Casualties and effects of Fire Support on the British Beaches in Normandy

Further to this thread: http://ww2talk.com/forums/topic/55465-comparison-of-british-and-american-areas-in-normandy-in-terms-of-fire-support-and-effect/

I thought I'd stick this file up for your perusal. The file ref is CAB 106/967

 

Andy,

Thanks for posting this doc. A slightly better attempt by AORG to analyse human & vehicle casualties. Obviously they could make a physical count of MG, mortar and gun positions in the beach defences, but they were still in denial about German Artillery - clearly it was just put in the "too hard basket".

The very same info appears in WO291/246 “Opposition Encountered on the British Beaches in Normandy on D-Day”.

One positive to come out of this doc is rationalising the number of actual "88s" involved ie. very few. I've read one account recently from an LCG crew member in the Gold area that claimed to have "knocked out nine eighty-eight millimetre guns". Curiously though the "88" myth continues to this day...

A related document has appeared online fairly recently - DEFE 2/433 Special Observer Party Beach Report - which is a detailed analysis of German positions a few weeks after D-Day. It's on the LMH Archive Canada website at http://lmharchive.ca/the-ronnie-shephard-fonds/

Arty

 

Most of the AORG material is in WO 291. IIRC the most significant lesson was that GE mortars were more effective than GE MGs. There wasn't a lot of GE field arty around on 6 Jun. The combination of mobile mortars and protected fixed artillery offered a better prospect of surviving the allied preparation fire. Of course part of the problem was that GE arty organisation wasn't overly effective because the arty commanders were not a permanent part of the chain of command.

 

I should point out I do have a lot more but it's just too many pages to post in any one file.

 

Arty

You would not claim that the 88mm guns were a myth had you been in range when just ONE 88mm sneaked out of a culvert fired a few

shots and killed FIVE Churchill Tanks -and a few men - then sneaked back into it's culvert - before anyone could draw a bead on him -
one was usually enough to hold a Battalion of Tanks away from it's infantry…

Cheers

 

Tom,

I’m not to going claim for one moment that I’ve ever had to face an 88 or anything similar (my service was much more recently, though my grandfather served through the desert campaign and was eventually wounded in action in Italy). I have nothing but respect for the vets who did the hard yards. I’ll add here, my first visit to Normandy wasn’t until 1993, a very long time after the shooting had stopped, where I found myself weeping at the grave of a British paratrooper I never knew. That paratrooper had indeed made the supreme sacrifice. I know the circumstances of his death through objectively studying the events.

My reference to the 88 myth is not suggesting they didn’t exist. However most Allied armour was knocked out by guns other than 88’s. On the landing beaches in the Gold, Juno & Sword areas, which is the topic of this thread after all, there was more than 25 anti-tank & field guns in action in the direct fire role - just 3 were 88s. A fact confirmed way back in 1944 by the AORG boffins. They didn’t have to face 88s in action in either. They were able to make an analysis of the actual gun type soon after that particular battle. The “myth” I refer to is the routine misidentification of German anti tank guns, anti aircraft guns & field guns by Allied troops.

With that said, my next post, is back on the subject, which is casualties suffered by the Allies on the beaches of Normandy.

The objective fact is that the lads who crossed those beaches were hit by MGs & mortars (and a few 88s), and, German artillery fire.

Regards
Arty

 

To the Artillery sceptics,

The critical subject matter of this topic is what happened in the first hours of 06Jun44 as the Allied troops hit the beaches ie. when most of the casualties were suffered. This and other AORG reports which attempted to assess the cause of casualties is fundamentally flawed. Back in 1944 the boffins had no idea about the actual number of German batteries in the Gold, Juno & Sword areas. Their belief was that there was just ten battery positions in the area which had all been dealt with. In 2014 we are fully aware that the AORG chaps were wrong. We also know now that the casualty figures that the AORG chaps used, in particular, for the Gold & Sword areas were considerably underestimated. Hence, the data they used back then was both incomplete and inaccurate and subsequently their ‘findings’ were, and are, a load of garbage.

The German units opposing the landings of the British and Canadian forces were elements of the 716th and 352nd Infantry Divisions. What mobile mortars did they have ? Most mortars (ie. 81s and 50’s) were in weapons pits (eg. tobruk pits), with more in reserve infantry companies. The AORG reports identified a total of just 13 mortars in the beach defences of Gold, Juno & Sword. Whereas there was in the order of 83 operational guns or howitzers behind Gold Juno & Sword - 13 in the anti ship role, 70 aimed towards the beaches.

The majority of the German batteries behind the coast were not in protected positions but in field positions - most of which were not detected, let alone engaged by Allied preparation fire.

