until mid-August, and to be ready to blast a way for the Army through the enemy's lines practically whenever serious resistance was offered to our advance. 135. On 18th July a combined effort, including U.S. Eighth Air Force and' A.E.A.F. was called for against three groups of enemy forces and installations to assist the 2nd Army advance south of Caen. Bomber Command despatched more than 1,000 sorties, contributing 5,000 out of the total of 6,800 tons of bombs dropped in this operation. As an indication of the effect of these attacks, the Bombing Analysis Unit found that a concentration of German tanks consisting of a Panzer Company with some Battalion H.Q. vehicles dispersed in an orchard was completely knocked out and ceased to exist as a fighting unit.* At the most only two tanks escaped serious bomb damage, and even if these had in fact been able to move under their own power (which is doubtful) they would have been unable to leave the area owing to the density of the craters. It was considered that a high proportion of the German personnel present during the attack became casualties. Large numbers of Germans suffering from shock and wandering about helplessly, were picked up by our troops in the other areas attacked on the same occasion. 136. In all there were eight occasions during the three months' battle in Northern France when this type of attack was called for, and some 17,560 tons were dropped on concentrations of German troops in the battle-field between D-Day and the middle of August. 137. But this was not by any means the limit of Bomber Command's assistance to the land forces. The by-passed coastal strongholds of Havre, Brest, He de Cezembre (part of the defences of St. Malo), Boulogne, Calais, and Cap Gris Nez, were all occupied with the help of the heavy bombers of my Command. The importance to the enemy of denying our armies the use of these places was so great that he was prepared to sacrifice their garrisons to the last man. Le Havre was bombed seven times a week, and altogether 9,750 tons of bombs were dropped on the defended areas of the port. This resulted in the capture by the Army of its garrison of 11,000 men for a loss of 50 soldiers. One attack by 762 bombers, which dropped 3,347 tons of H.E.—was sufficient at Boulogne, which surrendered with 8,000 prisoners within a week. Calais was bombed six times, receiving a total of some 8,000 tons of H.E., with a similar result. Brest was bombed by U.S. heavies as well as our own, and action was co-ordinated with the naval plan of the period, principally concerned with preventing the escape of enemy surface and underwater vessels, and the sinking of any vessels which might be used as blockships. 138. At the end of September two attacks were made on the defended area and gun positions at Cap Gris Nez. After some 3,700 tons of bombs were dropped, the Army was able to mop up the positions "and the Straits of Dover were opened. Dover and other south coast towns were thus relieved of the sporadic shell-fire they had endured for years. 139. The coming of autumn found these operations nearing completion and the Germans on the run everywhere, except at the mouth of the Scheldt, from which position they controlled the entrance to the port of Antwerp. Bomber Command was again called in to bomb them out of the island fortress of Walcheren.
What I find so odd is that the younger people of today will beleive the book that has been written, with much of their copy being quoted from previous books, some of it complete and utter rubbish. Yet find it difficult to come to terms with the Veterans version? very odd. What it amounts to is this. Quotations and written documents are more valid that the version of those that were there, and went through the experience. For their information? I have read books that were so completely and utterly wrong..not just about small matters, but the whole damn thing. In one book, I read the Canadians landed on Sword Beach amd there was no Thrid British Infantry Div that did land first, one of only two that came in first 50 div and Third Div came first... the third to land was the Canadians on Juno. In some books that is not even mentioned? BOOKS? Sapper
Morse's post of Air Marshal Harris' notes, corroborates much of what my summary of the documentary had stated. For instance the RAF didn’t bomb anything until a little more than a week after D-Day. They didn’t bomb Caen until July 7th a month after D-Day. This agrees with what I said in the original post. I believe that I got only two points wrong in the original statement and that they were somewhat trivial. The Panzer Division in route to the beach landings, that would have taken out the British and Canadian beach assaults, were not SS but they were still a Panzer division, intending to move through Caen to gain quick access to those beaches. The other slightly incorrect statement is that it was not B-17s Forts of the US Eighth AAF but rather B-26s Marauders of the US Ninth AAF. Also, the initial bombing of Caen was indeed ordered by Ike as Monty was not even off the beaches yet and had no clue was was coming his way on the other side of Caen. In addition, one would think that the bombing of Caen that happened a month later would not have had many additional civilian casualties as most civilians would have fled the city either when the minute the assault on the beaches started or at least after the first bombing on that day. You certainly wouldn't wait for the armies to seige your city before you fled. (of course some would just like some people would have insist on staying put just like some people stay at the epicenter of a category 5 cyclone instead of leaving the city like they were repeatedly warned for three days). Now, if you are a panzer commander and were blocked from by buildings destroyed in a bombing attack, such that you had to go around it and this circumventing of the city made you too late to accomplish your objective of repelling the beach assault, would you care that the city had been destroyed from B-26s versus B-17s or what Air group they came from? I doubt you would care; therefore these two points though technically wrong were completely immaterial to my original point that success of the air strike against Caen had saved the beach landings and that the Panzers had to go around Caen, where they were then subjected to brutal fighter/bomber strikes. If you think taking a beach is difficult against infantry alone, try coming ashore with a Panzer division in assault of you as well. Having not been in war, I can’t imagine how fearsome it is to troops in the open facing a heavy tank assault, but I think it is safe to speculate that it would tend to greatly impede one’s progress, if not something much worse. Shermans out in the open firing up hills at panzers, mostly hidden, would have had very little success. Hidden panzers, firing downhill at exposed Shermans, would have had a very easy day at the office. Once all the Shermans were gone, the infantry would have found it slightly more difficult to assault the beach than if the panzers weren't there. Would every soldier have been killed on the beach? I don't know for sure, but I think it is also safe to say that it would have been a massacre and would have resembled Dunkirk more than the D-Day scenario we have all come to love and admire for the gutsy service those folks performed. I believe most people would agree that the Allies were most vulnerable while on the beaches. Also if 21st Panzer had been mostly French tanks I doubt they could have withstood Monty’s Shermans for over a couple of days much less over a month.
