GOLD BEACH.

Air Bombardment.
The following missions against specific targets were planned.

From H – 30 Minutes to H Hour Heavy Bombers attacked the following targets. The bombers were briefed and took off hours before and the timings and targets could not be varied.
Mont Fleury Battery. 2 Squadrons.
Ver Sur Mer Battery. 4 Squadrons.
Arromanches I Battery. 5 Squadron.
Arromanches III Battery. 3 Squadron.
Longues Battery. 5 Squadron.
Arromanches Town. 5 Squadron.
La Riviere Beach Defences. 6 Squadrons.
Area Inland of La Riviere. 1 Squadron.
Le Hamel Beach Defences. 7 Squadrons.

From H Hour 2 Tactical Air Force attacked specific targets which it was thought might interfere with the landings. Fighter Bombers attacked the following:
Rocket emplacement at H + 15.
Anti Tank guns at H + 20.
Vaux Sur Aure Battery at H + 180

Later Medium Bombers attacked the following targets which it was thought would help the ground forces.
Port en Bessin between H + 300 to H + 360 Hours.
Villers Bocage at 16.00 Hours.

In addition fighter bombers were available on call for each brigade. They had pre arranged targets but could be diverted to more urgent ones. These are described later.

 

FORCE 'G'.
THE LAST TEN MILES.


The Headquarters Ships and the LSI(L)s arrived in column at the Lowering Position. This was to be the datum point for all the naval operations between this point and the shore. Strictly speaking the Lowering Position was the point at which the LSIs lowered their LCAs. It was also the reporting point for all ships and craft arriving off the beaches. Each group of ships and craft had their planned time of arrival at the Lowering Point but it might be necessary for them to wait in Waiting Positions until it was time for them to form up and take their place in the orderly movement of craft towards the beach.

The approach from the Lowering Position to the beach was timed on the basis of craft proceeding at 6 knots. Since it was planned that the LCTs carrying the AVREs should beach first they were to be the datum on which the phasing of all subsequent waves were based. It was stressed that the accurate phasing of the various waves was more important than the exact adherence to H Hour. Thus if the AVRE wave was late then all other waves should adjust their timing accordingly. Control craft were to guide groups of craft in the approach by their positions relative to other craft rather than strict timings.

Waiting Positions were established inshore of the Lowering Position and to the sides of the routes to be taken by the waves of craft. Major craft had two Waiting Positions for each beach, one for incoming craft and one for outgoing craft. Ingoing minor craft were not to be kept waiting and each beach had one minor craft outward Waiting Position only. These positions were to remain in use until nautical twilight on D+1. After the assault the Waiting Positions were marked, and protected, by LCF. These were to fly the alphabetical flag corresponding to the area.
King: Major Craft Out, J. Major Craft In, F. Minor Craft out, L.
Jig: Major Craft Out, H. Major Craft In, G. Minor Craft out, K.

On the run in to shore all craft that were fitted with D type mine sweeps were to run them when inshore of the Lowering Position.

All LCT touching down were to carry the poles used for camouflage netting. These were to be landed for the Royal Navy Beach Commandos to mark the seaward edge of any craters or soft patches of sand.

The minesweepers of 150 BYMS Flotilla were to sweep ahead of the bombarding destroyers as they moved to their positions on the flanks. Each minesweeper was assigned to a destroyer and was to stream double sweeps.
For Channel 5 the pairings were:
Grenville – BYMS 2002. Undine – BYMS 2003. Jervis – BYMS 2004. Urania – BYMS 2059.
For Channel 6 the pairings were:
Ulster – BYMS 2016. Urchin – BYMS 2015. Undaunted – BYMS 2062. Ursa – BYMS 2001.
BYMS 2042 and BYMS 2234 were spare craft and were to be used to replace craft as necessary.


The groups are naval groups and were for organising the large number of craft across the Channel and either to the beach or the point at which they would discharge personnel and vehicles into smaller craft. Even numbered groups were for King and used swept Channel 6. Odd numbered Groups were for Jig and used Channel 5.

By H Hour there was a ten mile deep column of craft making the approach to shore. Tables were produced showing the spacing between flights and the distance from shore for each flight at certain times. These were all based on the timing of Group 5, the LCT(A) and LCTs carrying AVREs. They were calculated on a planned speed of advance of 6 knots or 1000 yards in 5 minutes. Note the nautical nicety of the speed of advance. A craft going at 6 knots will seldom be making 1000 yards in 5 minutes since it is affected by tide, wind, drift etc.

At H-15 minutes the following should be the position of flights of craft.
1,200 yards from shore. DD tanks. In the event these were not launched but the LCTs beached late.
3,000 yards from shore. LCT(A) and LCT with AVRE. The flight on which all other timings were based.
3,750 yards from shore. Two LCT(R) 8 cables apart.
4,400 yards from shore. Assault company LCAs.
5,400 yards from shore. Two LCT(R) 8 cables apart.
7,000 yards from shore. Reserve company LCAs.
7,500 yards from shore. LCTs carrying SP artillery. 3½ cables to port of the centre line.
10,000 yards from shore. LCTs with dozers and Crocodiles.
12,000 yards from shore. Reserve battalion LCAs.
14,000 yards from shore. Reserve battalion LCAs.

Not timed to LCT(A) and LCT AVRE. May be held back.
1½ miles behind reserve battalion LCAs. First priority vehicles.
3 miles behind first priority vehicles. Second Priority vehicles.
3 miles behind second priority vehicles. Third priority vehicles.


Jig Beach.
Craft of Group G1 were to carry out the assault on Jig Green. This beach was only 1750 yards in extent and the craft were instructed to carry out a careful deployment and to observe closely their spacing on the beach. The division between the eastern and western sides of Jig Green was to be marked by a letter ‘J’ surmounted by a white triangle, apex uppermost. Jig Red could be used for later groups and Item Red was to be used for the second tide and build up.

Group 3.
LCT(3)s carrying DD tanks would be the first group to pass the Lowering Position. They were to cross the Channel in two columns, one for each beach. After passing the Lowering Position the columns were to open out to one cable apart. They were then to be navigated to the launching position 7000 yards from shore by LCH 317. Before reaching the launching point the craft were ordered by the senior officer of the group to deploy. In each column of four craft the second and fourth craft would come up on the port side of the leader and the fourth on the starboard side. At this point the craft should have anchored and prepared to launch the DD tanks. In the event it was decided to continue to shore and beach the LCTs. However the rest of the plan seems to have been followed.

The DD tanks when launched should have formed up on LCP(A) 165 and 208 on the shoreward side of the LCTs. They would then proceed to the beach in an arrow head formation. In fact the LCTs formed up for the run to shore with the LCP(A)s each leading a group of four. LCH 317 was to be navigation leader and take up a position between the two LCT groups. A LCP(Sy) was to assist with navigation, in particular by measuring the amount of drift caused by tide and current.

Once the DD tanks had landed the LCP(A)s rejoined the flotilla for smoke laying duties, the LCH reported to DSOAG Jig Red, the LCP(Sy) carried out surveys of the beach and the LCT(3)s reported to the LSIs in the Lowering Positions. Two LCT(3) were to moor alongside each LSI to carry personnel to shore as part of the Ferry Service.

It was stressed in the orders that although the DD tanks were timed to land at H-5 minutes the following waves should adhere to their schedule and spacings even if the DD tanks were late, or early. In the event they were late and arrived after Group 5.


Group 5.
The LCT(A) and LCT carrying AVREs crossed the Channel in two columns with the LCT(A) leading. After passing the Lowering Position they form four columns and as they proceed to the beach they deploy to port. The Centaurs in the LCT(A) are to beach and give close support from the craft. They will commence to disembark at H+20 and unbeach as soon as this is compete. It was stressed that it was of great importance that the LCT carrying AVREs should beach as close as possible to the planned positions, opposite the exits which they were to clear and open. In the event they were carried to the east by the current.

The deployment was somewhat complicated. On the approach to the Lowering Position there were to be two columns each with four LCT(A) leading and three LCT with AVRE following. When four columns were formed the craft were to be arranged with the columns abreast and having on the left a column of four LCT(A), then three LCT AVRE, four LCT(A) and three LCT AVRE. Finally the craft deployed to form a single line abreast with four LCT(A), three LCT, four LCT)(A) and three LCT. In the event the LCTs carrying AVRE followed this deployment with such LCT(A) as had survived the crossing and arrived on time fitted in as best they could.

Landing Craft Flak accompanied this group. LCF 19 and 20 take station close on right of Group 5, LCF 35 on the left. They are to provide close support to the LCTs. If the LCP(Sy) have not marked the Rocher du Calvados LCF 19 and 20 will give fire support from seaward of the rocks.

Three of the LCF and three LCT will have towed LCA(HR) across the Channel. They were to be slipped at H-30 minutes and take station ahead of LCT 2025, 2076 and 2030. They will keep station 100 yards ahead and fire rockets at H-1 minute. LCA (HR) will then turn away and return to the Lowering Position where they will be recovered by LSIs.

LCH 100 with DSOAG Jig Green will act as Senior Officer Group 5. It will lead the group to a position 4000 yards offshore when it will remain as Headquarters Ship for DSOAG. On the approach it took station on the right hand side and the right hand LCT followed. Other craft were to formate on the right hand LCT.

If they had been present the LCT(A) with Centaurs were to be ready to fire on the approach under the direction of FOOs in LCS(M). They were then to beach as high up the beach as possible and then the Centaurs were to be available to fire from the LCT(A) in support of the infantry. Centaurs and other vehicles were to disembark at H+20 minutes.

The LCTs of Group 5 were not to unbeach until the first flight of assault LCA had touched down. The LCAs were to touch down between the AVRE with 25 to 30 yards between craft. The reserve companies were to land in the same place as the assault companies.

706 Flotilla LCP(L) will be lowered as soon as possible after LCA and the first flight LCM have been lowered from the LSIs.
Formation of Group 5 for the crossing.

LCT(A) 2017 LCT(A) 2013
LCT(A) 2018 LCT(A) 2014
LCT(A) 2019 LCT(A) 2015
LCT(A) 2020 LCT(A) 2016
LCT AVRE 2028 LCT AVRE 2025
LCT AVRE 2029 LCT AVRE 2026
LCT AVRE 2030 LCT AVRE 2027
LCF 35 LCF 20
LCF 19

Formation of Group 5 for the approach.
LCH 100
LCT(A) 2017 LCT(A) 2013
LCF 35 LCT(A) 2018 LCT AVRE 2028 LCT(A) 2014 LCT AVRE 2025 LCF 20
LCT(A) 2019 LCT AVRE 2029 LCT(A) 2015 LCT AVRE 2026 LCF 19
LCT(A) 2020 LCT AVRE 2030 LCT(A) 2016 LCT AVRE 2027


Formation of Group 5 for landing.

LCF 2017 2018 2019 2020 2028 2029 2030 2016 2015 2014 2013 2027 2026 2025 LCF LCF


Group 7.
Having crossed the Channel in columns the LCT(4)s carrying the self propelled field artillery of 90 and 147 Field Regiments RA were to deploy into line abreast immediately after passing the Lowering Position. The guns were to open fire at a range of 11,000 yards at about H-33 minutes. Fire was to be lifted at H-7 minutes and cease at 3,400 yards at H+5 minutes.

After ceasing firing the LCTs were to disengage outwards and wheel to the rear. The inner columns were to wheel back inwards to take station 3 miles ahead of Group 11 and proceed to the beach to land at H+60 minutes on the eastern side of Jig Green. The outer columns were to wheel inwards and take station 3 miles astern of Group 11 and beach at H+120 minutes across Jig Green.

Army sources say that half of the two artillery regiments were called in to beach early when many of the LCT(A)s with Centaurs failed to arrive on time. Naval sources are clear that this was always the intention.

Five LCTs follow the SP artillery. Three LCT(4) carrying priority tracked vehicles follow the right hand division carrying 147 Field Regiment. They wheeled out with them and then followed them in to beach at H+60 minutes. Two LCT(3) carrying bulldozers and Crocodiles followed the SP artillery to the Lowering Position and then slow down so as to form up 2,500 astern of the SP artillery. They continued to the beach and landed at H+35 minutes, one on the west side and one on the east side.

ML 150 and 136 led the LCT divisions carrying SP artillery.

Formation of Group 7 for the run in.

LCT(R) LCT(R)

ML ML

LCT LCT LCT LCT LCT LCT LCT LCT LCT LCT LCT LCT


LCT (R) LCT(R)




Group 9.
Group 9 was the fast LSI group. This group does not fit into the pattern because it does not go to the shore but carries the LCAs which do. It is also out of sequence since it is the first to arrive at the Lowering Position and some at least of its LCAs are timed to land soon after Group 5.

When Group 9 was three miles from the Lowering Position SOAG Jig in HMS Nith will order Glenroy to anchor as previously arranged. Glenroy then assumes command of the LSI convoy. Glenroy itself anchors at Point DD which is in the centre of the swept and marked channel. The remaining LSI anchor in the centre of the channel two cables apart. (A cable is 600 feet.) Bulolo will anchor between Point DD (Channel 5, Jig Beach) and Point EE (Channel 6, King Beach).

The first flight of LCA from each ship will be lowered as ordered by Glenroy and assemble off the bows of their own LSI. Having formed up the LCA proceed to a position three cables on the shoreward side of Glenroy, where the navigation leader (ML 594) for the first flight is stationed. The navigation leader will show a blue light and fly a black pendant. The navigation leader leads in the flight to the beach, keeping 1400 yards astern of Group 5, and beach at H+7 minutes. On going ahead of the flight to lead them to the beach the ML will flash ‘P1’ slowly, and repeatedly, astern.

The second flight of LCA from each ship will be lowered about 15 minutes after the first and assemble off the bows of their own LSI. Having formed up the LCA proceed to a position three cables on the shoreward side of Glenroy, where the navigation leader (ML 131) for the second flight is stationed. The navigation leader will show two blue lights and fly two black pendants. The navigation leader leads in the flight to the beach, keeping 2,600 yards astern of the first flight, and beach at H+20 minutes. On going ahead of the flight to lead them to the beach the ML will flash ‘P2’ slowly, and repeatedly, astern.

The third flight of LCA from each ship will be lowered as convenient and assemble off the bows of their own LSI. Having formed up the LCA proceed to a position three cables on the shoreward side of Glenroy, where the navigation leader (ML 245) for the third flight is stationed. This ML was to stand well clear while the first two waves form up to avoid confusion. The navigation leader will show a three blue lights and fly three black pendants. The navigation leader leads in the flight to the beach. Half will land at H+45 minutes and half at H+55 minutes.

During the approach LCA are to keep clear of groups of LCTs and if necessary proceed to one side of the approach course and resume course on approaching the beach.

MLs 594, 131 and 245 disengage and turn away when the LCA waves are between 1000 and 2000 yards of the shore.

Glenroy also carries two LCA(OC) for 9 and 10 LCOCU. They were to be lowered and join two of the LCT of Group 5 as it passes the Lowering Position.

LCS(M) were carried by the LSI. Two which are to be used to carry FOOs are to be lowered immediately on the arrival of the LSIs at the Lowering Point. They are then to proceed at best speed to positions about 1000 yards off shore and act as required for FOOs to direct the fire of the SP artillery. The remaining LCS(M) are to be lowered and proceed to the beach on both flanks of the first flight LCAs. The craft from Spearhead and Crossbow are to be on the left flank and those from Arquebus on the right flank.

LCM were carried on the decks of LSI and were to be hoisted out, preloaded, by the ships derricks. Glenroy carried three LCM. The first two were to be lowered before the lowering the LCAs. One was to report to SOAG Jig on Nith by H+15 minutes to embark Brigadier 231 Brigade. The other was to carry OC Devonshire Regiment and his vehicles to the beach astern of the reserve battalion LCAs. The third LCM was to be lowered after the LCAs and proceed to LCI(L) 255 on its arrival with Group 15 to embark and land Brigadier 56 Brigade.

The other three LSI were to each carry LCM. One LCM from Crossbow was to be lowered as requisite and report to Albrighton on its arrival with Group 16 to embark and land Brigadier 151 Brigade. Three LCM carrying preloaded stores were to be lowered as requisite and sent into the beach at H+60 minutes.

The coxswains of the LCMs reporting to Headquarters ships were to be thoroughly briefed and have the ship or craft to which they were to report pointed out to them before leaving the LSI.

Nith with SOAG Jig and Brigadier 231 Brigade on board was to remain close to the Lowering Position until H Hour and then move to take up a position clear of the approach course about four miles from shore.


Group 11.
This was a large group of twenty seven LCTs and a LST. Twenty LCT carrying a squadron of Nottinghamshire Yeomanry and the tracked vehicles for 231 Brigade were to pass the Lowering Point in two columns and proceed to the beach, keeping a careful watch on the DSOAGs headquarters ship for signals concerning alterations to the time of beaching. The columns would each deploy into line abreast and beach at H+90 minutes.

Five LCT carrying tracked vehicles for 56 Brigade were to leave the columns after passing he Lowering Point and proceed to the ‘in’ Waiting Position GG. They were to wait and proceed to the beaches about H+2½ hours or as ordered by DSOAG Red. Four LCT carrying pre loaded stores were also to proceed to Waiting Position GG and wait to go to beach at about 2¾ hours or as ordered by DSOA Red. These LCT were held back an hour because of congestion on the beaches.

One LST with DUKWs on the tank deck was to pass the Lowering Point and move to a position 4 miles off the beach as ordered and swim off DUKWs at H+30 minutes. All six of its LCV(P) were to lowered at the same time and they were to report to DSOAG Jig Green in LCH 100 for despatch boat duties. On completion the LST was to return to the south west of the Lowering Position and wait to proceed in with Group 17.

So that the flow of craft could be monitored and re arranged if necessary the Beach Masters and Principal Beachmaster were to report to the naval commanders on headquarters ships. Beachmasters were to report immediately to the DSOAG on any or all of the following:
The landing of flights of craft. In particular the time of Group 5 beaching.
The opening of exits, and the closing of exits if this became necessary.
The capacity of the beach at any one time.
The progress of obstacle clearance as reported by officers commanding RE parties.
Casualties to craft.

The Principal Beach Master was to give an hourly sitrep to SOAG. He was also to report any shelling or air raids to the SOAG.

By the time the flights of LCTs arrive gaps should have been made in the beach obstacles and the gaps should be marked. LCT however could not be certain as the work was ongoing. Initially beach limit signs were to be erected only to mark the extent of the gaps in the beach obstacles. As obstacles were cleared the signs were moved outwards. LCTs were to touch down only between two signs of the same colour. As far as possible remaining beach obstacles were to be marked with red (port) and green (starboard) flags.


After the assault.
Having landed the DD tanks the LCT(3)s return to the LSIs. They embark remaining troops and proceed to a position about a mile offshore where they will be unloaded by LCA. When empty the LCT(3) proceed to the outgoing Waiting Positions from which they will be sailed back to the UK.

After the assault the LCA of the assault company flight will return to the LSI where they will be rehoisted unless they are required to make another trip. Exceptions are six which will remain in the assault area:
Two from 525 Flotilla will report to SOAG in Nith.
Two from 553 Flotilla will report to DSOAG Jig Green.
Two from 525 Flotilla will report to DSOAG Jig Red.

After unbeaching the LCA carrying the reserve companies will lie about one mile offshore to disembark troops from the remaining LCT(3). They will then return to the LSI except for:
Two from 524 Flotilla report to PBM.
Two from 524 Flotilla report to DSOAG Jig Green.
Two from 553 Flotilla report to DSOAG Jig Red.

Those remaining total:
2 for SOAG.
4 for each DSOAG.
2 for PBM.

LSI will leave as soon as possible. When all LCA have been rehoisted they will hoist ‘Ready to proceed’. They will then sail under escort to the UK.


LCA(HR) were to proceed to the LSIs to be hoisted as follows: three each to Spearhead, Crossbow, Arquebus and Lance, two each to Mace, Rapier and Halberd. In the event seven of the eighteen were lost so that only 11 were recovered.





King Beach.

The orders for King Beach were in most respects identical to those for Jig. Timings and composition of flights were identical and the general instructions were the same. The identities of flights and craft of course are different.

Group 4.
LCT(3)s carrying DD tanks would be the first group to pass the Lowering Position. They were to cross the Channel in two columns, one for each beach. After passing the Lowering Position the columns were to open out to one cable apart. They were then to be navigated to the launching position 7000 yards from shore by DSOAG Red in LCH 275. Before reaching the launching point the craft were ordered by the senior officer of the group to deploy. In each column of four craft the second and fourth craft would come up on the port side of the leader and the fourth on the starboard side. At this point the craft should have anchored and prepared to launch the DD tanks. In the event it was decided to continue to shore and beach the LCTs. However the rest of the plan seems to have been followed.

The DD tanks when launched should have formed up on LCP(A) 176 to the east and 199 to the west on the shoreward side of the LCTs. They would then proceed to the beach in an arrow head formation. In fact the LCTs formed up for the run to shore with the LCP(A)s each leading a group of four. LCH 275 was to be navigation leader and take up a position between the two LCT groups. LCP(Sy) 287 was to assist with navigation, in particular by measuring the amount of drift caused by tide and current.

Once the DD tanks had landed the LCP(A)s rejoined the flotilla for smoke laying duties, the LCH remained as headquarters ship for DSOAG King Red, LCP(Sy) 287 carried out surveys of the beach and the LCT(3)s reported to the LSIs in the Lowering Positions and be prepared to carry personnel to shore as part of the Ferry Service. LCT(3) serial 2400 and 2401 were to moor alongside Mace. LCT(3) serial 2402 and 2403 were to moor alongside Lance. LCT(3) serial 2404 and 2405 were to moor alongside Halberd. LCT(3) serial 2400 and 2401 were to moor alongside Rapier.

The LCT(3) would transfer troops to LCA from the ship to which they were working. To aid recognition they were to fly flags of the initial letter of their name, M-Mace, L-Lance, H-Halberd, R-Rapier.

It was stressed in the orders that although the DD tanks were timed to land at H-5 minutes the following waves should adhere to their schedule and spacings even if the DD tanks were late, or early. In the event they were late and arrived after Group 5.

LCG 1, 2 and 3 were to close the beach on the flanks of Group 4. LCS(L) 258 and 259 were to close the beach with Group 4. All were to give close support to assaulting troops.


Group 6.
The military plan ashore was based on the position of the LCT carrying AVREs on the beaches and it was seen as being most important that these craft should beach in the right places.

The LCT(A) and LCT carrying AVREs crossed the Channel in two columns with the LCT(A) leading. After passing the Lowering Position they form four columns and as they proceed to the beach they deploy to port. The Centaurs in the LCT(A) are to beach and give close support. They could commence to disembark at any time after H hour. It was however that continuity of fire should be maintained so that they would unload alternately. Even numbers would unload first and odd numbers could unload once the evens were established ashore. The LCT(A) could unbeach when this was complete and in any case before H+40.

The deployment was somewhat complicated. On the approach to the Lowering Position there were to be two columns each with four LCT(A) leading and three LCT with AVRE following. When four columns were formed the craft were to be arranged with the columns abreast and having on the left a column of four LCT(A), then three LCT AVRE, four LCT(A) and three LCT AVRE. Finally the craft deployed to form a single line abreast with four LCT(A), three LCT, four LCT)(A) and three LCT. In the event the LCTs carrying AVRE followed this deployment with such LCT(A) as had survived the crossing and arrived on time fitted in as best they could.

Landing Craft Flak accompanied this group. LCF 25 and 26 take station close on right of Group 5, LCF 36 and 28 on the left.

LCF 25, 26 and 36 will and LCT serials 2412, 2413, 2414, 2423, 2424 and 2425 will each have towed LCA(HR) across the Channel. They were to be slipped on passing the Lowering Position and attach themselves to LCT carrying AVREs. LCTs 2412 2413 and 2423 will each have one LCA(HR) while LCTs 2414, 2424 and 2425 will each have two. They will keep station on the port bow of the LCTs and fire rockets at H-1 minute. Where a LCT has two LCA(HR) they will both take station on the port bow a LCT length apart. LCA (HR) will then turn away and return to the Lowering Position where they will be recovered by LSIs.

LCH 187 with DSOAG King Green will lead the group to a position 4000 yards offshore when it will remain as Headquarters Ship for DSOAG. On the approach it took station on the right hand side and the right hand LCT followed. Other craft were to formate on the right hand LCT. DSOAG on LCH 187 is responsible for informing SOAG and leading flight of LCAs of the time when the LCTs touched down.

The LCTs of Group 5 were not to unbeach until the first flight of assault LCA had touched down. The LCAs were to touch down between the AVRE with 25 to 30 yards between craft. The reserve companies were to land in the same place as the assault companies.

ML 303 is to act as whipper in for support craft. This was the headquarters for all support craft.

700 LCP(L) Flotilla less LCP(A) 288 and 296 were available to make smoke.


Group 8.
Having crossed the Channel in columns the six LCT(4)s carrying the self propelled field artillery were to deploy into line abreast immediately after passing the Lowering Position. They were to take station 4,400 yards astern of the AVRE flight. The guns were to open fire at a range of 11,000 yards at about H-33 minutes. Fire was to be lifted at H-7 minutes and cease at 3,400 yards at H+5 minutes.

LCT(R) 362 and 460 were to take station 700 yards astern of the AVRE flight. LCT(R) 440 and 459 were to take station 2,100 yards astern of the AVRE flight. All were to be stationed opposite their respective targets and be 8 cables apart.

ML 248 led and controlled the LCT division carrying SP artillery.


Group 10.
Kingsmill leads the fast LSI group to the Lowering Position at EE.

First flight LCAs from each ship carrying assault companies assemble on the bow of their own ship and then proceed to a position one cable inshore of Mace where ML154 is to be.

Second flight LCAs from each ship carrying reserve companies is to be lowered 20 minutes after the first. They then assemble on the bow of their own ship and then proceed to a position one cable inshore of Lance where ML182 is to be.

Third flight LCAs from each ship carrying reserve battalion is to be lowered 20 minutes after the second. They then assemble on the bow of their own ship and then proceed to a position one cable inshore of Mace.

RRB 2 and 3 and two rescue craft accompany the LCA flights.

LSI will each hoist out LCMs which will report as follows.
LCM 2457 from Mace will report to LCH 187 by H Hour.
LCM 2480 from Rapier will report to LCH 275 by H Hour.
LCM 2516 from Lance will proceed with the reserve battalion.
LCM 2518 from Halberd will report to Kingsmill by H-10 minutes.
The remaining four LCM with pre loaded stores will report to Kingsmill for beaching instructions.

Each LSI also carries LCP(L) on deck. They will be hoisted out as soon as possible.


Group 13.
The numbering has been thrown out by Group 10 which was Bombardment Group ‘K’ which proceeded independently and arrived before the other groups.

Twenty one LCT(4) arrive with priority vehicles. First priority vehicles will be led in by ML599 to touch down at H+60 minutes. Second priority vehicles will be led in by ML 904 to land at H+90 minutes. Third priority vehicles will land at H+120 minutes. It is assumed that these LCTs will all go to the Waiting Position and wait to be ordered in.

LCT serials 2520, 2521 and 2522 are two LCT(3) and a LCT(4) with Crocodiles and bulldozers. They will go ahead on reaching the lowering position and beach on Green with the reserve battalion at H+45 minutes.

Five LCT(4) carry 56 Brigade vehicles.

LST closes to four miles off the beach and swims off DUKWs. These will be directed to the beach on which they are to land by DSOAGs on their run in.

FDT 13 arrives with this group.


After the assault.
Having landed the DD tanks the LCT(3)s return to the LSIs. They embark remaining troops and proceed to a position about a mile offshore where they will be unloaded by LCA. When empty the LCT(3) proceed to the outgoing Waiting Positions from which they will be sailed back to the UK.

After the assault the LCA of the assault company flight will return to the LSI where they will be rehoisted unless they are required to make another trip. Exceptions are six which will remain in the assault area:
Two from 539 Flotilla will report to SOAG in Kingsmill.
Two from 540 Flotilla will report to DSOAG King Green.
Two from 541 Flotilla will report to DSOAG King Red.