What is this suggestion that the German “artillery commanders were not a permanent part of a chain of command” supposed to mean? There is no reason to believe, at all, that German Artillery was not integrated just as was the practice in Allied units. The CO of the 716th Infantry Division was an Artilleryman himself. The HQ Artillery Regiment 1716 was co-located with Div HQ in Caen. The HQ of I Bn AR 1716 (for example) was co-located with the Regimental HQ of Grenadier Regiment 736 in WN17 aka Hillman. Battery Commanders and/or forward observers were located in Observation posts within Infantry positions.

Why is it 70 years after the events we are so fixated on a narrow strip of sand and the German defences located thereon? Is it because we can visualise German MG’s in ‘pillboxes’, mortars in pits and guns in bunkers, but what was going on in all the observation posts, connected to all the gun batteries situated well behind the coast, is too hard to grasp? Do we still not understand just how ineffective Allied fire was in knocking out the German Batteries? Do we believe that the German gunners had the day off perhaps?

We are talking about an assault on fixed defensive positions on and behind the coast here, backed up by numerous gun batteries - all part of a long since created defensive plan. I’m not suggesting that the German gunners were able to expend vast amounts of ammunition as the Allies did. The Allies saturated huge areas with their fire preparation - without inflicting many casualties or material damage on the defenders - a fact (ironically!) established by AORG teams soon after the event. However the German batteries, in their defensive role, were firing at pre-determined DF targets - just as Allied artillery would - into areas packed with troops and equipment. In a few cases Allied fire did indeed temporarily neutralise or suppress the fire of the German batteries however for the most part they remained unscathed until the PBI captured them - even then not all were taken.

There were a total of 20 German batteries in range of, and specifically sited to cover the coast in the Gold, Juno & Sword areas. 3 of the batteries had an anti shipping role of which just 1 battery (Longues Sur Mer) had all of it’s guns in under concrete - and it still had guns in action despite the Allied efforts. Another of the anti shipping batteries (Mont Fleury) had just one gun under concrete - it was probably neutralised. The third of the gun batteries (Ouistreham I) had dispersed it’s guns before 06June - a fact the Allies were unaware of as they continued to bomb and shell the original battery position. These guns were captured in action around 1200hrs by No. 6 Commando.

Which leaves 17 German batteries - all with a primary role of opposing enemy landings. Just 2 batteries (Merville and Ver Sur Mer) had their guns protected. Both batteries were targeted by the Allies, no guns were destroyed at either, and both batteries were in action during the day. Another 2 batteries (Ouistreham II and Colleville Sur Orne) each had 3 of their 4 guns protected. Both batteries were targeted - in the case of the first the Air and Naval bombardment missed altogether, the battery was not taken until later in the day. In the case of the second none of the protected guns were destroyed and the battery is known to have been in action, until it was taken around midday.

Down to 13 batteries now…2 batteries (Beny Sur Mer & Periers Sur le Dan) were located in fortified field positions - in both cases all of their guns were in open pits. Both batteries were targeted however both are known to have been in action. Both were captured after a fight in the afternoon and evening of D-Day respectively. 1 battery (Crepon) was in a fortified field position - although Allied Intelligence had identified the position they had not identified it as a battery position, and it was not targeted. It was not until early afternoon that British troops bypassed this rather hostile battery - it was not captured until the morning of 07June.

Of the other 10 batteries all were initially in field positions, none of which were apparently identified nor targeted by the Allied effort. These batteries consisted of 10cm howitzers, 10.5cm howitzers, 12.2cm howitzers & 15cm howitzers. There is no objective reason to believe that they were not all in action. Three of these batteries are known to have run out of ammunition - all which was fired into the Gold area.

I wont go into further detail here but the reality was there wasn’t 10 but 20 German gun or howitzer equipped batteries in action on the morning of 06Jun44 in the Gold, Juno and Sword areas. Just 1 was probably neutralised by the Allied effort. Just 1 was temporarily neutralised. Just 5 had their fire suppressed to some degree. By the end of the day the picture had however changed dramatically as the Allies successfully fought their way inland.

For the AORG boffins to have dismissed the effect of the German artillery fire back in 1944 was ignorance, for us to dismiss it today is ludicrous.


Arty

 

Ah the 88 matter. It gets very confusing because there were 88mm PAK and 88mm FLAK, and the former came in two or three types, plus there were many other types of PAK, eg 128mm, 81mm, 76mm, 75mm and many others. Being a cynical person I suspect allied troops generally hadn't much idea what was shooting at them and everything got called 88 unless there was unambiguous evidence to the contrary. Note that 88mm PAK 43 was very different in appearance to 88mm PAK 43/41. However, the various recoilless PAK would have had a distinctive firing signature. Not forgetting all sorts of field guns most of which were capable of anti-tank if required.

