Fighting withdrawal to St.Valery-en-Caux

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Great Post !

 

Thanks a lot Samuel, it's the little things that bring all this back to life. My father told me that my grandfather (7RNF) had told him that some of the food he recieved from the German families that they worked for was better than that at home before the war? Tough men for tough times. It was probably because of the way they were brought up that helped them through the bad times. When people talk of Post Tramatic stress I wonder what it must have been like, in your average community, after WW1 and WW2. Chester Potts tells me that half of 7RNF were sent home after muster at Gosforth Park, because they were miners, and replaced by men from Durham and London! Durhams being short and Londoners being "cocky".
Great post and good to hear from you.
All the best, John

 

After embarking for France on the 4th of April 1940 the 7th RNF landed at Le Havre and then proceded to the area of Bolbec and in particuar Gruchet le Valise were billets were found for the troops. In fact at the local Chateau where the officers were billeted one of the subalterns fell in love with the maid. A short lived romance as about 10 days later the Battalion were on the move again initailly to Blangy but things changed and they then proceeded to Strazeele near the Belgian border where they found further billets and stayed there about a week.

It was whilst here that they received orders that they were to join the 51st Highland Division which was destined to take up post on the Maginot Line. There then followed a long road move with the Bn ending up in the steel town of Amneville naer Metz. After about another 10 days or so the Battalion then moved up to the Maginot Line with Battalion HQ setting up in Eberviller. A small French Village which stank of manure (in those days midden heaps were piled up outside the farmhouses which in turn were all in the villages). With D Company as reserve A,B and C Companys then moved out to nearby villages which were to be their base of operations until the 'Mise En Guard' was called.

 

Hi Chester,

Good to hear from you again. I have some questions for you based on the Samuelburke post.
1. He talks of the physical condition of the troops who made up the Cheshires Bn. What was the condition of 7RNF? Were they all big fishermen, farmers and miners? I wonder how they were affected by the work they did, food they could get and survival through any prevelant diseases?
2. Samuel indicates that training was of a low standard, mainly route marching and grenade throwing; was this also the case with 7RNF? Was this down to an unimaginative Regtl Training programme, lack of equipment and facilities, a belief that "this war would be like the last", or was it just the speed of deployment?
3. Did 7RNF after handover/takeover from the Cheshires practice fire in that coal mine, did they feel at home?
4. What were the officers like, where were they drawn from, and what relationship did they have with their men?
5. Did all TA Bns feel less than their regular counterparts? I don't know if this point would bear out as 7RNF were with a TA Division.
6. Was there any cross postings of Reg Officers and NCOs to "stiffen" the TA troops?

I'm with Samuel when he says it must have taken more guts to face the enemy when you may believe yourself to be the 2nd XI (however, it has been my experience that one of the great saving graces's of the British soldier is that, even in difficult and sometimes disasterous circumstances, he maintains that he is always better than any other soldier, particularly the enemy!).

Regards

John

 

1. He talks of the physical condition of the troops who made up the Cheshires Bn. What was the condition of 7RNF? Were they all big fishermen, farmers and miners? I wonder how they were affected by the work they did, food they could get and survival through any prevelant diseases?
2. Samuel indicates that training was of a low standard, mainly route marching and grenade throwing; was this also the case with 7RNF? Was this down to an unimaginative Regtl Training programme, lack of equipment and facilities, a belief that "this war would be like the last", or was it just the speed of deployment?
3. Did 7RNF after handover/takeover from the Cheshires practice fire in that coal mine, did they feel at home?
4. What were the officers like, where were they drawn from, and what relationship did they have with their men?
5. Did all TA Bns feel less than their regular counterparts? I don't know if this point would bear out as 7RNF were with a TA Division.
6. Was there any cross postings of Reg Officers and NCOs to "stiffen" the TA troops?



John, excuse my late replies but I am not getting notification of further postings on this forum. I shall try and answer your questions.

