Allied Incompetence lost France

Discussion in '1940' started by Bayman, Jul 4, 2011.

  1. Bayman

    Bayman Member

    You're quite right. The statistics don't lie. How could I not have seen this. Clearly, everyone should have been home and relaxed by 1941.


    Canuk, you are quite right. The Germans should have been soundly beaten in 1938.

    Niall Ferguson in The War of the World, page 332, states, "the Americans were eager to appease Germany as anyone in Britain". Roosevelt wanted to give the Polish corridor back to them. The USA just prior to WW2 increased imports dramatically to Germany. On page 333, he states, "In Asia, the USA had already established a pattern of calling on others to take stands against aggression, while pursuing its own economic interest". "When Roosevelt began to do the same in Europe too. Chamberlain concluded that Americans were "a nation of cads". He said "it is best and safest to count on nothing from the Americans except words".

    Chamberlain, distrusted the Americans to a degree viewing them as economic opportunist. He wasn't far wrong.

    Ferguson states that the UK and France in 1938 should have rolled over the German border instead of Chamberlain engaging in shuttle diplomacy over Czechoslovakia. The Germans would not have stood a chance. Is this being more wise in hindsight by Ferguson? Well, Churchill said that throwing a small state to the wolves to obtain peace was highly delusionary, supporting an advance into Germany in 1938.

    Churchill came to power when Germany had taken the west. The situation was now different, and he wanted US industry involved in a big way - "give us the tools and we will do the job". Churchill had to manipulate the Americans, of which he was good. Although Roosevelt was arming heavily and preparing for war in case by announcing tat 50,000 planes per year would be built.

    In hindsight he allowed the Americans far too much into Europe and bought far too much materials from the USA too, in his obsession in defeating Hitler and ridding of the world of Nazis of who he despised. Relying far too much on the USA resulted in severe economic problems post war, as Chamberlain's fears came true.

    After the 1939 declaration of war, in early 1940 before the Germans attacked in the west. If immediately after Sept 1939 the UK and France went into Germany in a big way they would have gone under and all over and no world war.

    Germany faced France and the UK, who collectively far outnumbered Germany in every aspect, and also had equipment of better quality as well. The Germans suffered 50,000 casualties against Poland and 1/3 of the armour out of action. With German forces delpleted after Poland, if the UK and France had moved into Germany ASAP, the Germans would have been overpowered.

    Statisticly, Man U could have beaten Barcelona too!

    Nope. Barcelona had better players. It went to plan.
     
  2. James S

    James S Very Senior Member

    Bayman
    Germany's Poor Economy Lost Them The War

    Germany lost the second world war because the Allies were able to out produce them in the making of arms. Britain and the United States were able to produce huge numbers and far more aircraft. The false conclusion has been that Hitler's gamble in invading the USSR was the key behind Germany's defeat. That was sealed before Germany declared war.


    Germany was in diffs. before the war kicked off - the President of the Reichsbank was not sacked for nothing , and "The Four Year Plan" was the alternative , German was going broke and her industrial base could not hope to accommodate and cater for Hitler's plans to rearm - there were huge manpower shortages and wise choices were not made.
    ( The radical which Hitler always favoured worked against hi and cost money that he did not have, the taking of Austria and the czech State did ease some problems but it did not reverse the dire straits towards which Germany was lumbering.)

    "Allied incompetence" - I think this does not address all the issues .

    "Hitler need the resources of the East" , yes he wanted them but he also loathed the political system and saw the people as being racially inferior these alone would take him to Russia.
    In respect of the population, German needs would dictate policy and the fate of the Russian people would always be secondary.
     
  3. Bayman

    Bayman Member

    James,

    "Allied incompetence" - I think sums it up perfectly in France.

    "Hitler need the resources of the East" , yes he wanted them but he also loathed the political system and saw the people as being racially inferior these alone would take him to Russia.


    The 1933 German census gave 56.8% of the population in rural areas (towns less than 20,000 population) - Tooze, page 167. Tooze emphasises how backward German agriculture was. Tooze describes Germany as a medium sized workshop economy dependent on imported food. A situation Hitler did not like, as to him Germany had to be self sufficient in food and have as much natural resources as possible to compete on a world industrial scale.