After unbeaching the LCA carrying the reserve companies will lie about one mile offshore to disembark troops from the remaining LCT(3). They will then return to the LSI except for:
Two from 539 Flotilla report to PBM.
One from 540 Flotilla report to DSOAG King Green.
One from 541 Flotilla report to DSOAG King Green.
Two from 542 Flotilla report to DSOAG King Red.

Those remaining total:
2 for SOAG.
4 for each DSOAG.
2 for PBM.

LSI will leave as soon as possible. When all LCA have been rehoisted they will hoist ‘Ready to proceed’. They will then sail under escort to the UK.


LCTs.
After unbeaching the LCT(A) proceed to the Ferry Craft anchorage and anchor. They will be used by the Ferry Service. They will be augmented by 4½ USN flotillas of LCT(5) and LCT(6) transferred from the Western Task Force.

The LCT which have carried the AVREs will proceed to the outgoing Waiting Positions HH and JJ and be sailed to the UK in groups. As the later flights of LCT land their loads and unbeach they also proceed to the outgoing Positions HH and JJ.


LCI(L).
Four LCI(L) were to remain and join the Ferry Service. LCI(L) 2906 and 2904 remain on Jig. LCI(L) 2903 and 2907 remain on King. All report to the Ferry Craft anchorage and await orders. The remaining LCI(L) proceed to the outgoing Waiting Positions.

LCP(L).
These remain on Gold except for LCP(L) 308, 298, 299, 305, 303 and 304 which will leave before 1200 hours and report to Force S.

LCA(Sy) 287.
After assisting in guiding the DD tanks to shore the LCA(Sy) disenegaged to seaward and prepared to lay a cross bank buoy to mark the weatern extremity of the Roches de Ver. This was to be laid as soon after H Hour as was practicable. It was then to proceed to Kingsmill and collect a dan buoy which was to be laid in place of the cross plank buoy. The LCA(Sy) then came under the orders of the PBM for beach survey duties.



Thanks to Michel for the original documents

 

Defence against surface attack.
Including submarines and mines.

There were destroyer and trawler patrols outside of the three Force areas. These have been described elsewhere.

Patrols.
The area to seaward of the anchorages was divided into four areas which were patrolled by MLs and trawlers. By day the two outer areas were each patrolled by two MLs. The other two areas were patrolled by one trawler each. By night the two outer areas each had an extra ML. They were to patrol at 8 knots but could remain stopped if the weather was suitable. When not patrolling or in a screening position MLs and trawlers were to remain within hailing distance of the headquarters ship.

Closer to the anchorages there were boat patrols, again in four areas, each controlled by a headquarters ship or craft. An area based on Bulolo patrolled the northern flank of the MT ships and coasters unloading to westwards of the ship. They were to circle the headquarters ship at a distance of two cables. Craft included four LCVP despatch boats and two ships boats. A similar area to the east of Bulolo patrolled the northern edge of the coasters unloading. This area was controlled by Kingsmill and had two LCVP from Bulolo, two LCVP despatch boats and on ships boat.

Closer inshore and covering the flanks were the two groups based on the LCHs of the DSOAGs. One group under DSOAG Jig based on LCH 100 patrolled the western flank of the coasters and LSTs unloading in Jig area. This had two LCVP despatch boats and two LCP(L) from the smoke flotilla. The other group under DSOAG King based on LCH 275 patrolled the eastern flank and also had two LCVP despatch boats and two LCP(L) from the smoke flotilla.

Whilst on patrol one boat in each group was to report to the headquarters ship every 30 minutes for information. All the craft carried 5lb charges. On sighting an enemy craft they were to fire white Very lights and attack.

For anti submarine, and human torpedo, defence the craft on patrol were to drop 5lb charges at 15 minute intervals. These had a fifteen second delay which meant they would detonate at six fathoms. Trawlers and MLs also carried twenty five charges.

Captain D25 (25 Destroyer Flotilla), Senior Officer Destroyers was to have two destroyers at immediate notice in case of alarms.

All ships and craft were to report any object likely to be a mine fall into the water. They should report the bearing, distance and the position of the reporting vessel. All ships and craft in the anchorages were to be prepared to mark the position of mines by means of cross plank buoys.


Naval Communications.

Despatch Boats.
The Despatch Boat Service.
Almost immediately a Despatch Boat Service was established between Portsmouth and Gold Beach. This service was for the whole of the Eastern Task Force but its terminal was off Gold. Initially despatch boats reported to the yacht Sister Anne and later to the Headquarters Ship, Mulberry B. The service was to carry messages, urgent correspondence, blood and urgent small stores items. A four hourly service operated a strict timetable:
Leave Portsmouth. Arrive off beach. Leave for return. Arrive Portsmouth.
0400 1100 1200 1900
0800 1500 1600 2300
1200 1900 2000 0300
1430 2130 0500 1200
2359 0700 0800 1500

Sister Anne was a famous prewar yacht, often in the news (or gossip columns) because of the famous and wealthy people who sailed on her. She was 130 foot long and had twin propellers which made for good manoeuvrability.

Despatch boats were MLs.

All Force Commanders off Normandy ran despatch boats to collect from and deliver to Sister Anne at the following times: 0700, 0900, 1200, 1500, 1800 and 2100. Despatch boats were usually LCVPs.

Force G had ten despatch boats for duties in its own area. On D day these were LCAs left behind for the purpose by the LSI(L)s. Later LCVPs took over the duty. The Naval Commander Force ‘G’ had four despatch boats which were assigned to Sister Anne. Two were to carry between Sister Anne and the shore and two for the local despatch boat service to Bulolo, Nith, Kingsmill, Thysville and George W Woodward. The boats made the circuit in that order every two hours from 0600 to 2359. Captains DSOAG 1 and DSOAG 2 each had three despatch boats. When DSOAG 1 became Captain Southbound Sailings his boats went to DSOAG 2.

Bulolo carried four LCP(L) of which two were for staff duties, one was a Police Boat for incoming convoys and one was for signal duties.

All despatch boats were distinguished by flag N by day and red over white lights at night.

There was a naval maintenance service from the UK to Thysville. This used LSI(H) to carry mail and urgent stores for all ships and craft every other day. There was also a store carrier for less urgent stores.

Once mail etc. reached shore it was delivered to the Local Signal Station. The PBM was responsible for collecting it and delivering it to NOIC Gold, and in reverse. A DR service was available from the Naval Signal Office.


Naval Signals.
Afloat.
Most naval vessels were very well equipped with wireless sets, the larger the ship the greater the number of sets. However it was laid down that visual signals should be used wherever possible to ease the strain on the wireless nets. Wireless nets have been described elsewhere.

Ashore.
For Beach.
Naval Party 1518.
Nucleus Port Signal Station.
Main Port Signal Station.
Relief Port Signal Station.
Simplex Handcart Section No 4.
Local Simplex Section No 9.

Naval Party 1532. Beach Signal Unit No 9.
Naval Party 1533. Beach Signal Unit No 7.
Naval Party 1685. Beach Signal Unit No 2.

For Naval Officer In Charge Gold and staff.
Naval Party 1567.
Advanced Signal Maintenance Section No 1.
Nucleus Port Signal Section (BAN) No1.
Main Port Signal Section (BAN) No 1.
Relief Port Signal Section (BAN) No 1.
Simplex Handcart Section No 1.
100 watt Simplex Section No 1.
30 watt Simplex Section No 1.
Local Simplex Section No 1.

Naval Party 1570. 100 Watt Duplex Sections 1 and 2.

For Mulberry.
Naval Party 1582. Heavy Mobile Signals Section No 1 and Local Simplex Section No 1.
Naval Party 1586. Heavy Mobile Signals Section No 5 and Local Simplex Section No 9.
Naval Party 1590. Light Mobile Signals Section No 1 and Local Simplex Section No 2.
Naval Party 1594. Light Mobile Signals Section No 5 and Local Simplex Section No 10.
Naval Party 1600. Mobile Radar Unit No 1.
Naval Party 1601. Mobile VHF unit No 1 and Local Simplex Section No 17.

Naval Party 1609. L/T Section No 1.
Naval Party 1613. L/T Section No 5.

The various naval signals units have been described elsewhere.

 

PART TWO.

CONTENTS.
The Beach Groups.
9 Beach Group.
2 Hertfordshire Regiment (9 Beach Group)
10 Beach Group.
6 Border Regiment (10 Beach Group).
Medical Units.
90 Field Company RE.
89 Field Company RE.

The Beach Groups.

The assault brigades had landed under assault conditions and did not have the benefit of a beach organisation to help them. The assault battalions landed and went straight into action. The reserve and follow up battalions had the luxury of assembling and joining up with their supporting arms before going into action. By the time the vehicles started landing there was a need of some beach organisation to help them cross the beach, find and pass through the exits, locate the transit areas where they would de waterproof and then move on to the assembly areas where they would form units before moving forward.

By the second tide at around H plus 12 hours it was planned that the beaches would be ready to receive considerable numbers of personnel and vehicles, plus stores. At this time the combat units had passed through and the divisional provosts, medical units etc were needed forward. It would be some time before the beach organisation and its specialist units could be landed and organised. In the meantime a flexible, multi purpose organisation was needed to perform the necessary tasks.

In the Mediterranean the British army had formed Beach Bricks to organise and operate the beaches in the period immediately after the assault landings. Not having the luxury of spare units which could be assigned the task it was necessary for ad hoc units to be formed from personnel in reinforcement units. One of these, 36 Beach Brick, returned to the UK to share its experience. However it was thought a better idea to train existing infantry battalions to carry out the beach duties. This had the advantage of having a cohesive body of men who were used to working together, who had a command structure and who had a regimental identity and its consequent esprit de corps. It was also possible to rapidly return the battalion to its original organisation as a combat ready unit. In the event the Beach Group battalions were broken up as reinforcements for existing battalions.

The US Army formed Beach Battalions with a similar role but they were specialist units which would fill the gap between the combat formation moving on and the base troops establishing an organisation to manage the beaches. This battalion would be withdrawn when its task was done and thus be ready for the next operation.

The Beach Groups had specialist units added to it including an engineer field company, a provost company, medical units, etc. and could have still more units attached as required. The groups remained for some six weeks although by the end of June some of their sub units were removed to the Beach Sub Area and the core battalion began to run down as personnel were sent as reinforcements to combat battalions. By mid July only the headquarters remained.


On Gold two Beach Groups landed initially, with 9 Beach Group on King and 10 Beach Group on Jig. Both were similarly organised. Landing in reserve was 36 Beach Brick which retained much of its Mediterranean organisation. The War Diaries, Orders, Instructions and Reports for 9 and 10 Beach groups are very detailed. Those for 9 Beach Group are not as detailed as those for 10 Beach Group but contain information on different aspects of the organisation and operation. Taken together they give a very complete picture.

 

9 Beach Group.
9 Beach Group was formed around 2 Hertfordshire Regiment.

The War Diary and its appendices, including orders and instructions, for 9 Beach Group are not nearly as detailed as those for 10 Beach Group. They do however contain some items not mentioned in those for 10 Beach Group. It can be assumed that the organisation and operation of the two groups were near enough identical since they were performing the same tasks and came under the command of the same Beach Sub Area.

9 Beach Group was responsible for King Green and King Red on D Day to D + 2 and then for Love Green also. Its orders were:

- 9 Beach Group will land on King Green and King Red and will establish and maintain dumps for all stores landed.
- It will land troops, vehicles and stores of 30 Corps and follow up troops.
- During D Day the Beach Maintenance Area will develop from King to cater for the immediate requirements of assault troops.
- Initial Beach Dumps will be set up into which all stores except RE will be dumped until the main dumps open.

‘A’ (Beach) Company 2 Hertfordshire Regiment was to land and work King Green.
‘C’ (Beach) Company 2 Hertfordshire Regiment was to land and work King Red.
‘B’ (Reserve) Company 2 Hertfordshire Regiment was to land on King Green. 10 and 11 Platoons were to come under the command of ‘A’ and ‘C’ Companies. Company Headquarters and 12 Platoon were to report to the Command Post and then move to the Initial Dump Area.

Beach companies were responsible for the early layout and marking of all exits of their beaches and for ensuring that a smooth flow of traffic was maintained.

‘T’ Commando Royal Navy was to land on King in three parties, each commanded by a Beachmaster.
T1 Party was to work with ‘A’ Company on King Green.
T2 Party was to work with ‘C’ Company on King Red.
Beachmasters of T1 and T2 were to site their headquarters as near as possible to those of beach companies.
T3 Party was a reserve and reported to the Principal Beach Master on landing for orders. It was intended that it should eventually work on Love Beach.

Labour was allotted as follows:
75 Pioneer Company to 89 Field Company RE.
44 Pioneer Company to RE Stores Dump and then to Ordnance Stores Depot on D+1.
‘D’ Company 2 Hertfordshire Regiment to 7 Ordnance Beach Detachment.
‘S’ Company 2 Hertfordshire Regiment (less Anti Tank and Pioneer Platoons), to 2 DID.
Pioneer Platoon 2 Hertfordshire Regiment to Command Post.
‘H’ (Beach) Company 2 Hertfordshire Regiment to Transit Areas.
‘B’ Company 2 Hertfordshire Regiment (less two platoons) to Ammunition Section, Ordnance Beach Detachment, Initial Dump.
Anti Tank Platoon 2 Hertfordshire Regiment to 243 Petrol Depot for Petrol Points and on the establishment of the Supply Dump move to 2 DID.
Two sections 209 Pioneer Company to Medical Area.
One section 209 Pioneer Company to Beach Dressing Station, Green Beach.
One section 209 Pioneer Company to Beach Dressing Station, Red Beach.

All demands for labour in the beach area were co ordinated by the Beach Group Labour Master (Major) at the Beach Group Command Post. All demands for labour in the dumps were co ordinated by the 104 Beach Maintenance Area Labour Master (Lieutenant Colonel).


DUKWs.
DUKWs were operated by 536 GT Company RASC. All preloaded DUKWs except serial 2570 reported to the Initial Dump Area for unloading and then reported to the GT Park. Serial 2570 proceeded to the Wheeled Vehicle Transit Area and then to 69 Brigade Assembly Area when ordered.

All DUKWs proceeding seaward had to be prepared to evacuate casualties from the Beach Dressing Station to LSTs. The DUKW Control Point co ordinated this.

DUKWs were much in demand but were as far as possible to be reserved for the primary task of unloading coasters. Unauthorised passengers were prohibited. Certain officers had passes authorizing travel on DUKWs but no other passengers were permitted except on the orders of the Officer Commanding DUKW company or the Officer in Charge of DUKW Control. DUKWs for ferrying hatch gangs to coaster were allocated at the daily Ferry Control Conference.

In the event of air attack on any dump the DUKWs, whether loaded or not, were to be cleared from the threatened area immediately.

Supplies.
2 Detail Issuing Depot landed and proceeded to the Initial Dump Area. All supplies and water landed on D day were unloaded in this area. Reconnaissance parties from 2 DID and 5 DID proceeded to the supply area and prepared it to receive supplies. The depot was under the command of Officer Commanding 2 DID. It was to be ready to open at 0900 on D plus 1 and hold 800 tons of supplies with space for 200% expansion.

243 Petrol Depot landed and proceeded to the area allotted in the Initial Dump Area. Priority for establishing dumps was:
Petrol Point at 224268 for RN Craft. The eastern end of the sea wall. This was clearly signed ‘RN Petrol’.
Petrol Point in GT Park at 229267.
Petrol Dump in Initial Dump Area.

The Beach Depot was to close at 0900 on D plus 1 and concentrate under the command of Officer Commanding 244 Petrol Depot in the expansion area. Petrol Points continued to be maintained. The Petrol Detachment 107 Beach Unit RAF was to move under the command of Officer Commanding 243 Petrol Depot.

Ordnance Beach Detachment.
7 Ordnance Beach Detachment landed and proceeded to the initial dump area where ammunition and ordnance dumps were established. All preloaded ammunition was to be unloaded in the area allocated. Officer Commanding 7 Ordnance Beach Detachment landed on Jig to carry out a reconnaissance of the ammunition area. The ammunition section of 7 Ordnance Beach Detachment was to proceed to the ammunition area on D plus 1.

Officer Commanding 10 Ordnance Beach Detachment landed on King and reconnoitred the Ordnance Stores area. The ammunition section of 107 Beach Unit RAF was to move to the ammunition area under the command of 7 Ordnance Beach Detachment.

The ordnance section of 7 Ordnance Beach Detachment was to be under the command of Officer Commanding 10 Ordnance Beach Detachment. The Ordnance Depot was to open at 0900 on D plus 1 and hold 1000 tons with a 100% expansion area.

Technical control was exercised by Deputy Assistant Director of Ordnance Services 104 Beach Sub Area.


24 Beach Recovery Section.
24 Beach Recovery Section landed early on D Day and established Beach Recovery Points on King Red and King Green. They were responsible for the recovery of vehicles from the beaches as far as the Drowned Vehicle Park where Corps Workshop would assume responsibility. The REME bivouac area was also in the Drowned Vehicle Park. Half a light recovery section landed over the first two tides and was responsible for recovery in the Beach Maintenance Area in co operation with Provosts.


240 Provost Company.
240 Provost Company marked the beach exits and traffic circuits in the Beach Maintenance Area. Routes were to be marked by H plus 9 hours and circuits were co ordinated by the Deputy Assistant Provost Marshal 104 Beach Sub Area. The company was then to control all traffic in the Beach Maintenance Area, establish Traffic Control Posts, establish a Headquarters and Traffic Office and to control the movement of follow up troops through the transit areas to the Assembly Area and sign the routes.

The Regimental Provosts of 2 Hertfordshire Regiment assisted in guarding Prisoners of War on D Day until relieved by 602 (Vulnerable Points) Company CMP.


Port Operating.
1043 Port Operating Company and any other Transportation or Inland Water Transport personnel reported to the bivouac area. The representative of 8 Port Operating Group reported to the Command Post on landing and attended the Ferry Control Conference at Headquarters 104 Beach Sub Area at 2100 D plus 1.


Transit areas were established. Vehicles and personnel were not to be delayed in these areas after removal of Mae Wests, waterproofing etc. A Captain from 2 Hertfordshire Regiment commanded each of the three Transit Areas, personnel, wheeled vehicle and tracked vehicle. There was no documentation in Transit Areas during the first four tides. Provosts signed routes forward to Assembly Areas. Mae Wests dumped in the Transit Area were taken to the Casualty Evacuation Point for the use of casualties being evacuated.


107 Beach Flight RAF.
107 Beach Flight landed and proceeded to the Initial Dump Area where they worked with the units to which they were attached. The RAF Landing Officer and his detachment reported to the Beach group Command Post. The RAF Provost officer and his detachment reported to the Transit Areas where they were responsible for RAF signing from the Transit Area to the RAF Assembly Area. A workshop detachment reported to and worked in the REME area.

54 Balloon Unit landed and made their own arrangements with Beach Group personnel for assistance in bringing the balloon winches ashore. Balloons were sited as directed by the Anti Aircraft Defence Commander.


Medical.
The medical facilities consisted of two Field Dressing Stations, 32 and 35 to which were added small specialist units. Each of the Field Dressing Stations provided a Beach Dressing Station for each of King Green and King Red formed from Light Sections. The remainder, consisting of the heavy sections plus specialist units formed a Joint Medical Area under the command of the Officer Commanding 32 Field Dressing Station.

The Heavy Section of 232 Field Dressing Station together with 47 and 48 Field Surgical Units, 111 Field Surgical Team and 24 Field Transfusion Unit formed an Advanced Surgical Centre. A section 209 Pioneer Company provided labour for erecting tents, digging slit trenches, storing casualties arms and equipment and stretcher bearing. The Heavy Section of 35 Field Dressing Station established a Field Dressing Station on the same site with the assistance of a section 209 Pioneer Company. The Joint Medical Area was to be established and ready to receive casualties by H plus 4½ hours.

Beach Dressing Stations were to open earlier, by H plus 120 minutes. On King Green the Beach Dressing Station was formed by the Light Section of 32 Field Dressing Station with the addition of the Medical Officer from 120 LAA Regiment, a serjeant and ten stretcher bearers from 2 Hertfordshire Regiment and the assistance of a section 209 Pioneer Company. On King Red the Beach Dressing Station was formed by the Light Section of 35 Field Dressing Station with the addition of the Medical Officer and ten stretcher bearers from 2 Hertfordshire Regiment and the assistance of a section 209 Pioneer Company.

A Casualty Evacuation Post was established near the Beach Dressing Station on Jig Green West. A detachment from 3 Field Dressing Station with 6 and 7 sections 209 Pioneer Company landed about H plus six hours. There are some discrepancies in the timings for the establishment of the Post but it was delayed until the area was cleared of the enemy. It was probably established around H plus twelve hours with the evacuation of casualties starting an hour later.

The Officer Commanding the Casualty Evacuation Post was assisted by the Medical Officer 8 Port Operating Group landed on the second tide and reported to the Casualty Evacuation Point. He was to be responsible for the medical attention of all cases awaiting evacuation, to assist the Officer Commanding and act as a relief for him.

A detachment of 45 Field Hygiene Section landed with 35 Field Dressing Station on the first tide. Initially the detachment consisted of two serjeants. The Sanitary NCO was responsible for sanitation in the Beach Group Sector. The Water Duties NCO was responsible the supervision of water supply in the Beach Group Sector with regard to water purity. Both NCOs were responsible for Gas Duties including the use of G10 sets.

Two privates from 22 Port Detachment RAMC landed with 7 Ordnance Beach Detachment to supervise receipt and transfer of medical stores dumped in the Ordnance Depot.

Initially each Beach Dressing Station established a Casualty Evacuation Point in its vicinity and arranged for DUKW Control to evacuate casualties with available DUKWs. After H plus 7 hours a Casualty Evacuation Point was established at the junction of Jig and King under 104 Beach Sub Area.

Reconnaissance of Dump Areas.
Commanders proceeding on reconnaissance of Dump Areas rendezvoused with reconnaissance parties of 183 Field Company at the Initial Dump Area. All reconnaissance parties were to be duplicated. RE parties were allotted as follows:
Ordnance Stores Dump. NCO and 5 sappers.
Detail Issue Depot. NCO and 6 sappers.
RE Stores Dump. NCO and 6 sappers.
Medical. NCO and 6 sappers.

Command Post.
The Beach Group Command Post was established on King Red at 222269 and was dug by the Pioneer Platoon 2 Hertfordshire Regiment.

Defence.
In the event of a direct attack on 9 Beach Group Sector the beach group was to establish a defence island based on Ver sur Mer and La Riviere. Second in Command 2 Hertfordshire Regiment reconnoitred the defensive position after landing. He then issued a trace allotting defence areas to sub units by H+12 hours. The code word to take up defensive positions was ‘Tiger’.

Prisoners.
A Prisoner of War cage was established and manned by 602 (VP) Company CMP. The Labour Master allotted labour for the erection of the cage and for escorting prisoners from the cage to LSTs. One LST with escorts on board arrived daily, each able to carry 800 prisoners. Control arranged for the calling forward of prisoners from the cages. No documentation was carried out for prisoners embarked in this way. Civilian suspects were detained in the cage but segregated from Prisoners of War.

Tilts.
Tilts were to be collected from the Initial Dump Area and allotted as follows:
Each Beach Dressing Station. 12 tilts.
Beach Group Command Post. 6 tilts.
Beach group Headquarters. 5 tilts.
All tilts came from lorries of 305 GT Company RASC.

A camouflage net dump was established under the control of the Staff Captain, Camouflage, at the west end of the Initial Dump Area at 227266.

Burials.
A Burial Ground was established at the east end of the beach area. The Labour Master detailed labour to bury the dead and to maintain grave sites until 36 Graves Registration and Enquiries Unit landed on D plus 2. The Chaplain in Charge was responsible for providing a chaplain when required. He was responsible for supervising the maintenance of he burial site, compiling grave maps and rendering burial returns in triplicate.


Communications.
9 Beach Group Headquarters was established at the Command Post on D day and moved to 218258 at 1200 on D plus 1. 104 Beach Sub Area Headquarters was established in the vicinity of 9 Beach Group Command Post on D day. It was planned that it should move on the evening of D plus 1 but communications were not established and it moved on D plus 2.

No 18 sets were allotted on the scale of two each for the Beach group Command Post and Beach group Headquarters and one each for Provosts, 536 GT Company, ‘A’ Company 2 Hertfordshire Regiment, ‘B’ Company 2 Hertfordshire Regiment, ‘C’ Company 2 Hertfordshire Regiment, Military Landing Officers Rover, Commanding Officers Rover, Ordnance Stores, 2 Detail Issue Depot, 75 Pioneer Company and 89 Field Company. No 38 sets were allotted on the scale of two each for the Docks Superintendent and 536 GT Company and the remainder to Port Operating Companies for use on coasters.

Line communication was established throughout the Beach Maintenance Area by the Signal Platoon 2 Hertfordshire Regiment.

The Main Beach Signal Station was established initially in the proximity of the Beach Group Command Post and moved on the establishment of the Main Beach Group Headquarters.

Command Post.
Personnel based at the Command Post included:
Commander 9 Beach Group.
Military Landing Officers Party. 13 men.
Principal Beach Masters Party. 3 men.
Signal dutymen. 6 men.
Labour Master. 2 men.
RAF. 4 men.
Headquarters 8 Port Operating Group. 15 men.
DUKW Control. 8 men.
Total 52 men.

Beach Group Headquarters.
Second in Command 2 Hertfordshire Regiment.
Staff Captain.
Staff Captain Camouflage.
Adjutant 2 Hertfordshire Regiment.
Quartermaster 2 Hertfordshire Regiment.
Intelligence Officer 2 Hertfordshire Regiment.
Pioneer Officer 2 Hertfordshire Regiment.
13 clerks and batmen.

Main Beach Signal Station.
2 Hertfordshire Regiment signals. 32 men.
Pioneer Platoon 2 Hertfordshire Regiment. 21 men.
Battalion Headquarters and Headquarters Company 2 Hertfordshire Regiment. 40 men.
Staff Captains Increment. 5 men.
20 Beach Signals Section. 29 men.
RN Signals. 32 men.
Total 159 men.


Cooking Centres.
On D Day and D plus 1 sub units were responsible for cooking their own food using small cookers and ration packs. From 2359 hours, D plus 1 some 20 Cooking Centres were established. These were based on company sized units which had cooking facilities.
- Green Beach. ‘A’ Company 2 Hertfordshire Regiment cooked also for ‘T’ RN Commando and Craft Recovery Unit. 176 men.
- Red Beach. ‘C’ Company 2 Hertfordshire Regiment cooked also for ‘T’ RN Commando and Craft Recovery Unit. 176 men.
- Ordnance Dump. ‘D’ Company 2 Hertfordshire Regiment cooked also for 7 and 10 Ordnance beach Detachments, Port ordnance detachment and three Provost sections. 251 men.
- Supply Dump. ‘S’ Company 2 Hertfordshire Regiment and 2 Detail Issue Depot were cooked for by cooks from 2 DID. 175 men.
- Reserve. ‘B’ Company 2 Hertfordshire Regiment cooked also for Landing Craft Obstacle Clearance Unit. 151 men.
- RE. 89 Field Company also cooked for 180 Field Company and 51 Mechanical Equipment Detachment.
- Medical Area. All medical units pooled their resources and cooked for 233 men.
- Command Post personnel were cooked for by cooks from 75 Pioneer Company.
- Beach Group Headquarters was cooked for by the Quartermaster and cooks from 2 Hertfordshire Regiment.
- Main Beach Signal Station was cooked for by cooks from Headquarters Company 2 Hertfordshire Regiment.
- 8 Port Operating Group. Headquarters, 1025, 1035 and 1043 Port Operating Companies and 1052 Port Maintenance Company pooled their resources to feed 1438 men.
- REME, 536 GT Company RASC, 75 and 280 Pioneer Companies, 240 Provost Company, 183 and 583 Field Companies RE, RAF, 81 Assault Squadron/’C’ Squadron Westminster Dragoons all made their own arrangements.