"Sneaking" PAK in and out of culverts is clearly a view from someone with little of no experience of manhandling artillery off tarmac. It would be OK with things like 42mm PAK 41 weighing a mere 642 kg, but 88mm PAK 43 weighed 3.7 tonnes and was quite large (you'd need a serious size ditch). 88mm PAK 43/41 was even bigger, weighed 4.4 tonnes and had a split trail, prospect of getting it into action in a culvert would be 'interesting'. To get a bit of perspective 25-pr (87mm) weighed 1.8 tonnes and 17-pr (76mm) was 2 tonnes and manhandling them across country was a challenge (putting it politely). Still, I suppose the German super soldier was capable of anything.

 

I am working strictly from memory here (it's been a while since I looked at the primary sources), but from the 50th Div sources I've read I don't recall that German artillery fire was a critical problem for the assault waves on GOLD. German MG's, mortars, and anti-tank guns seem to have provided the great bulk of DF. However much fire the German batteries were able to bring down, apparently it was not nearly heavy enough either to pin the troops on the beach or to seriously impede their advance inland.

 

German arty HQs above regimental level did not permanently exist in formation HQs, ie there was no permanent equivalent to a UK CRA or CCRA and their staff. In the German army these arty HQs were pooled and were deployed to division and corps HQs when those formations were planning an offensive. Last time I heard defence of the Normandy beaches was not a German offensive operation.

For those unfamiliar with 'Operational Research in NW Europe', the official account of 2 ORS, their CO Lt Col P Johnson RA landed on D-Day as part of the Special Observer Party, he was the radar advisor to the assault AA brigade. 2 ORS was complete ashore by D+17, its other 'boffins' were Maj MM Swan REME, Maj JF Fairlie RCA, Maj D Hennessy R Sigs, Maj JG Wallace RA, Maj DFD Pike Gen List, Maj HA Sargeaunt Gen List, Capt G Mathieson RA, Capt DN Royce Int Corps, Capt CH Oakley DWR and two RAMC majors. There's sufficient gunners present to suggest that they may have had a bit of understanding about artillery. It's at WO 291/1331.

I'd also note that having guns is not a lot of use unless you also have observation to direct and control their fire. If you don't have this then the best you can do is fire at places where you think the enemy might be. Sometime you'll get lucky many times you won't (and that's taking no account of whether or not the fire was accurate. Given the terrain close to the beaches, then I'd suggest the GE arty observers were probably early casualties or PW.

I'd also suggest that if the German fd btys had been in position for some time then they would have been well positioned for concealment and well camouflaged. As long as the exercised good movement discipline they could be very difficult to locate with air recce. Alternatively they may have had planned and partially prepared positions, but not occupied them until the invasion started.

 

I'd go a step further and argue that OR had highlighted the fallacy of trying to achieve 'destruction' of hardened defences by area fire, be it bombs or shells (IIRC the initial work was associated with Pantelleria in the Med). The D-Day 'drenching fire' was an attempt to suppress, not destroy. Most of the bombs [mis-]dropped by 8th Air Force were small fragmentation bombs with instantaneous fuzes intended to stun the defenders just before the first waves landed.

 

you might find some related science in this thread focusing on Operation research
http://ww2talk.com/forums/topic/55664-montgmerys-scientists/

Matt

 

Mapshooter,

I’m not suggesting that the organisation of German Artillery was anything like that the superb machine that the RA was in North West Europe. However the subject is not a campaign but the events of the first hours of one day. As I mentioned previously, by the end of the day the German batteries on and behind the coast had for the most part been abandoned or captured or forced to withdraw.

Many observation posts on the beaches were indeed removed from the picture (although in few cases they remained intact for days afterwards). Plus they had high ground behind the beaches from which they could peruse the Allied efforts. Either way it didn’t mean the German guns stopped putting fire down. Regards their field positions we know they used alternate positions as well as dummy positions (the latter seems to have been a miserable failure), and their camouflage discipline was of a high order. It would be wrong to the think of them as anything but very dangerous bunch.

Arty



Meanwhile, here’s are few snippets from the Sword area….

From transcript of post war interview with Lt Rutherford, 2nd East Yorks.. “Touch down - obstacles in about 4’of water, we had to weave in & out, we landed in 3’water, immediately there was a cascade of mortars, shells, small arms fire…Lee of the cliff 6 to 8’high. Discovered none of rifles would fire because they were clogged with sand from deluge of mortar shells and what have you….”