    Cheap fast transportation (the steam ship and trains) had meant food could be transported between continents. This prevented European famines. The USA and Canada were pouring out cereals super cheap which affected European agriculture setting it back. German, French and UK agriculture was mainly outdated to North America's. Global food production was in the hands of the USA and UK using the UKs sea lanes and massive merchant fleet to transport food - animal and human consumption.

    Food transportation between continents did not apply only to cereals. For e.g., Liverpool companies owned vast tracts of Argentina processing beef and transporting it to the UK and other European ports. The Vesty empire owned massive ranches, processing plants and the shipping fleets to transport the meat products - total vertical integration to the point they owned the shops it was sold in. Only oil companies ever achieved such total control of their products.

    Germany with its smallholdings, had more in common with backward agricultural nations as Ireland, Bulgaria and Romania, as Tooze emphasises. The UK had a backward agricultural system in parts, however controlled food importation across continents. The Nazis wanted more land to expand agriculture into and be more self sufficient in food. They eyed he Ukraine. The land hungry Russians expanded over the Urals, but at least the Russians had the land to expand into.

    A prime point of the invasion of the USSR was Hitler's paranoia about the land-starved backwardness of German agriculture. This contrasted with the raw material and land resources of the American continent and Britain's empire. The land hungry Americans expanded into the west and obliterated the native population. In the 1920/30s that was still fresh in the memory and many people alive then could recall it. This provided Hitler with a precedent, for eliminating the native populations in the east to provide land for backward German agriculture. Germany would have been far better off making their backward agricultural system state-of-the-art in technology, rather than focussing its leading brains on war technology. This simple notion appears never to have occurred to them too much.

    Hitler had this obsession about the USA's rise and dominating the world economy. Who would win? Him or the people? Hitler eventually gave the USA the position he feared, as post war the USA was an economic and military world power.
    Adam Tooze, Wages of Destruction : Preface xxiiv:
    "America should provide the pivot for our understanding of the Third Reich. In seeking to explain the urgency of Hitler's aggression, historians have underestimated his acute awareness of the threat posed to Germany, along with the rest of the European powers, by the emergence of the USA as the global superpower."

    Tooze: Preface xxvi:
    "Germany could not simply settle down to become an affluent satellite of the USA"
    Hitler feared the rise of the USA, whose industrial and economical influence was felt in Germany. Hitler specifically mentioned the efficient US vehicle industry. He feared efficient US industry would wipe out European industry. To counter the USA, Hitler wanted Germany to control the Continent, the British the other parts of the world. He admired the British empire stating Germany could never have done it better than the British. He thought this was the only way to preserve European culture being self contained with no indirect economical control from the USA. Fighting the British was not a part of his view, hence wanting a Germany/UK/France alliance in the 1930s. He gave out many feelers for peace after September 1939.

    Hitler did not want Germany being a sub-set economy. Hitler wanted to be alongside the USA and Britain as world economic powers. He also wanted Germany to be an influential power in the world. Hitler could see how the UK was influential because it possessed the largest empire ever seen, and he accepted that. However he could not accept the upstart USA being a world economic power spreading its culture. Both the British Empire and the USA had access to large natural resources, while Germany did not.

    The standard of living in the USA, Germany could not match. Even if Germans enjoyed a higher standard of living than the USA without stealing land in the east, that would still not be acceptable to Hitler as their economy was a sub-set and foreign industry was setup in Germany.

    Hitler was attempting to put Germany, a relatively new nation, in a world economic position without having built anything up as the British had over centuries, and without any significant natural resources, as the USA had. To do that he had to steal off others.

    Germany had industrialised in the late 1800s/early 1900s, however was still largely an agricultural country with outdated agriculture which contrasted with some of its top-line industries. It could not feed itself without importing food - animal and human. It had no control of the imported food production and not full control in distribution of its imported food. The world was moving away from coal as the prime fuel and turning to the magic oil, which also contained many properties to extract for other products. The USA had an abundance of oil extracted mainly from the stolen territory in the west, the UK had oil in its empire, Germany had none.

    The UK became a world player over centuries building up an empire and world trade routes. The USA did it by expanding west taking land. The precedence if the USA in taking land and removing the populations was one way Germany could be a major economy, major power, self sufficient in most aspects and have influence.

