Dieppe Raid, Operation Jubilee

A quibble if we're trying to provide accurate information here. I toured Dieppe with a reputable Canadian guide last month and he indicated that almost all of the tanks did in fact make it off the beach but were stopped from advancing into the town by anti-tank barriers. The failure of the attached engineers to deal with these due to enormous casualties resulted in most of the tanks returning to the beach where over the course of the morning they did eventually throw tracks as they maneuvered. The nature of the cobble was well known and similar to many (most?) UK beaches.

No sources, but worth digging into if you are interested.


klambie
Not to quibble, your quibble but the promenade is not the beach and as you aptly point out (but I will be more direct) the engineeres who were to blow the obstacles were all casualties, the tanks that reached the promenade (all 4 of them) returned to the beach and resolutely remained in their tanks to provide whatever cover fire they could until their ammo was depleted. they then wisely chose to remain in their tanks rather than add to the casuatly toll of those unprotected on the beach. as for the cobble they friggin' well should have known it was impassable to tanks before when they planned this fiasco.


After a quick bit of digging, 27 tanks landed and probably 15 made it off the beach. Not the "almost all" I stated, but a substantial number. The count of 4 you mention (some say 3) is not accurate. The North Irish link below indicates only 5 failed to get off the beach due to the chert and attempts to describe the fate of all 30 tanks committed. The CMH paper summarizes 29 attempted to land, 2 drowned, 15 across the seawall (10 of which later returned to the beach where 1 was immobilized due to chert). Of those that didn't get off the beach, 4 had tracks broken by shellfire, 4 by chert and 3 likely by chert, though it is uncertain, 1 remained on the beach and was mobile throughout.

http://www.cmp-cpm.forces.gc.ca/dhh-dhp/his/rep-rap/doc/cmhq/cmhq108.pdf
para 2-7

http://northirishhorse.net/articles/Dieppe/16.html

http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol4/iss1/6
Abstract only. Canadian Military History Vol 4, No. 1 "The Calgary Tanks at Dieppe", Hugh G. Henry.

 

LJ,

Did you view youtube clip posted by WIlls? Would you accept Monty's view of the fiasco?

How can you compare Vimy with Dieppe. Two vastly different wars. That is like comparing British troop losses on Gold and Sword beaches with the Battle of the Somme where the Brits lost 80,000 men on a single day; July 1, 1916.

 

What are your views in relation to the tasking within the Dieppe Operation by 30 Commando to seize an Enigma Machine from the local German HQ?

 

This was discussed with a book release and subsequent documentary aired on the history channel last year.
If memory serves me, another thread on Dieppe was started.
I would say that history was being rewritten. for profit by the author and the history channel.

 

LJ,
Please depart from the fence that you are sitting on.
Was Dieppe a success or failure?

 

That is a simplistic question.

For who was it a success? The men who died? or the Germans who thought the Atlantic wall was vindicated but disillusioned in 1944? .

Arguably it was a success for Joe Stalin. On the basis of the build up of shipping, Hitler anticipated the Dieppe raid and ordered two panzer divisions, a parachute division and two bomber groups to deploy from the Eastern front to France.

It was a necessary test of tactics - and that defies a distinction between success and fail. the tactics for an opposed landing 1942 style did not work - FAI:L but was ti better to know that these methods not work with a test with a single division or to have found out when the whole army failed? The Dieppe approach to landings - attempting surpise had worked up to that time in NW Europe and worked in North Africa, Sicily and Italy.

 

Sheldrake,
You and LJ drink from the same bottle and share the same fence. Stalin enjoyed that one day? The distraction from the Eastern front only to wait 22 months until June of 1944? Ludicrous.
"it was a necessary test of tactics-and that defies a distinction between success and fail." Horseshit is my reply, or, as I alluded to in an earlier reply to your fellow fence sitter " horse excrement ".

 

Sheldrake,
You and LJ drink from the same bottle and share the same fence. Stalin enjoyed that one day? The distraction from the Eastern front only to wait 22 months until June of 1944? Ludicrous.
"it was a necessary test of tactics-and that defies a distinction between success and fail." Horseshit is my reply, or, as I alluded to in an earlier reply to your fellow fence sitter " horse excrement ".


I am not fence sitting. It is just that history is more complicated than yes/ no or media hyped witch hunts, conspiracy theories and other simplistic arguments.. .

No one involved ion planning or leading the Dieppe raid would have been happy with the heavy losses. Had they foreseen the losses the raid would not have gone ahead. The 600 lost on the St Nazaire raid was seen as high. No one would have sanctioned the loss of thousands.

However, on balance the benefits of the raid outweighed the losses incurred.