Originally posted by jimbotosome@Sep 24 2005, 04:26 PM Morse's post of Air Marshal Harris' notes, corroborates much of what my summary of the documentary had stated. For instance the RAF didn’t bomb anything until a little more than a week after D-Day. [post=39398]Quoted post[/post] Harris is only speaking for Bomber Command. 2nd TAF had 88 medium bombers and 160 light bombers under command and many of their 1006 fighters were in fact fighter-bombers. They were certainly in action. 2nd TAF was not under Harris' command. Actually, throughout June, Bomber Command continued to bomb invasion related targets as well as strategic targets, but they did not bomb tactical targets in the Neptune/Overlord operational area. On the question of 21st Panzer's equipment, they did indeed have Panzer IVs, but like most Panzer divisions they had a mixture of other types too. I have never seen any evidence though that they had any Panzer Vs and much of what they did have was reconditioned and salvaged, including French equipment. This doies not mean that they were ineffective, but it does mean that the Germans were struggling to equip their forces by this time.
First of all Jimbo, we know that the RAF took part in the operation by heavy bombers to destroy the network of transprt in Northern France. Indeed Harris is reported to have been more co-operative than Spaatz in the execution of the plans. BTW, here is the 21st Panzer's order of battle: 21st Panzer Division HQ HQ: 1 HQ Platoon in Staff Car (Generalleutnant Feuchtinger) G1: Major Heeringer G2: Hauptmann Vorster G3: Major Frhr. v. Berlichingen, until the end of August, then Major Scharnhorst G4: Major Frhr. v. Luedinghausen Recon: 1 SMG Motorcycle Platoon Division Security Company: 2 SMG Platoons in Sdkfz 251/1, 1 PAK40 & Tractor Nebelwerfer batterie : 1 SP Nebelwerfer /Somua half-track Panzer Reg’t 22 (Oberst von Oppeln-Bronikowski) Reg’t HQ: 1 HQ Pz IVH, 1 Recon Pz IIIL/M Flak Ko.:3 2cm AA & Tractors (by June, use 3 Flakpanzer 38) I. Panzer Abt, : (Hauptmann von Gottberg) (Rate as Regular until July, then Veteran) 1 HQ Pz IVH, 1 Recon Pz IIIL/M 4 Tank Kompanien, each: 3 Pz IVH Flak Ko.:3 2cm SPAA, 1 SP 7.5cm PAK 40 on GW H39 II. Panzer Abt, : (Major Vierzig) April: 1 HQ Pz IVH, 1 Recon Bef. Somua 5. Ko.: 1 Pz IVH, 1 Pz IVG 6. Ko.: 1 Pz IVH, 2 Somua 7. Ko.: 1 Pz IVH, 2 Somua 8. Ko.: 2 Somua, 1 Hotchkiss SPAT (PaK 40) June: All Ko. strength 1-2 PzIVH, 1 Ko. should be represented by MkIV Ausf C/G July (near EPSON): II. Abt. left for Grafenwoehr, Germany for refit to Panthers Abt. converted to Panthers 7 Aug, 1944 Panzer Grenadier Reg’t 125 (Major von Luck) (Rate as Regular until July, then Veteran) Regimental HQ: 1 HQ in Sdkfz 251/1 1 Engineer Zug : 1 Engineer (Rifles/Flame-thrower) in Truck 1 Aufklarung Zug: 1 SMG on Motorcycles 1 Infantry Gun Ko.: 1 150mm SP Gun (Gesch Pz sFH 13 Lorraine) 1 PanzerJager Ko.:1 PaK 40 & Truck 1 Nebelwerfer Ko.: 1 SP Reihenwerfer Somua (20-barrelled tiered mortar launcher on Somua MCG or MCL half-track) 1 Gepanzert Abt (Major Liehr) with: Bttn HQ: 1 HQ Platoon in Sdkfz 251/1 3 Infantry Kompanien each with: 3 Rifle Platoons in le SPW 107 (Unic Half-track) 1 Heavy Weapons Ko. with: 1 75mm SPAT (Gesch lgkw Somua. PaK 40 on Somua MCG S 307 half-track), and 1 Gesch lgkw P107 Flak 1 Motorized Abt (Hauptmann Kurzow {KIA 7 June},Major Kurz) with: Bttn HQ: 1 HQ in Truck 3 Infantry Kompanien each with: 3 Rifle Platoons in Trucks 1 Heavy Weapons Ko. with: 1 75mm SPAT (Gesch lgkw Somua. PaK 40 on Somua MCG S 307 half-track), and 1 Gesch lgkw P107 Flak Panzer Grenadier Reg’t 192 (Oberstleutnant Josef Rauch) (Rate as Regular until July, then Veteran) Use same organization as above. One bttn is Gepanzert, one bttn is Motorized (Major Zippe). Panzer-Jaeger Abt 200 (Major Becker) Bttn HQ: 1 HQ Stand in Half-track 3 Batteries each with: 2 88mm ATG & French Laffly Tractors. Prior to June, organized as two 3-stand batteries. Panzer Artillerie Reg’t 155 (Oberst Huehne) Regimental HQ: 1 HQ Platoon in Beob Pz Lorraine I. Abt with: 2 122mm Howitzers (horse-drawn), 1 105mm Howitzer & Tractor II. Abt with: 3 10.5 cm Gesch Pz le FH 18 Lorraine (SP) (#5 Btty lost its guns by June 27-use one stand of infantry instead) III. Abt