The Stores Programme.
On D Day four LCTs arrived. Three each carried 185 tons of ammunition and 15 tons of RE stores. The fourth carried 161 tons of Petrol, 17 tons of RE Stores and 22 tons of water. These four craft beached and dried out. They were unloaded by the Beach Companies and the loads moved to the Initial Dump Area by transport as it became available.

Four coasters arrived and anchored off shore. They were not to be completely discharged on D Day but if possible:
- Coaster 1 would unload 25 tons of smoke ammunition, 18 tons of supplies, 10 tons of water, 30 tons of airfield construction material, 5 tons of signals stores and 12 tons of G1098 stores.
- Coaster 2 would unload 45 tons of ammunition, 24 tons of supplies, 26 tons of airfield construction material and 5 tons of G1098 stores.
- Coaster 3 would unload 100 tons of ammunition.
- Coaster 4 would unload 62 tons of ammunition, 12 tons of supplies, 8 tons of water, 16 tons of airfield construction material and 3 tons of G1098 stores.

Twelve LBV arrived. Numbers 1 to 6 and numbers 10 to 12 each carried 50 tons of ammunition. Number 7 carried 50 tons of petrol. Numbers 8 and 9 each carried 13 tons of ammunition, 25 tons RE Stores and 12 tons of medical stores.

This gave a total of:
1263 tons of ammunition.
211 tons of petrol.
54 tons of supplies.
112 tons of RE Stores.
40 tons of water.
72 tons of Airfield Construction material.
5 tons of signals stores.
20 tons of G1098 stores.
24 tons of medical stores.

Note that ammunition and petrol should never be mixed.

 

From the War Diary of 2 Hertfordshire Regiment.
The War Diary is fairly standard but an interesting feature is the daily weather report. It is clearly written and gives a good idea of the work of the battalion.

6 June.
Some difficulties were recorded. Owing to the beach being not more than 20 to 30 yards wide at high tide, which was at H plus 3 hours, it was very difficult to control the movement of vehicles and there was considerable congestion. Great difficulty was also experienced in the construction of tracks through the coastal belt of minefields. The main exit at the left extremity of Red Beach was still under fire at H plus 3 hours.

2 Hertfordshire had to use its infantry skills to clear parts of the Beach Group area which were still occupied by the enemy after the assault troops had passed through. During the morning a small party of men from ‘C’ Company led by two Lieutenants cleared the western end of La Riviere capturing some 12 enemy of various nationalities left behind after the initial assault passed through.

At 1400 20 men from 10 Platoon, ‘B’ Company advanced east through La Riviere. The plan was to carry out a right flank attack via the woods at 935864 with fire support from a Daimler Armoured Car stationed on the coast road at 935866. The platoon bumped a small party of enemy in the wood and 7 were made prisoner. On reaching the eastern end of the wood they were fired on from positions at 937858 and 943865. An anti tank gun firing from the former position knocked out the Daimler and only one man escaped. The platoon took up positions at the eastern end of the wood while the company commander returned to bring forward 11 Platoon and a small party from ‘D’ Company. (It is not clear where the Daimler came from, or even if it was a Daimler Armoured Car).

At 1815 No. 11 Platoon advanced from the area of the wood to the road junction 940859 covered by the remainder of the force. Shortly afterwards the remainder advanced and were mortared heavily from the positions at 937858. Subsequently the whole force was cut off in the rear by accurate machine gun fire. There was no covering fire from either army or naval sources. Three men were killed and it was impossible to withdraw. The Officer Commanding decided to hold the road junction until dark and then withdraw. Shortly afterwards a patrol from 8 Kings Regiment advanced from the east and made contact and subsequently led the platoons via the road junction 945857 to the beaches at 950863. From there the force returned along the beach to La Riviere, arriving back at 2230. During the night the two platoons of ‘B’ Company took up defensive positions in the area 935864.

During the day 300 to 400 Prisoners of War arrived in the beaches and were evacuated by Rhino Ferry to LSTs.

During the night there was slight enemy air activity and bombs were dropped in the beach area. No damage or casualties.

7 June.
‘B’ Company advanced to the eastern edge of the wood 936863 to observe enemy positions. No movement or firing were seen. During the day a Bofors 40mm LAA gun was manoeuvred into position and fired 100 rounds at the position at 937858. No results were observed. During the evening six Sherman tanks fired a total of 12 rounds of 75mm High Explosive at the same position while a platoon of ‘B’ Company advanced along the road immediately to the north. The position was searched and three prisoners taken. The position on the coastline had been evacuated.

0615. An enemy fighter aircraft was shot down in rear of Green Beach by AA fire.

1200. Beach Group Headquarters was established in the chateau in Ver sur Mer 918857. The initial reconnaissance was made by the Adjutant, Intelligence Officer, Pioneer Officer and Intelligence Serjeant. Two unexploded naval shells were discovered, one in the grounds and one in the house. The latter was removed by a Bomb Disposal Section.

During the day several cases of sniping were reported in the area of La Riviere and Ver sur Mer. Not all were confirmed.

During the day heavy traffic congestion developed due to the greatly increased number of vehicles passing across the beaches and the narrowness of the roads.

Weather cold and windy.

8 June.
0900. ‘D’ Company, less one platoon which had not yet landed, moved forward to the Ordnance Stores Dump immediately west of Crepon 8983.

1400. ‘S’ Company less antitank and pioneer platoons moved forward to the Supplies Dump at Crepon 9083. One platoon of ‘B’ Company and one platoon of ‘D’ Company were due to arrive but had not done so.

9 June.
The Wheeled, Tracked and Personnel Transit Areas closed down.

1900. The Intelligence Officer contacted a member of the French Resistance group in order to check up on civilians in Ver sur Mer. Weather improving but overcast. 12 Platoon ‘B’ Company and 17 Platoon ‘D’ Company still not arrived.

10 June.
Weather showery but later became fine and cold. There was a visit by 8 USAAF official observers to see work in the beach area and the effect of bombing by US bombers. 12 Platoon ‘B’ Company and 17 Platoon ‘D’ Company still not arrived.

11 June.
Normal transhipment of stores from coasters to dumps. Weather cloudy with light rain. King Sector was closed for unloading from 1600 to 2000 hours to enable debris, drowned vehicles and wrecked craft to be cleared away. 12 Platoon ‘B’ Company and 17 Platoon ‘D’ Company still not arrived.

12 June.
12 Platoon ‘B’ Company and 17 Platoon ‘D’ Company arrived. The delay was caused by the non arrival of sailing orders for the LSI in which they were travelling. These orders were received only on 11th June after considerable trouble. (This was SS Neuralia which had sailed from the Thames on D day and was supposed to join Convoy EWP1 from the Solent on D+2. Confusion caused by a late alteration in the schedule led to her remaining in the Solent until D+5).

Transhipment of stores and personnel across the beaches proceeded smoothly and In 24 hours 2990 tons of stores were passed through King.

2100. Seven women suspects arrested by local Gendarmes assisted by Military Police and detained in the school at Ver sur Mer pending transfer to Bayeux civil prison. Weather very fine.

During the night a fairly heavy and sustained air attack developed on the beachhead.

13 June.
‘B’ Company commenced to operate Love Green Beach, unloading LCT at the ramp at the wheeled exit 928868. The Anti Tank Platoon was now working in the DUKW Transhipment Park 930865. 35 Field Dressing Station left 9 Beach Group and moved to the Bayeux area. Weather- west wind and heavy shower in the morning. Conditions did not interrupt unloading of stores etc.

14 June.
Five Lieutenants and 37 Other ranks (first reserves) were posted to the battalion and held surplus to the establishment. Reinforcements were distributed between the infantry companies. Weather excellent.

15 June.
‘D’ Company and ‘S’ Company were relieved of duties in the Ordnance Stores Dump and Supplies Dump respectively. These companies moved to a new bivouac area in wood 915858 and commenced work on the beaches unloading stores. They were replaced by 130 Pioneer Company in the dump areas. Weather very fair. Fairly heavy air raid on the Beach Maintenance Area during the night

16 June.
Weather not good. Freshening westerly breeze made DUKW operation difficult. Air raid during night.

17 June.
An organisation was developed in the beaches for handling increased landing of personnel from LCI. This was organised under the command of a major and a captain and consisted of officers and senior NCOs working 24 hour shifts. Transport in the form of Matador MATs were provided by 113 HAA Regiment for moving men’s kit to Assembly Area Control Point at Crepon.

47 and 48 Field Surgical Units and 24 Field Transfusion Unit left 9 Beach Group and moved to forward areas. Weather poor in the day. Wind veered to north. Still fresh.

1800. 44 Pioneer Company left 9 Beach Group and moved to Bayeux area. Enemy air raid during night.

18 June
Landing of personnel from LCI continued on an increased scale. Difficulty was experienced over provision of transport for mens kits.

1415. A Memorial Service for the fallen was held at the cemetery in La Riviere 931867. Representatives from all units in 9 Beach Group attended. Weather at first cold and cloudy with north wind. Later much better with less wind. Slight enemy air raid in night. No damage or casualties.

19 June.
During the day the wind increased to gale force and swung to the north east. Unloading of stores ceased at about 100 hours. No personnel crossed the beaches. A number of small craft, LBV and LCM were washed up to the top of the beach during the evening by the high spring tides.

20 June.
The north east gale continued with low cloud. In the afternoon the clouds cleared and there was bright sunshine. The wind maintained its strength. No unloading of stores or passing of personnel across the beaches. 7 Ordnance Beach Detachment ceased to be under command 9 Beach Group. Slight enemy air activity during the night.

21 June.
‘A’, ‘B’ and ‘C’ Companies were relieved on the beaches by 36 Beach Brick. The new responsibilities of these companies were as follows:
- ‘A’ Company to Le Hamel 876865. Providing personnel for the DUKW Transhipment Area.
- ‘B’ Company to St Come de Fresne 864856. Providing personnel for the DUKW Transhipment Area.
- ‘C’ Company in Reserve at Mont Fleury 920858.
‘D’ Company, ‘S’ Company (less AT Platoon) and ‘H’ Company remain in present locations:
- ‘D’ Company to provide drivers mates for DUKWs of 536 GT Company.
- ‘S’ Company provide a reserve of personnel.
- Anti Tank Platoon to Le Hamel to provide personnel for 104 BSA Casualty Evacuation Point at 886868.

The remainder of the Beach Group were working in their present tasks under the command of 36 Beach Brick. The Signal Platoon continued to provide communications for the beach area. The reasons for the change were to provide 36 Beach Brick with fresh experience of beach work and to rest the beach companies of 2 Hertfordshire Regiment.

22 June.
9 Beach Group Military Landing Officers staff relieved by 36 Beach Brick Military Landing Officers staff in King Sector.

2100. A US Flying Fortress bomber crashed at 934860 and burst into flames, being completely wrecked. Eight, possibly nine airmen bailed out before the crash and it is possible that no aircrew remained in the aircraft. No damage or casualties to ground troops. Bomber circled Ver sur Mer two or three times before the starboard wing bent and finally dropped off as the aircraft dived to earth.

Weather. By 1400 a great improvement had taken place. The wind dropped but still in the north east.

Unloading of 23 LST on Jig Sector began at about 1600 hours. No craft were beached on King Sector. DUKWs began to work during the afternoon on King Sector.

During the night considerable air activity maintained by the enemy.

23 June.
Weather very fine. Slight northerly breeze. About 1600 this freshened considerably and clouds gathered but by 2000 the wind had dropped gain and the clouds dispersed.

Unloading of stores by 36 Beach Brick continued with three coasters and 8 LBV beached. The DUKWs outstripped the 3 tonners in the Transhipment Area, landing on average one every 4 minutes.

Only very slight enemy activity at night.

24 June.
‘S’ Company assisted ‘D’ Company to provide drivers mates for DUKWs. ‘C’ Company provided labour for DUKW Transhipment Area. Weather very fine with practically no wind.

25 June.
Nothing to report. Weather fine in the morning. Cloudy later with a few showers in the evening. No enemy air activity.

26 June.
Nothing to report. Weather very unsettled. Considerable rain during the day. South west wind. No enemy air activity.

27 June.
Nothing to report. Variable wind with showers. No enemy air activity.

28 June.
1600. Explosion of dump of enemy and own ammunition in the area of King Green Beach. Apparently caused by careless handling by unauthorised persons. Nobody killed. One Naval officer evacuated to Field Dressing Station wounded.

The Anti Tank Platoon was released from duty at the Casualty Evacuation Point and returned to ‘S’ Company bivouac area in wood 915859. Slight air activity.

29 June.
2300. Office in Charge of residues arrived on Jig. He spent the night at Le Hamel with ‘A’ Company. Remainder of the residue remained at sea during the night. South west wind with heavy thunder showers. No air activity.

30 June.
Arrival of the residues. These consist of all the Carriers Universal, Carriers Loyd and Anti Tank guns, Mortar Carriers and a proportion of the battalion Motor Transport under the Motor Transport Officer (Lieutenant). The Regimental Quartermaster Serjeant also arrived with this party. Weather, less rain than in previous day but overcast with south west wind.

2300. Enemy aircraft over the area. No damage or casualties.


War Diary.
July.

July saw the work of the Beach Groups coming to an end as more permanent organisations took over. The specialist units from the services left the Beach Group for other duties and the core 2 Hertfordshire Regiment prepared to become a front line infantry battalion. Its tactical transport had arrived at the end of June and now some internal changes were made to bring it into line with a normal establishment. However there was a great need for reinforcements and the battalion was broken up. Some individual specialists were drafted to other units but in general complete platoons were posted together.

July 1.
0215 Enemy aircraft over the area. No damage or casualties.

1430. Commanding Officer held a conference for all Company Commanders, Intelligence Officer, Motor Transport Officer, Quarter Master, Regimental Serjeant Major and Provost Serjeant to pass on information that 2 Hertfordshire Regiment would shortly be released from Beach Group work. Weather dull and showery.

July 2.
32 Field Dressing Station left the Beach Group for Bayeux. Changes to the War Establishment were put into effect. The Mortar Officer was promoted Captain. A serjeant, two lance corporals and four privates posted to ‘H’ Company as snipers. Weather dull and showery.

July 3.
Weather very bad. Misty rain in the morning. Roads flooded in certain areas.

July 4.
Nothing to report. Weather good.

July 5.
Nothing to report. Weather good.

July 6.
9 Beach Group took over the working of the beaches on King from 36 Beach Brick. Reallocation of duties as follows.
- ‘A’ Company, Beach Company. Handling personnel at the causeway 918869. Unloading of stores on King Green.
- ‘C’ Company, Beach Company. Handling of transport on the ramp 923868. Unloading of stores on King Red and Love Green.
- ‘B’ and ‘D’ Companies. Transhipment area 930865.
A Lieutenant posted to I Royal Ulster Rifles (Air Landing).
89 Field Company RE left Beach Group
Weather very fine with fresh SE breeze.

July 7, 8, 9 and 10.
Nothing to report.

July 11.
Arrival of considerable numbers of personnel and vehicles from LSI and LCT.

July 12.
0145. Enemy aircraft over the area. Some very low.

July 13.
Afternoon. All out effort in passing stores across the beaches. A record figure of 3153 tons in the 24 hours. Weather fine and mild.

July 14.
1030. In honour of the French National Day 2 Hertfordshire Regiment provided a guard of honour from ‘S’ Company which together with one from Royal Marines was mounted at the War Memorial. All the local inhabitants attended church and then, in procession, headed by two tricolour standards borne by French ex servicemen in uniform, moved to the War Memorial. Here, after the singing of the National Anthem and the Marseillaise by French schoolchildren, Colonel Commanding 104 Beach Sub Area accompanied by Commanding Officer 9 Beach group laid a wreath at the Memorial. Later the whole procession moved to the War Cemetery near the church 919854 where men who fell during the present campaign are buried. Here a wreathe presented to the Sub Area Commander by two scoll children was placed on the graves of the fallen. During the afternoon a bus service took civilians of Ver sur Mer to Meauvaines 8985 where sports and other entertainments were held.

The Adjutant was notified by 1 Royal Irish Rangers of the death of the Lieutenant who was posted to 1 Royal Irish Rifles on 6 July. He died of multiple shrapnel wounds on 10 July while serving with 1 Royal Irish Rifles east of the Orne in the British beachhead. He had volunteered to transfer to the Airborne Division.

Weather. Dull with south west wind. Low flying aircraft over the area.

July 15.
Nothing to report. Weather. South west wind, variable.

July 16.
Nothing to report. Weather. Improvement during the afternoon.

July 17.
24 Beach Recovery Section moved to Arromanches 8586 and ceased to be under command 9 Beach Group. ‘T’ RN Commando ceased to be under command 9 Beach Group and returned to the UK.

Closing of King and Love for the passing of stores, vehicles and personnel. This development resulted from the improvement of facilities at the Mulberry and Courseulles sur Mer. King and Love to be reserved for an emergency. Weather fine. Light east wind.

July 18.
Battalion employed in clearing beaches.

July 19.
Nothing to report. Weather dull in the morning, fine later.

July 20.
Parade of 2 Hertfordshire Regiment on Marine football pitch for inspection by Beach Sub Area Commander on the occasion of the breaking up of 9 Beach Group. The parade was good and the band of the Royal Marines were present. The Commander Beach Sub Area announced the possibility that the battalion might have to provide drafts for active divisions. Weather fine in the morning. Wet in the afternoon and evening.

July 21.
9 Beach Group officially disbanded. 2 Hertfordshire Regiment came under the command of 102 Beach Sub Area for administration but remained under 104 Beach Sub Area for personnel matters. Weather very bad all day, continuous rain.

July 22.
Nothing to report. Weather. Rain during morning, dull but no rain in the afternoon and evening.

July 23.
0315. German Junkers 88 crashed at 932862 during evening air raid. Believed two airmen bailed out.
0330. Barrage balloon dropped on ‘S’ Company lines in wood at 915858.
1400. Six rifle platoons drafted away to other battalions as follows.
‘A’ Company and ‘B’ Company each send two platoons to 7 Somerset Light Infantry.
‘C’ Company and ‘D’ Company each send one platoon to 1 Oxs and Bucks Regiment.
Two lieutenants posted to 2/5 Lancashire Fusiliers.
Weather. Mild, cloudy, no rain.
During night enemy aircraft were in the area.

July 24.
‘B’ Company less two platoons moved from the area of DUKW Transhipment Park to wood 915859. Weather. Much brighter, sunny during afternoon and evening. During night enemy aircraft were in the area.

July 25 and 26.
Nothing to report. Weather variable. Cloudy.

July 27.
Nothing to report. Weather variable. Cloudy. Gusts of great intensity.

July 28.
A serjeant and private of Pioneer Platoon both killed instantly while clearing a minefield at 914860. The minefield was laid with 75mm shell type mines which had been partly cleared so that two cows could be disposed of. A lane right through the field was being completed when the accident happened while defusing one of the shells.

29 July.
Four rifle platoons drafted away as reinforcements to other battalions as follows:
‘A’ Company and ‘C’ Company each send one platoon to 1 Suffolk Regiment.
‘B’ Company and ‘D’ Company each send one platoon to 2 Warwickshire Regiment.

30 and 31 July.
Nothing to report.


Some snippets from Daily Orders.
Local purchase of food.
‘An acute shortage of commodities and in particular food and fuel exists. It is of vital importance that all available stocks should be conserved and redistributed when possible. It is equally important that any inflation resulting from uncontrolled expenditure by troops should be avoided. Until further orders all ranks are forbidden to make any individual purchases whatsoever from civilian sources in liberated territory’.
(Did anyone take notice of this? Pretty well all private diaries and reminiscences mention buying local food.)

Enemy Ammunition.
‘Dumps of enemy ammunition will be wired off immediately and DANGER notices erected. Ammunition boxes and containers will not be removed. Ammunition risk is considerably aggravated by removing ammunition from its container and leaving it lying about loose’.
(This order comes after an explosion in an enemy ammunition dump. Presumably beach group personnel were emptying ammunition boxes to use in improving their bivouac areas.)

Mae West.
‘It is reported that inflatable lifebelts are being used as improvised pillows or mattresses. Officers Commanding Companies will arrange an inspection and dispose of any inflatable lifebelts to the Quarter Master.’

Jerrycans.
‘Quantities of jerrycans have been seen laying about and some are even being used to revet bivouacs, a practice which must cease. All empty jerricans must be handed in in exchange for a full one.’

Vehicle Markings (26 June).
‘The white cross on the windscreen of Beach Group vehicles will be replaced by the word ‘SUN’.’
(Sun was the name of the Beach Maintenance Area behind Gold Beach.)

NAAFI. ½ franc tokens.
‘Owing to a shortage of small change in French currency it has been decided as a temporary measure to use tokens of the denomination of ½ franc in NAAFIs. Tokens will take the form of octagonal plastic discs.’

Casualties kit.
‘Patients are arriving at medical units without kit. The following must accompany a casualty on evacuation.
- Officers personal kit up to 40lbs, steel helmet and respirator.
- Other Ranks. Small kit, greatcoat, steel helmet and respirator.’

 

10 Beach Group.
The War Diaries and appendices for 10 Beach Group are particularly detailed and give the most comprehensive account of the work of such groups in organising a beach in the early hours of an assault that is available.

Much of the detail for the first tide have already been posted above and although there is some repetition in the accounts below these have been kept to a minimum.

The following account is broken into sections, each complete in itself but also forming part of the complex story of the Beach Group.
- Firstly the core of the Beach Group. This consists of 6 Border Regiment plus those units working as an integral part, or very closely with, the battalion.
- Secondly the engineer units which were essential in clearing the beaches, constructing beach exits and improving roads.
- Thirdly the medical units which provided an essential service and worked closely with the Beach Group.


10 Beach Group was formed around 6 Border Regiment. In common with other Beach Groups the infantry battalion provided the Headquarters for the Group. Battalion Headquarters was augmented by a Staff Captain and a small staff, and by an attached detachment from 21 Army Group Movement Control Pool which provided a Military Landing Officer and his team. Battalion signals provided communications within the Beach Group, the MO and stretcher bearers augmented the beach group medical facilities and the remainder of the battalion provided organisation and labour for the beaches and temporary dump areas.

There was a strong RAMC presence consisting of:
25 Field Dressing Station.
31 Field Dressing Station.
A detachment from 3 Field Sanitary Section.
106 Surgical Team.
115 Surgical Team.
41 Field Surgical Unit.
42 Field Surgical Unit.
30 Field Transfusion Unit.
23 Port Detachment.

Plus:
10 Ordnance Beach Depot RAOC.
25 Beach Recovery Section REME.
243 Headquarters Provost Company CMP.
173 Pioneer Company.
‘Q’ RN Beach Commando.
7 Beach Signal Unit RN.
108 Beach Flight RAF.
55 Balloon Unit RAF.

The following detachments came under the command of 10 Beach Group for the landing but reverted to their parent organisations over the next 24 hours.

Reverting to Commander RE at H + 90 minutes
Detachment 90 Field Company RE.
Detachment 69 Field Company RE.
Detachment 73 Field Company RE.
Detachment 623 Field Park Company RE.
Detachment 51 Mechanical Equipment Section RE.
Detachment 23 Stores Section RE.

Reverting to 76 AA Group RA at H + 90 minutes.
Detachment 113 HAA Regiment.
Detachment 120 LAA Regiment.
Detachment 152 AAOR .

Reverting to 104 Beach Sub Area about H + 6 to 8 hours.
Detachment ‘A’ Echelon 17 Movement Control Group RE.
Detachment Headquarters 6 Port Operating Group RE.
Detachment 74 Mechanical Equipment Section (Cranes).
Detachment 953 IWT Company RE.
Detachment 961 IWT Company RE.
Detachment 104 BSA Signal Section.
Detachment 209 Pioneer Company.
Detachment 743 Pioneer Company.
Detachment Headquarters 36 Beach Group, Including Movement Control Detachment.

Reverting to CRASC 104 Beach Sub Area 0900 D + 1
Detachment 705 GT Company.
Detachment 305 GT Company.
Detachment 5 Detail Issuing Depot.
Detachment 244 Petrol Depot.


Orders.
The orders for the various elements of the Beach Group were very detailed and divided into four stages.
Stage 1. H to H + 110 minutes.
Stage 2. H + 120 minutes to H + 3 ½ hours.
Stage 3. H + 3½ hours to H + 5½ hours.
Stage 4. H + 5½ hours to H + 12 hours.


6 Border Regiment.
Stage 1. H to H + 110 minutes.
- Reconnoitre Jig Green East and Jig Green West beaches.
- Establish the beach organisation on Jig Green East and Jig Green West.
- Reconnoitre the beach exits.
- Reconnoitre 10 Beach Group Assembly Area.
- Establish a Temporary Command Post on Jig Green.
- Establish a temporary Main Beach Signal Station on Jig Green manned by 7 RN Signals.
- Establish a temporary Main Beach Signal Station at Les Roquettes, 8886, manned by 21 Beach Signals.

Initially 231 Brigade, as the assault brigade, was responsible for the passage of personnel and vehicles of the Brigade Group across the beaches and through the exits. For this purpose it had Unit Landing Officers, Military Landing Officers from 36 Beach Group, 50 Division Provosts plus Assistant Beach Masters from ‘Q’ RN Commando. Immediately the deployment of 10 Beach Group was sufficiently advanced it was to ‘render maximum assistance’ to 231 Brigade.

The main tasks of 10 Beach Group in this stage were concerned with reconnaissance of the beach area and establishing the Beach Group Assembly Area.

‘A’ Company, 6 Border Regiment together with No1 Party, ‘Q’ RN Commando, detachments from 90 Field Company and 243 Headquarters Provost Company were to land and establish the beach organisation on Jig Green West.

‘C‘ Company, 6 Border Regiment together with No3 Party, ‘Q’ RN Commando, detachments from 90 Field Company and 243 Headquarters Provost Company were to land and establish the beach organisation on Jig Green East.

The 10 Beach Group Assembly Area party were to land at approximately H+90 minutes and establish the Assembly Area. This party, and subsequently the Assembly Area, was commanded by the Staff Captain, Camouflage, RE. He was assisted by a Lieutenant, a serjeant and seven other men from ‘S’ Company, 6 Border Regiment. This was a key role at this stage as this would be the area to which all Beach Group personnel and vehicles would report on landing and wait to be sent to their operational areas and tasks. The party allotted areas to the various sub units of the Beach Group, directed new arrivals to their allotted area and held them until the situation allowed them to be fed forward to their respective tasks. In order to do this the Staff Captain, Camouflage, and his staff had to maintain an up to date situation map so they could decide which areas were ready for sub units to be forwarded to. This in turn meant that they had to be fully conversant with the tactical plan of 231 Brigade and with the code words transmitted to announce success of each stage of the plan.
The Assembly Area was also to provide a Collection Post for all Prisoners of War in the Beach Group area.

At approximately H+100 minutes 10 Beach Group Commanders Rover (a jeep with wireless set) landed with the Commander. The Rover, and its wireless operated by 21 Beach Signals on 231 Brigades ‘A’ Wave, remained in the Beach Group Assembly Area as a listening set for information on the tactical situation.

25 Beach Recovery Section landed and established a Recovery Post on each of Jig Green West and Jig Green East.


Stage 2. H + 120 minutes to H + 3 ½ hours.
- Continue the build up of the Beach Organisation.
- Establish 10 Beach Group Assembly Area.
- Land and concentrate the following sub units in 10 Beach Group Assembly Area. Beach Group Headquarters reconnaissance party, dump personnel, 25 and 31 Field Dressing Station, Command Post personnel, Beach Group Headquarters personnel and Signal Platoon 6 Border Regiment.
- Reconnoitre the Initial Dump Area.
- Reconnoitre 10 Beach Group Command Post.
- Reconnoitre 10 Beach Group Headquarters.

In the second stage 10 Beach Group assumed responsibility for the passage of all personnel and vehicles of 231 and 56 Brigades across Jig Green as far as the exits. 231 and 56 Brigades remained responsible for the passage of their respective brigades forward from the beach exits to their respective Assembly Areas. 10 Beach Group was however to ‘continue to render maximum assistance’ to both brigades forward of the exits.