1. Two SS panzer divisions and two bomber groups were absent from the Eastern front at a time when Stalingrad was a decisive place. The switch of resources was not known at the time. The Irony is that Hitler ordered the move before the raid was launched because the Luftwaffe had noticed the build up of shipping.
.
2. Getting the balance of firepower to support the assault was key to the success of D Day. If the Normandy invasion had been delivered with 1942 techniques or worse had the British agreed to launch Op Sledgehammer in 1942 the results would have looked like the 1st day of the Somme. an the casualty list ten times higher than Dieppe.

3. Dieppe provided a good argument against the pressure to launch a "Second front Now!" A premature D Day would have been one of the few scenarios that would allow Hitler to win the war.

4. The apparent success of the German Atlantic wall resulted in overconfidence and mal-deployment.

the first two were two of the objectives to be achieved by Op Jubilee. The other two were unintended consequences, but still benefited the allied cause. .

 

I have seen that the level of this discussion has fallen to the use of arguments as : Canadian soldiers were led to their death by incompetent aristocratic (of course) British officers while the truth is that the plans for Jubilee were approved by the Canadian commanders .


I am fed up to the back teeth with this .

 

Sheldrake,
You and LJ drink from the same bottle and share the same fence. Stalin enjoyed that one day? The distraction from the Eastern front only to wait 22 months until June of 1944? Ludicrous.
"it was a necessary test of tactics-and that defies a distinction between success and fail." Horseshit is my reply, or, as I alluded to in an earlier reply to your fellow fence sitter " horse excrement ".


I am not fence sitting. It is just that history is more complicated than yes/ no or media hyped witch hunts, conspiracy theories and other simplistic arguments.. .

No one involved ion planning or leading the Dieppe raid would have been happy with the heavy losses. Had they foreseen the losses the raid would not have gone ahead. The 600 lost on the St Nazaire raid was seen as high. No one would have sanctioned the loss of thousands.

However, on balance the benefits of the raid outweighed the losses incurred.

1. Two SS panzer divisions and two bomber groups were absent from the Eastern front at a time when Stalingrad was a decisive place. The switch of resources was not known at the time. The Irony is that Hitler ordered the move before the raid was launched because the Luftwaffe had noticed the build up of shipping.
.
2. Getting the balance of firepower to support the assault was key to the success of D Day. If the Normandy invasion had been delivered with 1942 techniques or worse had the British agreed to launch Op Sledgehammer in 1942 the results would have looked like the 1st day of the Somme. an the casualty list ten times higher than Dieppe.

3. Dieppe provided a good argument against the pressure to launch a "Second front Now!" A premature D Day would have been one of the few scenarios that would allow Hitler to win the war.

4. The apparent success of the German Atlantic wall resulted in overconfidence and mal-deployment.

the first two were two of the objectives to be achieved by Op Jubilee. The other two were unintended consequences, but still benefited the allied cause. .

Sheldrake,
A good summation. For Canadians, OP Jubileee will forever be a sensitive issue.

 

LJ,
I can only point to the slaughter as evidenced by Canuck's post where he shows photos of the graves. So, let's move on to another debate.

 

A study:


http://canadianmilitaryhistory.ca/the-dieppe-raid-a-decision-making-exercise-operation-rutter-part-1/


Some of these files relate to Dieppe - which, I cannot remember !



http://heritage.canadiana.ca/view/oocihm.lac_mikan_135823


http://heritage.canadiana.ca/

 

Have you read the book? I'd say this is too harsh. O'Keefe has managed to locate a lot of smoke, though I'd like some more specific documents to be sure it's fire. Even if he's not there yet (and perhaps he never finds conclusive proof), I think his motives are valid.

 

Kevin,
The documentation which O'Keefe put forward was really nothing that wasn't known already. The critics felt he had sensationalized a fairly minor part of the raid and his conclusions were a stretch. I can't speak to his motives but the entire package was really a non-event and added little to a better understanding of the operation.
The fact that 40 Commando remained offshore as a floating reserve force during the early part of the raid is further evidence that they were not the focal point of the operation. They were finally ordered ashore by Ham-Roberts under the mistaken belief that the RHLI had secured the beach. Leaving the engagement of the Commandos to the discretion of the Canadian operational commander is simply inconsistent with O'Keefe's "primary objective" argument.

 

No apologies for bumping this truly wonderful thread

Ron

 

I recall seeing on this wonderful forum of a photo, presumably a German photo taken from the cliffs south of Dunkirk, which had been annotated with both tank and landing craft identification.

I can't find this photo now - can any kind member help?

Also I found this image online:

Can anyone advise what book/publication this is from and whether there are any other pages attached?

 

Hi,
This photo ?

Regards

Danny

 

Both of those pages are from the 'Then and Now' After The Battle Publications

 

Cheers Danny and Drew, had a suspicion that was the book.
I will have to look for a copy on Abe.

edit: copy ordered.

 

Any information on commemorative events this year?