I cant speak for the Cheshires however the physical condition of the men of 7RNF was very good. They had spent quite a bit of time together by this stage and had trained together as a unit. They had quite a lot of experienced soldiers in their ranks including many veterans of WW1 and reservists from the Duke of Wellingtons and Durham Light Infantry. The Duke of Boots were highly skilled in the use of the Vickers as they had used this weapon before. The unit was also supplemented by militaimen from the Royal Green Jackets (Cockneys) as well.

With regards to training, 1939 was a period of chaotic reorganistaion. It was not until Alton that the Battalion received the new battledress and new vehicles. The Vickers they had been equipped with had previously been for drill purposes only and had been reconverted to fire again. There were 4 guns to a Platoon making 12 to a Company. To give you an idea of the lack of ammunition, Jimmy Charters will tell you that at Alton they fired 10 rounds from the Vickers prior to deployment for France! Thats not to say that they were not proficient in its use.

When the TA was mobilised in 39 it was told to double itself in numbers. This resulted in the 9th Battalion being formed. These were younger more inexperienced soldiers and many of these second line TA units found themselves in France very poorly equipped and designated as airfield building units or other such mundane jobs.

With regards to taking over from the Cheshires I have not heard about using the coal mine but one of the veterans did comment on the poor state of training of the Cheshires (Please note that I am not having a pop at the Cheshires here but that is what I was told by someone who was there!) Perhaps 4th Cheshires were such a 2nd line TA unit??

The Officers were by and large, long time TA Officers. The Company Commanders were subbies during the 1920s and had mixed with a great deal of experienced soldiers from the Great War. They were profficient in what they had been taught but as was later seen, they faced a completely different type of warfare to that of 1918.

There were some very brave young officers amongst them who proved themselves in battle. Lt Peter Beckingham was wounded twice but refused to leave his men, he was later awarded the MC, John Munro Garlick was also in the thick of it with B Coy and was wounded on the 5th of June. He was evacuated and transferred to the Royal Air Force as a bomber pilot. He won the DFC and bar until being shot down in his Lanc in 1943 and killed.

There appaers to have been one bad egg amongst the Battalions officers who feigned illness twice to get himself out of the firing line and he was a Company Commander.

From speaking to veterans there appaers not to have been the animosity from regular to TA as I remember during my service with the Fusiliers. I think that they could all still remember the role of the TA units in WW1 and how important they had been in stopping the Kaisers advance in 1914!

With regards to cross posting of officers from regular to TA to stiffen them up this did not happen! In fact one Captain from the 2nd Battalion RNF who had been a Company Commander in his parent unit was demoted to Commanding HQ Coy in the 7th. This was not a stiffening of the Battalion but the regulars getting rid of a weak officer!

On the NCO front some of the reservists were very experienced NCOs and brought a wealth of experience to the Battalion. In my opinion 7RNF were a first rate TA frontline Battalion with some highly rated soldiers. They would later prove themselves in battle and gave good account of themselves.

 

Tahnks Chester,

It's not the timing of the reply but the quality that counts, and this is excellent.

No doubt I'll have more questions, so would you rather communicate by e-mail, or continue on this site, as others may be interested, or find common links.

'til the next time, regards

John

 

Cheshires can’t shoot straight! Only fit for digging! Thanks Chesterflyer that got him talking for once.


To date, I only thought the 4th had only been ignored by history – even their Regimental; Museum does not mention them and shows only the 2nd Battalion at Dunkirk. But they also managed to collected bad press, as well!!!


The facts - arrived in France in January 1940 to suffer extremely cold weather. Wasted the next 4 months sitting in front of the Maginot, bored, cold and sporadically shelled. They have, however, the distinction of being the first TA MMG regiment to fire on the enemy in WW2.


I have only followed D Coy properly but they fought 3 actions as rearguard firstly under command of 12 Lancers and then 4/7 Dragoon Guards. They suffered significant losses on the River Dendre.