From transcript of post war interview with Sgt Thompson, 2nd East Yorks… “We’d lost that many men that the strength we had wasn’t much at all, and when we got off the beach we were getting shelled and mortared…”

From memoirs of Pte Roebuck, 2nd East Yorks… “There were bodies floating in the sea. There were men halfway the beach…there were shells landing all around in the sea and on the beach…”

From memoirs of Lt Robertson, 2nd East Yorks… “Shells were falling all around us; a craft on our left received a direct hit and started to settle…”

From memoirs of Pte Ron Major 2nd East Yorks….“the Commandos who followed us were surprised at the mortality rate and put it down to inexperience. This wasn't the case. We had been well trained. But heavy artillery and machine gun fire was pouring down on us. There just wasn't anywhere to go….”

From War Diary 2nd East Yorks 06Jun44... “Cross fire and sniping was fairly considerable and accurate enemy mortar and shellfire was causing some casualties…

From War Diary 2nd East Yorks, again... “By this time the mortars, AA guns and some carriers had come ashore but had suffered some casualties from shell and mortar fire on the first lateral…”

From DSO citation of Lt Coln Hutchinson, CO 2nd East Yorks “6Jun44.… The beaches were under heavy fire and the assault coys suffered many casualties, but he rapidly collected his battalion and organised the mopping up of the remaining beach localities. During this period he was continuously under enemy artillery and mortar fire….”

From MC citation LT Oates, 2nd East Yorks…“This officer commanded a platoon in an assault coy of his Battalion which landed on the beach at LA BRECHE FRANCE, on 6 Jun44. The assault was met by very accurate and heavy small arms and artillery fire which caused many casualties at a critical time….”

From War Diary 246 Fd Sqn RE 06Jun44... “The assault was successful and opposition lighter than expected but mortars and shell fire on the beaches caused casualties and congestion for some hours…”

From War Diary Middlesex 06Jun44...”0725...On the beaches they came under heavy mortar and arty. Fire and suffered a number of casualties…”

From memoirs of Lt Jones, 1st South Lancs… “Up to now the German shelling had been spasmodic & haphazard, but it began to increase and one of the places selected was obviously our crossroad. A shell exploded on the road close by and a fragment of shrapnel ploughed through the torch clipped on my webbing belt…”

Lt Jones, 1st South Lancs, again… “We made our way back along the lateral road, which the Germans were now shelling constantly, and one of my platoon, a tall, thin young lad with sandy hair, was badly wounded by a piece of shrapnel in the neck. An Artillery captain emerged from a fox-hole alongside the road, expertly applied digital pressure to the wound…”

From diary of Maj Wormald, 13/18 Hussars 06Jun44… “By then the beach area was becoming a distinctly unhealthy place, due to mortar and shell fire. The time must have been about H + 15.”

From after action report by Cpl Kitson, 79 Sqn RE 06Jun44... “Lt Hutchinson here did some excellent work by dismounting and organising mine clearing between the sand-dunes and lateral rd. This area was under hy shell and mortar fire and cas were occurring on all sides.”

From memoirs of Sapper Lane 263 Fd Coy RE.. “…mortars, shells and bullets that were hammering down onto a relatively small & concentrated area. On at least two occasions I was eyewitness to shells or mortars making direct hits on soldiers moving close to me and seeing them literally disappear in a flash….”

From after action report of Obstacle Clearance Team, 77 Sqn RE 06Jun44...L/Cpl JACOB and Spr WATKIN blown into water by shell and recovered later from beach….”

From WO205/903 - Report on Operation Overlord Phase I - 06Jun44 0833hrs: “8 Bde ask for blind conc on Perier sur le Dan Bty.”

From War Diary No. 3 Commando 06Jun44... “0905 - Touch down after run-in, the last half of which was under shell fire. LCI(S) 289 and 290 hit near beach - both in sinking condition. Some casualties in 6 Troop (LCI 290). Further casualties occur on beach. Beach under shell fire….’

From War Diary No. 41 RM Commando 06Jun44... “0825...The beach was quite obviously still under fire as mortar bombs and shells were crashing down fairly plentifully. It appeared however that Red Beach was getting a better share of this fire than White…”

From War Diary 33rd Field Regiment 06Jun44... “H+105...Beach now subjected to Shellfire, mortaring and incendiary rockets. Shells fall near several craft on way in…Casualties on beach. Lt KE Bellingham killed by direct hit from shell while driving ‘weazle‘…”

From War Diary 76 Fd Regt 06Jun44...”0835...Troops A & B came in to land. AC (SP) was hit by a shell and set on fire…L/Bdr Drummond killed by shell…B Troop came in to land…a shell hit the top of the ramp…the wreckage of the ramp was so bad that only H Track (AOP) was able to beach…0840...Persistent enemy shelling on beach scoring 4 more hits of B Troop’s LCT and many near misses.”

