Reading up on this today and one major factor against French armour was how thirsty the French tanks were compared to the Germans. Refuelling from wheeled-tankers took a lot longer for the French than for the Germans who often used "Jerry" cans. The wheeled tankers also had zero cross-country ability which restricted their freedom of movement. French commanders had no intiative so were always referring to the next level of Command before making a descision. Whereas the Germans Commanders were encouraged to solve their own problems. One French counter-attack at Sedan took 12 hours from the intial order until the troops started the attack. The German response took 10 minutes to organise!. To combat the Char 1 Bis the Germans soon learnt to aim for the armoured louvres on the side-rear which protected the oil radiator and passed on this knowledge to other formations. Some French Armoured attacks intially had success against the Germans, even against Panzer IIIs. But German re-enforcemnets soon tipped the scales. Another problem the French Armoured units encountered was the roads up to the Front were choked with refugees and worse still other French units in full retreat. Faulty communication and coordination between the various forces was probably France's biggest downfall. Even with their under-performing tanks they might have been able to mount a decent defense if one unit knew what the other was doing in a timely manner. But the French never really wanted a fight. They were on the victorious side in WWI and yet there they were, only a short number of years later, having to go through the whole thing again. The Germans were motivated by retribution. After the initial breakthrough by Germany I believe the French had no real chance to win the war. The French leaders had a defeatist attitude, but their outlook and their decision to surrender early in the fight was not completely unwarranted. They had seen the landscape of their country despoiled by the first World War and they had no desire to see it ravaged a second time. In the end it was probably a good decision, because they would have been defeated anyway. Their military was not designed to fight a mobile war. Which leads to another point; French military doctrine is highly critisized nowadays, but it was actually reasonable and would probably have been highly effective if they had not overlooked one 'minor' detail (namely, the rift in the Ardennes Forest). The French continental border is quite large and the Maginot Line was imposing. Germany didn't attack it for a reason. The deployment of French tanks into "penny-packets" was also not unreasonable. When you have so much ground to defend and you don't know where the enemy will make his attack, where do you place the bulk of your forces? You are almost forced to disperse your equipment to counter an attack from any direction. Massing tanks into large forces is really only sensible when you know where the battle is going to occur.