Dont Panic, the Boss knows all about it

Discussion in 'The Eastern Front' started by Gerard, Jun 12, 2011.

  1. Gerard

    Gerard Seelow/Prora

    This time 70 years ago the Soviet Army was nearing one of its biggest crises in its history. For over a year (according to Chief of General Staff Intelligence Golikov) Stalin had been receiving warnings from a number of different sources all intimating or boldly telling him that the Germans were planning an attack on the Soviet Union. Erickson in Road to Stalingrad lists a lot of these sources, ranging from the Japanese Ambassador in Moscow to the English, US representatives, to Soviet Agents and even his own Commanders. Soviet Commanders reported that overflights of Soviet Airspace was increasing, that reports were coming in of large concentrations of German troops in Eastern Poland and yet they were told to do nothing. Red Army Commanders were not allowed take independent action. An example of this is described in Ericksons book and concerns General Kirponos, commander of the Kiev Military District (soon to become Southwestern Front).
    When he wrote to Stalin of his Concerns about the German build up on the River Bug he was told that "any preparation would be provocation, that the Germans must not be given any pretext for initiation of military action against us" (pg 91, Erickson, Road to Stalingrad)

    Following this rebuttal of his concerns, Kirponos moved some units and formations into more favourable postions at the frontier. NKVD and border units noticed the Red Army's movements and reported this to Beria who instructed Kirponos to countermand these orders at once. So at this point, Kirponos, the commander of one of the largest military districts in the Soviet Union, had no freedom of action with which to take. He knew the Germans were going to attack, he was getting reports telling him that German Recce Aircraft were flying over his operational area with virtual impunity and yet he was not allowed to do anything with which to prepare for the attack in case the Germans were provoked. :unsure: And this is just one example of what was going on through the months of May and June 1941 in the Soviet High Command.
     
  2. Steve Mac

    Steve Mac Very Senior Member

    Hello Gerard,

    You'd have thought the Soviets would have learned something from study of the Belgian non-provacation stance in late 1939/early 1940... That didn't work either!

    Best,

    Steve.
     
  3. Gage

    Gage The Battle of Barking Creek

    If the Russians had prepared with the time they had would it have made any big difference?
     
  4. sol

    sol Very Senior Member

    From Hughes-Wilson "Military Intelligence Blunders"

    Others were more devious, as the Tass official denial on 8 May 1941 of any German troop concentrations on the Russian border showed. There was a mass of evidence to the contrary, of which Stalin was well aware. Even overt German photo-reconnaissance flights were studiously "overlooked", despite at least one crash at Rovno on 15 April 1941 of a Luftwaffe plane laden with incriminating exposed intelligence films in the wreckage. Soviet anti-aircraft defences were specifically ordered not to open fire on German aircraft, even if they strayed into Soviet airspace.

    Out of topic according the book they weren't only one to make similar mistakes

    This Japanese intelligence activity was well known in Malaya. The head of the Straits Settlement Police, writing after the war, claimed that the extent of Japanese espionage had compelled him to recommend to the Governor that at least half of any Japanese company's workforce must in future be non-Japanese labour. Nothing was done. The policy from London was to do nothing that might antagonize the Japanese, in case it provoked them to attack.

    Sometimes Japanese spying was so blatant that it became farcical. In late 1940 the Japanese Press Attache in Singapore, Mamoru, was arrested inflagrante and eventually jailed by the British authorities for three and a half years for openly running espionage agents in Malaysia (including a British Army corporal) and in particular for offering guided tours of British barracks and military installations to Japanese army officers visiting Malaya. The most blatant examples of all were the unauthorized mooring of two Japanese submarines in the Malayan harbour of Endau, which was owned by a Japanese mining company, and the remarkable testimony of Captain Collinge of the Straits Volunteers. In September or October 1940 he saw a Japanese officer, in full Japanese Army uniform, observing a squadron of British armoured cars on exercise before coolly embarking on a motor boat and heading out to sea in the gathering dusk, "presumably to rendezvous with a Japanese ship offshore". When he reported this, Collinge was told by two British civilians on the Governor's staff not to make an issue of it, "as the policy of H.M. Government . . . was to appease the Japs and to avoid provoking an incident at all costs."
     
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  5. AlexW

    AlexW Junior Member

    This is all hindsight. Because it turned out to be the correct answer everyone forgets about all the contra-indications including the massive German deception effort because they couldn't hide all those troops moving eastwards.

    I've mentioned it before but this book gives a much better overview of the whole intelligence picture in the run up to Barbarossa.