From memoirs of Sgt Wheatley, 7th Fd Regt…“All this time there were shells dropping in the sea all around the LCT and, as we went down the ramp, one landed in the middle of the deck that we had just left….”

 

Sword was exposed to fire from German batteries sited beyond the Orne and outside the assault area. In the end, the beach had to be closed for this reason. What was the naval gunfire and air plan for dealing with these on D-Day? Was the purpose of this plan to knock out such guns, or to 'drench' them long enough for the assault to succeed? Do we know how much fire was hitting Sword on D-Day from the east and how much was coming from German batteries sited to the south and nearer to the beach?

From your snippets, it does seem as if artillery fire was a much greater problem on Sword than on Gold. As in the latter case, it was clearly not heavy enough to halt the assault. If it aggravated the congestion at the beach exits, though, it may thereby have slowed down the exploitation towards Caen.

 

TTH,

Yes indeed, then there were the long range guns to the east - Houlgate, Benerville, & Villerville - all of which were the subject of ongoing RN attention at the time (HMS Roberts, Ramillies & Warspite respectively). Of their 18 guns just 6 were in casemates (and pointing out to sea), the remainder had open firing platforms - though once again some guns had been re-deployed prior to 06June (ie. due to the attentions of the Allied Airforces and the fact that their bunkers were still under construction). These batteries certainly had their hands full coping with attentions of Bombarding Force D - yet they were still not knocked out. They almost certainly spent most of the day attempting to engage HM ships. Although the War Diary German of the Naval Staff Operations Division states that on 06June “at 1150…Battery 3/1255 fired upon ten landing boats near Riva Bella…”.

These batteries were probably not endeavouring to shell the beach area at that point in time. Villerville was certainly out of range of Queen Beach. As for Houlgate & Benerville, attempting to spot fall of shot on a land target 15-20km away would have been all but impossible.

There were a few further guns in the Le Havre area - likely to have been effectively screened (by smoke) - any fire would have been literally blind and at very long range.

What occurred in the following days and weeks is another matter.

Arty



And a 'few' more snippets from the Sword area...

From War Diary Norfolks 06Jun44... “…landed 5 minutes early at 0950...Beach under fairly heavy mortar and shellfire…”

From War Diary Warwicks 06Jun44... “Due to touch down at 0955 hours….The beach was under mortar and shell fire…C Coys LCI hit a mine on the beach, and was also hit by a shell, whilst D Coys LCI had both it’s ramparts shot away. This and the sniping and the shelling on the beach caused a certain amount of confusion…“

From War Diary KSLI 06Jun44...“1010..It was NOT an easy landing….The beach was still under shellfire….One LCI shortly after we had disembarked was hit by shell fire and sunk….1100...Every officer and man had carried ashore a sandbag…in there was placed gasmasks, cardigans…95% was recovered in MT…the missing 5% having been destroyed by shelling….1300 X Coy come under fairly heavy Mortar and Artillery Fire on the forward slopes of the ridge south of Hermanville…”

From War Diary 71 Fd Coy 06Jun44...”All parties disembarked by 1100 hrs on a shell swept and thickly occupied beach…”

From War Diary 223rd Field Ambulance 06Jun44... “Enemy opposition in the form of mortar fire and shell fire is encountered both at sea and on the beach…”

From War Diary 2nd RUR 06Jun44... “1200...Although the beaches had been almost cleared of the enemy, hostile shells and mortar bombs were falling in fair quantities…”

From War Diary Staffordshire Yeomanry 06Jun44... “Touched down at 1030 hrs on White beach…Spasmodic shelling and a considerable amount of sniping….”

From War Diary Staffordshire Yeomanry, again... “The C.O. appreciated that the ridge in the vicinity of Pt. 61 was ground vital to us and ordered "C" Sqn. to seize it forthwith…."C" Sqn. was now engaged by a Bty of 122mm guns firing East from the wooded area around PERIER-SUR-LE-DANS, and temporarily held up.”

From War Diary 629 Fd Sqn RE 06Jun44... “2IC (Capt GN McDougal, MC RE) with 1 White Armd Personnel truck disembarked approx 1300 hours and was killed by shellfire on the beach within the hour…”

War Diary 3 Inf Div HQ… “1600 Div Hq shelled…”