I understand the passion behind your arguments. But war is sometimes a callous business, Sometimes lives are sacrificed to see if tactics work. There are far worse losses of life, e.g ion the "diversionary attacks" in both World Wars which clearly failed to divert any enemy whatsoever. Dieppe is not one of these. The evidence is there to show that the shipping for Rutter encouraged Hitler to reinforce France at the expense of the east front. Valuable lessons were learned and adopted. l You have ridiculed the Dieppe Raid, but what would you do instead? It is a cop out to claim that you would not have done as badly. Where would you have have launched an operation of at least a divisional size, with what resources and plans?
Frank, The Canadians who served in NW Europe and Italy fought many tough actions and were given many difficult assignments. The Scheldt comes to mind. They suffered a higher casualty rate in Normandy than either the British or Americans, were bombed by Allied air forces, faced the best of the SS formations and had in excess of 130 soldiers murdered. There were mistakes, miscalculations and the usual fog of war. They accepted the savagery that war is and performed their assignments under those conditions. No complaints that their lot was any better or worse than any other Allied unit. Dieppe was DIFFERENT and Canadian vets who fought on other fronts remain bitter over it. For all the many reasons quoted in this and other threads, it stands uniquely alone. They felt they had no chance whatsoever. The orchestrated cover up that followed only angered them more. Go to Puys and judge for yourself. What I would have done is quite irrelevant to the conversation. That is pure " what if" speculation. We can only comment on the events that occurred and the specific choices and decisions made by the planners. Your arguments suggest that the troops were doomed by inescapable circumstances. It is difficult to accept that perspective when so many basic military principles were violated or ignored.
Canuck, There is no dispute about the bitterness that the Dieppe raid caused in Canada or among Canadian troops. The experience was shocking, the losses heavy and the results not immediately apparent. It was widely believed, inside and outside the services, that the operation was pointless. As you have pointed out, Dieppe was not the only time that Canadian soldiers took heavy casualties attacking strong German defences. The 2nd Canadian Division suffered more dead and wounded in the advances from Caen to Falaise than at Dieppe. The infantry attacking the SS on Op Atlantic had little or no better protection from bullets than at Dieppe, also planned and conducted with generous assistance from messrs Cockup and SNAFU. The difference with Dieppe was that it took place in isolation and before the operation could be put into context or the results became evident. This difference has more to do with public interest and the story of how the Dieppe operation was perceived than in the planning or execution of the operation. I accept that there are limitations to counter factual "what if history", but causality is fundamental historic concept. It is inconsistent argue that the results of Op Jubilee did not justify its cost, based on assumptions about alternative histories but then choose to ignore the evidence that the results were significant, or the possibility that things might have turned out far worse. If we are to understand why rational professionals decided that Op Jubilee should be mounted, we should try to understand the information they possessed, the choices available and the potential impact of those choices. Any comments on the decisions made by the planners are based on judgments about what they might have done instead! The principles of war are broadly framed and contradictory, and easiest applied in hindsight. Whatever criticisms can be made of the tactics at Dieppe are mitigated by the assumption of tactical surprise, justified by experience from earlier commando raids. Had 2nd Canadian Division taken part in the St Nazaire raid using the same tactics as at Dieppe, the principles of war would be quoted to support the audacious tactics of the raid.