with: 2 10.5 cm Gesch Pz le FH 18 Lorraine (SP), 1 15.0 cm Gesch Pz sFH 13 Lorraine, 1 SP 107 "Stalinorgel" Heeres FLAK Abt 305 (Major Ohlendorf) Abt HQ: 1 HQ in Truck 2 Heavy Batteries each with: 1 88/56mm & Tractor and 1 20mm Flak SdKfz 10/4 1 Medium Battery with: 1 Quad 20mm Flak SdKfz 7/1 , 1 20mm Flak SdKfz 10/4 Panzer Aufklärungs Abt 21 (Major Waldow {KIA 9 June}, Major Brandt) Abt Staff : 1 HQ in 250/1, 1 8.0 cm 250/7 (from 3,4 Ko.), 1 75mm 250/8 1 Ko.: 3 SdKfz 250/9, 1 SdKfz 250/1 2 Ko.: 1 50mm armed AC, 1 75mm armed AC, 3 light AC 3 Ko.: 1 Inf stand in leSPW, 1 3.7cm AT gun & Tractor, 1 SP 3.7cm PAK 35/36 on Infanterie Schlepper UE 630(f) or 251/10 4 Ko.: 3 Inf stands in leSPW, 1 3.7 cm AT gun & Tractor 5 Ko.: 3 Inf stands in leSPW, 1 SP 3.7cm gun (as above), 1 250/7 Panzer Pionier Abt 220 (Major Hoegl) Abt HQ: 1 HQ in Truck 1 8.0 cm 250/7 (from 1,2,3 Ko.) 1. Armoured Assault Ko: 3 Pionier Platoons (Rifles/Flame-throwers) in 251/1 2. Armoured Assault Ko: 3 Pionier Platoons (Rifles/Flame-throwers) in 251/1 3 Motorized Ko. with: 3 Pionier Platoons (Rifles/Flame-throwers) in Trucks 4.Bridging Column: 1 Large Bridge (60t)/Trailer, Pionier Platoon & Truck Sturmgeschutz Abt 200 (Major Becker) (Rate as Veteran) Abt HQ:1 HQ Fu Pz P107, 1 PAK 40 & Truck, 2 SP 4.7cm PaK (t) auf Renault 35.R. 4 Batteries, each of 1 7.5cm PAK 40 on GW H39, 1 10.5 cm lFH 16 or 18 on GW H39 Division combat losses: 6 June, 1944: 16 tanks lost. 8 June, 1944: 70 out of 124 Mk IVs operational after air attacks. Staffordshire Yeomanry AT and artillery get 13 more. 6 June to 8 July losses as total write-offs were 54 Pz IVs. 1 August, 1944: Pz Mk IVs down to 42 vehicles. 10 August, 1944: First contact with American troops. 22 August: "The strengths of the companies of the Panzer Grenadier Regiments were only 40-50 men. Artillery, assault gun units, and AA units had lost 2/3 of their weapons owing to the fire of the enemy" Note 10 below. 25 August,1944: Division down to 12 tanks. Late September,1944, Rgt. 192 was down to 240 men (including the attached Luftwaffe Field Bttn) 1 October-11 November: Deployed on a 52-km broad front, the averages in combat forces in the area of the Vosges each day: 15 Mk IVs 4-5 light field howitzers with SP carriages 9 Batteries of 3 guns, among them 3 batteries with heavy howitzer "18" 2 Batteries with 88 AA guns 6-8 AT guns (88s) 10 At guns (75s) "The number of weapons was never greater than this but often considerably lower owing to losses". Pg 24 (see note 10 below). This corroborates Angies description of 21st Panzer Division as being of a division made up of scrap materials. Sapper, and I say this with the utmost respect, what materials are we meant to reference if books are so distorted?? Surely you can point to some literature that is not biased in any way? You surely are not asking me to accept only the eyewitness accounts that are left? If that is the case why hace a discussion? I have the utmost respect for you but as such I am also entitled to quesation your sources, as you are mine. That is the way historians work. And as you have dismissed anny books on the subjest I am waiting with enthusiasm your list of sources which we should look up and use for research I await your reply Gerard
Originally posted by Gotthard Heinrici+Sep 24 2005, 10:47 PM-->(Gotthard Heinrici @ Sep 24 2005, 10:47 PM)</div><div class='quotemain'>First of all Jimbo, we know that the RAF took part in the operation by heavy bombers to destroy the network of transprt in Northern France. [/b] I didn’t say that the RAF didn’t take part in heavy bombing. Harris said that his heavies didn’t strike until June 14. That’s not my opinion, it was his. I am not going to infer he was lying. The whole issue was that I was “corrected” that there were no US bombers in the bombing of Caen, that it was all RAF and it was Halifaxes (heavies). But, the documentary I referenced that you may all watch and make up your own mind if the flight commander that took the footage of his B-26s in the June 6th bombing is lying. I am not prepared to call him a liar either. For some reason, one which I have no clue why, the folks claiming to be there insisted that didn’t know what I was talking about, but