96 Coy RASC "History of the units campaign in N.W. Europe"

Discussion in 'RASC' started by Paul Bulmer, Nov 19, 2022.

  1. Paul Bulmer

    Paul Bulmer Member

    The Commanding Officer, Major A.W. Holmes of the 96 Coy RASC (Troop Carrying), wrote a history document for his company for the period from May 1944 to June 1945. The war diary for 3 November 1945 states:

    A “History of the unit during the campaign in N.W. Europe” has just been completed by O.C. and forwarded to D.S.T. H.Q. B.A.O.R. It is fairly comprehensive and covers the period May 44-June 45.


    I would be interested if the forum could give me any thoughts if this document is available anywhere. There is no reference to it on the National Archive site.

    Paul
     
    Chris C likes this.
  2. Chris C

    Chris C Canadian

  3. Paul Bulmer

    Paul Bulmer Member

    Thanks for the suggestion. I have contacted them generally the about the 96 coy, but they replied saying that they had nothing of any significance. I wonder if there is anything at the imperial war museum. I have never been to their archives, it may be an interesting experience.
     
  4. hutt

    hutt Member

    I did an online search of the IWM for '96 coy' (all records) and it does have some hits but would need further work to see if any were of real interest. Nothing for A W Holmes. It would be a shame if this little history has been lost.
     
  5. Paul Bulmer

    Paul Bulmer Member

    Transcript of the original document stored in the archive at The Royal Logistic Corps Museum, Building 301, Worthy Down, Winchester SO21 2RG

    SUBJECT: - History of the unit during the Campaign in N.W. Europe. – 96 Coy (Troop Carrying)

    1. After completion of re-mobilization and final training of 96 Coy RASC (Troop Carrying) the unit was selected to carry Tac, Main and Rear HQs Second Army across the invasion. Accordingly on 12 May 1944, the unit moved into location at PURBROOK, Hants with Rear HG Second Army. The unit was split up and distributed over the various branches, and “phased in” according to a table prepared by Major Turner, Camp Comdt, and Major Kann of ‘Q’ Branch. The first vehicle, with Tac HQ landed on ‘D’ Day and the last party was due on D+14. The weather however delayed this plan, and they landed on D+25.


    2. After un-loading in Normandy, vehicles were collected from the Branches and concentrated in a location near Rear Army, under the orders of Capt. A.R. McInnes RASC. When the unit was complete, it was taken into Army Reserve for Troop Carrying. Location was moved from BANVILLE to ESQUAY-SUR-SEULLES – a very pleasant spot in orchard and near the stream, on 7 July 44. The unit remained based on this location while carrying out various troop lifts within the beachhead until 16 Aug 44. Among these lifts were the following: - Lift of 9 Bde of 3 (Br) Inf. Div. from area north of CAEN to area CAUMONT: again to BENNY BOCAGE and VIRE, lifts of reinforcements between beaches, RHUs and CRCs; lift of 46 Bde of 15 (S) Div. East to west.


    3. Instructions were laid down that an operational log of all details would be rendered to DDST Rear Second Army fortnightly, and this was continued throughout the campaign to June 45. A copy was also included in the War Diary, and this log gave a very comprehensive picture of the whole of the work carried out by all platoons of the Company, into whatever lifts they were divided up. It was understood that these logs were required for similar record purposes to this history.


    4. The unit was transferred from Army Reserve to command 12 Corps on 15 Aug 44 and the following day moved to location near THURY-HARCOURT. On 18 Aug, Company HQ and Workshops moved again to MARTIGNY and was lifting 15 (S) Div. While the move into location, just evacuated by Brigade HQ, was taking place, four shells landed in the field doing no damage however, despite some near misses. On 19 Aug at 0200 hours a parachute flare landed on the cab of a vehicle and burned the tyres. The fire was put out. On 20 Aug the unit changed location and formation three times. In the morning the lift and command was 59 Div. – then, just being withdrawn for breaking up, - later in the morning to 53 (W) Div., and finally to 15 (S) Div. The last location was near USSY, north of FALAISE, and that night there was a fairly heavy air-raid with some eighteen parachute flares and twenty bombs in and around the location – in an orchard. The following morning at 0900 hours a very large D.A. bomb probably 4,000 lbs. exploded in the edge of the location. The ground was so sodden, due to heavy rains that it had penetrated deeply, and only 2 TCVs were damaged – both fairly badly, but neither was evacuated beyond repair. No serious personal injuries. CRASC 15 (S) Div. (Lt. Col. K.M. Whitworth RASC) visited the location during the day.