There are about 900 good reasons why this battle needs to be reviewed, discussed and not swept away as just bad luck. FRADLEY ELLIS United Kingdom Gunner 911977Royal Artillery02/06/1940 Age: 25 C. 69. FRASER DAVID CARRUTHERS United Kingdom Pilot Officer ( W.Op./Air Gnr. ) 171020Royal Air Force Volunteer Reserve04/05/1944 N. 7. FRIENDLY JOCELYN United Kingdom Warrant Officer ( Nav. ) 581211Royal Air Force21/05/1943 Age: 22 H. 16. FRIESEN PETER Canadian Trooper L/54835Calgary Regiment R.C.A.C.19/08/1942 L. 66. FRITSCH JOHN STEVE Canadian Private B/37982Royal Hamilton Light Infantry R.C.I.C.19/08/1942 Age: 21 D. 30. FROOM PETER WILLIAM United Kingdom Aircraftman 2nd Class ( W. Op/Air Gnr. ) 619761Royal Air Force04/05/1940 Age: 19 A. 69. FROST ALBERT GEORGE Canadian Corporal B/66879Royal Regiment of Canada R.C.I.C.19/08/1942 Age: 31 G. 69. FUJA CARL JOSEPH Canadian Private B/67531Royal Regiment of Canada R.C.I.C.19/08/1942 Age: 25 J. 76. GAGNON JULES ALPHONSE Canadian Private L/12289South Saskatchewan Regiment R.C.I.C.19/08/1942 Sp. Mem. 6. GAJEWSKI PAUL Canadian Private B/37604Royal Hamilton Light Infantry R.C.I.C.19/08/1942 Age: 37 E. 26. GALARNEAU ROLAND Canadian Private D/61129Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal R.C.I.C.19/08/1942 Age: 21 K. 47. GALE HORACE EDWARD DUNNING United Kingdom Surgeon Lieutenant Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve19/08/1942 Age: 33 C. 2. GARIEPY ANTONIO Canadian Private D/61691Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal R.C.I.C.19/08/1942 L. 59. GARRISON THOMAS JOSEPH Canadian Private B/37107Royal Hamilton Light Infantry R.C.I.C.19/08/1942 Age: 32 A. 63. GARTHWAITE WILLIAM OWEN United Kingdom Private 3854009The Loyal Regiment (North Lancashire)19/08/1942 Age: 30 F. 62. GEORGE SAM Canadian Private A/22008Essex Scottish Regiment R.C.I.C.19/08/1942 D. 51. GERBER HARLEY EARL OWEN
Canuck Can only agree with your 900 reasons to review Dieppe as the 6000 reasons lost at Agira - Ortona - Hitler - Gustav and the Gothic Lines were lost in necessary and better planned attacks... Cheers
No strangers to amphibious warfare.(some may suggest we are strangers to learning) General Wolfe, the Battle of Tanga (almost a full dress rehearsal for Dieppe ?) and Gallipoli but a few: http://www.guerrillasoftsavo.com/1/post/2012/11/battle-at-tanga-one-of-the-most-notable-failures-in-british-military-history.html Safe to assume that someone like Montgomery who had himself exercised beach assaults at Slapton Sands in 1938 would have learned the lessons from these all field officers use past battles to learn the 'art'. The politics and the need for 'players' to prove themselves can be seen in all of the allied armies. Maybe Montgomery who could in his mind marginalize 'side shows' as irrelevant and if not within his remit - give an opinion and turn his mind to other things.
I agree. A review and a discussion involves ideas and debate, and a willingness to challenge preconceptions. Until a couple of years ago I used to repeat the mantra that this was a utter disaster, compounded by Mountbatten's personality, and a great study of how not to plan an operation. Then I had to check the facts, read some sources and study the battle in detail. What I found made me reconsider the view I had as an accepted until then. This is why I have taken an unfashionable position on a topic which still provokes strong emotions and widely seen as a symbol of incompetence and failure by "butchers and bunglers". Rightly we mourn all our war dead. The debate over Dieppe concerns whether the benefits of the operation to the allies outweighed the costs and whether it was mounted competently. The list of the dead from Dieppe is lengthy, and includes one of my relatives. It isn't It isn't as easy to list those who were saved because the raid at Dieppe took place, but they do exist. How about:- The members of the Red Army who did not face the troops withdrawn from Russia to deal with the threatened "second front". he Allied soldiers who lived because the right tactics were used on D Day, he allied soldiers who lived because, as a direct result of Dieppe the AVRE was invented to tackle the problems experienced at Dieppe. he Allied soldiers who lived because the German leaders were convinced by their success at Dieppe that they failed to adequately defend the French Coast. These are less tangible than the roll of the dead from Dieppe, but they must be considered in assessing how we view Dieppe 3/4 of a century later. Of course it is possible to believe , with the advantage of hind sight that all of this could have been achieved without taking risks. I could add 19,000 names that resulted from an attack launched on 1 July 1916 based on the kind of armchair planning that wishful thinking would have us believe could have avoided the risks of losing 900 at Dieppe. PS IMHO the conduct of the Gustav line battles of Dec 43-March 44 are far more reprehensible, costly and futile than Op Jubilee.