I didn’t make it up, I basically took the word of the people that were at Caen (either in the air or in a panzer) rather than those that were still on the beaches. Nothing personal. Originally posted by Gotthard Heinrici@Sep 24 2005, 10:47 PM Indeed Harris is reported to have been more co-operative than Spaatz in the execution of the plans. Now that is a dubious claim. I am not aware of Harris and Spaatz not getting along. One bombed at night and one bombed during the day. The main differences between them is that Harris’ doctrine was to attack civilian populations in order to force a surrender and Spaatz’s doctrine was to destroy the Luftwaffe first. Originally posted by Gotthard Heinrici@Sep 24 2005, 10:47 PM This corroborates Angies description of 21st Panzer Division as being of a division made up of scrap materials. Impressive list you posted. Gerard, I have no personal quarrel with that. I just pointed out to Angie that if 21st Panzer were indeed scrap metal and wimpy French tanks, the tank commanders didn’t know it and were shocked that fighter bombers could so easily annihilate them because as they said “they thought their tanks were very good”. They saw French tanks mercilessly blown up by Stukas at Dunkirk, so I don’t think that seeing them blown up when they were in them would have been such a revelation, but should have rather been expected. In addition, I also pointed out to Angie that if this Panzer group was made up of “scrap metal” and patch jobs, that this makeshift panzer division managed to hold Monty’s entire groups and armor bogged down for a whole month. If that’s ok with her, it is certainly ok with me. Originally posted by Gotthard Heinrici@Sep 24 2005, 10:47 PM Sapper, and I say this with the utmost respect, what materials are we meant to reference if books are so distorted?? Surely you can point to some literature that is not biased in any way? I am sure there are some but since there are such manifest contradictions, I don’t know how someone would objectively determine that, at least not on a consistent basis. You figure out a good way to determine the true authority on any given issue, I would be glad to hear it friend. Originally posted by Gotthard Heinrici@Sep 24 2005, 10:47 PM You surely are not asking me to accept only the eyewitness accounts that are left? If that is the case why hace a discussion? I think the issue is that I am more inclined to quote the testimony of the major players versus books often written on rumor, hearsay and in gross retrospect. Sometimes you have to accept the book’s version if the testimony is in stark contrast to conventional wisdom. For instance, if a veteran said the troops landed on D-Day at Calais instead of Normandy, I would probably believe the books. If someone on the beach at Normandy said the water was up to his chest and the book said it was up to his knees, I would believe the person that was there over the book. What I am finding is that in the absence of such incontrovertable testimony, the books are often in contradiction of each other leaving you with a majority view prevailing which may or may not be the correct one. Sometimes you don’t even have that. <!--QuoteBegin-Gotthard Heinrici@Sep 24 2005, 10:47 PM I have the utmost respect for you but as such I am also entitled to quesation your sources, as you are mine. That is the way historians work. And as you have dismissed anny books on the subjest I am waiting with enthusiasm your list of sources which we should look up and use for research I don’t take your request for my sources as disrespectful, you can question my sources all you want. I am not averse to being challenged. Redcoat has challenged me on quite a few things and proved me wrong. As far as my sources, I have been trying to post them lately on anything I state, but not on things that are obviously my opinion. I posted the link in a previous post in this thread to the History Channel program web site where I saw this documentary twice including once a few days ago. I don’t know if you get the History Channel where you are, since I don’t know where you are. It is on in the UK and in the US which is why I posted that source so others could watch it and judge for themselves.