    Barbarossa: The Axis and the Allies: Amazon.co.uk: John Erickson, David Dilks: Books

    e.g. The predominant view held in Whitehall was that the movements were simply to exert pressure and a set of German demands would be presented to Stalin. It wasn't until 12th June that the JIC came down firmly on the side of an invasion.

    Also, you have to remember, that Stalin suspected everything of being a British plot since we had so spectacularly mucked things up over his offer of an alliance in March/April 1939.
     
  6. Gerard

    Gerard Seelow/Prora

    This is all hindsight. Because it turned out to be the correct answer everyone forgets about all the contra-indications including the massive German deception effort because they couldn't hide all those troops moving eastwards.

    I've mentioned it before but this book gives a much better overview of the whole intelligence picture in the run up to Barbarossa.

    Barbarossa: The Axis and the Allies: Amazon.co.uk: John Erickson, David Dilks: Books

    e.g. The predominant view held in Whitehall was that the movements were simply to exert pressure and a set of German demands would be presented to Stalin. It wasn't until 12th June that the JIC came down firmly on the side of an invasion.

    Also, you have to remember, that Stalin suspected everything of being a British plot since we had so spectacularly mucked things up over his offer of an alliance in March/April 1939.
    Actually Alex, its not hindsight per se. Its merely an observation of the constraints that the Soviet Offiver Corps were under in the months leading up to Barbarossa. Lots of German infiltration, and no leadership from above. Thats not hindsight.
     
  7. L J

    L J Senior Member

    But also a lot of iiiiiinformations of an incoming German attack,and ,nothing was happening (some one was crying wolf to much)
     
  8. AlexW

    AlexW Junior Member

    Sorry, a bit late getting back to this....and appropriately enough it's 10 hours after STAVKA sent the alert out to the pogranichki which most of them would never receive. :)

    It's a cliche but none the less true for that 'Victory has a thousand fathers, defeat is an orphan'. The hindsight starts as soon as things start to go wrong. The Soviet generals had to wait until the thaw under Krushchev to start to publically blame Stalin, and he must shoulder a large share of it, but as soon as they could they did.
     
  9. Gerard

    Gerard Seelow/Prora

    Of all the branches of the Soviet Union, the Navy seems to have been more prepared than most, the ships and ports having been put on alert 2-3 hours before the actual invasion.
     
  10. Gerard

    Gerard Seelow/Prora

    Sorry, a bit late getting back to this....and appropriately enough it's 10 hours after STAVKA sent the alert out to the pogranichki which most of them would never receive. :)

    It's a cliche but none the less true for that 'Victory has a thousand fathers, defeat is an orphan'. The hindsight starts as soon as things start to go wrong. The Soviet generals had to wait until the thaw under Krushchev to start to publically blame Stalin, and he must shoulder a large share of it, but as soon as they could they did.
    You could also be talking about the Wehrmacht Generals and Hitler there Alex!!! :lol:
     
  11. Earthican

    Earthican Senior Member

    While reading this blog:

    Soviet on June 1941 Barbarossa

    This sentence cracked me up.

    "The "1941 Plan for the Defense of State Borders" assumed Germany would need 10-15 days to finalize their invasion. However, Stalin preferred to look the other way as the Wehrmacht prepared for 11 months. One observer called Hitler the only man Stalin ever trusted. The dictator's wishful thinking was not the Soviets' sole intelligence weakness. They over-estimated German strength at 260 divisions, 10,000 tanks and 15,000 aircraft (real numbers: 150, 3,300, and 2,510 respectively). However, 500,000 untrained recruits and reserve armies sent to die front in the weeks prior to Bartarossatag could not stave off disaster."
     
  12. L J

    L J Senior Member

    This sentence cracked me also up.
    Saying that Hiler was the only man Stalin ever trusted,is a good joke .
    Saying that Stalin was looking the other way while Germany was preparing since 11 months,is a less good one :Stalin did not,and Germany was not preparing.
    Stalin had good reasons not to believe his secret services,who were (as is mentioned) exagerating the German strength,but,also were crying wolf,and,there was no wolf to perceive .
    While Stalin suspected that Hitler would attack,if there wa a good moment ,he also was convince,that ,as long Germany was at war with Britain,it would not attack the SU:in MK,Hitler had attacked the imperial regime,because it was involved in a two front war,which Germany not could win .
    Btw,claiming of a desaster is a big exageration because the German plan to defeat the SU in a short,quick campaign,failed,already after 10 weeks .I could say,with more reason,that on 31 august 1941,a catastrophe was looming....on the Germans .
     

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