The 10 Beach Group Reconnaissance Party landed to reconnoitre the Initial Dump Area, just behind the beaches. The party was composed of the Commander 10 Beach Group, Military Landing Officer, Staff Captain, Quartermaster, Officers Commanding 90 Field Company RE and 243 Headquarters Provost Company. These were to rendezvous at the Temporary Command Post on Jig Green at H+120 minutes. The Initial Dump Area consisted of sections for 1,000 tons of ammunition, 30 tons of medical supplies, 30 tons of supplies including water, 500 tons of POL plus an area for G1098 stores including motorcycles. Beach Dumps for RE Stores on Jig Green East and West were to be set up as ordered by the Officer Commanding 90 Field Company RE. Officers Commanding ‘A’ and ‘C’ Companies were to agree the areas for RE Stores on their respective beaches. Each RE Dump should hold 80 tons.

A Temporary Command Post was established centrally on Jig Green by H+120 minutes. The staff included the Assistant Military Landing Officer 10 Beach Group, Principal Beach Master ‘Q’ RN Commando or his representative, RAF Landing Officer and Assistant RAF Landing Officer plus personnel from 7 RN Signals.

Beach Dressing Stations were to be established by H+120 minutes. 25 Field Dressing Station established one on Jig Green West and 31 Field Dressing Station on Jig Green East.


Stage 3. H + 3½ hours to H + 5½ hours.
This was a particularly busy time for 10 Beach Group with most of the elements of the group being established.
- Continue the build up of 10 Beach Group.
- Establish the Initial Dump Area.
- Establish 10 Beach Group Command Post.
- Establish 10 Beach Group Headquarters.
- Reconnoitre Ammunition Depot and Petrol Depot.
- Reconnoitre Beach Maintenance Area routes.
- Establish the Medical Area.
- Reconnoitre Item Red Beach.

In Stage 3 10 Beach Group became responsible for the passage of all personnel and vehicles across the beach and through the exits on to the main forward routes. Forward routes to the Assembly Areas were signed by 50 Division Provosts.

The Battalion Assembly Areas of 231 Brigade closed down when ordered by the Staff Captain 231 Brigade and the personnel and vehicles moved forward to the Brigade Assembly Area. The DUKWs of 705 GT Company which joined the battalions in Battalion Assembly Areas only moved forwards to the cross roads at 874853, dumped preloaded ammunition and returned to the beach.

‘O’ Groups of Initial Dumps and Beach Companies rendezvoused at 10 Beach Group Assembly Area at H+3½ hours. This group included:
Commander Initial Dump Area. Staff Captain 10 Beach Group.
Commander Initial Ammunition Area. Commander 10 Beach Ordnance Detachment.
Commander Initial Supplies Area. Second in Command 5 Detail Issuing Detachment.
Commander Initial POL Area. Commander Carrier Platoon, 6 Border Regiment.
Commander Initial G1096 Area. Quartermaster 10 Beach Group.
Officer Commanding ‘A’ Company, 6 Border Regiment or representative.
Officer Commanding ‘C’ Company, 6 Border Regiment or representative.
Staff Captain RASC 10 Beach Group.
Officer from 243 Headquarters Provost Company.
Officer Commanding 705 GT Company RASC.

Immediately after the 10 Beach Group Initial Dump Area Order Conference the commanders of areas established their areas. These were to be ready to receive stores by H+6 hours. The Staff Captain 10 Beach Group co ordinated the commanders of the Initial Dump Area assisted by the Assistant Military Landing Officer 10 Beach Group (a Captain Canadian Army), the amusingly titled BOWO 10 Beach Group (Brigade Ordnance Warrant Officer), a corporal clerk RASC, a corporal clerk REME, a corporal clerk RAOC and a batman. The Commander Initial Dump Area (Staff Captain) established a Report Centre in the Initial Dump Area as soon as was practicable. All preloaded vehicles with loads for the dump area then reported their arrival and were directed to the correct area.

Labour for the Initial Dump Area included:
Ammunition and Medical area.
12 men including an officer from 10 OBD.
One Platoon ‘A’ Company, 6 Border Regiment.
One Platoon ‘C’ Company, 6 Border Regiment.
One Platoon ‘D’ Company, 6 Border Regiment.
Supply area.
3 men including an officer from 5 DID.
One section from 173 Pioneer Company.
POL area.
Carrier Platoon, 6 Border Regiment.
2 men including a Staff Serjeant from 244 Petrol Depot.
G1098 area.
Quartermaster 6 Border Regiment.
One section from 173 Pioneer Company.
One section from 173 Pioneer Company provided a reserve of labour held under the Commander Initial Dump Area.

With the Initial Dumps established the Beach Maintenance Area Dumps could be reconnoitred. Jig was to be responsible for the establishing of the Ammunition Depot and the POL Depot. Reconnaissance parties concentrated in 10 Beach Group Assembly Area and waited to be informed by the Staff Captain Camouflage when the tactical situation permitted the initial reconnaissance of the areas. The Ammunition Depot was to be ready to open for issues by 1400 hours on D+1. It would have an initial capacity of 8000 tons and have an expansion area of 150% by D+3. The POL Depot was to be ready to open for issues by 0900 hours on D+1. It would have an initial capacity of 1000 tons and have an expansion area of 500% by D+3.

The depot personnel of 5 DID and 10 OBD Stores Section landed and concentrated in 10 Beach Group Assembly Area while waiting to join the main depots in 9 Beach Groups area on King. They were to move to King when informed by the Staff Captain Camouflage that the tactical situation permitted.

In the event the Beach Maintenance Area Dumps were some twelve hours late opening. The delay was caused by the fact that the areas were not clear of the enemy until later than planned and when the dump personnel could gain access to them they often had to carry out some mopping up of enemy troops and some mine clearance.

As soon as the tactical situation allowed personnel from ‘D’ Company 6 Border Regiment, No2 Party ‘Q’ RN Commando, a detachment of 90 Field Company RE and a detachment of 243 Provost Company were to carry out a reconnaissance of Item Red Beach. When informed by the Staff Captain Camouflage that the tactical situation permitted it they were to move to Item Red by the most practicable route. Since the route must pass through or round Le Hamel, which was not secured until 1600 hours, this was delayed. It was planned that Item Red would be organised and ready to receive the personnel and vehicles of 7 Armoured Division by H+10 hours.

To receive the follow up formations expected on the second tide it was planned that 10 Beach Group Transit Areas would be established. The reconnaissance parties concentrated in 10 Beach Group Assembly Area and waited to be informed by the Staff Captain Camouflage when the tactical situation permitted the initial reconnaissance of the areas. The reconnaissance party consisted of:
Officer Commanding ‘H’ Company 6 Border Regiment who would be in command of the Transit Area.
Captain from ‘A’ Echelon, 17 Movement Control Group. This group would eventually control all forward movement from the Beach Maintenance Area.
Representative from 90 Field Company. Responsible for mine clearance and road improvement.
Representative from 243 Provost Company. Responsible for traffic control and route signing.

When the Transit Areas were established all vehicles landing were to first report to them for documentation and de waterproofing. Until this time no documentation had been carried out, although Unit Landing Officers and their party checked vehicles and personnel, and vehicles de waterproofed under unit control.

10 Beach Group Command Post was to be established at approximately H + 4½ hours. This was considerably delayed since it was to be in Le Hamel which was not secured until some four hours later. The Intelligence Officer (a Captain) from 10 Beach Group was responsible for the layout and construction of the post. The actual work was carried out by the Pioneer Platoon 6 Border Regiment with a detachment from 90 Field Company RE to clear booby traps. The Intelligence Officer informed the Temporary Command Post when the Command Post was ready for occupation. Command Post personnel then carried out a staged transfer so that command and communication functions were maintained.

10 Beach Group Command Post consisted of:
Commanding Officer (Lieutenant Colonel) with a batman a driver and an Amphibious Jeep
Second in Command (Major) with driver and Jeep
Intelligence Officer (Captain) with intelligence corporal and two other ranks
12 Signallers
Regimental Police Serjeant
ACC serjeant and 2 cooks.

Military Landing Officer’s Staff.
Military Landing Officer, Major with driver and Amphibious Jeep.
4 Assistant Military Landing Officers with 1 Jeep and driver.
Quarter Master Serjeant with motorcycle.
2 clerks, 2 checkers and 1 batman.

108 Beach Unit RAF.
Squadron Leader RAF Landing Officer with Jeep.
Landing Officer with motorcycle.
Assistant Landing Officer RAF with motorcycle.
Corporal clerk, driver and batman.

RASC.
Captain with clerk, driver and a Jeep.

6 Port Operating Group.
Port Superintendent, Major, with motorcycle.
Technical Officer, Captain
Corporal clerk and batman.

The Adjutant 10 Beach Group was responsible for the establishment of 10 Beach Group Headquarters. This was largely administrative, with the Command Post exercising operational control.



Stage 4. H + 5½ hours to H + 12 hours.
- Establish the Beach Group organisation on Item Red Beach.
- Develop Ammunition Depot and Petrol Depot.
- Reconnoitre and establish 10 Beach Group Transit Areas which will be in operation by H+10 hours.
- Receive stores into 10 Beach Group Initial Dump Area.

10 Beach Group remained responsible for all personnel and vehicles across the beaches and through the exits but after H+9 hours 104 Beach Sub Area took over responsibility for all routes in the Beach Maintenance Area from 50 Division. Personnel and vehicles landing on Jig Green continued to move forward over routes as ordered by 104 Beach Sub Area to the formation Assembly Area. Sometime after H+10 hours, on the orders of 10 Beach Group Command Post all personnel and vehicles proceeded to 10 Beach Group Transit Areas.

Receiving stores into the Initial Dump Area became an important task in Stage 4. At H+2 hours Two LCT4 landed on Jig Green West and were unloaded by ‘A’ Company, 6 Border Regiment. Two more LCT4 landed on Jig Green West and were unloaded by ‘C’ Company, 6 Border Regiment. The LCTs carry Coles Cranes which were used for unloading RE stores. The cranes reported to the RE Beach Dump on completion of this task.

Stores loaded in LCT and LBV.
CTG1. 185 tons ammunition and 15 tons RE stores, 3 3ton 4 X 4 and one Coles Crane. Jig Green West
CTG2. 185 tons ammunition and 15 tons RE stores, 4 3ton 4 X 4 and one Coles Crane. Jig Green West
CTG3. 185 tons ammunition and 15 tons RE stores, 3 3ton 4 X 4 and one Coles Crane. Jig Green East.
CTG4. 161 tons POL, 17 tons RE stores and 22 tons water, 4 3ton 4 X 4 and one Coles Crane. Jig Green East.

Totals.
855 tons ammunition.
211 tons POL.
62 tons RE Stores.
22 tons water.


More stores were landed on preloaded RASC vehicles. These reported to the G1098 Dump in the Initial Dump Area and offloaded canopies and superstructures, offloaded stores in the appropriate dump and then reported to the Staff Captain RASC at the Initial Dump Area Transport Park. Domestic vehicles of 10 Beach Group, including Beach AA units, either dumped their loads at task sites or in the G1098 Dump as appropriate, dumped canopies and superstructures and also reported to the Staff Captain RASC.

In the initial stages all Beach Group load carrying vehicles, with the possible exception of those of medical units, were to be available for moving stores to Initial Dumps. Canopies and superstructures were removed to make loading easier, particularly if cranes were used. The canopies were issued to Beach Group units for use as bivouac shelters although it is not clear if this was just the canvas or the entire tilt including frame.

The Staff Captain RASC was responsible for operating all transport placed under his command in order to fulfil the stores unloading programme.

Planned availability of transport.
Once the following vehicles had unloaded they became available for use by 10 Beach Group for moving stores to dumps. Those landing from LCT were likely to be on time. Those landing by Rhino Ferry were unlikely to land at the time given.
H+120 minutes.
One 3ton 4 X 4 from 6 Border Regiment. Signals. Land from LCT.
H+4½ hours.
Two 3ton 4 X 4 from ‘A’ and ‘C’ Companies, 6 Border Regiment. Land by Rhino ferry.
H+6 hours.
Three 3ton 4 X 4 from Signals and ‘B’ and ‘D’ Companies, 6 Border Regiment. Land by Rhino Ferry.
Fourteen 3ton 4 X 4 from 305 GT Company RASC. Land from LCT carrying stores.
Twenty four 3ton 4 X 4 from 305 GT Company RASC. Land by Rhino Ferry.
H+10 hours.
Six 3ton 4 X 4 from 305 GT Company RASC. Land by Rhino Ferry.
H+12½ hours.
Six 3ton 4 X 2 and three 3ton 4 X 4 from 113 HAA Regiment. Land by Rhino Ferry.
Three 3ton 4 X 4 from 152 AAOR. Land by Rhino Ferry.
H+19½ hours.
Three 3ton 4 X 4 from ‘H’ and ‘S’ Companies, 6 Border Regiment. Land from LCT.
Two 3ton 4 X 4 from 51 ME Section RE. Land from LCT.
One 3ton 4 X 4 from 5 DID. Land from LCT.
Nine 3ton 4 X 2 and one 3ton 4 X 4 from 112 HAA Regiment. Land by Rhino Ferry.

The following might be available if the medical situation allowed.
H+6 hours.
Four 3ton 4 X 4 from 25 FDS and 42 FSU. Landing by Rhino Ferry.
Four 3ton 4 X 4 from 31 FDS and 41 FSU. Landing by Rhino Ferry.
H+19½ hours.
Two 3ton 4 X 4 from 25 and 31 FDS. Land from LCT.

Eight DUKWs awaiting unloading in the Initial DUKW Standing received priority for unloading and was to be called forward as soon as the Initial Dump Area was ready to receive them. They then reverted to 705 GT Company and were to be ready to transfer to King. DUKWs which landed subsequently, except those under the command of 56 Brigade, proceeded to the Initial DUKW Standing on the beach and receive priority for unloading.

A Transit Headquarters was established for the Tactical Headquarters of the Follow Up and Build Up formations. This was established adjacent to the MBSS. The Intelligence Officer 10 Beach Group allocated accommodation and kept an up to date situation map for the information of formation staff.

10 Beach Group established the Beach Group Transit Areas to begin operation by H +10 hours. These were commanded by the Officer Commanding ‘H’ Company 6 Border Regiment with a staff of:
Two men from ‘H’ Company, 6 Border Regiment.
Three men from ‘S’ Company, 6 Border Regiment. Including the Officer Commanding.
Eight men from ‘C’ Company, 6 Border Regiment.
Five men from ‘A’ Echelon 17 Movement Control Group. Including an officer.
Half section from 243 Headquarters Provost Company.


Stage 5. H+12 hours onwards.
- Complete the build up of 10 Beach Group.
- Implement the 1st Key Plan in full or part as ordered by Headquarters 104 Beach Sub Area.

All personnel and vehicles now passed through 10 Beach Group Transit Areas. All troops landing in the third tide onwards moved from the Transit Areas in small parties to a section of Assembly Area West. Routes to this Assembly Area were be signed by 10 Beach Group provosts. After the 4th tide 10 Beach Group Transit Areas were to close down but remain as de waterproofing areas. In the event the Transit Areas closed down altogether on D+2 and de waterproofing was done on LSTs, Rhinos or at the beach exits. Documentation was carried out by Assembly Area West.

Seven LBV beach on Jig Green East at approximately H+12½ hours. ‘C’ Company 6 Border Regiment were responsible for unloading. BVGs 1 to 6 each carried 50 tons of ammunition. BVG7 carried 50 tons POL.

When the main depots were ready to receive commodities delivery to the Initial Dump Area will ceased. This should have been early on D+1 but was delayed by some twelve hours. When the main depots were ready to issue all issues from the Initial Dump Area ceased. Remaining stocks were transferred as transport was available.

The priority for issue from the Initial depots on D Day was for ammunition. Petrol was only to be drawn on the evening of D day as an emergency. D Day withdrawals were to be complete by first light on D+1. The Drawing Route were reconnoitred and signed by 243 Headquarters Provost Company. This was to avoid the main forward routes so as not to hinder the movement of personnel and vehicles inland. Officer Commanding 243 Provost Company was responsible for notifying 10 Beach Group Command Post when this task has been completed and issue could commence.

The development of Ammunition and POL Depots was to continue with all urgency. The initial allotment of labour for the ammunition dump was ‘B’ Company 6 Border Regiment (less one platoon still working in the initial dump) and 68 Pioneer Company (les one section at the petrol depot). The platoon from ‘B’ Company working on the initial dump will join the Ammunition Depot immediately the Initial Dump Area closes for receipts. The initial allotment of labour for the Petrol Depot was the Anti Tank Platoon 6 Border Regiment, the Mortar Platoon 6 Border Regiment (less the party at 10 Beach Group Assembly Area) and a section from 68 Pioneer Company. Early on D+1 on the orders of 10 Beach group Command Post the following will join the Petrol Depot, the Carrier Platoon 6 Border Regiment and the party of the Mortar Platoon working at the Initial Dump Area. Ammunition and Petrol Depots will report to 104 Beach Sub Area and 10 Beach Group Command Post by the quickest means the time they will be ready to receive ammunition and petrol. Demands for extra labour were to be made to the Labour Master 104 Beach Sub Area.

Defence.
In the event of a direct attack on 10 Beach Group Sector the beach group was to establish a defence island based on Asnelles sur Mer and Le Hamel. Second in Command 6 Border Regiment reconnoitred the defensive position after landing. He then issued a trace allotting defence areas to sub units by H+12 hours. The code word to take up defensive positions was ‘Bug’.

Beach AA, 55 Balloon Unit RAF and Smoke Detachments were also to deploy as shown on trace.


Company Orders.
‘A’ and ‘C’ Company orders are identical except that ‘A’ Company was to land on Jig Green West and ‘C’ Company on Jig Green East.

Stage 1. H to H + 110 minutes.
- Liaise with assault infantry battalions and with officers of 36 Beach Group who have already landed for control of the exits.
- Reconnoitre the beach and exits in conjunction with platoon commander 90 Field Company RE and 243 Headquarters Provost Company.
- Establish Beach Company Headquarters.
- Give maximum assistance in passing 231 Brigade across the beach.
- Reconnoitre and confirm sites for Beach Dressing Station RAMC and Beach Recovery Post REME.

Stage 2. H + 120 minutes to H + 3 ½ hours.
- Control all personnel and vehicles of 231 Brigade across the beach as far as the exits.
- Maintain constant liaison with Unit Landing Officers and officers of 36 Beach Group on exits.
- Direct all Beach Group personnel who are not detached for work on the beach to Beach Group Assembly Area.
- Craft Recovery Units RN lands and will be administered by ‘A’ and ‘C’ Company.

Stage 3. H + 3½ hours to H + 5½ hours.
- Officer Commanding attends ‘O’ Group at Beach Group Assembly Area at H + 4 hours.
- Provide one platoon for work in initial stores dump. To report there when ordered by Beach Group Commander.
- Control movement of all personnel across the beach and through the exits to Brigade Assembly Area.
- Prepare for the receipt of approximately 500 tons of stores in two LCT(4) and three LBV beaching on Jig Green West.

Stage 4. H + 5½ hours to H + 12 hours.
- Unload and clear to the initial dump area all stores in LCT and LBV.
- Pass all Follow Up and Build Up troops and vehicles across the beaches and through the exits to Formation Assembly Areas.
- After H + 10 hours, when ordered by Beach Group Control Post, all personnel and vehicles will pass through Beach Group Transit Areas.
- Provide two men per balloon to assist 55 Balloon Unit with winches arriving on LSTs.


‘D’ Company’s orders concerned its preparing Item Red Beach for the arrival of 7 Armoured Division.
Stage 1. H to H + 110 minutes.
- Officer Commanding and reconnaissance party will land on Jig Green East and proceed to the Beach Group Assembly Area.

Stage 2. H + 120 minutes to H + 3½ hours.
- A proportion of the company arrives and reports to Officer Commanding at Beach Group Assembly Area.

Stage 3. H + 3½ hours to H + 5½ hours.
- On being informed by the Officer Commanding Beach Group Assembly Area (Staff Captain RE, Camouflage) that the tactical situation permits the Officer Commanding ‘D’ Company and reconnaissance parties will carry out reconnaissance of Item Red Beach. Reconnaissance parties from 90 Field Company RE, 243 Headquarters Provost Company and ‘Q’ RN Beach Commando.

Stage 4. H + 5½ hours to H + 12 hours.
- The Build Up of ‘D’ Company will land and proceed to the Beach Group Assembly Area.
- On completion of reconnaissance Officer Commanding ‘D’ Company will call forward personnel from the Beach Group Assembly Area to Item Red Beach as required for clearance and preparation of the beach for the passage of personnel and vehicles.

From H + 12 hours.
- ‘D’ Company fully deployed and established for passing of personnel and vehicles of 7 Armoured Division landing on Item Red.
- Continuous systematic development and clearance of the beach.


10 Beach Group 2nd tide

On the second tide it was planned that the LSTs would be ready to discharge their vehicles and that the beach would be ready to receive them. Most of the Beach Group personnel and equipment were ashore so only a small number would be landing on the second tide. However those LSTs which were towing Rhino Ferries were also carrying the personnel and equipment required to operate them.

A small number of personnel and equipment were scheduled to land on King and then transfer to Jig Green. These included:
12 DUKWs with 26 men from 705 GT Company RASC.
1 15cwt and 2 men from 243 Provost Company.
18 men with six balloons and hand winches from 55 Balloon Unit RAF.

Landing on Jig at H +12½ hours. were 31 DUKWs, 1 15cwt water, 2 15cwt GS and 144 men from 705 GT Company RASC. 6 DUKWs were carried on the davits of LSTs. All DUKWs were preloaded..

At H + 19½ hours administrative vehicles and personnel for the Beach Group units landed from LCT(3)s..
1 3ton and 33 men from 108 RAF Beach Section.
1 3ton 4 X 4, 1 15cwt water and 8 men from 31 Field Dressing Station.
1 Jeep, 2 15cwt, 1 3ton 4 X 4 and 8 men from Support Company, 6 Border Regiment.
2 3ton 4 X 4 and 3 men from Headquarters Company, 6 Border Regiment.
1 3ton 4 X 4 and 35 men from 5 Detail Issue Depot.
15cwt water, 3ton 4 X 4 and 8 men from 25 Field Dressing Station.
4 Jeeps and 4 men from 243 Headquarters Provost Company.
3 ton and 20 men from 244 Petrol Depot. Trailer pump carried on 3ton.
15cwt and 13 men from 10 Ordnance Beach Depot. Includes two men for Port Detachment RAMC.

Landing from LSTs at the same time were Landing from LST.
2 X BARV, 4 X D8 Tractors, 4 X Breakdown Tractor, 4 X 20 ton trailer, 1 DUKW, 1 jeep and 36 men from 25 Beach Recovery Section.
286 men from 68 Pioneer Company.

 

Medical Units.

Stage 1. H to H + 110 minutes.
Beach Dressing Stations, formed from the Light Sections of 25 and 31 Field Dressing Stations, were established on Jig Green West and Jig Green East. Three Jeeps per Beach Dressing Station landed at approximately H+90 minutes and remained in the beach area for the rapid collection of casualties and delivering them to the Beach Dressing Stations.

Stage 2. H + 120 minutes to H + 3½ hours.
Beach Dressing Stations proceeded with the collection and treatment of casualties. Reconnaissance parties from 10 Beach Group Medical Area landed and proceeded to 10 Beach Group Assembly Area. When the tactical situation permitted they proceeded to reconnoitre the medical area.

Stage 3. H + 3½ hours to H + 5½ hours.
The marching parties of 25 and 31 Field Dressing Stations landed and proceeded to 10 Beach Group Assembly Area from where they were led forward by a runner from the reconnaissance parties already landed. 10 Beach Group medical area then took over all casualties which were already nested in the medical area from the assault Field Ambulances, which moved forward with their formations. The medical area now opened for the receipt of all casualties.

Stage 4. H + 5½ hours to H + 12 hours.
The build up of 25 and 31 Field Dressing Stations continued. Surgical teams landed. The Casualty Evacuation Post landed at H+6 hours. The Advanced Surgical Centre was established by H+10 hours. Medical accommodation was completed by H+10 hours. Evacuation of casualties commenced at H+10 hours approximately. In the event the establishment of the Casualty Evacuation Point was delayed because the area was still held by the enemy.

Stage 5. H + 12 hours onwards.
10 Beach Group medical area was built up by the addition of the Casualty Clearing Station.

On D+4 a General Hospital of 200 beds was due be established.


The medical facilities centred on two Field Dressing Stations, 25 and 31 to which were added small specialist units. Each of the Field Dressing Stations provided a Beach Dressing Station for each of Jig Green East and Jig Green West formed from Light Sections. The remainder consisting of the heavy sections plus specialist units formed a Joint Medical Area under the command of the Officer Commanding 25 Field Dressing Station.

The Heavy Section of 25 Field Dressing Station together with 41 and 42 Field Surgical Units, 106 and 115 Surgical Teams and 30 Field Transfusion Unit formed an Advanced Surgical Centre. 10 Section 209 Pioneer Company provided labour for erecting tents, digging slit trenches, storing casualties arms and equipment and stretcher bearing. The Heavy Section of 31 Field Dressing Station established a Field Dressing Station on the same site with the assistance of 9 Section 209 Pioneer Company. The Joint Medical Area was to be established and ready to receive casualties by H plus 4½ hours.

Beach Dressing Stations were to open earlier, by H plus 120 minutes. On Jig Green West the Beach Dressing Station was formed by the Light Section of 25 Field Dressing Station with the addition of the Medical Officer and ten stretcher bearers from 6 Border Regiment and the assistance of 8 Section 209 Pioneer Company. On Jig Green East the Beach Dressing Station was formed by the Light Section of 31 Field Dressing Station with the addition of the Medical Officer from 119 HAA Regiment plus a serjeant and ten stretcher bearers from 6 Border Regiment and the assistance of 3 Section 209 Pioneer Company.

A Casualty Evacuation Post was established near the Beach Dressing Station on Jig Green West. A detachment from 3 Field Dressing Station with 6 and 7 sections 209 Pioneer Company landed about H plus six hours. There are some discrepancies in the timings for the establishment of the Post but it was delayed until the area was cleared of the enemy. It was probably established around H plus twelve hours with the evacuation of casualties starting an hour later.

The Officer Commanding the Casualty Evacuation Post was assisted by the Medical Officer 8 Port Operating Group landed on the second tide and reported to the Casualty Evacuation Point. He was to be responsible for the medical attention of all cases awaiting evacuation, to assist the Officer Commanding and act as a relief for him.


The Field Dressing Station was a mobile and flexible unit. It could be used in a variety of ways. They were very effective when working as Advanced Surgical Centres with a Field Surgical Unit and a Field Transfusion Unit attached. Field Dressing Stations were also useful when increasing the capacity of Casualty Clearing Stations. On the beaches they were used to fill four roles, the Surgical Centre, the Dressing Station for less serious cases, the Beach Dressing Station and the Casualty Evacuation Point.

A Field Dressing Station had two sections, a Heavy Section and a Light Section. The Light Section was intended to be stationed further forward and act as a triage point, retaining and treating less serious cases and passing the more serious back to the Heavy Section. Light Sections formed the Beach Dressing Station in each beach group and the Casualty Evacuation Point.

A Light Section was commanded by a Medical Officer who could be a Major, Captain or Lieutenant. There were fifteen other personnel including a serjeant nursing orderly, a hospital cook, a corporal nursing orderly, five nursing orderlies, general dutyman, four stretcher bearers, a driver IC and cook ACC. Transport was limited to one 3ton GS lorry for the stores and equipment.