Not wishing to get into a scorecard argument over who did what where and who lost the most. This paper by Lt Colonel James Goodman Canadian Military Engineers appears to have a handle on it. Failure of planning and a growth of complexity. We are aware of 'first contact and the plans go out of the window' if you are having problems before contact that can only be bad planning. http://www.scribd.com/doc/172877060/The-Allied-Raid-on-Dieppe-1942 Not sure that Dieppe was the sole mover of the use of armour as used on D Day (Normandy) in the assault. The Combined Operations Experimental Establishment was in being from 1939: http://research.archives.gov/description/15113
Sheldrake, Your main thrust here is that OP Jubillee helped in the planning of Operation Overlord. Assuming I have this correct, let's discuss your earlier point that the establishment of a 'second front' posed a problem for the Germans and therefore relieved some of the pressure on the Soviets. If that is the case, then somewhere in the planning files there must be supporting information as to what the Allies would have done had OP Jubillee been a success. Would the Allies be in a position to fast forward Overlord to August 20, 1942? Absolutely not. So, the generals and the planners decided do a little raid on Dieppe and see what happens? Well, here are the facts. Canadian KIA 907. Canadian wounded 586. Canadian captured 1,946. Combined British losses, either captured, wounded or killed amounted to 934. From the document supplied by Wills here is the author's conclusion: Operation Jubillee did not fail because of poor intel, a lack of preparation, or the loss of operational surprise. It failed because a plan that started out as a joint battle of land, sea and air forces had developed into an overly complex, scripted event that had no chance for success. As the other Canadians on this thread have stated, OP Jubillee was a complete disaster and had little to do with the success of Overlord. Nice debate, eh?
'Churchill wasn't a doctrine wonk,. but he was a historian. His feeling for history and instincts told him that encouraging aggressive souls to wage war on the Germans by raiding over the channel was a good idea', ----------- Might be reasonable to expect that being an 'historian' would lead to him being minded of the two fiascos #159 above, Battle of Tanga and Gallipoli both sea landing expeditions. Tanga one of the British army's disasters kept from public scrutiny until 1966. Mr Churchill was dismissed his post after these two expeditions. I do not 'do history', however, it would appear to me that a man who had to carry the can for these might not be the driving force for Dieppe - fire fingers ouch, fire fingers............ This also begs the question that much of the writings of Gallipoli were published without reference to Tanga as the official papers were withheld. Colonel Goodman #161 above states that he had access to more information than the official Canadian WW2 diarist many years before and when we realize that many papers have been and are withheld, some whilst named individuals were/are still alive this can lead to history being revisited.
17thDYRCH and wills. Thank you for another copy of Lt Col Goodman's paper. Goodman appears to be extracting lessons for modern joint Ops. It is not clear how a more responsive flexible plan could have worked in 1942. There are lots of papers which can be quoted one way or a another about Dieppe. I'll match the Lt Col Goodman's paper with one by Col Boone, and raise you a level of rank and context. . "Recconascance in force" which addresses the points you raise. Several armoured engineering developments were under development already. However there is a causal link between the problems experienced at Dieppe and the development of the AVRE as a generic engineer vehicle. Just google Lt JJ Denovan RCE He is also credited in the British Official history of AFV design HMSO Publication The Universal Tank. As both quoted papers make clear, the Dieppe operation was planned and launched as a diversion with the aim of helping the Soviets who were fighting for their existence in 1942. During the 144 days from the start of the German Summer offensive on 28th June 1942 and the Red army attack on 19th November, the Red army lost over 680,000 ,men, 4,400 casualties a day. Every day Dieppe. scale losses. As the Fuehrer order dated 9th July 1942 illustrates Op Rutter & Jubilee were far more successful than many other diversionary operations. The decisive theatre in 1942 was southern Russia, and resulted in Stalingrad, generally seen as the turning point of the war against Germany. Yet within two weeks of the start of the campaign, Hitler ordered crack troops and aircraft to be diverted to a secondary front. That is a success of sorts. I do not know if the Fuhrer directive was intercepted and decoded by Ultra. If it had been,it might explain why so many people were to declare it as a success without documenting why. Past experience did encourage caution among the British leaders. Just be thankful that George C Marshall; and Joe Stalin did not get their way in 1942 and force the British to agree to a three division Gallipoli sized "second front" landing in France. We would be mourning a lot more than 900 dead.