I didn’t say that the RAF didn’t take part in heavy bombing. Harris said that his heavies didn’t strike until June 14. That’s not my opinion, it was his. I am not going to infer he was lying. Harris was reporting on the time when he came under ther OPCon of Overlord, the attacks on the transport system came earlier. I feel an article cominng on! Quick nurse the screens!
Originally posted by jimbotosome+Sep 25 2005, 06:21 AM-->(jimbotosome @ Sep 25 2005, 06:21 AM)</div><div class='quotemain'>I am not aware of Harris and Spaatz not getting along. One bombed at night and one bombed during the day. The main differences between them is that Harris’ doctrine was to attack civilian populations in order to force a surrender and Spaatz’s doctrine was to destroy the Luftwaffe first. [/b] I think the British and American "bomber barons" got on fine with each other, because whatever their differences in doctrine and approach, they all set out to prove that strategic bombing could win the war in itself. As it happens, they were wrong. Both Harris and Spaatz opposed the use of their forces in invasion related tasks, but they had to do it when ordered. All the evidence suggests that Harris did it with better grace and enthusiasm than Spaatz. It is not, however, a major issue. <!--QuoteBegin-jimbotosome@Sep 25 2005, 06:21 AM I also pointed out to Angie that if this Panzer group was made up of “scrap metal” and patch jobs, that this makeshift panzer division managed to hold Monty’s entire groups and armor bogged down for a whole month. If that’s ok with her, it is certainly ok with me. We were only talking about D-day, when 21 Pz was the only Panzer Division in action. 12 SS Pz (Hitlerjugend) was in action on the British/Canadian front on 7 June, Panzer Lehr shortly after that and then a number of other Panzer divisions during the month. The bulk of the Panzer divisions were deployed on the British/Canadian front. It was very much what Red Army doctrine called a "joining battle", where initial contact is between fairly small numbers, but other units quickly join on both sides. Finally, the concluding part of Gottard's post was addressed to Sapper. While reserving the right to challenge your sources, just as you can challenge our's, I don't think we are questioning your use of sources. Some sources are less reliable than others though and by reading a variety of them you build up a body of knowledge which allows you to grade the reliability of material. I must admit though that I would not willingly sit down to read yet another Normandy campaign book.
Originally posted by angie999+Sep 25 2005, 10:16 AM-->(angie999 @ Sep 25 2005, 10:16 AM)</div><div class='quotemain'>Originally posted by jimbotosome@Sep 25 2005, 06:21 AM I am not aware of Harris and Spaatz not getting along. One bombed at night and one bombed during the day. The main differences between them is that Harris’ doctrine was to attack civilian populations in order to force a surrender and Spaatz’s doctrine was to destroy the Luftwaffe first. <!--QuoteBegin-jimbotosome@Sep 25 2005, 06:21 AM I also pointed out to Angie that if this Panzer group was made up of “scrap metal” and patch jobs, that this makeshift panzer division managed to hold Monty’s entire groups and armor bogged down for a whole month. If that’s ok with her, it is certainly ok with me. We were only talking about D-day, when 21 Pz was the only Panzer Division in action. 12 SS Pz (Hitlerjugend) was in action on the British/Canadian front on 7 June, Panzer Lehr shortly after that and then a number of other Panzer divisions during the month. The bulk of the Panzer divisions were deployed on the British/Canadian front. It was very much what Red Army doctrine called a "joining battle", where initial contact is between fairly small numbers, but other units quickly join on both sides. Finally, the concluding part of Gottard's post was addressed to Sapper. While reserving the right to challenge your sources, just as you can challenge our's, I don't think we are questioning your use of sources. Some sources are less reliable than others though and by reading a variety of them you build up a body of knowledge which allows you to grade the reliability of material. I must admit though that I would not willingly sit down to read yet another Normandy campaign book. [post=39418]Quoted post[/post] [/b]Sorry Jimbo, I didnt make myself clear in my earlier post. When I referred to Harris and Spaatz and their level of co-operation, I was not referring their co-operation with each other, but towards the Transportation Plan, one of the most contentious issues of the campaign, And I think the origin of this thread!! As regards Panzer Forces on D-Day well the only panzer formation engaged with the Allies that day was 21st Panzer. As angie has said, this formation may have been the initial counter but was by no means the only Panzer formation engaged in holding back Montgomery's forces.