    • The German mentality was one of being a world economic player alongside the UK and USA.
    • The precedence of the USA's rapid rise to a world economic power, based on land acquisition by force from indigenous people and the Mexicans, and largely eliminating the indigenous populations convinced the Germans they could do the same to their east.
     
  4. phylo_roadking

    phylo_roadking Very Senior Member

    First off - OP, you can't just repeatedly stand on your statement that you're making general points when people take you to task over specifics - for YOU are making some very shaky specific pronouncements in the process of making your overall point!

    The general point was that the Germans were strapped and look at what they turned out in in new aircraft in WW2 to what the Allies did. This clearly shows the inadequacy of German industry.


    The Meteor was an interim design that never saw true frontline operational service; it was a very poor second to the Me262....the REAL competitor for the 262 was to have been the DH Vampire which would have outperformed it in many areas AND been far more manouverable.

    The Typhoon was a failed high-altitude interceptor replacement for the Spitfire that needed a niche - provided for it luckily by its wide-chord wing - to simply not waste all the design and development costs.

    Conversely, the Germans produced THE best multi-role aircraft of the war in the shape of the Ju88, an aircraft that in one form or other was still rolling off the surviving production lines in March 1945 after a six year operational history.

    The Germans could not knock out the French Char-B or the British Matilda 2.


    They did BOTH; Billotte's Char Bs were severely asaulted by PzIIIs, while Rommel first showed the British how vulnerable their tanks would be to the 88mm at Arras.

    The BEF was a fully motorised army, no horses were used to tow guns or supplies, unlike the German army, which was mainly horse drawn.


    Tooze's statement on the BEF being "fully" motorised is very misleading - what in reality happned was the BEF had enough motorised transport to shift the entire force - in 2-3 lifts ;) At Arras, for example, the RASC lorries that took the Bitish infantry into position at their start lines for the two-pronged attack around the town THEN had to retrun and load up with men and supplies to take into the town.

    The British did introduce the Matilda 2 tank, although late in the Battle of France, which again the Germans could barely knock out.


    The problem was - they were only engaged in ONE (1) major engagement....and the Germans only had to defeat them once, there ;)

    The Meteor was the first proper fully developed jet plane introduced. The 262 was slightly faster than the Meteor F3, but far more unreliable.

    Slightly??? The Meteor F MkIII's top speed at altitude was 415 mph...the 262's was 540!

    It was the Derwent 5s of the F Mk IV that gave it a performance superior to the 262....AFTER the war.

    A quick Google is all you need...


    And strangely that information is very much at odds with what Hans Fey, the Messerschmitt test pilot who defected on 31st March 1945, brought across to the Allies; the Me 262 flew well, with speeds of 280–310 mph with one engine out, but unless trimmed out and flown level, speeds slower than 190 mph meant problems with assymetrical thrust. However...flying on flaps to landing between this and the 262's 155 mph stall speed removed this problem.
     
  5. leccy

    leccy Senior Member

    @op

    The ME 262's engines were originally rated for alot longer than 10 hours but due to a lack of crucial materials sub standard materials had to be used reducing the life of the engines.

    The design of the ME 262 engine is axial flow which is the type used by nearly all jet engines since, the Meteor used centrifugal flow engines which were not as efficient. The design was right the materials were wrong.

    The Meteor was marginal in power and took a long time to respond to the throttle (typical for all jets of the time), it also had a tendency to snake when the guns were fired making it a bad gun platform.

    This will allow you to look at how good the French Armour was or as was more the case not.

    French Vehicles

    This shows the quantities of tanks including the 462 FT17's in combat units.