On 26th May they were at La Panne hoping to go home but were pushed back into the line (and knew they were going to be sacrificed). The next day, D Coy (my father’s lot) which had been boosted by a Section of 2nd Cheshires and a Platoon from B Coy, fought at Wormhoudt under the command of a depleted 2nd Royal Warwicks Battalion against Hitler’s best in the form of the SS Liebstandarde Adolf Hitler. Totally outnumbered and outgunned, they, the Warwicks and 53rd AT (Royal Artillery) fought the SS to a stand still. In the process the British shot up the SS General’s car, kept him trapped for three hours in sewage filled ditch with his head down in the pig sh….. if not eating it (everyone claims the honour of this action but my father’s lot were in pole position to take pot shots at him). Try as they may, the SS could not rescue him. It needed the intervention by Guderian’s regular Army tanks to overcome the British defence and to release this criminal to the mortal embarrassment of the SS (who then proceeded to commit their customary revenge massacre). One wonders what these SS, minimum height 6 foot, perfect specimens of the Aryan race and smart as guardsmen thought of these scrawny, scruffs from Liverpool and Manchester.


Meanwhile a depleted, combined A and C Coy fought at Cassel, covered the break out and was the last to leave – those not killed (which included the Major) were all captured.


Another Platoon of Cheshires was assisting the 5th Gloucesters in their incredible stand at Ledringhem,; all killed or captured as far as I can tell.

The last platoon of Cheshires together with the scrapings from Wormhoudt, were committed the next day at Wylder and met a similar terrible fate at the hands of the tanks.


Less than half the Battalion escaped from Dunkirk. The attrition in Lieutenants was particularly severe; of the twelve in the front line on the 26th May only two escaped Dunkirk (and one was the 2nd Battalion Lt referred to earlier). But, by assisting in holding the South West line from Cassel to Bergues on 26th to 29th May, the sacrifice of 4th Cheshires, allowed many tens of thousands to escape.


My father and another soldier escaped across the fields and got on a French Destroyer, which took them to Le Havre. Where, strangely enough, they received orders to join the 51st – luckily for them this did not happen as France collapsed and they caught a small boat back to England.


You will not find any of this in the history books – all of which say 2 platoons of Cheshires at Wormhoudt (there were four), no mention of the platoon at Ledringhem and "a Unit of TA Cheshires" – Cassel.

This lack of recognition is what you will find with the 7th RNF – if you are spread around as support troops, your full worth is not recognised. As you have already discovered you need to get down to platoon level (and maybe even section level) to discover where they were and what they did.

　
But I return the new insight I have got on the Cheshires and relevance to the TA v Regular Army discussion and 7RNF.


My father was part of the first Militia, 150 conscripts called on 1st July 1939, (he like the rest had just turned 21years old). They were based at the Chester Depot (not with the TA) and were trained by regulars of the 2nd Battalion Cheshires. Just for the record, the 2nd Battalion Cheshires was the first mechanised MMG battalion in the British Army. The training was excellent and the Militia lads had lots and lots of bullets to play with and were very proficient in firing the gun.


200 old regulars joined exclusively from D Coys ie MMG Companies of such regiments as Green Howards and Lincolns (as you know separating out the MMG from the Infantry was a recent innovation at the time). The old reservists were very experienced and very competent with the Vickers (my father’s comment). However, I did see a report that the Cheshires MO rejected many reservists on the grounds of fitness – interesting!


4th Battalion Cheshires were a typical infantry TA unit of the time, drawn almost exclusively from the Wirral area. They were at less than half strength; the CO was a well-decorated vet from WW1; they had almost a full complement of Lieutenants (most of these besides being wealthy, were University Graduates as well) but were seriously short of higher-ranking Officers.


On 1st September 1939, the TA boys were called up. They knew nothing about a Vickers and were sent down to Aldershot to find out from the 2nd Cheshires. It is not clear how many or for how long since the Cheshire historian omits this detail.


Manchesters were also drafted in because the Battalion was still below strength.