Particularly if Mountbatten was in charge! Frank, No one is disputing the need of and the pressure for diversionary action and aggressive raiding in 1942. While the strategy was sound the execution was weak and rather than the nebulous "benefits" you ascribe, I suggest that the raid may have, in fact, undermined the strategic value. It was a large scale raid which failed to acheive a single objective, suffered enormous casualty rates and from which the Germans enjoyed much propaganda value. Are you suggesting that this fiasco somehow had more value than a well executed and successful raid might have attained? I'm struggling to understand how those beaches, littered with Canadian corpses, somehow terrified the Germans, bolstered the Russians and inspired the innovation of the Normandy invasion. The mythology of he Dieppe raid has been often repeated by historians and even today the disinformation and propaganda attempts to divert from the real failure that it was. The latest Enigma theory is frankly preposterous. Be thankful that I only question the incompetent planning, poor intelligence, site selection and security. Some Canadian writers offer a far more cynical and sinister view: "There are many indications that military failure was intended. First, the town of Dieppe happened to be, and was known to be, an eminently defensible site, and therefore necessarily one of the strongest German positions on the Atlantic coast of France. Anyone arriving there by ferry from England sees immediately that this port, surrounded by high and steep cliffs, bristling at the time with machine guns and cannon, must have been a deadly trap for the attackers. The Germans could not believe their eyes when they found themselves being attacked there. One of their war correspondents, who witnessed the inevitable slaughter, described the raid as “an operation that violated all the rules of military logic and strategy.” Other factors, such as poor planning, inadequate preparations, inferior equipment (such as tanks that could not negotiate the pebbles of Dieppe’s beach), make it seem more likely that the objective was military failure, rather than success. On the other hand, the Dieppe operation, including its bloody failure, actually made sense if it was ordered for a “latent” non-military purpose. Military operations are frequently carried out to achieve a political objective, and that seems to have been the case at Dieppe in August 1942. The Western Allies’ political leaders in general, the British political leadership in particular, and Prime Minister Churchill, above all, found themselves under relentless pressure to open a second front, were unwilling to open such a front, but lacked a convincing justification for their inaction. The failure of what could be presented as an attempt to open a second front, or at least as a prelude to the opening of a second front, did provide such a justification. Seen in this light, the Dieppe tragedy was indeed a great success, even a double success. First, the operation could be, and was, presented as a selfless and heroic attempt to assist the Soviets. Second, the failure of the operation seemed to demonstrate only too clearly that the western Allies were indeed not yet ready to open a second front. If Jubilee was intended to silence the voices clamouring for the opening of a second front, it was indeed a great success. The Dieppe disaster silenced the popular demand for a second front, and allowed Churchill and Roosevelt to continue to sit on the fence as the Nazis and the Soviets slaughtered each other in the East. The political motivation for Dieppe would explain why the lambs that were led to the slaughter were not American or British, but Canadian. Indeed, the Canadians constituted the perfect cannon fodder for this enterprise, because their political and military leaders did not belong to the exclusive club of the British-American top command who planned the operation, and who would obviously have been reluctant to sacrifice their own men. Our hypothesis likewise explains why the British were also involved, but in much smaller numbers, and why the Americans sent only a token force. After the tragedy of Dieppe, even Stalin stopped begging for a second front. The Soviets would eventually get one, but only much later, in 1944, when Stalin was no longer asking for such a favour. At that point, however, the Americans and the British had urgent reasons of their own for landing on the coast of France. Indeed, after the Battles of Stalingrad and Kursk, when Soviet troops were relentlessly grinding their way towards Berlin, “it became imperative for American and English strategy,” as two American historians (Peter N. Carroll and David W. Noble) have written, “to land troops in France and drive into Germany to keep most of that country out of [Soviet] hands.” When a second front was finally opened in Normandy in June 1944, it was not done to assist the Soviets, but to prevent the Soviets from winning the war on their own. The Soviets finally got their second front when they no longer wanted or needed it. (This does not mean that did they did not welcome the landings in Normandy, or did not benefit from the belated opening of a second front; after all, the Germans remained an extremely tough opponent until the very end.) As for the Canadians, who had been sacrificed at Dieppe, they also got something, namely, heaps of praise from the men at the top of the military and political hierarchy. Churchill himself, for example, solemnly declared that Jubilee had been “the key to the success of the landings in Normandy” and “a Canadian contribution of the greatest significance to final victory.” The Canadians were showered with prestigious awards, including no less than three Victoria Crosses. The hyperbolic kudos and the unusually high number of VCs probably reflected a desire on the part of the authorities to atone for their decision to send so many men on a suicidal mission in order to achieve highly questionably political goals."