    Official French Tank Strength 10th May 1940

    Because at the time there was a lot of confusion about French armoured strength here is another one

    French Tank Strength 10th May 1940

    BEF Tank Strength

    BEF Tank strength 10th May 1940

    And to be fair German Tank strength

    German tank strength 10th May 1940
     
  6. Jedburgh22

    Jedburgh22 Very Senior Member

    Surely the tactical innovation that the German use of armour, air power, and logistics helped them win the 1940 campaigns in both Western Europe and Scandinavia, in the East they lost possibly because of unpreparedness for winter warfare and also a certain political naivite in that they did not turn the Russians and Ukrainians against the Communists. It is almost certain that without the huge injections of Allied material into the USSR the Russians would have found it hard to beat the Germans.
    I note Bayman's reference to equipment - the German Army was much less mechanised than the Allied armies throughout the way, however the use of what they had was often tactically much better and German errors on the battlefield in the main were caused by being ordered to hold positions Stalingrad for example where the generals would have preferred to fight a mobile war of movement.
    WWII could be described as a war of ideologies and capital - the American aim (often unstated) was to win the war when they entered but to ensure the dismantling of the European Colonial Empires something they achieved.
     
  7. Drew5233

    Drew5233 #FuturePilot 1940 Obsessive

    Yes, but there was a lead time of 18 months. The UK and US were developing new designs, P-38, the British with the Mustang, Mosquito, etc. The Germans knew newer more advanced designs would come through and existing planes improved. The Spitfire was vastly improved during WW2, as it could take the modifications and still be front line until the very end.

    In May 1940 the USA pledged 50,000 planes per year alone. The UK production on top of that. Hitler knew that these planes would be coming in force from mid 1941 onwards and aimed towards Germany, with or without US pilots.

    France was receiving aircraft from America before June 1940.

    Assignment to Catastrophe Vols 1 and 2 by Spears
     
  8. Gooseman

    Gooseman Senior Member

    Hi there. New here, so my first post, though I have been a fly on this virtual wall for quite some time. From Dutch origin, so forgive my poor English (please). I am by the way the author of War Over Holland, which some of you may know.

    Bayman's observations intrigue me. To some extent I find them tempting to go along with. One thing I observe is that Bayman may wanna trim down on his tendency to overcompensate.

    I fully agree that the Westfeldzug was more of an Allied loss than a German grand-slam. But that had little to do with the Blitzkrieg myth, but particularly with the tactical and operational skills of the German front hurds. The expansion of German root-tactics, in development since the mid-1800's, into the mechanized warfare in joint efforts with a flying cavalry is only one side of the story. I strongly feel that the revenues of the liberal command structure and the relative independent lower tactical levels in the German 1940 army versus the Dutch-Franco-Belgian rigid dictated command structure benefited the quick German win. Should one zoom in on the details of the decisive elements of the Westfeldzug, the German operational successes largely seem to scale back on modest local successes, sometimes gained on NCO level, that were rapidly and cleverly scaled up by low tactical levels as to gain momentum within hours. Compare that to the rigid and slow chain of command on the Allied side and one gets close to the key of the amazing German success in May 1940. At least that is what I feel after studying for many years on this fascinating topic.

    I also feel that discussions on quality of material largely fail. I don't waste my time on comparisons of a Bf-109 to a Spit or a P-38. It doesn't make sense. The Germans were able to produce so many military products of superb quality in itself, that based on a quality assessment they should have won the war. It were the two large super powers that proved them wrong. Both the US and the USSR showed that quality was easily defeated (in the long run) by quantity, as long as standards of a minimum capacity were met. The mass production of Sherman tanks, T-34's and KV-1's posed the Germans with the challenge that every tank of theirs had to kill a dozen or more before it could return the investment.

    Quality of material is such a dangerous element of analysis that I usually try to avoid it. The standard excuse for the unexpected rapid defeat in France and the Low Countries was - after all - the eleged overwhelming quality and quantity of the German invasion force. That myth has been killed by quite a number of reputed historians during the last two decades. The quality issue only seems to be valid when it came to command and control, above anything else. And that leaves us - at least in my book - a highly complicated 'what if' analysis over things, which does not allow 'quick and easy' solutions, let alone that our theses can be tested with actual data or outcome.

    Anyway. Interesting debate and plenty of knowledge here.
     
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  9. CL1

    CL1 116th LAA and 92nd (Loyals) LAA,Royal Artillery

    Gooseman

    welcome to the forum
     
  10. Gage

    Gage The Battle of Barking Creek

    Gooseman

    welcome to the forum

    Pop over to User Intoductions so we can all say a proper hello. :)
     
  11. fredleander

    fredleander Senior Member

    They couldn't even design and R&D a heavy bomber.
    Not entirely correct. I am not sure what you mean by "a heavy bomber" but I'd say the Ju90 (Ju290, Ju390) series was a heavy bomber. Also the Messerschmitt "Amerika-bomber", the He177 and the Fw-200. What about the Blohm und Voss six-engine flying boat?