The Militia and Reservists joined them and were welcomed wholeheartedly into the 4th by TA soldiers, NCOs and Officers


However, the TA lacked up to date training even as an infantry regiment – on top of this they were trying to get to convert to a mechanised MMG Battalion – all within 3 or 4 months. They were very willing to learn and very receptive but just did not have time to get to the same level of expertise as the Militia or the Old Reservists.


You will appreciate that the an MMG Battalion of the time had a complement of over 700 men and officers devoted to keeping just 16 Vickers in the field. The Number One position, ie the gunner firing the Vickers, was critical and every one of these positions was filled by Militia lads – they had been taught by the best. This is not to say that the TA could not have achieved the same proficiency (some did) but they just did not have time or training by Regulars before they were all despatched to France.


Old ideas lingered on in the TA. Just to give an example, the TA were still drilled in fours while the Regular Army (and newly trained Militia) had moved to drill in threes. The Militia lads had to show them even simple things like how to align the sights and how to deal with an inclinometer. So I think you can appreciate my father’s comment and frustration about getting WW1 training imposed on them when they just received excellent tuition from good Regulars.


D Company was lucky to get a Major who had only been in the reserve for short while and had recent experience of commanding a MMG Coy. The Lts were all decent blokes, committed, intelligent and brave but very inexperienced. In the archives I discovered that the Major makes his Lts write up a report after each action, what went right, what went wrong, conclusion then adds his advice. They were definitely trying to improve.


Here is nice example from the report of a Cheshire survivor of the Wormhoudt massacre, Pvt Humphrey:

" Lt Glasspool sited the gun positions and told Pte Humphreys' section to dig in at the base of a hedge in an open field facing out towards the supposed enemy positions. They began digging but on the suggestion of Pte Stubbs, who was an experienced regular soldier, moved their gun pit to the far side of the hedge where they had a much better position."

Maybe a good idea – however, it shows where the experience lay and could you imagine this happening in a Regular Battalion – sadly Glasspool was not seen again; he was killed in action.


The Old Regulars had real combat experience and promoting some of them to NCOs would have filled the experience void but the opportunity was missed (my father’s opinion).


French civilians were not happy to see them; training was not good (as I have described), the use of the Coalmine for live firing and supporting a very unimpressive French Army (understatement – but I do not want to open up that one) - All in all, four months wasted. Little wonder that the Cheshire Historian comments on the difficulty of carrying out training and an adverse effect on morale. The other ranks, at least, were pleased when they left the Maginot.


They were happier when the real action started that is what they had come for and thought that they were doing well - could not understand why (I know it has been said before) they constantly had to withdraw.


I was amazed at how complex the make-up of the 4th Battalion was – it seems inadequate to describe them as TA when half the soldiers were not TA and the leader (the Major) a Reservist; such a variety of skill, experience and backgrounds must have made command demanding.


Anyway that is the view of young conscript (non TA) at the time. For young TA Officer’s view, there is nice report by Lt Haywood, the 8th Worcesters (TA) and same Brigade as some 4 Cheshires that touches on the TA and regular Army relationship:


Some "regular" officers we met were apt to regard Territorials and other amateur soldiers as people interfering in something in which they had no concern. We, in our turn, had the utmost contempt for these fools. I can truthfully say, however, that the overwhelming majority of professional soldiers with whom we served in the B.E.F. were extraordinarily kind and patient, and had the sense to see we were eager to learn. In this latter category "Bulgy" Thorne was an outstanding example. He was the ideal man to command a Territorial Army Division, and he knew his job inside out.

And
The leading marching troops arrived shortly afterwards, and, for some hours, the Brig and I marched with each Battalion in turn, while his car ferried stragglers in relays for a few miles. The more experienced "Regulars" of the Warwicks were in better shape than the "Territorials" of the Worcesters and Gloucesters, but the latter, for all that, were sticking it nobly.


The full report is on the Worcester’s website – it is pretty long but my father agrees that the bits dealing with their feelings it is a fair summary, except the comments on batmen. An Officer asked him to be his batman but my father refused "I was not going to be anybody’s servant".