Richard Rohmer wrote in his book, Patton’s Gap, At first light on 18 July about 1,100 heavy bombers of Bomber Command and 600 of VIII United States Air Force attacked the target area to the east and south of the Orne from Colombelles southwest to Faubourg de Vaucelles dropping delayed fused bombs on the flanks of the frontage of attack and on strong points and concentration areas in the rear. They were followed by about 400 medium bombers which came in from 07:00 to 07:45 hours…..
Originally posted by angie999+Sep 25 2005, 05:16 AM-->(angie999 @ Sep 25 2005, 05:16 AM)</div><div class='quotemain'>Both Harris and Spaatz opposed the use of their forces in invasion related tasks, but they had to do it when ordered. All the evidence suggests that Harris did it with better grace and enthusiasm than Spaatz. [/b] That probably has to do with whether your source was a British or an American historian. Just as the British historians painted Patton out of control and Monty as the hero, so did the American historians paint Monty as out of control and Patton as the hero. <!--QuoteBegin-angie999@Sep 25 2005, 05:16 AM We were only talking about D-day, when 21 Pz was the only Panzer Division in action. 12 SS Pz (Hitlerjugend) was in action on the British/Canadian front on 7 June, Panzer Lehr shortly after that and then a number of other Panzer divisions during the month. The bulk of the Panzer divisions were deployed on the British/Canadian front. It was very much what Red Army doctrine called a "joining battle", where initial contact is between fairly small numbers, but other units quickly join on both sides. Funny you mentioned that. I bought General Bradley’s autobiography “A General’s Life”. It is a large book and has a lot of detail. I find it a much better book than “A Soldiers Story”. He addresses lots of the claims by historians in it which is nice. I saw on another thread where someone posted the issue of whether the capture of Caen was a D-Day objective or just the road to Caen. It was the most important objective. Bradley said that “a bolder faster thrust by the British 3rd and the Canadian 3rd Divisions would certainly have gained Caen, and with the help of the 6th Parachute Division might have led to encirclement and annihilation of 21st Panzer. Historian Liddell Hart blamed the missed opportunity on “the excessive caution of the commanders on the spot, at a time when there was hardly anything to stop them". The official British Army historian (Hansen) criticized the failure to gain Caen on D-Day as “partially due to the pace at which the assault divisions’ operations were carried out”. He expounds that Caen is only eight miles from the shore and could only have taken the day if they had moved rapidly and there was little evidence of urgency. Bradley said that there was slight or indifferent opposition with no more than 15000 troops along with 21st Panzer which was blocked and about 3000 in reserve against three infantry divisions and one airborne division at Caen/Bayeux (83,000 men). He also said the Northern and Northeastern approaches were “wide open” because the 21st Panzer was tied up being engaged at the Orne Rive. Bradley corroborates the claim by the History Channel documentary that 21st Panzer didn’t get into attack position until 4pm as well as the fact that they were late because Caen was congested from the bombing. Days after he had the opportunity to study Demsey’s D-Day operations. He said he was “keenly disappointed”. You and I had a discussion going where I said I would have to research a little more because I remember reading in “A Soldiers Story” that Patton (Haislip) Argentan ordered by Bradley. I found that in his autobiography. You had argued that they were afraid to face the retreating Panzers head on. That’s not what Bradley says. He said he had to halt them because they were in no man’s land waiting for the Canadians to close the gap. In fact, Patton had ordered Haislip to push slowly in the direction of Falaise and he went 8 miles from the Argentan line only 6 miles from the Canadian front. He did this without Bradley’s ok and Bradley ordered him back to Argentan. Bradley was furious because Patton had violated the Allied agreement. He said that he withdrew them back to Argentan because the “bomb lines” were getting close since it was used to prepare the area ahead of the Canadians and he was also afraid of friendly artillery exchanges. Bradley was furious at Monty’s unrealistic faith in the inexperienced Canadians and his failure to reinforce them with the battle hardened British divisions and especially armor divisions. Bradley said that Patton fuming over being stopped, wrote in his diary that he believed that the order had originated from Monty. Bradley said it was his decision alone and that Ike backed him on it. They expected Monty to reinforce the Canadians but it didn’t happen until Aug 14 and fulfill their part of the agreement. But, Bradley said that the reports of Germans that escaped reported by historians are “egregiously wrong”. He said the Germans had not yet withdrawn any substantial numbers of troops and the troops that did withdraw were non-combatants and other non-essential forces. The order to withdraw was not given until Aug 16. Hitler would not let Von Kluge withdraw still believing in the failed counterattack of the Americans at Mortain. So he rebuts the claim that the "Falaise Gap" resulted in a significant loss of trapped combatants.