The heavy section was much larger and provided administration for the light section also. A Major was Officer Commanding and there were two other medical officers who could be Major, Captain or Lieutenant. There was also a non medical subaltern for administration, and a quartermaster.
Other personnel included:
staff Serjeant
serjeant clerk
serjeant dispenser
serjeant hospital cook
2 X serjeant nursing orderly
serjeant nursing orderly for duty as storeman for stewards store.
cook
hospital cook
lance corporal nursing orderly
12 X nursing orderly
2 X ambulance nursing orderly
nursing orderly as barber
3 X nursing orderly as batman
2 X corporal general duties
lance corporal general duties
corporal passive air defence and anti gas duties
private passive air defence and anti gas duties
lance corporal linen storeman
corporal pack storeman
stewards storeman
sanitary dutyman
water dutyman
plus attached:
carpenter and joiner RE
15 X driver IC RASC
electrician RASC
motorcyclist RASC
transport serjeant RASC
transport corporal RASC
corporal vehicle mechanic RASC
2 X cook ACC
Vehicles, not all of which were landed initially.
2 X bicycle
2 X motorcycle
1 X car 2seater 4 X 2
1 X car 4seater 4 X 2
1 X 15cwt water
7 X 3ton 4 X 2 GS
2 X ambulance 4 stretcher.

The Field Surgical Unit was intended to be attached to another unit such as the Field Dressing Station. It consisted of:
Major, Specialist in Surgery
Captain or Lieutenant, Graded Anaesthetist
Lance corporal nursing orderly
2 X operation room assistant
2 X nursing orderly
batman
3 X driver RASC
1 X Car 4 seater for officers kit, batmen and replenishment of surgical supplies.
1 X 3ton GS for theatre, technical equipment and supplies, fitted with half a penthouse.
1 X 3ton GS for beds, mattresses etc

 

90 Field Company RE.
90 Field Company RE was under the command of 10 Beach Group for the initial stages but reverted to Commander RE 104 Beach Sub Area. However most of he work that it carried out was in 10 Beach Group area and was concerned with the development, improvement and maintenance of Jig Green and Item Beaches.

Operation Order No1. 27 May.
‘90 Field Company will do all RE work necessary to get transport off Jig, and later Item, beaches.’

There were initially three elements, one to land on Jig Green East, one to land on Jig Green West and one in Reserve.

Jig Green East.
No 3 Platoon of 90 Field Company landed together with ‘C’ Company Border Regiment (Beach Group). Working with , and under command of, 90 Field Company were three sections of 173 Pioneer Company, three dozers from ‘B’ Detachment 51 Mechanical Equipment Section and a dumper from 51 Mechanical Equipment Section.

Jig Green West.
No 2 Platoon of 90 Field Company landed together with ‘A’ Company Border Regiment (Beach Group). Working with , and under command of, 90 Field Company were two sections of 173 Pioneer Company, two dozers from ‘B’ Detachment 51 Mechanical Equipment Section and a dumper from 51 Mechanical Equipment Section.

In reserve were No 1 Platoon of 90 Field Company, two sections of 173 Pioneer Company, the remainder of ‘B’ Detachment 51 Mechanical Equipment Section and 23 Stores Section.

The initial tasks, in order of priority, were
No 3 Platoon.
- Assist 73 Field Company to complete the clearance or crossing of obstacles below the high water mark.
- Improve and maintain one heavy and one light tracked exits from the left half of the beach. The light tracked exit was to be suitable for DUKWs by H+2½ hours.
- Construct and maintain one wheeled exit by H+4 hours.
- Clear, repair and maintain the coast road.
- Construct and maintain a beach lateral above high water mark by H+9 hours.
No 3 Platoon would then take over the work of No 2 Platoon and maintain all exits, coast road and beach lateral on Jig Green East. In addition it was to
- Clear mines and obstacles from Jig Green East.
- Clear, repair and maintain the coast road eastwards towards King Beach.

No 2 Platoon.
- Assist 73 Field Company to complete the clearance or crossing of obstacles below the high water mark.
- Improve and maintain one heavy and one light tracked exits from the left half of the beach. The light tracked exit was to be suitable for DUKWs by H+2½ hours.
- Construct and maintain one wheeled exit by H+4 hours.
- Clear, repair and maintain the coast road.
- Construct and maintain a beach lateral above high water mark by H+9 hours.
At this point No2 Platoon handed over its maintenance tasks to No 3 Platoon and then
- In conjunction with the Officer Commanding ‘D’ Company Border Regiment reconnoitre Item Red Beach.
- Construct one wheeled exit 18 foot wide at 169264, two tracked exits between 163263 and 165263 and one wheeled entry at 176265.
- Take over the maintenance of wheeled exit from No 1 Platoon.
- Clear mines and booby traps.
- Construct a tracked exit at 152266.

No 1 Platoon.
- Construct and maintain one wheeled exit at 174265 byH+6 hours.
- Clear mines and booby traps and repair all roads by H+6.
- Reconnoitre and mark minefield 168264 to 169264 by H+10 hours.
- Clear mines an booby traps by H+10 hours.
- Establish water point at 175253 before 1200 D+1.

23 Stores Section.
- Offload trailers bogged down below high water mark and carry stores above high water mark. One section of pioneers allocated to 1 Platoon may assist.
- Assist offloading of stores from LCMs.
- Clear RE Beach Dump Area near wheeled exit on Jig Green West.
- With Pioneer Labour and 90 Field Company transport ferry RE stores to RE Beach Dump Area.
- Layout and organise RE Beach Dump.

Stores.
At H Hour seven LCM each land 200 yards Somerfeld or chespale track and 12 yards Pierced Steel Planking.

At H+60 minutes LCT(IV)s land trailers loaded with trackway material and towed by RE dozers. Two Freihof trailers for No 2 Platoon and three for No 3 Platoon. Each trailer is loaded with
50 yards Pierced Steel Planking on double hessian.
75 yards Sommerfeld track on double 4’ 6” chespale.
25 yards Sommerfeld track on hessian.
One 26’ set Amacore 1’ 6” diameter.
6 sledgehammers
8 flexiboards
150 X 2’ pickets.
50 X 3’ pickets.
Picks, shovels and wirecutters.

At H+90 minutes two more Freihof trailers towed by tractors of 25 Recovery Section REME land trackway material for No 3 Platoon. Each trailer carries
300 yards Somerfeld track on hessian.
150 X 2’ pickets.
50 X 3’ pickets.
Picks, shovels and wirecutters.

Two dumpers land, one for each of Nos 2 and 3 Platoons. Each carries 50 yards of 4’ 6” chespale track.

Two 20 ton trailers towed by Matador MATs, one for each of Nos 2 and 3 Platoons, land. Each carries.
25 yards Pierced Steel Planking on double hessian.
250 yards double 4’ 6” chespale track.
250 yards Somerfeld track on CI.
100 yards Somerfeld track on hessian.
One 26’ set Amacore 1’ 6” diameter.
20 sledgehammers
12 flexiboards
525 X 2’ pickets.
175 X 3’ pickets.

At H+6 hours twelve 3ton GS lorries from 305 GT Company RASC land. Each carries
50 yards of Somerfeld track on chespale.
50 yards of Somerfeld track on hessian.
150 X 2’ pickets.
50 X 3’ pickets.
2 sledgehammers.

A tipper from 90 Field Company lands loaded with explosives.
16 Wades.
50 Beehives.
250 lbs of ammonal.
500 lbs of 808.
224 lbs of guncotton.

Nos 2 and 3 Platoon each unload two Freihof trailers before H+90 minutes. HQ and 3 Platoon winch trucks will report to 3 Platoon on landing and stand by to ferry stores to above High Water Mark. Nos 1 and 2 Platoons winch trucks will on landing stand by to ferry destroyed underwater obstacles.


War Diary.
Detailed RE planning based on the Assault Brigade plan was prepared and the phasing in of transport and stores was arranged in detail. As the landing was to take place in the most difficult combination of beach and ground – soft clay beaches under thin sand with peat outcrops and peat marshes in the hinterland – some training was arranged for all ranks at Brancaster, where similar conditions exist.

During May frantic attempts were made to bring the company up to 100% in stores and vehicles. This was never achieved but deficiencies were covered by improvisation.

The Officer Commanding was not impressed by the Marshalling Area sub camp of which he wrote ‘all domestic affairs were arranged by the permanent staff whose interest, when discernable, was naturally impersonal. He was however impressed by the briefings:
18 May by CRE 104 BSA.
19 May by Commander 231 Brigade.
21 May by Commanding Officer 10 Beach Group.
25 May by Commander 50 Division.

For the assault the company was divided into four groups:
Assault. 211 personnel, 8 handcarts and 12 vehicles.
2nd tide. 15 personnel, 7 vehicles and 2 Stella trailers.
D+4. 10 personnel and 5 vehicles.
Up to D+17. 20 personnel and 17 vehicles.


At H Hour reconnaissance officers were to land from LCT(A)s carrying Centaur SP guns. The craft were overcome by rough weather and the reconnaissance officers arrived two or three days later.

At H+30 2 and 3 Platoon reconnaissance officers landed with the reconnaissance and mine clearing parties. They landed on time and found Le Hamel still strongly held. Never the less parties, using whatever cover they could, got on with the reconnaissance of exits and clearance.

At H+60 2 and 3 Platoon working parties were due to land. Some were late. Bulldozers towing RE stores were also due to land. Work was held up by enemy fire from the village for an hour.

At H+90 the Officer Commanding landed. His truck was drowned and he waded ashore. Wheeled transport landed. It was put down on the wrong side of a runnel, on clay and among underwater obstacles with a four foot sea running. Most of this transport was drowned and was overcome by the rapid rising tide. One man was drowned. Commenced constructing beach exits on Jig Green East.

H+120 minutes. The reserve platoon, stores section and marching party of the company headquarters were due to land but arrived late. No 2 Platoon commenced construction of one wheeled and one tracked exit on Jig Green East. No 3 Platoon commenced construction of one wheeled and one tracked exit on Jig Green West, re instating crater and widening the main coast road.

H+5 hours. No 1 Platoon reconnaissance party landed and endeavoured to reach the village to breach the sea wall but failed as the village was still held by the enemy. Constructed one DUKW entrance and exit on Jig Green West. Headquarters Platoon landed and assists 2 and 3 Platoons on Jig Green Beach.

H+6 hours. No 2 Platoon commences one wheeled and one tracked exit on Item Beach. Remainder of day the rest of the company maintain Jig Green East and West.

Casualties:
One driver drowned.
Three ORs wounded by sniper fire.
Two Lieutenants and four ORs from reconnaissance parties missing. Should have landed with a Carrier and a M14.
Vehicle casualties:
3 X 3ton winch
2 X 15 cwt compressor
2 X jeep
1 X M14
2 X motorcycle.


June 7.
0200. No 2 Platoon completed one wheeled and one tracked exit on Item beaches then commenced to widen the wheeled exit for two way traffic.

0400. The second tide vehicles land, five 3ton, water truck, 15cwt and White Scout Car, with the balance of G1098 equipment and water point equipment.

0600. No 1 Platoon commenced construction of the water point.

1400 No 1 Platoon completed water point at site of hospital at Le Hamel with an estimated yield of 10,000 gallons a day.

For the remainder of the day:
1 Platoon constructed one wheeled and personnel exit on Jig Green West.
2 Platoon completed widening and maintaining exits on Item beaches.
3 Platoon constructed one wheeled exit, widened a stretch of coast road and laid a beach lateral on Jig Green East.
Headquarters reconnoitred and set up Company Headquarters and commenced normal company administration.

Casualties: 2 OR with facial injuries from schumine while clearing mines from exit.

June 8.
No 1 Platoon. Maintain water point and commenced ramp through sea wall to coast road for exit from causeway on Jig Green West.
No 2 Platoon. Maintain Item beaches and commenced a ramp on Item beach.
No 3 Platoon. Maintain Jig Beaches and construct one wheeled exit on Jig Green East. Continued widening coast road and lengthened beach lateral on Jig Green East.
Headquarters. Reinstated bomb craters in Asnelles, cleared roads of telephone and electrical supply cable, established telephonic communication to platoons plus normal company administration.
Lieutenant and 2 ORs arrive having being delayed.

June 9.
No 1 Platoon. Maintain water point and continued construction of the ramp through sea wall to coast road for exit from causeway on Jig Green West.
No 2 Platoon. Maintain Item beaches and continue construction of the ramp on Item beach.
No 3 Platoon. Maintain Jig Beaches and continue construction of one wheeled exit on Jig Green East, widening coast road and extend the beach lateral to Jig Red beach.
Headquarters. Extended telephonic communication to 51 Mechanical Equipment Section, commenced reconnaissance of minefields in Beach group area, plus normal company administration.

One OR casualty, facial injuries clearing mines from beach exits.
Lieutenant and 2 ORs arrive having being delayed.

June 10.
No 1 Platoon. Maintain water point and continued construction of the ramp through sea wall to coast road for exit from causeway on Jig Green West.
No 2 Platoon. Maintain Item beaches and continue construction of the ramp on Item beach.
No 3 Platoon. Maintain Jig Beaches and continue construction of one wheeled exit on Jig Green East, commenced one tracked exit on Jig Green and continued work on the beach lateral.
Headquarters. Continued reconnaissance of minefields in Beach group area, commenced reconnaissance of engineer resources plus normal company administration.

One OR casualty, burnt filling hydra burner.

Hydra burners were used for cooking in small units. It resembled a large primus stove. It was filled with paraffin and pressured up using a foot pump. It should be used with a shallow trench covered with steel plates. Flame is shot from the stove, along the trench and thus heats the metal plates. Dixies of food can then be placed on the plates for cooking. They had a reputation for exploding.

June 11.
No 1 Platoon. Maintain water point and continued construction of the ramp through sea wall to coast road for exit from causeway on Jig Green West. Commenced producing concrete for ramp.
No 2 Platoon. Maintain Item beaches, continued construction of the ramp on Item beach, commenced reconstruction of roads in Le Hamel.
No 3 Platoon. Maintain Jig Beaches, completed one tracked exit on Jig green, commenced widening exits and continued work on the beach lateral.
Headquarters. Continued reconnaissance of minefields in Beach group area, reconnaissance of engineer resources plus normal company administration.

June 12.
No 1 Platoon. Maintain water point and continued construction of the ramp through sea wall to coast road for exit from causeway on Jig Green West, production of concrete, reconstruction and maintenance of 300 yards of coast road on Jig Green West.
No 2 Platoon. Maintain Item beaches, continued construction of the ramp on Item beach, reconstruction of roads in Le Hamel, construction of roads in initial dumping area and production of hardcore for all the roads being maintained by the company.
No 3 Platoon. Maintain Jig Beaches, beach salvage and obstacle clearance, widening tracked exit on Jig Green East and continued work on the beach lateral.
Headquarters. Continued reconnaissance of minefields in Beach Group area and engineer resources plus normal company administration.

June 13.
No 1 Platoon. Maintain water point, completed ramp to causeway on Jig Green West, constructed DUKW exit on Jig Green West, improved coast road on Jig Green West.
No 2 Platoon. Maintain Item beaches, completed concrete ramp to causeway on Item Red East, continued roads in initial dump area and production of hardcore, also commenced one wheeled exit on Item Red east.
No 3 Platoon. Maintain Jig Beaches, beach salvage and obstacle clearance, widening tracked exit on Jig Green East and continued work on the beach lateral.
Headquarters. Reconnaissances completed as far as possible. Normal company administration.

Half of coast road to La Riviere allotted to 90 Field Company for maintenance. D+4 transport landed, four 3ton GS and one 15cwt GS.

June 14.
No 1 Platoon. Maintain water point, completed ramp to causeway on Jig Green West, constructed DUKW exit on Jig Green West, improved coast road on Jig Green West.
No 2 Platoon. Maintain Item beaches, completed concrete ramp to causeway on Item Red East, continued roads in initial dump area and production of hardcore, also commenced one wheeled exit and construction of a slipway on Item Red East.
No 3 Platoon. Maintain Jig Beaches, beach salvage and obstacle clearance, widening tracked exit on Jig Green East and continued work on the beach lateral.
Headquarters. Normal company administration.

June 15.
No 1 Platoon. Maintain water point, completed ramp to causeway on Jig Green West, constructed DUKW exit on Jig Green West, improved coast road on Jig Green West.
No 2 Platoon. Maintain Item beaches, completed concrete ramp to causeway on Item Red East, continued roads in initial dump area and production of hardcore, slip way on Item Red East. One wheeled exit completed.
No 3 Platoon. Maintain Jig Beaches, beach salvage and obstacle clearance, widening tracked exit on Jig Green East and continued work on the beach lateral. Commenced widening entrances to beach exits and constructed a DUKW turnaround at Casualty Evacuation Post.
Headquarters. Reconnaissance for a further water point. Normal company administration.

June 16.
No 1 Platoon. Maintain water point, constructed DUKW exit on Jig Green West, improved coast road on Jig Green West.
No 2 Platoon. Maintain Item beaches, completed concrete ramp to causeway on Item Red East, continued roads in initial dump area and production of hardcore, slipway completed.
No 3 Platoon. Maintain Jig Beaches. Commenced widening entrances to beach exits and constructed a DUKW turnaround at Casualty Evacuation Post. Commenced clearing minefields (133 Teller and 180 Schumine), commenced construction of 12 foot class 40 bridge at No 7 exit using reinforced concrete and RSJs.
Headquarters. Tested water point for yield. Normal company administration.

June 17.
No 1 Platoon. Maintain water point, maintain DUKW exits and entrances, improved coast road on Jig Green West.
No 2 Platoon. Maintain Item beaches, concrete 50 yards of main coast road, continued roads in initial dump area and production of hardcore.
No 3 Platoon. Maintain Jig Beaches, clearing minefields (124 Teller and 422 Schumine), construction of 12 foot class 40 bridge at No 7 exit.
Headquarters. Commenced construction of a water point at Asnelles with limited water supply materials and labour. Normal company administration.

June 18.
No 1 Platoon. Maintain water point, maintain DUKW exits and entrances, commenced collecting materials for DUKW transhipment point.
No 2 Platoon. Maintain Item beaches and production of hardcore.
No 3 Platoon. Maintain Jig Beaches, clearing minefields (115 Teller and 120 Schumine), continue beach lateral.
Headquarters. Commenced construction of a water point at Asnelles. Normal company administration.

June 19.
No 1 Platoon. Maintain water point, maintain DUKW exits and entrances, improved coast road on Jig Green West.
No 2 Platoon. Maintain Item beaches, production of hardcore, commence new exit on Item Red East.
No 3 Platoon. Maintain Jig Beaches, clearing minefields (124 Teller and 422 Schumine), maintain all coast roads les stretch maintained by 1 Platoon.
Headquarters. Construction of a water point at Asnelles. Normal company administration.

June 20.
No 1 Platoon. Maintain water point, maintain DUKW exits and entrances, improved coast road on Jig Green West.
No 2 Platoon. Maintain Item beaches, production of hardcore, completed beach exit.
No 3 Platoon. Maintain Jig Beaches maintain coast road, clearing minefields.
Headquarters. Construction of a water point at Asnelles. Normal company administration.

June 21.
No 1 Platoon. Maintain water point and establish booster tank, maintain DUKW exits and entrances, improved coast road on Jig Green West.
No 2 Platoon. Maintain Item beaches, production of hardcore, construct one bay of DUKW transhipment area.
No 3 Platoon. Maintain Jig Beaches, maintain coast road, continue beach lateral, collect timber for and construct one bay of DUKW transhipment area.
Headquarters. construction of a water point at Asnelles. Normal company administration.

June 22.
No 1 Platoon. Maintain water point, construct booster tank, maintain DUKW exits and entrances, maintain coast road on Jig Green West.
No 2 Platoon. Maintain Item beaches, production of hardcore, construct roads in DUKW transhipment area.
No 3 Platoon. Maintain Jig Beaches, beach salvage, maintain coast road, continue beach lateral, construct one bay of DUKW transhipment area.
Headquarters. construction of a water point at Asnelles. Normal company administration.

June 23.
No 1 Platoon. Maintain water point, construct booster tank, maintain DUKW exits and entrances, maintain coast road on Jig Green West.
No 2 Platoon. Maintain Item beaches, production of hardcore, construct roads in DUKW transhipment area.
No 3 Platoon. Maintain Jig Beaches, beach salvage, maintain coast road, continue beach lateral.
Headquarters. construction of a water point at Asnelles. Normal company administration.

June 24.
No 1 Platoon. Maintain water point, construct booster tank, maintain DUKW exits and entrances, maintain coast road on Jig Green West.
No 2 Platoon. Maintain Item beaches, production of hardcore, construct roads in DUKW transhipment area.
No 3 Platoon. Maintain Jig Beaches, beach salvage, maintain coast road, continue beach lateral.
Headquarters. construction of a water point at Asnelles. Normal company administration.

June 25.
No 1 Platoon. Maintain water point, construct booster tank, maintain DUKW exits and entrances, maintain coast road on Jig Green West.
No 2 Platoon. Maintain Item beaches, production of hardcore, maintain DUKW transhipment area,improve causeway exits.
No 3 Platoon. Maintain Jig Beaches, beach salvage, maintain coast road, lift 800 yards Somerfeld and coir track.
Headquarters. Water point at Asnelles complete and being maintained. Normal company administration.

June 26.
No 1 Platoon. Maintain water point, completed booster tank, maintain DUKW exits and entrances, maintain coast road on Jig Green West.
No 2 Platoon. Maintain Item beaches, production of hardcore, maintain DUKW transhipment area, improve causeway exits, construct control tower for DUKW transhipment area.
No 3 Platoon. Maintain Jig Beaches, beach salvage, maintain coast road, lift 800 yards Somerfeld and coir track.
Headquarters. Water point at Asnelles being maintained. Normal company administration.

June 27.
No 1 Platoon. Maintain water point, maintain DUKW exits and entrances, maintain coast road on Jig Green West, construct one exit for Rhino ferry and produced hardcore..
No 2 Platoon. Maintain Item beaches, production of hardcore, maintain DUKW transhipment area, improve causeway exits, construct control tower for DUKW transhipment area and construct standings for RAF plane transporters.
No 3 Platoon. Maintain Jig Beaches, beach salvage, maintain coast road, construct a dumping area.
Headquarters. Water point at Asnelles being maintained. Normal company administration.

June 28.
No 1 Platoon. Maintain water point, maintain DUKW exits and entrances, maintain coast road on Jig Green West, construct one exit for Rhino ferry and produced hardcore..
No 2 Platoon. Maintain Item beaches, production of hardcore, maintain DUKW transhipment area, improve causeway exits, construct control tower for DUKW transhipment area and construct standings for RAF plane transporters.
No 3 Platoon. Maintain Jig Beaches, beach salvage, maintain coast road, construct a dumping area.
Headquarters. Water point at Asnelles being maintained. Normal company administration.

June 29.
No 1 Platoon. Maintain water point, maintain DUKW exits and entrances, maintain coast road on Jig Green West, improve 500 yard stretch of Dover road, sink Rhino ferry.
No 2 Platoon. Maintain Item beaches, production of hardcore, maintain DUKW transhipment area, improve causeway exits, construct control tower for DUKW transhipment area and construct standings for RAF plane transporters, construct turntable. Salvaged one LCT.
No 3 Platoon. Maintain Jig Beaches, beach salvage, maintain coast road, construct a dumping area, mine clearance. Made fast Rhino ferry to the shore and completed shore approaches.
Headquarters. Water point at Asnelles being maintained. Normal company administration.

June 30.
No 1 Platoon. Maintain water point, maintain DUKW exits and entrances, maintain coast road on Jig Green West, improve 500 yard stretch of Dover road.
No 2 Platoon. Maintain Item beaches, production of hardcore, maintain DUKW transhipment area, improve causeway exits, construct control tower for DUKW transhipment area and construct standings for RAF plane transporters, construct turntable. Salvaged one LCT.
No 3 Platoon. Maintain Jig Beaches, beach salvage, maintain coast road, construct a dumping area, mine clearance. Sink Rhino ferry.
Headquarters. Water point at Asnelles being maintained. Normal company administration.

 

89 Field Company.
89 Field Company landed under 9 Beach Group and although command reverted to CRE 104 Beach Sub Area the company remained on King Beach and worked on its development, improvement and maintenance.

War Diary.
The War Diary is not nearly as detailed as that for 90 Field Company but it does confirm that the work of both companies was almost identical. The entries are somewhat terse, or perhaps economical.

6 June.
First elements of unit landed at La Riviere. By end of first tide 7 officers and 196 OR landed.
Gaps made through defensive minefields and exits off beaches for tracked and wheeled vehicles constructed. Reconnaissance made for water point.
HQ established at La Riviere.

7 June.
Improvements to beach exits.
Clearance of mines from Wheeled Vehicle Transit Area and Tracked Vehicle Transit Area.
Water Point established.

8 June.
Construction of beach lateral commenced.
Road maintenance and improvements to beach exits.
Clearance of beach.
Water point in operation.

9 June.
General maintenance of beach and exits.
Clearance of mines on route onto DUKW beach.

10 June.
Construction of two way road just off beaches commenced.
Improvements to beach lateral.
Clearance of mines in various areas of beach head.

11 June.
Beach maintenance.
Clearance of mines in beach head.
Construction of two way road just off beaches.

12 June.
Beach maintenance.
Mine clearance.
Roadworks.

13 June.
Beach maintenance.
Mine clearance.
Drainage operations carried out to prevent flooding in marshy areas.
DUKW park constructed.

14 June.
8 ORs and 4 vehicles due D+4 landed.
Road maintenance.
Mine clearance.
Roadworks.
Drainage improvements to DUKW park.
20,000 gallons of water issued from water point.

15 June.
Beach maintenance.
Mine clearance (600 mines lifted).
Roadworks.
Drainage.
Construction of further DUKW park.
Rear lateral 2 way road completed.

16 June.
Beach maintenance.
Mine clearance.
Roadworks for DUKW area and DUKW transhipment area.

17 June.
Beach maintenance.
Mine clearance.
Roadworks including construction of road over mud flats.
Roadworks in DUKW area
2 ORs wounded by blast. One OR declared illegally absent.

18 June.
Beach maintenance.
Construction of road across mud flats.
Collection and destruction of fused German mines.
Clearing mines.
Operation of water point and construction of access road.
Roadworks.

19 June.
Roadworks.
Destruction of mines and shells.
Mine clearance.
Beach maintenance.
Preparation of camouflets for defence works.
Clearance of ditches.

20 June.
Road maintenance.
Ditch and drain clearance.
Mine destruction.
Mine clearance.
Operation of water point.

21 June.
Beach maintenance.
Cutting and preparing forestry pickets.
Quarrying sandstone.
Drainage maintenance.
Operation of water point.
Work on enlarging DUKW transhipment point.

22 June.
Beach maintenance.
Clearing of obstacles.
Mine clearance.
Operation of water point.
Erection of loading bays and control post for DUKWs.
Nine reinforcements join.

23 June.
Beach Maintenance.
Erection of loading bays for DUKW transhipment area.
Operation of water point.
Drainage of marshes.

24 June.
Beach maintenance.
Timber preparation.
Quarrying stone.
Drainage of DUKW transhipment area.
Operation of water point.
Enlargement of transhipment area.

25 June.
Drainage.
Destruction of enemy mines.
Beach maintenance.
Operation of water point.
Mine clearance.

26 June.
Beach maintenance.
Condition of roads in petrol point unsafe.
Shell destruction.
Operation of water point.
Road maintenance.

27 June.
Beach maintenance of PSP track.
Culverting.
Demolition of fused mines.
Operation of water point.
Road construction.
3 ORs injured by mine blast.

28 June.
Construction of landing ramp.
Mine clearance.
Drainage.
Operation of water point.

29 June.
Construction of landing ramp.
Repair of sea wall.
Operation of water point.
Beach maintenance.
DUKW transhipment area maintenance.

30 June.
Construction of landing ramp.
Repair of sea wall.
Operation of water point.
Beach maintenance.
DUKW transhipment area maintenance.

 

PART THREE

104 BEACH SUB AREA.

CONTENTS.
Order of Battle.
War Diary.
Headquarters.
Landing Table.
Discharging Stores.
Vehicles, Personnel and Evacuation.
Snippets and Administration.
36 Beach Brick.
Phase 3.
8 GHQ Engineers.