Sheldrake To state that the planning - execution of the Gustav Line is akin to the problems of Dieppe.....tells me that you have not studied the Liri Valley campaign in any depth whatever or you would know that it was a totally different ball game - or you have been reading the nonsense put forward from Gens. Clark and Juin who started the myth that 8th Army was slow.....as I keep on repeating " it is one thing to race over undefended mountains as the Arunci's.....but a totally different task in trying to open a thick barred and bolted defence built up to withstand much pressure " personally I thought 1st Cdn Div did very well to get through that obstacle in two days.....but I was 20 miles away at the time - Gerry Chester of the NIH was up front losing 14 Tanks along with 51st RTR losing another 14Tanks...very close to the start line to that particular Battle ..... it took time to get through that Valley- at a crawl ......but much faster with an undefended bunch of hills.....sure their were traffic problems - try getting five divisions through a 20 mile DEFENDED gap - with an Agra pushing in... Cheers
Tim That is quite provocative. Shekdrake I've been watching this for a bit and must repeat a few very simple comments. Anyone who ever operated a tracked loader (bulldozer) in a quarry would know that it would be an impossible task to maneuver tanks in such loose Cobble. Any infantryman could tell you that traversing such loose material (in what were basically patent leather shoes with steel studs added) would be an almost impossible task; before adding a 60 lbs. pack (water soaked battledress in many cases) then add in a 10 to 20 percent grade. These outrageous beach conditions alone should have had the planners looking another beach. Never mind the total lack of operational security, fire support. Did I fail to mention the natural enfilade which turned the beaches into a shooting gallery. Its nearly universally supported that the allies needed to mount and carry out raiding along the coast when and where possible. Here the where is the only question. the answer anywhere but Dieppe. The 2nd Canadian division was wasted as was, (say for comparison) the 51st Highland Div in 1940 for little or no strategic or tactical gain. The phase first used by Lloyd George comes to mind "Lions lead by Donkeys" IMHO Matt
Alexander the Great: I am never afraid of an army of lions led by a lamb, I fear an army of lambs led by a lion heart. The Times of London during the Sevastapol campaign. reported the alleged words of a Russian describing the British - 'lions led by asses'.
I think the planning for Operation Diadem was excellent and the operation was successful. I agree with your comments on the difficulties facing 8th army pushing up the Lire valley. While the Liri Valley looks like a flat plain on the map or from the air or from Pt 593, it is a lot more lumpy and close ground level. Very little of Italy could be described as "good tank country" In case I had not made it clear. My comparison was concerning the attacks on the Gustav line between Dec 1943 and March 1944, (i.e. before the May offensive) was abysmal and show the generals involved in a very poor light. Moutnbatten seems to have attracted disproportionate criticism compared to Clark and Alexander who escaped lightly given the losses and the rather slipshod and unrealistic planning for much of 5th Army in Winter 1943-44. With hindsight Dieppe asked expected too much of the soldiers, and put too much faith in surprise. It was also all over in 24 hours and followed by lots of time spent on "lessons learned" The uncoordinated attacks in January 1944 ending with the fiasco of the 36 Div at the Rapido was followed by a repeat performance in February and March asking the impossible on the Monte Cassino Massif. Followed by self congratulation s over the capture of Rome, and some repeats of the Gustav line problems the following autumn in the Gothic line. Oh and just what was the purpose of the offensives on the Gothic line in autumn 1944?
Sheldrake I can only agree with you on the planning of the initial battles of Cassino from Dec - March '44.....as this was in the hands of the US 5th Army - who made the cardinal sin of reinforcing the failure of 34th US division with the French/North African corps - the battle of 36th Division at Pietro en fine was another bad example - which was called to account after the war - but the teflon coated Clark was forgiven.... he then master minded the second and third battles with mainly the Kiwis and 4th Indians which were never the same again- only then did Alexander insist on bringing 8th Army over from the coast to clear both Cassino and the Liri Valley to the biggest cock up in History by Clark disobeying orders to capture Rome - granted there were a few escape routes for the Germans via Narni - Terni and Rietti - BUT by stopping them at Valmontone - just perhaps - the battles of the Gothic Line might NOT have been necessary - as it was Leese refused to fight alongside Clark BUT we had to give up two corps of six divisions to replace the force demanded by the idiotic landing at the South of France..... Not too well known is the conversation between Harding and Alex when it was known that Clark had disobeyed orders at Valmontone - Alex - in a fury - asked " what can I do " as he knew perfectly well that the US had the largest hand by that time - and played it for all it was worth. The Gothic Line was truly unnecessary and cost 8th Army 14,000 KIA including 306 of my Brigade - and thousands wounded filling the hospitals for months - and the seven cemeteries - the main problems at the Gothic was the shortage of manpower - rain - snow - ice Cheers