    All these were designed and "R&D'ed".
     
  12. fredleander

    fredleander Senior Member

    I fully agree that the Westfeldzug was more of an Allied loss than a German grand-slam. But that had little to do with the Blitzkrieg myth, but particularly with the tactical and operational skills of the German front hurds. The expansion of German root-tactics, in development since the mid-1800's, into the mechanized warfare in joint efforts with a flying cavalry is only one side of the story. I strongly feel that the revenues of the liberal command structure and the relative independent low tactical levels in the German 1940 army versus the Dutch-Franco-Belgian rigid dictated command structure benefited the quick German win. Should one zoom in on the details of the decisive elements of the Westfeldzug, the German operational successes largely seem to scale back on modest local successes, sometimes gained on NCO level, that were rapidly and cleverly scaled up by low tactical levels as to gain momentum within hours. Compare that to the rigid and slow chain of command on the Allied side and one gets close to the key to the amazing German success in May 1940. At least that is what I feel after studying for many years on this fascinating topic.

    Anyway. Interesting debate and plenty of knowledge here.
    Hallo, good to see you here. What I would like to have are some books written by French/Dutch/Belgian historians/participants of the fighting in 1940. Would you know of any? Should be in English.

    That said I agree with most of your points. One aspect I believe is overshadowed by the rapid armoured German attack, is the capability of its infantry at the time. And, as you write yourself, its emphasis on local initiative and delegation of leadership.
     
  13. L J

    L J Senior Member

    There also is the point (conveniently forgotten ?)that
    a)the German army and airforce were emerging very weakened from the battle of France
    b)the battle of France only was a partial success for the Germans:the British decision not to give up,resulted in a serious strategic crisis for the Germans,which they never could resolve and resulted into their defeat .
     
  14. fredleander

    fredleander Senior Member

    There also is the point (conveniently forgotten ?)that
    a)the German army and airforce were emerging very weakened from the battle of France
    b)the battle of France only was a partial success for the Germans:the British decision not to give up,resulted in a serious strategic crisis for the Germans,which they never could resolve and resulted into their defeat .
    That they could not resolve it, I am not so sure of. That they did not resolve it is for sure....:)....
     
  15. Slipdigit

    Slipdigit Old Hickory Recon

    Gooseman cut to the heart of the matter. Well said, even though English is not your first tongue.
     
  16. Gooseman

    Gooseman Senior Member

    There also is the point (conveniently forgotten ?)that
    a)the German army and airforce were emerging very weakened from the battle of France
    b)the battle of France only was a partial success for the Germans:the British decision not to give up,resulted in a serious strategic crisis for the Germans,which they never could resolve and resulted into their defeat .

    May I comment on these two statements?

    a) Any army loses during a large scale campaign. The German losses were, however, neclectable weighing the military and economic gains. Compared to the losses of the BEF and RAF, I feel it is hard to defend a statement as if the German losses during the brief campaign were hardest felt on their side. More importantly, the core of the German field-army had gained irreplaceable battle experience. For one thing, the Germans learnt that their arty tactics had been poor and their armoured columns too vulnerable and massive, causing gigantic logistical challenges. The adaptions that were made to both tank designs and mechanized warfare tactics were gains from the Westfeldzug. Most important was also the fact that much of the lost material was recovered and repaired. I therefor do not agree that the German losses during the campaign mattered in any significant way as to the remainder of the war.

    b) I cannot see where the Germans had expected, given their initial strategy for the Westfeldzug, the British to yield all along during or directly after the France campaign. The Operation Seelion had been scheduled which was a prep to invade the Islands and force the UK into submission. Moreover, I don't think that one can say that the fact that the UK continued the war, was in any way decisive for the final outcome. That kind of 'what if' analysis is more than speculative. For one thing, the invasion of the USSR and the involvement of the US in the war seemed to be the undisputed turning points. But I cannot see why the UK not yielding in June 1940, caused the Germans more than a nuisance. I fear that 'we from the west' tend to exagerate particularly the European role in the submission of Hitler in 1945. Where would we have been if it hadn't been for the American and Russian efforts?
     