But is not this just the best summary you have seen of the role of the BEF and British Gov policy:


"Of the armies that fought against the Germans in May 1940—French, Belgian, Dutch and British—the B.E.F. was the smallest. By its very numbers the B.E.F. was not designed to play the leading part in the land fighting during the early part of the war. The huge French Army had that task to fulfil. Britain’s role was first to build up a powerful Navy and Air Force, and then, gradually, but surely, to increase her Army. Moreover, as is now so evident, it was well for the world that France agreed to this plan, because, after Dunkirk, the Royal Navy kept open the sea routes, while the R.A.F. thwarted the efforts of the enemy to soften-up England for invasion.

Please, as you read, keep these all-important facts in mind. Remember, too, that the German Army was vastly superior in numbers and equipment, and—let us admit the unpleasant fact! — far better trained.
The Battle of France was NOT lost by the failure of the smallest Army involved to show the courage, determination and endurance expected of fighting men.

　
Hope this helps you formulate questions about your Grandfather’s Battalion.


Anyway 7RNF should be grateful to the Cheshires for leaving them with nice dry gun pits. When the Cheshires took over from a French Unit, they jumped smartly, at the command, into the gun pit only to sink to the waist in mud and slime with the French soldiers rolling around creased up with laughter – entente cordiale!


　
　
　
　
　
　
　
　
　
　
　
　


　
　
　

 

Sorry got my maths wrong - 48 Vickers MMG in a Battalion. Actually this makes my point even stronger - all 48 were fired by Militia lads.

 

Hello Samuel,

Fan-flipping-tastic, this is a wonderful insight into the soldiers who made up the bulk of the BEF and just what I've been waiting to read. It tells of the stuff that is mostly left out of official accounts of battles, especially in these days of "sound bites".

"Unfashionable" units can sometimes be overlooked for the more prestigious ones. I've never subscribed to this as all British Regts with their hundreds of years of recorded history are all prestigious and in their own way elite! I should know, I've served with a few, (Who are the Waffen SS anyway? - just a bunch of thugs who deprived the Werhmacht of equipment and men).

It seems that wherever the British army contacted the enemy there was only one side that came off worse! (Where were the French again? This is more a reflection of their command than the man -"There are no bad soldiers, only bad officers").

I have always had immense respect for all those who are serving, or have served their country and people, Reg or TA.

It shows that County Regts were not always manned by men of that county, 7RNF had Durhams, London Rifles and DWR in their ranks, but those who were transfered in, to fill out the regts, were well recieved and blended in well. I would assume due to training and as you have elluded to the patience and understanding of older, more experienced hands.

Once again, great, great post.

 

Samuel, thanks for that post which is great. I would have to disagree with the Militia boys being better than the TA lads though. From my research they had only a few weeks training and had been concripted whereas a lot of the TA lads were volunteers and had been in the TA for many years, and the regular Army training was there in the form of PSI's who ensured that certain standards were attained (Still the case today with the TA). There were obviously very green TA lads who had been in the units not that long who undoubtably lacked experience. Perhaps it was knowledge of the Vickers that was lacking in a lot of respects. In 7RNF it was not the militia boys who were the no 1's on the guns, it was whoever the most capable be it reservist/TA or militia.

 

Hi Chester,

Does anyone know what the difference was between Reservist, TA and Militia.

I was under the impression that a reservist was one who had served with the colours, left the regt but still had a commitment to turn out and train, for a set time, e.g. 3-5 years, and then cold be called back within a certain time frame 3-5 years? He would be expected to pick up on things quite quickly as he would not have been out of service for too long.

A "Terrier" was someone who may not have had regular service, but joined a local Coy/Bn and served in a formed unit, recieving training on a "regular" basis instructed by Regular Army PSIs, for the defence of the country but could also be deployed outside of the country.

The militia were formed bodies created only to defend the British Isles. Their training would not have been as regular or as often as the TA.