Jimbo, I do not think we should discuss the Caen question on this topic, which is supposed to be about use of heavy bombers, but you could copy your post over to the "Monty before Caen" topic at: http://www.ww2talk.com/index.php?showtopic=2118 I would just add that I personally would not trust the writings of any of the commanders, particularly Montgomery and Bradley, for my views on this (or any) campaign. They were trying to push their respective points of view and as historians they are far from reliable. Autobiography from famous people is one of the worst types of historical source. Another thing is that the best historians, such as D'Este and Hastings, do not in my opinion inject a serious national bias in their work. And probably the most critical work I have read on Omaha Beach, for instance, was written by an American*. Serious historians try very hard to be objective and try to avoid such bias, unlike the generals in their writings. * Lewis, Adrian R., Omaha Beach: a Flawed Victory, the University of North Carolina Press, 2001.
Originally posted by jimbotosome+Sep 27 2005, 02:32 AM-->(jimbotosome @ Sep 27 2005, 02:32 AM)</div><div class='quotemain'><!--QuoteBegin-angie999@Sep 25 2005, 05:16 AM Both Harris and Spaatz opposed the use of their forces in invasion related tasks, but they had to do it when ordered. All the evidence suggests that Harris did it with better grace and enthusiasm than Spaatz. That probably has to do with whether your source was a British or an American historian. Just as the British historians painted Patton out of control and Monty as the hero, so did the American historians paint Monty as out of control and Patton as the hero. [post=39459]Quoted post[/post] [/b] Not all historians, British or Americans, are out and out nationaist propagandists. The fact is that both Harris and Spaatz had serious professional disagreements with the proposed pre-Overlord bombing strategy. Spaatz continued the argument beyond the point where orders had been issued, while Harris did not, or at least did not to the same extent. Neither disobeyed their orders, but Spaatz continued to argue that bombing German oil targets would be more decisive. If you do not believe me, it is easier for you to go and check out the primary sources in the US archives than it is for me.
Originally posted by jimbotosome@Sep 27 2005, 02:32 AM Just as the British historians painted Patton out of control and Monty as the hero, so did the American historians paint Monty as out of control and Patton as the hero. [post=39459]Quoted post[/post] This is utter tosh. Go and read a wider variety of resources, be prepared to be critical where necessary of both and make up your own mind based on objective analysis. For instance, have you actually read Carlo D'Este (American historian! Lt Col US Army retd.!): Decision in Normandy? He has probably influenced my thinking more than any other single historian of Normandy. You seem to think that if we fall short of standards of hero worship of Eisenhower, Bradley and Patton it can only be through national bias or jealousy, because they were perfect in every way.
Angie, Completely agree with you. Max Hastings (An English Historian) will paint a critical image of Montgomery as opposed to slavishly praising him. Carlo D'Este's Decision in Normandy is probably THE definitive work on the Campaign and he spares no-one from criticism if they deserve it. The trick is to read the material and decide what is wheat and what is chaff. For example, years ago when I started reading about History I studied a lot of the memoirs of the Wehrmacht Generals and only that thus getting an unbalanced view of the Eastern Front. My point is that if you read only memoirs or autobiographies of Generals you will eventually see that although historically competent, there is ALWAYS and I mean ALWAYS a self-serving angle.
Originally posted by Gotthard Heinrici@Sep 28 2005, 06:19 AM Angie, Completely agree with you. Max Hastings (An English Historian) will paint a critical image of Montgomery as opposed to slavishly praising him. Carlo D'Este's Decision in Normandy is probably THE definitive work on the Campaign and he spares no-one from criticism if they deserve it. The trick is to read the material and decide what is wheat and what is chaff. For example, years ago when I started reading about History I studied a lot of the memoirs of the Wehrmacht Generals and only that thus getting an unbalanced view of the Eastern Front. My point is that if you read only memoirs or autobiographies of Generals you will eventually see that although historically competent, there is ALWAYS and I mean ALWAYS a self-serving angle. [post=39500]Quoted post[/post] Also, Russell Weigley's "Eisenhower's Lieutenants," by an American, tears up some of the American commanders. I also recommend Robin Neillands and Denis Whitaker's books on Normandy. Less canonization and demonization and more analysis. Too many people who study Normandy -- or claim to -- take their views direct from "Patton." The movie. Not the general.