Sub Areas were fairly common headquarters. They were to be found in base area as Base Sub Areas and on the Lines of Communication as Line of Communication Sub Areas. They had establishments to reflect the particular needs of the task but were a Brigadiers command and had staffs of General Staff Officers, Commander Royal Engineers, Commander RASC, Movement Control, medical services, provosts etc. and were responsible for the administration and control of an area. The Beach Sub Areas had an establishment which reflected their particular role and when the task was completed in late July the headquarters remained more or less intact and moved to a different role.

Beach Sub Areas filled the gap between the initial two days of a landing, when the Beach Groups operated the beaches, until a fully developed Rear Maintenance Area took over. The Headquarters Beach Sub Area assumed command of the Beach Groups, plus such other staffs and units as were required to operate the beaches and dumps, plus such units as higher headquarters allotted from time to time.

Gold Beach is more complicated than others since it included Mulberry Harbour and Port en Bessin which were separate organisations.
104 Beach Sub Area formed Beach Maintenance Area ‘Sun’
4 Line of Communication Sub Area controlled Mulberry Area.
No 10 Garrison was responsible for Port en Bessin under 4 Line of Communication Sub Area.
No 11 Line of Communication Area was phased in to take over command of all the above.

If this is not sufficiently complex from D + 8 2nd Army Roadhead took over control of the Beach Maintenance Area dumps and depots and as specialist units arrived to work them 104 Beach Sub Area units were either withdrawn or placed under 2nd Army.

In outline the work of the Beach Sub Area fell into three phases.
Phase 1.
The Beach Sub Area lands and gradually develops the beaches and dump areas.

Phase 2.
After the first week control of the dumps and depots passes to higher formations and the Beach Sub Area concentrates on the operation of the beaches, passing personnel, vehicles and stores from ships and craft to dumps and assembly areas.

Phase 3.
After three weeks a further reorganisation saw the gradual removal of specialist units from the Beach Sub Area to forward formations, the running down of the Beach Groups and a concentration on the Build Up, mainly landing stores.


104 Beach Sub Area Order of Battle.
The basic Order of Battle for 104 Beach Sub Area was:

9 Beach Group.
10 Beach Group.
36 Beach Brick.
These are detailed separately.

Apart from the units which were part of the three beach groups there was a considerable number of units coming directly under the command of 104 Beach Group. These could in some cases be made available to beach units. There was necessarily a number of intermediate headquarters but still some had to control a large number of sub units.

This is the initial Order of Battle. Units were added or removed from time to time. As with the Beach Groups the units were found as far as possible from normal pre existing units which might have modified establishments and special equipment scales but could revert to a normal establishment and role when they were no longer required in the beach areas.

Royal Engineers.
Commander Royal Engineers 8 GHQ Troops Engineers. This headquarters controlled the field engineers of 104 Beach Sub Area. It had originally controlled a group of units comparable to divisional engineers but several units were added.
89, 90, 69, 183, 73 and 280 Field Companies RE.
623 Field Park Company RE.
55 Electrical and Mechanical Section RE. For water point.
51, 23 and 6 Mechanical Equipment Sections RE.
21 and 23 Stores Sections RE.
1 and 2 Advanced Park Sections RE.
26 Bomb Disposal Section RE.

Movement Control.
Detachment 21 Army group Movement Control Pool. Principal Military Landing Officers team.
Two sections ‘A’ Echelon 17 Movement Control Group. For Assembly Areas.

Royal Engineers Transportation.
Headquarters 6 Port Operating Group RE.
1022, 1026, 1036 and 1045 Port Operating Companies RE.
968 Port Maintenance Company RE.
Headquarters 8 Port Operating Group RE.
1025, 1035, 1043 and 1048 Port Operating Companies RE.
1052 Port Maintenance Company RE.
To work with Port Operating Groups.
74 Mechanical Equipment Section RE. Cranes.
38 and 44 Port Ammunition Detachments.
36 Port Ordnance Detachment.

961 and 953 Inland Water Transport Operating Companies RE.
Detachment 927 Inland Water Transport Light Aid Workshop Company.

Signals.
104 Beach Sub Area Signals Section.

Supply and Transport.
Commander RASC 28 Transport Column.
536, 705, 168 and 305 GT Companies RASC.
One Platoon 633 GT Company RASC.

2 and 5 Detail Issuing Depots RASC.
243 and 244 Petrol Depots RASC.

Medical.
Detachment 3 Field Dressing Station RAMC for Casualty Evacuation Point.
16 Field Dressing Station RAMC.
49 and 50 Field Surgical Unit RAMC.
57 Field transfusion Unit RAMC.
Detachment 31 Field Hygiene Section RAMC.
4 Field Sanitation Section RAMC.

Ordnance.
43 Ordnance Ammunition Company RAOC.

REME.
6 Line of Communication Workshop REME.
Detachment 3 Line of Communication Recovery Company REME.
Light Aid Detachment Type ‘B’ REME.
623 Field Park REME.

Provost.
Three Sections 602 Provost Company, Vulnerable Points.
Two Sections 73 Provost Company, Traffic Control.

Pioneer.
121, 130, 209, 243, 280 Pioneer Companies.

Miscellaneous.
218 Prisoner of War Cage. Headquarters Assembly Area Control Unit.

RAF.
4 Beach Squadron.

 

104 Beach Sub Area War Diary.
Apart from the entries for D Day the War Diary gives very basic information on the working of the Beach Sub Area. The detail is to be found in the appendices. These include the various orders, instructions, reports etc. The appendices to the War Diaries of the various sub units are also very informative.

D Day.
1200. Deputy Assistant Adjutant and Quarter Master General and Principal Military Landing Officer landed on King Green.
1245. Commander and Brigade Major accompanied by Naval Officer in Charge and operational staff land on King Green.
1330. Digging of temporary Command Post began.
1400. Reconnaissance party, Brigade Major and an RE officer, moved to Meuvaines on the edges of which fighting was still in progress.
1500. 110 Prisoners of War rounded up by Beach Group personnel and housed in a beached LCT pending evacuation. PWs set to work clearing the beach.
1600. Temporary Command Post moved to German observation house south of Ver Battery. Naval Signal Station established there.
1630. First casualties evacuated by DUKW.
1700. Preparations made by 104 BSA for destroyer fire in support of attack by 2 Hertfordshire Regiment on village of Le Buisson to clear enemy. Fire was not forthcoming. The attack went in at 1810 and was not successful.
2245. 30 Corp GOC land on King Green and was escorted to 50 Division HQ at Meuvaine by Brigade Major.
2350. Deputy Assistant Director of Medical Services (Evacuation) landed and joined Command Post.

‘The development of the beach from 1000 hours continued throughout the day according to plan. The opposition encountered by the assault division and the leading elements of the beach companies, and the reconnaissance parties of depots, somewhat disorganised the swift deployment of the beach organisation. In addition the surface of the beach was considerably worse than had been expected. As a result stranded and disabled vehicles and craft and the complexity of the beach mining and obstacles added to the difficulties of quick development. Clearing of the beaches by RE and LCOCU personnel continued steadily under the direction of the CRE but owing to the mass of stranded craft, the volume of traffic continually landing and the general confusion of parties not knowing exactly where they were when they landed it cannot be said that the beaches were under control but each individual party knew exactly what it had to do and got on with the job without any direction from higher HQ.’

A fair and well balanced view of the situation. Amid the apparent chaos on the beaches the well trained, confident and competent junior officers and NCOs got on with the job, modifying the plan and orders as necessary.

7 June.
Preparation and occupation of the Command Post continued with the help of Prisoners of War. The remainder of the Headquarters groups including Staff Captain and Deputy Assistant Director of Ordnance Services arrived at the Command Post.
Reconnaissance of depots started.
The Beach Ammunition Dumps issued ammunition.
Deputy Assistant Director of Medical Services (Evacuation) arranged for the evacuation of casualties to four LSTs.
One petrol and one ammunition LCT which landed the previous night were unloaded.
A Ferry Conference was held at 1900.
10 Beach Group medical area was bombed.

8 June.
Reconnaissance and occupation of Meuvaines House for Headquarters started.
Development of the dumps continued. Reconnaissance Party for Stores Dump was involved in a skirmish with the enemy.
Ammunition Depot started to issue.
First supplies of blood arrived.
Evacuation of casualties to LSTs continued.
Assembly Areas personnel cleared enemy away from their area and started operating.

9 June.
30 Corps HQ took over direct control of the beaches to increase tonnage.
Advanced and Main Headquarters were now:
Main at Meuvaines. Brigade Major, Deputy Assistant Director of Ordnance Services, Deputy Assistant Director of Medical Services (Evacuation), Assistant Provost Marshall, Staff Captain ‘A’, Camp Commandant, Naval officer in Charges secretariat.
Advanced. Commander, A/Q, Principal Military Landing officer and Movement Staff, Staff Captain ‘Q’, Naval Officer in Charge operations staff.

10 June.
Major, Officer Commanding 104 Beach Sub Area Signals, missing.
Casualties evacuated to hospital carrier Duke of Lancaster.
Ordnance Ammunition Depot started to issue.

12 June.
35 Field Dressing Station closed and evacuated all casualties to 32 Field Dressing Station.

13 June.
35 Field Dressing Station passed from command and moved to Bayeux.
Ordnance Depots passed from BSA control to Lines of Communication.

17 to 21 June.
Weather bad. Beach Groups constructed DUKW Transhipment Areas.
Improvement of Advanced Headquarters continued.

19 June.
Information Room at Advanced Headquarters opened.

22 June.
36 Beach Brick took over King and Love Sectors and Transhipment Areas from 9 Beach Group, which took over the commitments of 36 Beach Brick.

26 June.
A Detachment from 225 Civil Affairs came in support of 104 Beach Sub Area and was established at Meuvaines.
108 Fire Fighting Company consisting of 53 and 54 1st Class Fire Fighting Brigades came in support of 104 Beach Sub Area.

27 June.
Salvage Ammunition Dump exploded off King Green Beach. A considerable area of grassland containing mines caught fire.

 

Headquarters 104 Beach Sub Area.

Most of the Advanced Headquarters 104 Beach Sub Area embarked at Southampton, DAA/GMQ and Military Landing Officer on HMS Bulolo. A party, including Staff Captain, DADOS and most of Main Headquarters, due to land on the second tide embarked at Felixstowe.

The headquarters landed in four echelons. The first echelon, landing on D Day, was the Commander’s party. The Commander, Brigade Major and an orderly landed from the RN Command Ship while the Deputy Assistant Adjutant and Quarter Master General (all one person) landed from the Brigade Headquarters Ship. The Commanders party was in fact the second to land, at1245. The Commander and Brigade Major accompanied by Naval Officer in Charge and his operational staff landed on King Green. The Deputy Assistant Adjutant and Quarter Master General and the Principal Military Landing Officer landed on King Green at 1200. These parties concentrated at 9 Beach Group’s Command Post and a Beach Sub Area Command Post was established under the direction of the Deputy Assistant Adjutant and Quarter Master General. Communications between the Beach Sub Area Command Post and those of the Beach Groups was established as soon as possible, first by wireless and later by telephone.


Also landing on D Day was the Sub Area Command Post Party consisting of Deputy Assistant Director of Medical Services (Evacuation) with seven other ranks and a Jeep and the Staff Quarter Master Serjeant with six other ranks and a Jeep. The Deputy Assistant of Medical Services (Evacuation) was delayed.

The digging of the temporary Command Post began at 1330 and at 1400 a reconnaissance party including the Brigade Major and an RE officer, moved to Meuvaines. They found that fighting was still in progress on the fringes of the village. At 1600 the temporary Command Post moved to a German observation post south of Ver sur Mer Battery. The Naval Signal Station was also established there.

At 2245 General Officer Commanding 30 Corp landed on King Green and was escorted to 50 Division HQ at Meuvaine by the Brigade Major. The Deputy Assistant Director of Medical Services (Evacuation) landed and reported to the Command Post at 2350.

Equipment and G1098 stores were landed by a preloaded DUKW from 168 GT Company and a 3 ton 4 X 4 from 305 GT Company.

The remaining headquarters parties landed early on D plus 1. These included the Main Headquarters party which consisted of the Staff Captain with thirteen other ranks, the Intelligence Officer, Deputy Assistant Director of Ordnance Services and Deputy Assistant Provost Marshall. Attached were an Deputy Director of Ordnance Services (Ammunition) and an Ordnance Officer. Transport included one 3ton 4 X 4 GS and three Amphibious Jeeps. The Staff Captain made his way by Jeep as soon as possible to the Command Post while the rest followed under the command of the Deputy Assistant Director of Ordnance Services. This group should have been guided to the Main Headquarters at Meuvaines but this was not yet ready for occupation. Apart from the delays in clearing the area the Chateau was used by the Tactical Headquarters 50 Division.

The Rear Headquarters party landed on D plus 2 with the Staff Captain (Camouflage), a Jeep and five officers from 36 Beach Group. Two staff cars with two drivers also landed on D plus 2.

The reconnaissance and occupation of Meuvaines Chateau for Headquarters started on D plus 2 under the direction of the Brigade Major. He was responsible for the allotment of offices and administration areas for
Main Headquarters, including the Naval Officer in Charge and staff.
The Anti Aircraft Defence Commander.
Commander Royal Engineers.
Headquarters 8 Port Operating Company.
Commander RASC.
Officer Commanding Sub Area Troops.

A Reconnaissance Report Centre was established by the Main Headquarters party early on D plus 1. The representatives of services and headquarters forming part of the Main Headquarters rendezvoused here and were then shown their respective areas. It was stressed that such reconnaissance parties should be kept to a minimum and that the main party personnel and vehicles should be kept back until the reconnaissance was complete. Presumably it was thought that even professional and well disciplined officers would rush to ‘bag’ the beast spots given half a chance.

A section of pioneers and thirty tilts from 3 ton lorries were available for the headquarters. The pioneers were allotted priority tasks by the Brigade Major. It was made clear that all personnel remained responsible for digging their own slit trenches. The tilts were used to provide covered accommodation in the various areas as follows:
Sub Area Headquarters. 6 tilts.
Naval officer in Charge. 1 tilt.
Signals. 1 tilt.
RAF. 1 tilt.
Officer Commanding Sub Area Troops. 2 tilts.
Commander RE. 3 tilts.
Commander RASC. 2 tilts.
Port Operating Group. 2 tilts.
Administration. 12 tilts.

The Officer Commanding 104 Beach Sub Area Signals was responsible for establishing and maintaining communications from Main Headquarters. This work was to be started as soon as possible and progress reported to the Brigade Major every four hours until complete. The priority for establishing communications by line or wireless was:
Sub Area Command Post.
Headquarters 10 Beach Group.
Headquarters 9 Beach Group.
Anti Aircraft Operations Room.

The Officer Commanding Headquarters Company 36 Beach Brick was Camp Commander of Main Headquarters. He was responsible for the administration of the headquarters area. He allotted administrative and cooking areas for the various sections, although some smaller sections could have joint messes. He was responsible for the distribution of supplies and petrol to all sections and for the supervision of the defence layout and the digging of slit trenches.

Initially officers fed from the men’s cookhouses but later four officer’s feeding areas were arranged for an average of about fifteen officers each. The four centres were based on Headquarters including RASC, CRE, 8 Port Operating Group and Officer Commanding Sub Area Troops.



The Meuvaines Chateau.
Post war this building was well preserved and often photographed because it was a Camp de Vacances run by a charity providing holidays for children.

The house provided office accommodation and the wooded areas provided bivouac areas which were well hidden from reconnaissance aircraft.


Royal Navy mess tent in the grounds of the Chateau.



Military Landing Officers.
Much of the work of the Military Landing Officers, all of whom were trained Movement Control staff officers, was done before the event. They had the task of working out loading and landing tables, and of constantly modifying them. Then they were to supervise the loading of craft and eventually to co ordinate the unloading of craft and the movement of vehicles and personnel inland.

104 Beach Sub Area attached to their Report some detailed notes on the planning of stowage of landing craft and of preloaded vehicles. Other Beach Sub Area reports touched on these but not in such detail. Perhaps they did not plan in such detail.

Stowage planning.
- Large scale paper diagrams were produced for each craft to be stowed. This was not done for personnel ships and craft.
- Diagrams were gridded off.
- A picture layout of the complete assault force was prepared showing timings. This was then given to the ‘G’ (planning) staff who filled in the outline details by units. Several of these layouts survive.
- From this picture the Brigade ‘G’ staff broke down the units into more detail.
- Individual craft diagrams were then gridded off and suggested stowage filled in by Military Landing Officers showing the vehicles to scale. These diagrams were then handed to the Brigade Major who filled in the name of the unit against the type of vehicle.
- Landing tables and unit sheets were completed from the completed diagrams which were then used as craft stowage plans.

A report submitted by 104 Beach Sub Area said that when LCTs were loaded there was sometimes room for extra vehicles and it would be useful if there was in future a reserve of vehicles which could be loaded. This would have been unwise. Other beaches commented that craft were often overloaded because staff had squeezed in an extra vehicle. This made the craft heavier, especially at the bows where any extra vehicle would be, which led to it grounding too early and discharging vehicles in water that was too deep.

Preloaded vehicles.
A similar method was used as for stowing craft.
- All load carrying vehicles were numbered throughout the formation. For example:
No 1 Platoon 536 GT Company (DUKWs) were numbered A1 to A33.
No 4 Platoon 305 GT Company (3 ton GS) were numbered J1 to J33.
- The numbers were then shown on a diagram in order and time of landing.
- Vehicles were then paper stowed by commodities according to the tonnages and times stores were required on shore. Ammunition was stowed by categories.
- GT Companies were informed of the load allotted to each vehicle by number.
- When the time came to preload the vehicles, some two or three weeks before D day, dumps of stores for preloading were made.
- Stores were sorted into lorry (or DUKW) loads so that when each DUKW or lorry reported to the dump they collected their own particular load.
- Three copies of a wagon weighbill were made. On copy was given to the vehicle, one copy to the service or unit concerned with the load and one copy was for the Military Landing Officer.
Thus everyone concerned knew what each vehicle was carrying, and each unit concerned knew which vehicle was carrying their stores.

For a more complete account see the tables for preloaded DUKWs on Jig. (10 Beach Group).

As always Military Landing Officers complained about the following:
- Junior officers wanting adjustments to the landing tables and/or stowage plans. Orders and reminders were issued to the effect that only senior officers should approach Military Landing Officers. Usually this would be the Brigade Major.
- After landing units wanting to know when and where they would receive their stores and equipment. This was alleviated by setting up an information centre at Beach Sub Area Headquarters.


Note:
Military Landing Officers are listed on the landing tables as coming from Movement Control Increment, 21 Army Group Movement Control Pool (or variations on this).

Personnel listed as coming from 17 Movement Control Group are for the Assembly Areas and the control of the forward movement of personnel and vehicles.

 

104 Beach Sub Area Landing Table.

For the initial stages of the landings the two Beach Groups necessarily worked independently of the Beach Sub Area Headquarters and controlled the Beach Sub Area assets landing in their sectors. Gradually the Beach Sub Area landed its headquarters and assumed control of its assets already landed and those arriving subsequently.

First to land, in the first two hours, were
- the reconnaissance party from the Headquarters Commander Royal Engineers who would have to assume responsibility for the coordination of engineer efforts
- Liaison Officers from Beach Sub Area Headquarters attached to each Beach Group.
- Military Landing Officers landing with each Beach Group.

Landing before H plus 6 hours were a section of 209 Pioneer Company to work with the Field Dressing Stations.

Landing before H plus 8 hours were personnel and equipment required for the unloading of craft on the second tide.
- Advanced Headquarters 104 Beach Sub Area.
- Four RB Cranes from Mechanical Equipment Section.
- Advanced Headquarters Commander RASC to coordinate the work of clearing stores from the beach to dumps.
- Two platoons of a GT Company RASC with 3ton 4 X 4 lorries.
- The main body of the Pioneer Company.

Landing on the second tide were personnel required to unload stores, establish depots and operate Assembly Areas for personnel and vehicles.
- 218 Prisoner of War Cage. Not at this stage to handle prisoners but to provide an Assembly Area Control Unit.
- ‘A’ Echelon Movement Control Group for the Assembly Areas.
- An Ordnance Ammunition Company for the Ammunition Depot.
- A Port Ammunition Detachment.
- A Port Ordnance Detachment.
- A Port Operating Company.
- Two Pioneer Companies for the Beach Maintenance Area Field Companies.
- One Mechanical and Electrical Section RE for water supply.
- Three RB cranes from the Mechanical Equipment Section.
- RAF Beach Squadron Headquarters.
- Main Body of Beach Sub Area Headquarters.
- Main Body of Headquarters Commander RE.
- Main Body Headquarters 8 Port Operating Group.

The greater part of the Beach Sub Area organisation and personnel were now ashore, leaving a few oddments and elements of 36 Beach Brick to follow. On the third tide
- Rear Party Headquarters 104 Beach Sub Area.
- Company Headquarters and two platoons of GT Company with 3ton 4 X 4 lorries.

On D plus 2.
- Reconnaissance party for a third DUKW Company yet to land.
- Parties of 6 Port Operating Group arriving on Motor Transport Ships.
- Main Body of Headquarters Commander RASC.
Plus 36 Beach Brick
- One Company 18 Durham Light Infantry.
- Two pioneer Companies.
- Ammunition Section from Ordnance Beach Detachment.
- 41 Troop RA (labour).
- Reconnaissance parties for other units.

On D plus 3.
- One pioneer Company.
- 26 Beach Recovery Section REME. 36 Beach Brick.
- Two platoons of the third DUKW Company.
- Remainder of Port Operating Groups.
- Main body of the Mechanical Equipment Section.

 

Discharging stores.

In general all the stores that were discharged were in depots within eight hours of the end of he 24 hour period in which they were landed. At two busy periods, when ammunition was much in demand, stacks were made in the Transhipment Areas and stores were delivered from there to depots as transport allowed.

Bad weather disrupted unloading for two periods. The storm from D plus 10 to D plus 16 halted unloading for a period and the time was used to construct DUKW transhipment bays, carrying out salvage inland and improving billets and bivouacs. A further period of bad weather from D plus 31 to D plus 33 slowed down unloading and several small craft and Rhino Ferries were thrown onto the top of the beach.
Some stores had ben landed on D Day from LCTs, LBVs and preloaded DUKWs. These had been handled by the beach groups and either taken forward to brigades by DUKW or taken to the beach dumps. This work is described under the beach groups.

Some stores coasters were scheduled to arrive on D Day. These carried their own personnel from Port Operating Companies. These were trained stevedores and would first discharge the coaster on which they arrived and then be available to discharge later arrivals.

Stores coasters to arrive on D day.
38. Apricity. 144 foot. 440 tons. Ex Poole.
Supplies 12 tons. Includes two tons of bagged coal.
Ordnance 6 tons.
RE Stores 31½ tons.
POL. 200 tons. 60% MT80. 40% DERV and lubricants.
Total 248½ tons.

685. Northgate. 150 foot. 480 tons. Ex Poole.
Supplies 26 tons. Includes two tons of bagged coal.
RE Stores 27½ tons.
POL. 161½ tons. 60% MT80. 40% DERV and lubricants.
Total 215 tons.

898. Stanley Force. 171 foot. 630 tons. Ex Southampton.
Ammunition 149 tons.
Supplies 20 tons. Includes two tons of bagged coal.
Ordnance 44¾ tons.
Total 213¾ tons.

740. Polglen. Supplies 12 tons. Includes two tons of bagged coal.
Ordnance 56 tons.
RE Stores 33½ tons.
Ammunition 241 tons.
Total 342½ tons.

Total.
Supplies. 70 tons.
Ordnance. 106¾ tons.
POL. 361½ tons.
RE Stores. 92 tons.
Ammunition. 390 tons.
Total. 1020½ tons.

D plus 1 fifteen LBV and three LCT loaded with stores arrived.
Ammunition was the main cargo but some other stores were also landed.
Seven LBV each carried 50 tons of ammunition.
One LBV carried 25 tons of ammunition and 25 tons of RE Stores.
Two LBV each carried 50 tons of POL.
One LBV carried 25 tons of POL and 25 tons of RE Stores.
One LBV carried 25 tons of POL and 25 tons of Supplies.
Two LBV each carried 50 tons of RE Stores.
One LBV carried 25 tons of ammunition and 25 tons of Supplies.

Three LCT each carried 255 tons of ammunition and 45 tons of Supplies.

Totals
Ammunition 1165 tons.
POL. 150 tons.
Supplies. 185 tons.
RE Stores 150 tons.


Preloaded coasters were due to arrive for several days and the names and cargoes were known well in advance. Cargoes always followed the standard pattern of a main load of either ammunition or POL, the two were never mixed, plus smaller quantities of other stores.

On D plus 1 a further eight coasters were due to arrive but were not to be discharged immediately.
571. Leoville.
1035. Yewpark
472. Ipswich Trader. 162 foot. 390 tons. Ex Southampton.
922. Teeswood.
1032. Yewglen. 175 foot. 610 tons. Ex Southampton.
544. Kyle Castle. 207 foot. 800 tons. Ex Southampton.
384. Gallacum. 165 foot. 618 tons. Ex Southampton.
93. Renguela.
These carried.
RAF Explosives. 76½ tons.
RAF POL 102 tons.
RAF Stores 22½ tons.
Ammunition 2975 tons.
Ordnance stores (FBE). 13½ tons.
POL. 391½ tons.
RE Stores. 528½ tons.
Supplies. 278½ tons.
Ordnance Stores 196½ tons.
Transportation Stores. 22½ tons.
Army Fire Service Stores. 53½ tons.
Medical Stores. 4½ tons.

On D plus 2 a further seven coasters were due to arrive.
217. Cragside.
431. Harlem.
631. Maurice Rose.
100. Berryden. 132 foot. 500 tons. Ex Southampton.
430. Gwent Hills.
112. Bonawe. 142 foot. 340 tons. Ex Littlehampton.
46. Aridity. 132 foot. 280 tons. Ex Southampton.
These carried.
RAF Explosives. 89½ tons.
Ammunition 1805 tons.
POL. 242 tons.
RE Stores. 528½ tons.
Supplies. 541½ tons. Includes 20 tons of bagged coal.
Ordnance Stores 505½ tons.
Transportation Stores. 12½ tons.
Army Fire Service Stores. 56 tons.

On D plus 3 a further six coasters were due to arrive.
863. Soldality.
821. Sandhill.
890. Spes.
538. Ell.
778. Bingen.
1018. William Howland.
These carried.
RAF POL. 290 tons. 100 Octane.
RAF Explosives. 83½ tons.
RAF Stores. 69½ tons.
Ammunition 3053 tons.
POL. 1248 tons. MT80.
RE Stores. 647½ tons.
Supplies. 566½ tons. Includes 88 tons of bagged coal.
Ordnance Stores 433½ tons.
Medical Stores. 8½ tons.

On D plus 4 a further six coasters were due to arrive. These are generally larger coasters and carry a single commodity.
369. Flathouse. Supplies and Stores.
233. Cyrus Sears. Stores.
992. Waldo Hill. Ammunition.
161. Charles Slater. Ammunition.
451. Herbert W Walker. Ammunition.
138. Bucklaw. POL. For Mulberry.
These carried.
RAF Explosives. 264 tons.
RAF Stores. 39½ tons.
Ammunition. 4966½ tons.
POL. 522 tons. 80% MT80. 20% DERV.
RE Stores. 749½ tons.
Supplies. 1226½ tons. Includes 26 tons of bagged coal.
Ordnance Stores 143½ tons.
Transportation Stores. 4½ tons.
In addition 142 tons of ammunition was scheduled to land in six LCT.

On D plus 5 a further six coasters were due to arrive. These are generally larger coasters and carry a single commodity.
965. Tully Crosby. Supplies and Stores.
433. Halo. Supplies and Stores.
292. Millian Hill. Ammunition.
302. Empire Bank. POL.
807. Saint Angus. POL.
276. Dunward. POL. May be diverted to Mulberry.
These carried.
RAF Explosives. 60 tons.
RAF Stores. 5½ tons.
Ammunition. 653½ tons.
POL. 970½ tons. 66% MT80.
RE Stores. 684 tons.
Supplies. 655½ tons.
Ordnance Stores 1054½ tons.
Medical Stores. 5½ tons.