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  17. phylo_roadking

    phylo_roadking Very Senior Member

    Unfortunately the OP hasn't retrned to answer any of the many points raised with his arguments.

    In the meantime...

    and airforce were emerging very weakened from the battle of France



    Not that weakened ;) The units that took up bases in France for the BoB were back up to strength in three weeks to begin offensive operations against the UK at full rate.

    Most important was also the fact that much of the lost material was recovered and repaired.


    And of course even these were greatly outmatched by the French materiel recovered from battlefields and from the Armistice depots ;)
     
  18. JCB

    JCB Senior Member

    May I comment on these two statements?

    a
    b) I cannot see where the Germans had expected, given their initial strategy for the Westfeldzug, the British to yield all along during or directly after the France campaign. The Operation Seelion had been scheduled which was a prep to invade the Islands and force the UK into submission. Moreover, I don't think that one can say that the fact that the UK continued the war, was in any way decisive for the final outcome. That kind of 'what if' analysis is more than speculative. For one thing, the invasion of the USSR and the involvement of the US in the war seemed to be the undisputed turning points. But I cannot see why the UK not yielding in June 1940, caused the Germans more than a nuisance. I fear that 'we from the west' tend to exagerate particularly the European role in the submission of Hitler in 1945. Where would we have been if it hadn't been for the American and Russian efforts?

    'Up sh*t creek without a paddle' :)
    However if Britain had made peace with Germany in 1940 giving Germany the freedom of the seas and meaning it could divert all its efforts and that of the conqurered countries to the East could they have defeated Russia?
    If Russia was victorious they would have held the whole of Europe as America would have had no base for invasion.
    Would America have entered the war at all ?
     
  19. Gooseman

    Gooseman Senior Member

    Hallo, good to see you here. What I would like to have are some books written by French/Dutch/Belgian historians/participants of the fighting in 1940. Would you know of any? Should be in English.


    One particularly on the brief German campaign in the Netherlands. That was published quite recently, 2009. It is a production of the Dutch Military History section of the Ministery of Defense. Not that this (in itself) reputed source prevents the book from being (near to) flawless - not at all. It incorporates many imperfecties, but on the higher level of detail it is the best (in English) one can get (in print) on the German campaign in Holland. It is called 'May 1940 - the Battle for the Netherlands'. [ISSN no: 1385-7827 / ISBN 9789004184381]. Publishing house is Brill in the Netherlands and UK. It is quite costly though. I believe it is around 130 USD.
     
  20. Gooseman

    Gooseman Senior Member

    However if Britain had made peace with Germany in 1940 giving Germany the freedom of the seas and meaning it could divert all its efforts and that of the conqurered countries to the east could they have defeated Russia?

    I don't think anyone could affirm such a question, because of its highly speculative load. I think that the defeat of German would eventually have been imperative and I even think that, save the American entrance in the war come 1942, they would have lost against the USSR on the long run in any case, mainly due to the uneven balance in man-power, material and particularly the Russian willingness to sacrifice human life as if their soldiers were mere flies. The USSR redefined 'Totaler Krieg' beyond the original Goebbels definition. Germany was simply drained from that very 'strategy' alone.

    Having said that, I must stress that I do not intend to underestimate the British sacrifices or the obvious necessity for Germany to apply adequate means and material to the Western front and the Atlantic for that matter, to homeland defences in another stage. Obviously, when the US entered the war in 1942, the UK being unoccupied and meanwhile grown into a quite capable self-defence too, it all became much more than the initial nuisance to the Germans. Their classic dilemma of a prolonged multi-front war - grossly neclected by Herr Hitler - grew true and obviously caused them second thoughts on their 1940 decisions. But in fact I believe most of us would agree that as off the point that Hitler took over general command in the Summer of 1940, he piled up one flaw after the other. I tend to say that Germany beat itself more than anyone else. That it is unrealistic to isolate one theatre from the other, and weighing them carefully each and every one of those, should be said. Speaking for myself, I always feel much restraint from those kinds of what-ifs, for they tend to be highly speculative.
     
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