Originally posted by Kiwiwriter@Sep 28 2005, 03:18 PM I also recommend Robin Neillands and Denis Whitaker's books on Normandy. [post=39508]Quoted post[/post] On the other hand, Neilland's new book, The Battle for the Rhine, 1944, really tears into Eisenhower, who he accuses of letting strategy drift after Normandy, and is not too kind to Bradley or Patton either. People could just say it is a Brit attacking the Yanks, or they could read it and make their minds up for themselves.
The talk of Caen came about because of the argument that the US was not involved in the bombing of Caen which was a part of the subject of this thread. It was not really off-topic since it is a broad subject that spans many topics. But, I have no problem discussing it elsewhere. I wasn't accused of being in the weeds anywhere else. The problem with using historians to establish “fact” is that they are human and therefore usually out to make a name for themselves. Who would buy your book if you tell people things they know or things that are a given. They usually base their "facts" on hearsay and their own interpretations and often with much revisionism. To me it is easier to read the biography and see what they were thinking and determine if it matches the explanation for events. Sure you have to consider the source but to me the source is a lot more likely to have its basis of fact in his opinion (from his perspective) than those that were not there and have gleaned their opinions and interpretations from potential enemies and egoists discussing the subject or persons they opposed in contradistinction. It’s sort of like the news medias CNN, CBS, NBC, ABC, BBC, AP, Reuters, New York Times, The Los Angeles Times, The London Times have such an intense liberal spin on them it is like looking into an alternate universe or alternate reality since most of their claims are so baseless, ideological, exaggerated and/or corrupt. I think they have all moved one notch beyond Al Jazeera in biased content now and they no longer care about that they have become so transparent. They are propaganda machines that would impress Goebels. (They are the “The Forth Estate”, if you will). Am I to believe that the historians now ascended into the same lofty protected class as “scientists” where their opinions and conjectures are treated as asymptotic fact and can no longer be questioned? Are they “too” superhuman and not subject to the weaknesses of mere mortals like ourselves? With Patton, I can see the potential problems with his opinion. He was loud, boastful, and boisterous. He used hyperbole quite a bit as it often seemed to be meant to inflate himself , denigrate others or possibly just prevarication. I assume Monty had the same problems since their reputations as egotists preceded and succeeded them. But from my impression, they were more alike than they were different. There is no smoke without a fire. But with Bradley, I don’t put him in that category. He was not prone to exaggerate, was very quite and very polite, genteel, not known for his ego. Sgt. Alvin York told Bradley that he would never make it because he was “too nice”. As the scripture says, you will know them by their fruits. Bradley often stated his frustration when Ike, Patton, or Monty "frosted his pumpkin", but always spoke about them noting his respect for them. Bradley thought Alan Brooke was the best "strategist" of WWII but didn't like the fact he was always protecting Monty from retribution for his acts. Ike thought Bradley was the best "tactician" of WWII. Bradley held no lingering resentment against any of them and expressed his approval of them. If I met someone like he reads in public, I would tend to trust them more than if I met Patton or Monty. So, why should that be different when evaluating their autobiographies? I don’t find Eisenhower that way either. Though a little more assertive than Bradley, he was certainly flexible and was very concerned about appearing biased toward American troops so much so that he (as Bradley said) tended to show a bias toward the British and Canadians. People with egos believe that their self-promotion will project an image of them but people that are concerned about what honest people think enough to restrain their behavior are typically honest people themselves. Autobiographies are very good when they are used in conjunction with others since they often present both sides of the issue which makes it easy to determine the facts basing the conclusions on why it caused the given impressions by both sides. One tends to shed light on the other. This is why the defense gets to put on its case in a court after the prosecution has presented its case. If the jury deliberated after hearing just the prosecution’s side of the issue, they would always find the defendant guilty. I would rather judge a case hearing both sides than someone giving their opinion of what happened who had not been there. If history was structured, settled and certain, it would be of little interest to most. Hear it once and there is no reason to discuss it. A history forum would be as exciting as watching paint dry.
A history forum would be as exciting as watching paint dry. That is the basic problem with history, and it is something that will never really be dealt with. The major issue is, how do we make it more interesting for the general reader – answer, we cant! Regarding WW2, the problem is that as we get older ourselves, then the number of people who actually took part decreases. This leaves us with only the printed sources. In saying that, we should all be aware of the bias which in is inherent in human nature. I would like to point out that the two sources I used recently, one was the official document written by Harris in his role as AOC Bomber Command, which was biased because he only referred to his commands participation in operations and not any other info, such as it was a combined operation or the politics behind. That came later with is autobiography – which reminds me! The second was written by a former pilot who flew photo-reccie missions during the campaign but became interested in military history as the result of his experiences in WW2. He only reported those things that he had personally verified. But since the thread was about how effect was the use of heavy bombers then it was not off topic to talk about the details of the operations.