On D plus 6 a further six coasters were due to arrive. Three carry ammunition and three carry POL.
199. Cordale. Ammunition.
496. Jim. Ammunition.
149. Carnalea. Ammunition.
792. Ronan. POL. For Mulberry.
614. Marsa. POL.
1043. Zeeland I. POL.
These carried.
RAF Explosives. 199 tons.
Ammunition. 4099 tons.
RAF POL. 963 tons. 100 octane.
POL. 3352½ tons. 80% MT80. 20% DERV.

On D plus 7 a further four coasters were due to arrive. Three carry stores. One carries POL
610. Maplefield. Stores.
376. Folda. Stores.
1046. Zelo. Supplies and Stores.
1044. Zeeland II. POL.
These carried.
RAF Stores. 51 tons.
RAF POL. 212½ tons. 100 octane.
POL. 204½ tons. 80% MT80.
RE Stores. 672 tons.
Supplies. 427 tons.
Ordnance Stores 564½ tons.
Medical Stores. 16½ tons.

These coasters delivered nearly 40,000 tons in the first week. Not all of it was actually landed in that time period.

Ammunition caused the greatest difficulty to dumps and depots. While some stores were landed in only small quantities and some items, such as MT80, are identical, ammunition was landed both in large amounts and wide variety. On D Day alone the preloaded vehicles landed 216 tons of ammunition in 44 categories. Quantities varied from 2,500 rounds of 25pdr HE to 40 rounds of 37mm HE. Size of projectile ranged from 155mm to .3in.

Since ammunition was preloaded several weeks in advance the proportions of each type of ammunition had been based on staff assessments of likely expenditure. In the event little anti aircraft ammunition was used but far more field artillery ammunition than estimated. Attempts were made to land the field artillery ammunition from the coasters first but the method of stowing on the coasters made this difficult. In any case it was a short term expedient since it then took longer to discharge the coaster completely and delayed its return to the UK and this its eventual return to France with more ammunition.


D plus 1 fifteen LBV and three LCT loaded with stores arrived.
Ammunition was the main cargo but some other stores were also landed.
Seven LBV each carried 50 tons of ammunition.
One LBV carried 25 tons of ammunition and 25 tons of RE Stores.
Two LBV each carried 50 tons of POL.
One LBV carried 25 tons of POL and 25 tons of RE Stores.
One LBV carried 25 tons of POL and 25 tons of Supplies.
Two LBV each carried 50 tons of RE Stores.
One LBV carried 25 tons of ammunition and 25 tons of Supplies.

Three LCT each carried 255 tons of ammunition and 45 tons of Supplies.

Totals
Ammunition 1165 tons.
POL. 150 tons.
Supplies. 185 tons.
RE Stores 150 tons.


There were several methods employed in discharging coasters:
By DUKW.
By LBV.
By LCT.
By Rhino Ferry.
By LCM.
By beaching.

The DUKW was considered an excellent vehicle and it was the preferred method of unloading stores from coasters. Once DUKW transhipment points were established they became the major part of an efficient and effective system of transferring stores from coaster to dump. They were most effective when the distance travelled on land was limited since they required plenty of space for cornering and their tyres suffered heavy wear on roads. They were generally not used for unloading larger Liberty type ships as these had to moor further off shore, some three to five miles. This meant greater wear and tear on the DUKWs, a slower turn round and more frequent interruptions because of bad weather and heavy seas.

Initially DUKWs were worked 24 hours a day. Two crews were provided for each DUKW by the GT Company but it was soon obvious that more personnel were required. There were not any more trained DUKW drivers available but more co drivers were found. This allowed the drivers to be spread more thinly. Each DUKW was also provided with a pioneer to act as boathook man and remove some tasks from the DUKW crew. The Commander RASC was allotted a pioneer company for this work. A DUKW company had some 20% reserve vehicles which were intended to replace those undergoing service and repair.

Sections of six DUKWs operated together. The section corporal on a motorcycle led the section from the GT Park to the DUKW Control Point where they were given the name and number of the ship they were to discharge. When released from the Control Point they were led by a LCP(L) or other craft to the coaster. Stevedores lowered three cargo nets of stores into each DUKW and when all the section was loaded they were led back to shore and the DUKW exit. Before leaving the coaster it was ensured that each DUKW displayed a board stating the nature of the load and its destination. On shore they were led to the correct dump or depot by the section NCO on routes that were signed by Provosts and Provost pointsmen controlled junctions. Having delivered their load to a dump or depot, (or transhipment point) they were led back to the GT Park where crews could be fed, vehicles refuelled and maintained, before setting off again.



DUKW Transhipment Area.
Initially DUKWs operated a complete circuit from the Transport Park to the DUKW Beach Control Point, to the coasters off shore, back to shore and to the dump or depot. This had several clear disadvantages:
- Roads had to be improved and widened to allow DUKWs to use them.
- DUKWs caused problems for other road transport.
- DUKWs were not making the beast use of their unique amphibious ability.
- DUKWs were in limited supply and needed frequent maintenance.

It was sensible to limit the distance covered by the DUKW out of the water by setting up a point where stores could be transferred to lorries. This did require an increase in the number of lorries and in the amount of labour but these were more readily available than were DUKWs. Ideally it also required some engineer construction work and the use of cranes.

The simplest transhipment method parked a lorry alongside a DUKW and stores were manhandled from one to the other. This could be set up quickly but had the disadvantages of requiring more labour, keeping the DUKW in the area until all its stores had been transferred since there was no sorting and holding area, and requiring both DUKW and lorry to be present at the same time.

The second method required only a little construction work. A crane unloaded cargo nets from the DUKW and placed them on the ground. Labour removed stores from the nets and transferred them to a lorry parked down a slope or in a sunken bay. The transfer could be eased by the use of a roller runway. This method both speeded up unloading and allowed space for sorting and holding stores, although this was on the ground.

The most effective method required considerable engineer construction work but had an elevated sorting area. The elevated sorting areas were constructed of earth held in place with timber revetments. They were some twenty foot wide, the same height as the DUKWs combing and could be any length. DUKWs parked on one side of the bay and cranes unloaded cargo nets onto the sorting area where labour transferred stores to a roller runway into a lorry. This method allowed DUKWs to depart as soon as the three cargo nets had been lifted out. Although ideally a lorry should be waiting to receive the stores this was not essential as the platform could hold them.

When the storm of 19 to 22 June stopped unloading the engineers took advantage of the lull to construct this type of transhipment point. However some similar work had been carried out earlier. There is a photograph of a rudimentary platform in use on June 11. However this may have actually been in a dump or depot rather than a transfer point.

A transfer bay using a crane required twelve men in addition to the DUKW crew and crane driver. Eight men were required on the platform and four for stowing the lorry. The DUKW parked parallel to the bay but outside the crane. The DUKW codriver/boathook man hooked the cargo nets onto the crane hook, one at a time. Nets were unloaded in the order centre one, forward one, rear one. There was a minor problem with the cargo nets. All orders and instructions stressed the need for a DUKW to always retain three cargo nets. The simplest transfer method presented no problem since the nets never left the DUKW. In the methods involving the use of the crane the nets remained on the platform to be unloaded by the platform crew. It was not possible for the DUKW to retain its own nets. In this case the platform crew laid out three nets from a previous DUKW before the next DUKW arrived. These three nets were lifted by the crane and stowed in the DUKW before the last full one was taken out. The DUKW was then able to move off as soon as the last net was lifted out and without the risk of leaving without the nets.

The space alongside the platform was left clear so that the cranes could move along to another position and unload another DUKW while the platform crew was handling the previous load.

Roller runways speeded up the loading of lorries and avoided over tiring the platform crews. The runways were fixed firmly with a 1/30 slope. One end should be about the height of the lorry side and the lorry should park with the end about at the centre of the body. Stores were lifted out of the cargo net and placed on the runway and pushed gently down it. Usually there were two men to each cargo net and they took it in turns to place stores on the runway. The other two men were a lance corporal or senior man in charge and a brakeman for the runway. All stores were placed on the runway in the same way so that the men in the lorry have the handles etc. coming to their hands in the same way each time.

Two men in the lorry took the stores from the runway and passed them to the stowers who stowed the front of the lorry first, then the far side and then the back. As the remaining space in the lorry got smaller the men got out onto the platform until only one man remained to put in the last stores. Items were stowed to make for ease of unloading over the tailboard, all handles to the rear so that they could be reached easily. Stores should not have been packed so tightly that they were difficult to get out. Men worked six hour shifts but the crane driver was changed every four hours.

Some items such as bulky RE stores and 40 gallon drums were not be in cargo nets and had to be transferred from the DUKW to the lorry by crane.

A Central Controller with a loud hailer called DUKWs and lorries to vacant spaces. Spaces were lettered or numbered. DUKWs arrived direct from the Beach DUKW Control and lorries were held in a cushion.

Personnel from the various Port Detachments, RAOC and RASC, were available at the Transfer Point to check the transfer of stores and avoid mixed loads. The lorry should go to only one dump or depot. Traffic circuits were designed on this assumption.


LBVs and LCTs were used for discharging stores. They were loaded at coasters in the same way as DUKWs and then headed to the shore. Usually they were allowed to dry out and then discharged into lorries. The most effective means of discharge was to reverse a lorry into the craft and then use a roller runway to move stores to the vehicles tailgate. 3 ton GS lorries were used for this but it was found that 10ton lorries were more efficient despite early doubts as to its suitability for beach use. It could reverse into barges and LCTs which made for easier and quicker unloading, it carried three time as much as the standard 3ton GS lorry and so saved on driver manpower and on road space and it was especially valuable for awkward loads. Despite earlier fears it did not bog down on the beaches or exits. The 6 ton semi trailer was not suitable for work on the beaches. It did bog down and it could not be reversed into barges and LCTs. It was however found to be excellent at working from transhipment areas to dumps.

The Rhino ferry was not a success in its intended role of discharging LSTs anchored off shore. Bad weather conditions, delays, damage to Rhinos and the loss of a high proportion of the tugs intended to operate with the ferries meant that the discharging of LSTs was soon far behind schedule. On D plus 1 LSTs were beached and allowed to dry out before discharging vehicles direct onto the beach. This was so successful that it became the norm and Rhino ferries became available for the discharge of stores. They were generally used to discharge the larger ‘Liberty’ type ships. DUKWs were not generally used for this task for reasons given above. The Rhino however could carry a considerable load and its length meant that stores from more than one hatch could be discharged onto it at the same time. If necessary the Rhino could be assisted in making its way ashore and in beaching by such other vessels as were available. The surviving Rhino tugs were used and these were later joined by some larger TID tugs. LCMs were generally available and LCTs were used on occasion.

On reaching the shore and drying out the Rhino could be discharged into lorries. Several methods were used. Roller runways could move stores into lorries parked alongside the Rhino. Lorries could be reversed up the Rhino’s ramp where it could be loaded using pioneer labour. Cranes could be used if available, and were generally used for heavy or bulky items.

LCMs could be used for stores but this was seen as a last resort as they did not carry a great deal and were awkward to discharge into lorries when they reached shore. 104 Beach Sub Area issued orders that LCM were never to be used for stores discharge unless specially requested by Headquarters 104 Beach Sub Area and ordered by the Naval Officer In Charge. They could be used where there was a gap in the flow of DUKWs.

Beaching of coasters was an efficient and effective method of discharging where the beach was suitable. Coasters simply anchored as near the shore as possible and waited for the tide to go out. Some coasters were actually designed for this use. Lorries could then park alongside and the coasters derricks and Port Operating personnel discharge stores in cargo nets in the normal manner.



Cranes.
Cranes were seen as essential for unloading RE stores on D Day. In theory all stores could be manhandled but getting awkward and bulky items out of Landing Barges, LCMs and LCTs would be slow. A pontoon section needed some twenty men to carry it in good conditions. Later cranes were useful in discharging LBVs and Rhino ferries which were beached and dried out. They were also used in the transhipment areas.

Cranes were of three types.
The Coles Crane mounted on a 3ton 6 X 4 lorry chassis was a useful and mobile piece of equipment. 74 Mechanical Equipment Section would land eight Coles Cranes on D day and more later.
- Four Coles Cranes landed on Jig at H plus 5 hours for 10 Beach Group. These were carries in stores LCTs. Initially they were to unload RE Stores from the LCT and were then available for work in the initial dump area.
- Three Coles Cranes landed on Jig at H plus 12 hours and moved to report to 9 Beach group on landing. A further Coles Crane landed on King at H plus 20 hours and reported to 9 Beach Group.
- 1035 Port Operating Company landed two RB 10 and one RB 19 crawler cranes at H plus 12 hours. These moved along the beach to King and were used to unload RE Stores from LCMs.
- Further RB cranes of the Port Operating Companies landed from D plus 2 and were allotted to sectors on arrival at the Assembly Area.

Coles Cranes were also used in the depot areas but these belonged to the depot units and were not available for more general use.

Eventually the Beach Sub Area had the following cranes at its disposal:
- 8 Port Operating Group had 6 RB19 and 9 RB10.
- 74 Mechanical Equipment Section had 18 Coles cranes (13 MkVI and 5 MkVII) and 2 RB19.
However 74 Mechanical Equipment Section became a unit of 11 Line of Communication Area in the third week and then cranes could be withdrawn for work in the 2 Army Roadhead.

In the third week the following was the basic allotment:
- King/Love. 2 RB19 and 1 RB10 for work on the beaches and 3 RB10 and 2 Coles for the transhipment area.
- Item/Jig. 2 RB19 and 3 Coles for the transhipment area.
Other cranes could be allotted according to availability and requirements.


Beach to Dumps.
Once stores were ashore the swift passage of vehicles from the beach to the dumps required good roads, good route layouts and good traffic control.

Roads were the task of the Royal Engineers, initially the Field Companies of the Beach Groups but assisted by other units as available. The work of improving and maintaining roads is described under he various RE units.

Traffic needed careful regulation. All routes were fully utilised and vehicles were forbidden to halt on any traffic route. If it was necessary to halt vehicles were to pull onto the verge, by this time clear of mines, or into a bay. Vehicles that broke down were to be pushed or towed clear by the first vehicle on the spot capable of doing the job. The nearest Provost Headquarters, Traffic Point or CMP(VP) policeman was to be informed of the exact location of any heavy vehicle which could not be moved. Overtaking was forbidden except for Despatch Rides on motorcycles or flagged cars (Brigadier or above).

No mechanical equipment either on tracks or on transporters was allowed move forward of the Assembly Areas on any road except between 2200 and 0600 and between 1200 and 1400. Traffic Control personnel were authorised to order any such vehicle off the road. Large and/or slow moving vehicles and equipment caused congestion and delays for other traffic.

An impressive total amount of stores was landed over Gold beaches by 104 Beach Sub Area.
Week 1. 20,751 tons were landed.
Week 2. 38,725 tons were landed.
Week 3. 26,041 tons were landed despite landing being stopped by bad weather for two days.
Week 4. 33,257 tons were landed.
Week 5. 19,806 tons were landed.
Week 6. 30,928 tons were landed.
104 Beach Sub Area landed a total of 148,757 tons of stores.

While the proportions of different types of stores landed in each period differed the amount of ammunition was always the greatest, followed in order by petrol, supplies, RE Stores, Ordnance stores, RAF ammunition and supplies, G1098 stores, NAAFI stores and medical supplies. Even when only very small amounts of a category were landed it caused complications in the unloading, transhipping, transporting to the correct depot and storing correctly.

 

Vehicles, personnel and evacuations.
Despite the common view being that the beaches became less busy with the opening of the Mulberry Harbour Gold Beach, and 104 Beach Sub Area maintained a steady flow of vehicles, personnel and stores.

The landing of vehicles did not require the same amount of labour as did the landing of stores. The work of beach companies landing vehicles was limited to controlling and directing vehicles off the beaches, through the exits and on their way to the Assembly Areas. Personnel might be required to assist with vehicles which were in difficulty but this was increasingly rare.

Where possible vehicles were landed from LCT onto ramps and hards prepared by engineers. At periods of high water LCT could beach and discharge vehicles very rapidly and without the vehicles getting wet. There were eventually three Naval Pontoon causeways, one per beach, which allowed vehicles to be discharged for longer periods, usually any time except two hours either side of low water. LSTs continued to beach and dry out. They could then discharge vehicles directly onto the beach.

Unloading of Motor Transport Coasters and Motor Transport ships always took place offshore. They did not beach and dry out. The most common method was to discharge vehicles into LCTs of the Ferry Service. These then discharged their loads at the ramps, hards or causeways. LBVs (Landing Barge Vehicle) could also be used but these were inefficient compared with LCTs.

Personnel continued to land over the beaches. Some marching personnel landed from LSTs but the majority landed from LCIs or LSIs. LCIs landed personnel directly onto the Naval Pontoon causeways. Personnel from LSIs were normally ferried ashore on LCIs or LCTs. At busy times the LSIs own LCAs ferried personnel ashore but this was inefficient and rare. Personnel normally landed without getting their feet wet.

The beach company again controlled and directed marching personnel off the beach and on their way to Assembly Areas. Kit was generally transported to the Assembly Area in transport provided by the Beach Sub Area. If the distance to the Assembly Area exceeded five miles personnel could be provided with transport as well. This was often beyond the capacity of normal RASC vehicles and unit transport, including that of AA units, was often used to supplement the lifts.

The number of vehicles landed was impressive.
Week 1. 13,553 vehicles were landed.
Week 2. 9,103 vehicles were landed.
Week 3. 9,892 vehicles were landed despite landing being stopped by bad weather for two days.
Week 4. 10,016 vehicles were landed.
Week 5. 7,055 vehicles were landed.
Week 6. 7,272 vehicles were landed. This included two busy days when 2334 and 2369 vehicles were landed respectively.
104 Beach Sub Area landed a total of 58,920 vehicles.

So was the amount of personnel.
Week 1. 67,984 personnel were landed.
Week 2. 30,523 personnel were landed.
Week 3. 43,010 personnel were landed despite landing being stopped by bad weather for two days.
Week 4. 53,783 personnel were landed.
Week 5. 19,551 personnel were landed.
Week 6. 27,974 personnel were landed.
104 Beach Sub Area landed a total of 242,825 personnel.

Casualty Evacuation.
The evacuation of casualties was a major task for the Beach Sub Area. All casualties from 30 Corps plus the Beach Sub Area would pass through the medical facilities of the sub area and be evacuated from the Casualty Evacuation Post. In the first stages all casualties were to be evacuated except those that required life saving surgery or those cases unfit to travel. These were expected to account for some 5% of the total casualties. As the medical holding units, Corps Casualty Clearing Stations and General Hospitals, were established those cases likely to recover quickly could also be retained. Casualty Evacuation ceased on Gold after D plus 19 when the Casualty Evacuation Point on Juno took over the handling of all casualty evacuation in the British sector.

The chain of evacuation was:
- From forward units to the nearest beach medical unit or Casualty Clearing Station, when established, by divisional ambulance or jeep.
- From the Beach Maintenance Area to the nearest beach medical unit or Casualty Clearing Station, when established, by Beach Group ambulance or jeep.
- From Beach Dressing Station to Medical Area by Beach Group ambulance or jeep. Casualties may be directed to Casualty Evacuation Point if they are fit for evacuation without further treatment.
- From Medical Areas to Casualty Evacuation Point by Beach Group ambulance, jeep or medical DUKW. In the later stages cases likely to recover quickly were sent to a Casualty Clearing Station or General Hospital.

Return loads.
Apart from casualties and prisoners there were some return loads. Since the armies on the Continent were only a hundred miles across the Channel from the UK and there was a daily shuttle service of ships and craft it was possible and convenient to carry out some base functions in the UK. Repairable MT assemblies, including engines, were returned to UK workshops for repair and reconditioning. Gas cylinders and compressed air bottles were returned to the UK for refilling. Inflatable lifebelts, Mae Wests, were returned from the first day for use by units arriving later. Kit belonging to casualties was also returned to the UK. All the above were collected in ordnance depots and the Principal Military Landing Officer informed of the nature and quantities to be evacuated. The Principal Military Landing Officer then issued instructions for calling forward loads.

 

Snippets and administration.
Depots and dumps opened 12 hours late due to enemy resistance and the fact that in many cases depot personnel had to clear their own areas before occupying them. Once open they worked smoothly under 104 Beach Sub Area until 2 Army Roadhead took over responsibility for the depots on D plus 8. The Beach Maintenance Area dumps were steadily expanded into Roadhead dumps and specialist units arrived to operate them. 104 Beach Sub Area became a POL and ammunition sector. Stores continued to be delivered to the existing dumps by 104 Beach Dub Area but the dumps and withdrawals from them was in the hands of 2 Army.

The smooth flow of stores was somewhat interrupted by the use of two formations since the Beach Sub Area was responsible for the movement of stores from the beaches and transhipment area to depots and the turnaround in the depot and return to the beaches was in the hands of 2 Army.

Liberty ships were unpopular for stores. They needed to moor three to five miles offshore which meant a longer journey for DUKWs or craft, and there was more likely to be rough conditions caused by sea and wind. Bad weather caused more delays and interruptions to the programme of unloading Liberty ships than to any other ships, coasters or craft. Another problem was that Liberty ships normally stowed some 2,000 tons of ammunition at the bottom of the holds where it acted as ballast. This meant that this commodity, which was most urgently needed, was the last to be unloaded and the most likely to be delayed by bad weather.

Transit areas.
The tracked and wheeled transit areas closed on D plus 2. Vehicles were then sent direct to the Assembly Areas. Transit areas were no longer needed because of changes to the planned methods of landing vehicles. They were needed originally to provide a place where vehicle crews could de waterproof their vehicles and where documentation could be carried out. Documentation was now carried out in the Assembly Areas and very few vehicles now landed wet shod. LSTs beached and dried out before discharging their loads direct onto a dry beach. This enabled vehicle crews to de waterproof vehicles while still on the LST. Vehicles landing from Rhino ferries onto pontoon causeways could de waterproof on the ferry. Vehicles landing via LCT onto hards could de waterproof on the craft. Vehicles landing from MT ships via LCT still landed in shallow water and needed their waterproofing but there was space on the beach exits or lateral road to enable de waterproofing to be carried out. This change enabled the process to be speeded up, cleared space just inland of the beaches and released personnel for other duties.

RAF.
Until sufficient RAF S & T columns are available to meet RAF requirements for store movement the responsibility for the movement of stores from depots to airfields and RAF units rested with 2 Army. Demands for transport were not to be submitted to 104 Beach Sub Area and no transport allotted to stores clearance from the beaches was to be diverted to the task. 104 Beach Sub Area continued to be responsible for the delivery of RAF stores from shipping and craft to RAF or Army dumps.


Medical.
Field Dressing Stations landed with sufficient medical supplies for 200 patients for 14 days. They also landed with the following non medical items, 2000 tins of self heating soup, 2000 tins of self hating cocoa, 2000 cigarettes, 800 Dorothy bags (small bag containing toiletries) and 12 packs of playing cards.

Personnel of Beach Medical units including attached pioneers retained their lifebelts until the reached their units site. These then formed an initial pool for casualties. Lifebelts for subsequent casualties will be provided from those discarded in the Transit Areas by incoming troops. Every casualty evacuated from the Casualty Evacuation Point had to war a lifebelt.

26 Tents HP, Extending, were landed to the Ordnance Beach Detachment as a reserve of tentage for medical units. Lorry canopies were also allotted to Beach Dressing Stations and Casualty Evacuation Point to provide cover for casualties.

The Officer Commanding 9 Advanced Depot Medical Stores landed with 3 Casualty Clearing Station on D Day. The Advanced Depot Medical Stores was established in the Corps Medical Area on D plus 3. Three preloaded 3 ton lorries landed with medical stores on that day and all Medical Maintenance Blocks were then moved to the Depot.

Blood.
Transfusion units land with 100 pints of blood each and there was then a daily delivery of approximately 100 pints by Naval Despatch Launch. This was delivered to the Headquarters Ship from where it was collected and transferred to the Casualty Evacuation Point under arrangements made by the Naval medical Liaison Officer. The Officer Commanding 7 Field Transfusion Unit was then responsible for collecting it and holding it for issue to forward units and Beach Field Transfusion Units. On D plus 4 ‘Y’ Blood Bank landed with 81 General Hospital and assumed responsibility for the collection and distribution of blood.

Stretchers, blankets, pyjamas and groundsheets.
In addition to stretchers, blankets, pyjamas and groundsheets carried by medical unis a reserve was landed. 113 HAA Regiment landed ten stretchers on each gun, giving a total of 240. These were unloaded in the Vehicle Transit Areas and the Senior Medical officers of Beach Groups arranged for their collection when transport was available. A dump was formed in the medical areas.

Each medical LST replaced all the stretchers and blankets evacuated with casualties and initially landed a further 200 stretchers and 600 blankets. These formed a dump at the Casualty Evacuation Point. A Corps reserve was landed to Ordnance Beach Detachments and came under the control of the Deputy Assistant Director of Medical Services (Evacuation) until the Corps Assistant Director of Medical Services landed and assumed control.

The Deputy Assistant Director of Medical Services (Evacuation) with seven other ranks and a Jeep landed early on D day and reported to 104 Beach Dub Area Command Post.

During the day the staff of the Deputy Assistant Director of Medical Services (Evacuation) was augmented. The Medical Officer 28 Line of Communication Transport Column landed on the first tide and reported to the Deputy Assistant Director of Medical Services (Evacuation) at 104 Beach Dub Area Command Post. His duty was to establish a Medical Intelligence Centre which would display the following information:
- A map with the locations of all medical units and up to date traffic circuits.
- A record of casualties evacuated from the Casualty Evacuation Post showing particulars of the LSTs and Hospital Carriers loaded.
- A record of all medical stores landed.
- The availability state of medical DUKWs and labour from 209 Pioneer Company.
He would also establish a Regimental Aid Post at Main Headquarters 104 Beach Sub Area.

The Medical Officer 36 Beach Group landed on D plus 1 and reported to the Deputy Assistant Director of Medical Services (Evacuation) at 104 Beach Dub Area Command Post. His duties were to assist the Deputy Assistant Director of Medical Services (Evacuation) in the control and co ordination of casualty evacuation and assist in the maintenance of the Medical Intelligence Centre.

The Medical Officer 6 Port Operating Group landed with the Group Headquarters and reported to the Deputy Assistant Director of Medical Services (Evacuation). His duties were to be allotted as the situation demanded.

June 13. (D plus 7).
As the battle moved forward medical units of the Beach Groups were called forward by 2 Army to join formations. Most medical units had been provided by the formations in the first place and were now rejoining them. On D plus 7 some units had already departed and more were on notice to move or were to be ready to move at short notice. This meant that they were not available to receive new casualties.

35 Field Dressing Station had been called forward to 30 Corps.
16 Field Dressing Station and attached units had been called forward to 7 Armoured Division.
Casualty Evacuation Point, found from 3 Field Dressing Station, was on short notice to move.
All other Field Dressing Stations became Army Field Dressing Stations and could be called forward at any time.
31 Field Dressing Station, 41 and 47 Field Surgical Units were warned to be ready to move.

The medical provision in the beach areas was now:
9 Beach Group.
32 Field Dressing Station, 48 Field Surgical Unit, 111 Field Surgical Team and 24 Field Transfusion Unit remain.
47 Field Surgical Unit was to close and be ready to move.
35 Field Dressing Station and Beach Dressing Station King Red had already moved.
Beach Dressing Station King Green closed down and rejoined 32 Field Dressing Station.
Regimental Medical Officers of 2 Hertfordshire Regiment and 120 LAA Regiment establish Regimental Aid Posts in the Beach Group area.