However, it seems that due to demand, any of the above could be used to augment regular or TA Bns, whichever needed them most! It also seems from the postings, on this site, that training could have varied quite considerably, depending on what the role of the units were.

Is this almost correct or just a load of guesswork?!!!!!!

 

John,

just about bang on. As today there were quite a number of ex regulars who then joined the TA. I remember my service in both TA and Regular, on excercise Lionheart in 1984, BAOR reinforcement. The TA Bn I was with were supplemented by reservists, all ex regulars. We had about 60 of them from all sorts of backgrounds.

The militia in 1940 as I understand it were conscripts who were called up on mobilisation to serve the colours. In my experience when you get a group of men from these differing backgrounds in isnt long before they are working as a team drawing off all their varying skills. &RNF had a good 4 plus months to train and get their act together as a 1st line TA Battalion in 1940.

 

Hmmm, Lionheart,

I was mobilised from my 1st Class Course at Bordon to fleshout the Armoured Delivery Squadron, then based in Paderborn, met some 5th Wessex, who to be fair were actually a UK home defence Bn, bit porky though!

 

Yes, I remember there was a big difference between home defence Battalions and BAOR role TA Battalions. The home defence mob were poorly equipped and standards were not as good in my opinion.

 

I have a question. 2nd Platoon (HQ Coy) had the prefix AA - I had thought this might be Anti Aircraft but my father says no - do you know what the letters stand for?

PS - Maybe 4th Cheshire were a special case regarding Militia since these lads had a full 3 to 4 months training on the Vickers before the TA were even introduced to the gun. They were all tested - the Militia came out best. Of course no modern army can exist long with without the full back-up services, REME, armourer, transport, cooks, clerks, stores etc even their own barber. These seemed to work well.

 

Hi Samuel,

When I have looked at the orbat of MMG Bns on the Vickers MG site there is an AA Plt. However when I spoke to Chester his orbat did not include an AA Plt. Chesters' orbat would have been early e.g. pre 39 is yours, pre or post.

As far as this Militia thing goes, I'm not about to cast doubt on any organisation, as I wasn't there, so different forces's from different parts of the country could have been at different states of readiness.

I'm just trying to get a feel for the units', particularly my grandfathers', that stood up to the plate at the very begining of the conflict. So much is written, from Alemaein onwards, and quite rightly so, but the withdrawl to St. Valery seems to have been been forgotten, even dare I say erased, yet it shows the metal of the men who, under extremeley arduous conditions and fluctuating chaotic situations, not only fought back, but kept their cohesion when all others had left or been broken.

 

I have a question. 2nd Platoon (HQ Coy) had the prefix AA - I had thought this might be Anti Aircraft but my father says no - do you know what the letters stand for?

PS - Maybe 4th Cheshire were a special case regarding Militia since these lads had a full 3 to 4 months training on the Vickers before the TA were even introduced to the gun. They were all tested - the Militia came out best. Of course no modern army can exist long with without the full back-up services, REME, armourer, transport, cooks, clerks, stores etc even their own barber. These seemed to work well.

No.2 Platoon, HQ Company within a MG Battalion was typically a Anti-Aircraft Platoon during the battle of France. It consisted of 3 motorcycles and 4 15 Cwt trucks, 15 men and used Bren LMG's in the AA role.

 

Thanks for the info Drew.

Seems to me that the AA Plt could have been for HQ protection only, as 4 trucks and 15 men, and at most 6 LMGs would be spread pretty thin across the devolved Bn or even to provide cover whilst the Bn was moving as a unit. How was it used?

 

Thanks for that.

It does make you wonder why they did not rig up a Vickers on the truck to shoot skywards - would have been a lot more powerful than a Bren.

 

There is a mention of of the AA Plt fitted with central Motley AA mounts and in adddition to the AA platoon, one truck in the admin platoon and two trucks in each MG company were fitted with forward Motley AA mounts.

Some great examples below:
Bren LMG mount - MLU FORUM