10 Beach Group.
25 Field Dressing Station, 42 Field Surgical Unit, 116 and 106 Field Surgical Team and 30 Field Transfusion Unit remain.
31 Field Dressing Station and 41 Field Surgical Unit were on short notice to move.
Beach Dressing Station Item Red closed.
Regimental Medical Officers of 6 Border regiment and 113 HAA Regiment establish Regimental Aid Posts in the Beach Group area.

104 Beach Sub Area.
Casualty Evacuation Point hands over to Light Section 25 Field Dressing Station.

Regimental Aid Posts were established as follows:
6 Border Regiment. Le Hamel. 869865.
25 Field Dressing Station. Asnelles. 878859.
6 Port Operating Group. 885849.
218 PW Cage. Crepon. 898835.
113 HAA Regiment. 890860.
2 Hertfordshire Regiment. La Riviere. 926866.
8 Port Operating Group. Mont Fleury. 927863.
120 LAA Regiment. 919856.
32 Field Dressing Station. 915855.
RN Sick Bay. 918859.

Regimental Medical Officers of Headquarters Assembly Area and 18 Durham Light Infantry also established Regimental Aid Posts in the Beach Sub Area. Possibly not at the same time as those above.

There were Dental Officers at 25 and 31 Field Dressing Stations.


104 Beach Sub Area units were to draw POL from Petrol Parks in the GT Parks and not from the Petrol Depot. The Petrol Points would be open from 1400 to 1600 daily. Full cans of petrol would only be issued in exchange for empty ones. The shortage of Jerrycans was a constant problem. Units left them laying around or used them for other purposes.

Units of 104 Beach Sub Area drew supplies from 2 Detail Issuing Detachment, which remained under the command of the sub area. Supplies were to be drawn between 1000 and 1800 hours according to a strict timetable.

All civilian cafes, hotels etc were out of bounds and were not to be used by troops. No purchases of food were to be made from civilian sources except by officers authorised to contract for local purchases.

Accommodation was gradually improved and, although many troops remained under canvas, wherever possible headquarters and staffs were moved into buildings. However since France was an ally no accommodation could be occupied except on the written orders of a field officer (Major or above.) Wherever possible occupation was to be agreed with the owner or occupier. Requisition notes were to be prepared as soon as possible and handed to the owner or occupier or in their absence to the major or local police. A copy was to be sent to the Hirings Officer at Headquarters 11 Line of Communications Area. Furniture and chattels were not to be taken into use but stored in one room and securely locked.

Civilian vehicles and trailers were not to be impressed by units.

Instructions were issued regarding the preservation of useful installations. The list of these was modest when compared with other areas. Three were listed as ‘must be kept intact’, the Wurtzburg Radar Station at 855865, the installation ? at 857862 and the Hospital at Asnelles 876866. If possible the destruction of the following was to be avoided, civil line and cable communications, power cables and any medical or monastic buildings suitable for medical purposes. In practice this did not apply to damage caused by fighting but if no other arrangements had been made to protect the installations from damage by saboteurs of own troops then the Beach groups should provide guards.


Enemy equipment.
Heavy equipment, ammunition etc. was to be left in situ so far as it was consistent with safety. Brief descriptions were to be sent to Rear Headquarters 104 BSA. Stocks of food stuffs were to be reported and not consumed unless passed as fit for human consumption by a Medical Officer or analyst. Maps, documents, minefield plans, uniforms etc were to be tied securely in a sack or sandbag and sent to Main Headquarters 104 BSA with a brief description of the place and circumstance of the find.

Captured enemy vehicles and trailers may be taken over by units provided that authority is obtained from G(SD) 2 Army. When a request is submitted either a certificate will be issued allotting a WD number which is to be painted on the vehicle or trailer or the unit will be ordered to hand the vehicle over to the nearest army vehicle park.


Defence.
Defence of the Beach Maintenance Area from ground attack was the responsibility of 50 Division and then 2 Army. 104 Beach Sub Area would only contribute to this defence in emergency. Sub Area units were to be prepared to defend their own area at all times however.

Within 24 hours of landing all ranks dug slit trenches and all headquarters were dug in. Houses were only occupied in exceptional cases and then only when there were cellars to use for accommodation. All men were to keep personal weapons and ammunition with them and never be more than 10 minutes away from them.

Beach Groups, being fully trained infantry battalions, prepared defensive plans for their areas based on two or three dominating features, preferably villages.

Anti aircraft defence was the responsibility of the Anti Aircraft Defence Commander who coordinated the AA defence including HAA and LAA units, balloons and the emergency siting of AA for possible anti tank defence. Units kept LMGs ready for use against low flying aircraft but only in case the balloon barrage should be destroyed. Aircraft could only be engaged if markings could clearly be seen or if they were committing a hostile act. Even so fire would only be opened under the supervision of an officer or NCO, when no friendly aircraft were in the area and when the target was at a height of less than 600 foot.

Anti aircraft guns could open fire on aircraft clearly recognised as hostile or were committing a hostile act. Normally they could only open fire on an unseen aircraft when in communication with the Anti Aircraft Operations Room.

Sixty balloons of 4 RAF Beach Squadron (54 and 55 Balloon Units) were deployed. 76 AA Brigade exercised operational control of balloons through Anti Aircraft Defence Commander. Because of the location of an Emergency Landing Strip at 8885 balloons could not be flown on parts of Jig. Replacement balloons could be taken from LSTs or LCTs.

Camouflage was an important element of the defence scheme. Headquarters of Beach Sub Area and Beach Groups each had a Staff Captain (Camouflage) to advise and supervise camouflage. The order of priority for camouflage was, Headquarters, Depots, Transport, Medical facilities, Bivouac areas and beaches.

Meuvaines was a key feature to be defended in the event of an attack by the enemy. It was not only a cross roads and route centre but also the site of several headquarters. The Colonel commanding 104 Beach Sub Area was in command of the defence with the Commander RE as second in Command. The Defence Command Post was in the basement of Meuvaine Chateau. Apart from the headquarters personnel there were a number of 104 Beach Sub Area units allocated to the defence force, although in the case of a sudden attack they would not all be immediately available.

The defence force was divided into four sectors, logically named North, East, South and West, plus a mobile reserve.

North Sector was commanded by Officer Commanding 113 HAA Regiment RA and contained:
Headquarters 113 HAA Regiment. 105 men.
G2 RN Camp. 250 men.
55 Balloon Section RAF. 70 men.
1026 Port Operating Company. 320 men.

East Sector was commanded by officer Commanding 244 Petrol Depot and contained:
244 Petrol Depot. 42 men.
119 Pioneer Company. ?
104 BSA Signal Section. 5 men.
RN Signals. 60 men.

South Sector was commanded by the Officer Commanding 6 Port Operating Group and contained:
Headquarters 6 Port Operating Group. 48 men.
1022 Port Operating Company. 320 men.
Headquarters troops 104 BSA. 50 men.
24 Base Defence Sector RAF. 206 men.

West Sector was commanded by the Officer in Charge of detachment 705 GT Company RASC and contained:
968 Port maintenance Company. 80 men.
Detachments 705 GT Company and 551 GT Company. 400 men.
16 Air Formation Signals. 35 men.
85 Field Maintenance Section RAF. 14 men.

Mobile Reserve was commanded by Commander RE and contained:
Headquarters CRE personnel.
26 Bomb Disposal Section.
Headquarters personnel 36 Beach Brick.
64 Section 243 Provost Company.
Field Repair Unit RAF.
All spare officers.

Outposts were reconnoitred and ready for occupation on the approach roads to the south and south west. One, manned by East Sector, was on the high ground west of the village and south of the road to Crepon. The other, manned by South Sector, was in the high wooded feature at 888831. Outposts were to be self sufficient in supplies and ammunition for 48 hours.

Patrols were to be ready to establish contact with allied troops in Asnelles and Crepon.

All roads from Meuvaine were to be blocked on the sounding of the alarm. CRE made a central dump of mines and detonators near the HQ CRE.

The alarm was the continuous sounding of whistles and all available motor horns.


BSA vehicles.
Twelve Weasels were issued to 104 Beach Sub Area about ten days before marshalling began. They were issued to Military Landing Officers for beach work and to Headquarters CRE and the beach group engineer field companies. It is known that 89 and 90 Field Companies each received three Weasels. The exact allocation of the remaining six has not been found but they were all issued in lieu of jeeps. According to the report of 104 Beach Sub Area the Weasels proved to be invaluable in the early stages. They could travel anywhere and could ‘waltz’ on clay and peat which would bog the ordinary jeep. Having less track pressure than any other vehicle they were less likely to set off mines, particularly on the beaches.

The amphibious jeep was not well thought of. They were difficult to use on roads since they were larger and heavier than a normal jeep and had a larger turning circle. They also took more space on landing craft than the normal jeep, offered no advantage on the beach and were little used on water.

The James 125cc lightweight motorcycle was found to be excellent for beach use. It did not bog down but if it did it could be carried. It was also easier to land in the early stages. It could be carried in DUKWs, on the bonnets of jeeps or be carried. If properly maintained it was found to be reliable. Thirty were issued to 104 Beach Sub Area.


15 June.
Missing. One Jeep property of 104 Beach Sub Area. Removed from 10 Beach Group Command Post. No M5473195. Marked ‘Olive’. At Approx. 1730 14 June.

 

36 Beach Brick.
36 Beach Brick was placed under the command of 104 Beach Sub Area on 22 May and remained until 21 July when the Beach Sub Area was broken up. It was provided on the assumption that the Beach Groups would suffer 33% casualties on D Day and D plus 1. This was greatly over pessimistic. 36 Beach Brick started landing on D plus 2 and was held in reserve except when it relieved 9 Beach Group for a period. This was to give 9 Beach Group a chance to refit after living in bivouacs, and to give 36 Beach Brick experience. While in reserve the resources of 36 Beach Brick were split up for work between the two sectors, there being scope for only two groups to operate at any one time.

36 Beach Brick had been formed in Italy and served in landings there before being brought to the UK to share its experience and to work with 50 Division, also returned from Italy. The title ‘Brick’ suggests a different organisation to that of the Beach Group. It was largely formed from personnel in reinforcement camps rather from the conversion of an infantry battalion.
- There was a Headquarters 36 Beach Brick with a movement detachment. Unlike the Beach groups the movement officers were not from 21 Army Group Movement Pool but were originally regimental officers and they had come from Italy with the Beach Brick.
- There was also a Headquarters 18 Durham Light Infantry, a battalion headquarters. This allowed Headquarters 36 Beach Brick to concentrate on operational tasks.
- Personnel were formed from Headquarters Company 18 Durham Light Infantry, one rifle company from 18 Durham Light Infantry, one independent company from Queens Regiment and two troops Royal Artillery, Nos 41 and 43. These were not trained infantry or artillery units but they were experienced and provided a very useful pool of skilled and intelligent labour with high morale.
- To the above were added 36 Ordnance Beach Detachment, 26 Beach Recovery Section REME plus 119 and 191 Pioneer Companies.
- The Beach brick differed from the Beach Group in not having engineer, medical or transport units.

 

Phase Three.
From 25 June.

Having recovered from the storm of 19 to 22 June, and having constructed efficient DUKW Transhipment Areas in the downtime resulting from the storm, a new pattern of working was introduced. 104 Beach Sub Area would now concentrate on the Build Up Phase. The primary task now was to pass as many build up personnel, stores and vehicles as possible across the beaches. Stores were to be delivered to the dumps and depots now under the control of No 2 Roadhead. Personnel and vehicles would pass through the Assembly Areas to formation concentration areas.

Specialist units were either withdrawn altogether or concentrated from Beach Group control to 104 Beach Sub Area.
Medical units and engineer units which were no longer required in the beach areas were withdrawn.
7, 10 and 36 Ordnance Beach Detachments were withdrawn from Beach Groups.
5 Detail Issuing Depot and 244 Petrol Company were withdrawn from 104 Beach Sub Area.
25 Beach Recovery Section and 6 Line of Communication Troops Workshop were redeployed.

After D plus 17 the Prisoner of War cage became a transit cage only. Prisoners were then transferred there from the Army Cage and held only until they were collected by escorts from the UK and loaded onto returning LSTs. On D plus 31 the cage closed down and all prisoners were then evacuated through Arromanches.


36 Beach Brick was to operate King and Love. King Green was reserved for the maintenance and repair of RN craft. Personnel could still be landed across the beaches and vehicles from LCTs could be landed on the causeway. King Red was for beached LBV, PBR and coasters. Personnel could land by LCI or from LSI using the Ferry Service. Love Green would land LCTs on the hard and personnel and beached coasters could be landed as necessary. Coasters could be unloaded by DUKW through the DUKW exits.

10 Beach Group would operate Item and Jig. Item Red was to be used for beached barges and coasters, coasters being discharged by DUKW, personnel by LCI and vehicles by LST. Jig Green West was for beached LST and LCT discharging to the tracked and wheeled vehicle exits. Jig Green East and Jig Red was for personnel and beached barges.

9 Beach Group was to be used as reserve beach companies, labour, transhipment and traffic control.


With the proviso ‘as far as possible’ it was now intended that:
- 10 Beach Group would handle ammunition over Item Sector.
- 36 Beach Brick would handle Supplies, Ordnance Stores and RE Stores over King Sector.
- Ferry Control would allocate stores ships, coasters and barges on the above basis.
- Motor Transport from MT Ships would be landed across Jig Sector by 10 Beach Group.
- 6 Port Operating Group would be primarily responsible for the discharge of MT ships to ferry craft on Item/Jig Sectors and the hard on Love Sector. When reserve hatch gangs were available they would be prepared to work stores coasters on 10 Beach Group’s sector.
- 8 Port Operating Group would be responsible for the discharge of stores and coasters across the whole of 104 Beach Sub Area’s front.
- DUKW Transhipment Areas were provided behind each Beach Group and were worked by the Beach Group concerned, albeit with additional labour when necessary and available. Two companies from 9 Beach Group were to work under the command of 10 Beach Group. No DUKW was then to proceed forward of the Transhipment Area and in particular no cargo net was ever to proceed forward of the Transhipment Area. If 3 ton, 6 ton or 10 ton load carrying vehicles were not available in the Transhipment Areas stores were to be stacked by the bays and disposed off as transport became available.
- Cranes would be allotted to the Transhipment Areas at the daily Ferry Control Conference.
- Ferry craft were to be allotted as follows, depending on availability. For MT discharge, 40 to 45 LCT, 8 to 10 Rhino and 30 LCM. For stores discharge, 20 to 30 LBV and 10 PBR. These were to be allotted at the daily Ferry Control Conference. Normally the bulk of the LBV would be allotted to King.


There was a basic allotment of transport but additional vehicles could be allotted if available.
- Jig/Item had a basic allotment of DUKWs consisting of 705 GT Company and one and a half platoons from 160 GT Company. In addition it had 10 ton lorries from 2 platoons of 213 GT Company.
- King/Love had a basic allotment of DUKWs consisting of 536 GT Company and one and a half platoons from 160 GT Company. In addition it had 3 ton lorries of 305 GT Company.
- Two platoons of 213 GT Company and the balance of available 3 and 6 ton GS vehicles were allotted as necessary at the daily Ferry Control Conference.
20% of DUKWs and 10% of other load carrying vehicles were to be off the road daily for maintenance.
With the Maintenance Area now fully developed the dumps and depots were operated by normal base units. The Beach Groups and 104 Beach Sub Area were now only responsible for landing stores and transporting them to the appropriate dump or depot.
- Supplies were to be delivered to the supplies area operated by 52, 58 and 62 Base Supply Depots. Transport reported to the report centre at 825822 and were then directed to the correct area.
- POL was to be delivered to the POL area operated by 21, 131 and 206 Petrol Depots. Transport reported to the report centre at 782788 and were then directed to the correct area.
- Ordnance Stores were to be delivered to the Ordnance area operated by 17 Advanced Ordnance Depot. Transport reported to the report centre at 791827 and were then directed to the correct area.
- RE Stores were to be delivered to the RE area operated by 174 and 180 Workshop and Park Companies. Transport reported to the report centre at 822778 and were then directed to the correct area.
- Ammunition was to be delivered to the ammunition area operated by 15 Base Ammunition Depot. Transport reported to the report centre at 859821 and were then directed to the correct area.
- Transportation Stores were to be delivered to the transportation stores area operated by Headquarters 1 Transportation Stores Group and 188 Transportation Stores Company. Transport reported to the report centre at 811776 and were then directed to the correct area.
- G1098 Stores were to be delivered to 1 Ordnance Maintenance Company attached to 17 Advanced Ordnance Depot.

Labour.
The reserve Beach Group, No 9 at this time, provided a pool of labour and appointed a labour master to coordinate demands and allot the available labour. 75 and 173 Pioneer Companies remained allotted as basic labour to Commander RE. One pioneer company was permanently allotted to CRASC to provide boathook men for DUKW companies.

From 1 July 16 Group Pioneer Corps was affiliated to Headquarters 104 Beach Sub Area and assumed control of all pioneer companies.

Civil labour could be employed but only through Labour Services. Rates of pay were set by the Deputy Director of Labour 11 Line of Communication Area. Prisoners of War were no longer to be retained for labour but escorted direct to the Prisoner of War Cage.


Provosts.
From 2 July 240 and 243 Provost Companies were placed under the direct control of 104 Beach Sub Area through the Assistant Provost Marshal. From this time Beach Groups would have provosts allotted to them as necessary, except that 10 Beach Group had a basic allocation of one section and one officer.

Beach groups were now responsible for control of traffic and for policing of their sectors as far as the lateral road from Le Hamel to La Riviere. This was only a few yards from the beach for much of its length. The Assistant provost marshal was responsible for control, allotment and signing of the remainder of the Beach Sub Area and for coordinating with flanking formations. He was also responsible for the assessment of Beach Group demands and for the allotment of additional Provost personnel.

The traffic control trained personnel of 36 Beach Brick had been employed by the Assistant Provost Marshall but now reverted to 36 Beach brick and were employed on the policing of the beach and lateral road and for the guarding of NAAFI stores on board ship and in transit. In the latter case they were replacing provosts from CMP(VP).

The Assistant Provost Marshall now became responsible also for 602 CMP(VP) detachment attached to 218 Prisoner of War Cage.

On 5 July refuges from Caen arrived in the area and had to be screened etc.

 

8 GHQ Engineers.
Commander Royal Engineers commanding 8 GHQ Engineers assumed command of engineer units in 104 Beach Sub Area, including field companies initially attached to beach groups. The Commander RE established his headquarters alongside that of 104 Beach Sub Area.

On D Day the Commander Royal Engineers reconnaissance party landed and established a RE Report Centre on King Sector. An Advanced Headquarters Royal Engineers was established at Meauvaines (8985) by 2000.

An early task was to reconnoitre routes in the Beach Maintenance Area. This was hampered in some areas by local centres of enemy resistance and sniping.

On 7 June Main Headquarters RE landed and moved to Meauvaines with Headquarters 104 Beach Sub Area. The Commander RE held a Company Commanders conference where they were informed that companies would be under the control of CRE and will proceed as already briefed with route construction and maintenance. 280 Field Company was to construct a landing ramp for LST on King. Command of 73 Field Company passed to Chief Engineer 30 Corps. 583 and 584 Field Companies came under the command of CRE. These two companies were to construct pontoon causeways but this work was delayed as some of the equipment had been lost in the crossing.

A reconnaissance of the beach found peat and clay within 6 inches of the surface of the sand in runnels. This gave trouble in the maintenance of exit routes. PSP was tried but proved unsatisfactory. Flexiboards were found to be the best solution. These were in short supply and where they were used between high and low water they had to be lifted as the tide rose to prevent them washing away. Picketing was inadequate especially in soft ground.

A large quantity of German arms and equipment found. Mechanical equipment included 5 excavators, 6 concrete mixers, 2 pumps, portable compressor, power saw, 2½ ton roller and 24 Kw SL generator.

On 9 June 202 and 203 Works Sections (22 CRE Works) landed and carried out a reconnaissance of the Beach Maintenance Area on behalf of 22 CRE who were to take over maintenance on arrival of the Artizan Works Companies. On 10 June 659 Artizan Works Company was placed under the command of 8 GHQ Troops Engineers and employed in support of 89 and 90 Field Companies on maintenance of the coast road and the construction of beach marking signs.

The existing one way coast road between La Riviere and Le Hamel was the only serious problem. This road was built over a marsh at a height of 3 or 4 feet above high water. It was pitted with bomb craters which wrecked the foundation and interfered with the drainage of the marsh. Craters were repaired with rubble from demolished buildings, coir matting and chespales. Ditches were redug and the road widened to take two way traffic. The railway line shown on maps no longer existed and some lengths of Decanville type track dumped by the side of the road were thought to have been used by the Germans in construction of concrete emplacements.

On 11 June construction of a new tank exit route from Jig Red Beach was started by 69 Field Company. On 12 June a detachment 6 Mechanical Equipment Section landed and reinforced 51 Mechanical Equipment Section. 183 Field Company constructed a two way by pass round village of Crepon.

As the Beach Maintenance Area developed much of the work of construction and maintenance was removed from 8 GHQ Engineers. On 13 June command of 183 and 280 Field Companies passed to 6 Army Troops Engineers. Command of 659 Artizan Works Company reverted to 22 CRE Works. 659 Company took over Beach Maintenance Area route maintenance from 183 Field Company. On 15 June command of 108 and 121 Pioneer Companies passed to 22 CRE Works. On 16 June Beach Maintenance Area route maintenance in 69 Field Company was area taken over by 718 Artizan Works Company. Command of 690 Field Company passed to 6 Army troops Engineers. 104 Beach Sub Area route maintenance responsibility was now confined to beach exits and the coast lateral. Remainder of Beach Maintenance Area was now responsibility of 22 CRE Works.


Water Supply.
Water supply was an engineer responsibility. Units landed with two days supply of water but water points were required as soon as possible. Water points were erected on 7 June at La Riviere by 89 Field Company and at Le Hamel by 90 Field Company. On 8 June 55 Electrical and Mechanical Section established a water point at Creully Bridge (907805). On 14 June CRE ordered the construction by 55 Electrical and Mechanical Section of an additional water point at Creully Bridge in the area of the existing water point, from which 24,000 gallons a day was insufficient to meet demand. This Water Point was taken over by 4 CE Works on 20 June.


Water supply became a problem across 104 Beach Sub Area. Orders were issued that no water from water points was to be used for washing and no water should be taken from civil water supply. It was reported that wells were beginning to dry up. Water could only be taken from the three established water points.

On 23 and 24 June further water reconnaissance was carried out at Crepon and St. Comde de Fresne. Several wells and one borehole were located. The yields from the wells was unsatisfactory. Deep well equipment was required to raise water for test yield in the borehole. An extension to the storage capacity at the water point at Le Hamel was provided by the construction of a reinforced concrete tank incorporating reinforced concrete floor and walls of the disused French hospital at the site of the well.

On 29 to 30 June further reconnaissance was carried out for water points at Asnelles and St. Comde de Fresne. A 1000 gallons per hour deep well pump being installed at the borehole.


18 June. Command 51 ME section passed to 2 Army troops. 623 Field Park Company landed and moved to area of RE Dump.

On 19 June Commander RE 104 Beach Sub Area responsibility for road maintenance was amended to include La Riviere – Crepon – Ryes – Le Hamel. The Commander RE ordered the development of the existing quarry at King 1 exit with 51 Mechanical Equipment Section providing the necessary equipment. Crushed stone from the quarry was used initially for surfacing the coast road. Rubble from demolished buildings and gravel from the beach was used for the repair of Beach Maintenance Area routes. This work done by 280 Pioneer Company pending their employment in 180 Workshop and Park Company in the RE Dump.

The Commander 104 BSA requested DUKW transhipment areas to be constructed from local resources. Heavy rain and gale force winds halted the discharge of ships, coasters and craft. On 20 June 659 Artizan Works Company and its attached 108 Pioneer Company plus 209 Pioneer Company were placed under the command of the Commander RE. Detachments were attached to 89 and 90 Field Companies for the construction of DUKW transhipment areas in King and Jig Sectors. Remainder employed on track maintenance. On 21 June construction of the transhipment stands and road improvements were delayed by a shortage of engineer stores which were now controlled by 2 Army.

The storm of 19-21 June damaged the ramp on Love Green and caused considerable erosion of backfill behind the gaps in the sea wall at La Riviere in places where the wall had been hit in D Day bombardment. CRE decided to repair the damaged portions of the wall in concrete and masonry and to surface the landing ramp with pre cast blocks.

The storm also damaged roads in the area and on 29 June road repair work was given a high priority as a result of the bad weather. The return route Crepon to Love Green was assigned to 89 Field Company with 75 Pioneer Company and 659 Artizan Works Company with 108 Pioneer Company. Dover Road and the coast lateral were assigned to 90 Field Company and 173 and 280 Pioneer Companies.

Road improvements and repair continued but depended on the use of tipper lorries. These were assigned as available. Obviously there was great demand and all roads required work. ‘A’ and ‘B’ Platoons of 486 Tipper Company RASC were initially assigned, giving sixty task vehicles. This was reduced when the above were replaced by ‘B’ Platoon 26 Tipper Company plus three lorries from ‘A’ Platoon, giving thirty three task vehicles plus three in reserve. Bad weather also caused delays in road improvement and repair work.


51 Mechanical Equipment Section.
Mechanical Equipment Sections provided a variety of equipment to support the field companies in their tasks. Initially two detachments landed, one with each of the beach groups, and each detachment had eight armoured dozers. Later they landed rollers, graders, dumpers and other equipment together with drivers/operators. In addition to providing equipment in support of the field companies much time was spent in the recovery and repair of mechanical equipment left scattered around the beaches by other units. The section also collected captured German and French mechanical equipment. A mechanical equipment park was established in each sector into which was collected all captured and abandoned mechanical equipment. All such equipment was reported to 30 Corps and later a pool of unused mechanical equipment was established in the main RE Dump.

Mechanical Equipment Sections deployed on the Normandy beaches were Type B. This was a Captains command with a Subaltern as second in command. Total personnel was 74 other ranks of which 45 were excavator operators, qualified to operate any of the mechanical equipment. The equipment varied but beach units had four tractor 6 X 4 Heavy (Scammel) and four 20 ton low loading trailer (Multiwheeler) to move the equipment to where it was needed.

Mine clearance.
Mine clearance continued to be a major task. The main routes and sites for dumps were soon cleared but mines and booby traps remained in unsuspected place for many weeks, occasionally causing casualties and damage. Many minefields were simply marked and left as long as they were not in areas required for dumps, assembly areas etc.

On 22 June a German chart showing detailed location of minefields in Asnelles was received from the Intelligence section, 104 Beach Maintenance Area. This gave valuable information for future reconnaissance but additional mines were found scattered indiscriminately.

26 BD Section landed and established its section HQ at Meauvaines. Originally 26 Bomb Disposal Section was a part of Commander RE’s assets but came under command of 10 Army Group RE on 18 June and left the area on 27 June. The primary task of course was to neutralise unexploded bombs in the Beach Sub Area. In fact only two were reported and dealt with although many more went unreported. The section were not idle however. Large numbers of Allied naval and AA shells were found and removed. Two batteries of ground rockets were disassembled. One was still capable of firing but its remote firing cables had been cut by bombardment.

A variety of suspicious or mysterious objects were reported and dealt with including an 8” German rocket shell, bazooka type missiles and ‘Goliath’ remote controlled demolition vehicles. Where appropriate these were handed over to technical intelligence.

Bomb Disposal personnel also assisted with mine clearance and general sapper tasks.

26 June.
623 Field Park Company took over RE Stores Dump at Ver sur Mer from 180 Workshop and Park Company.

Pioneers.
Pioneer companies worked closely with engineer units and in the Beach Sub Area most engineer units had a company permanently attached to them for labour.
75 Pioneer Company worked with 89 Field Company RE.
173 Pioneer Company worked with 90 Field Company RE.
280 Pioneer company worked with 69 Army Field Company RE.
121 Pioneer Company worked with 183 Army Field Company RE.
108 Pioneer Company worked with 659 Artizan Works Company RE.
44 Pioneer Company worked with 1 and 2 Advanced Park Sections from 180 Workshop and Park Company RE.