    5. At this time a certain hold was being maintained on the unit by CRASC 2 Tk. Tptr. Coln, RASC, under which formation the unit had basically been placed since before joining Rear HQ Second Army for the invasion. It was understood that this was because the unit was controlled by ‘G’ Branch due to its operational role, as were the Tk. Tptr. Units. The position was thus defined by ADST (T), Lt. Col. G. Slack RASC. This situation tended however to make for very considerable difficulties, as, for example, at this stage an officer of the unit was required to report back to 2 Tk. Tptr. Coln. Each day at 0900 hours – despite the fact that the Column was anything up to 30 miles in rear of us.


    6. After various false starts, due largely to confused operational picture of the closure of the FALAISE gap and the lack of information regarding the position and degree of success of the Polish Armoured Div. to the Northeast, 15 (S) Div. began to move forward, and the unit moved to VERMOUTIERS. Control and inter-communication with the platoon lifts were still good at this stage, though they were shortly to become most involved. At VERMOUTIERS, on 26 Aug the unit passed again to command of 53 (W) Div., to lift 160 and 71 Bdes, the latter in conjunction with 13 Coy RASC (Troop Carrying).


    7. From now on until the middle of September 44, there was continuously the closest co-operation between the two companies, due initially to the necessity of carrying a complete Div., between two Troop Carrying Coys - instead of 3. Very often lifts of vehicles would be split up all over the place and come under command of an officer of the other Coy. (See attached copies of letters on this subject). Major E.T. Dickens RASC O.C. 13 Coy RASC and his officers, co-operated to the full in all these matters and, due to the formation of a total 9 Bn. lifts between the two Coys; the provision of officer and/or NCO staffs for these lifts of approx. 18 TCVs each, plus the organization of an Advanced HQ by the Coys. – sufficient of a strain on resources as it was – the position without this good spirit of mutual assistance would have been impossible.


    8. The principle of a Tac HQ or Forward Report Centre was originally worked by this unit and was implemented about this time. Initially, this consisted of one P.U., one or two DRs and a 3-ton G.S. lorry, staffed by the 2IC and a Corporal Clerk. The function was at first, that of a report centre but became more and more an operational HQ, which moved on a Bde level, and was of course more mobile than Coy HQ and Workshops could be.


    9. On 28 Aug 44 the unit moved to St. JUST (near GLOS-LA-FERRIERE) and on 31 Aug moved again for a few hours to EMALLVILLE near the River SEINE, after a very roundabout journey, taking 22 hours on the road. The Pls were in advance of HQ, the first vehicle of which crossed the river at LES ANDLEYS at 2200 hrs., on this date. Early on the morning of 1 Sept the unit arrived at LASORS, on the edge of the FORET de LYONS and harboured up in an orchard, together with the HQ of 13 Coy RASC. It was found very convenient to locate the two HQs as closely together as possible and the two units were very closely integrated. The three Bdes. of 53 (W) Div. were still being carried by the two Troop Carrying Coys, together. At LASORS, evidence was provided by the local Maquis that the Germans, a day or two before had tortured, by burning the hands and feet, seven of their number, and had then shot them. These included the local Mayor, leader of the Marquis, and their bodies were found in a wood nearby. The bodies of some 12 Germans were also found in the area. The FOREST de LYONS, in which large pockets of enemy were being cleared up, was about 2 miles away from this location.


    10. Troop lifts were still out with Bns, and the unit moved midday 2 Sep 44 to VIGNACOURT, north of the Somme. The move took 20 1/2 hours over a heavily congested and badly demolished route. After the SOMME was crossed at PICQUIGNY the advance party (of 53 Div.) in which the Troop Carrying Coys were represented, was ambushed, and one Capt. R.E.M.E. and one DR were killed. On 3 Sept this unit and 13 Coy RASC located themselves together outside VIGNACOURT, and in the Area of a number of rocket bomb launching sites. These sites had been very thoroughly smashed up by the Allied Air Forces and their destruction made a considerable impression on the troops under command. It was here also that a man in civilian clothes presented himself to OC 96 Coy RASC and declared he was an American airman shot down in February 44 and that he had been in hiding with the Maquis in ABBEVILLE and AMIENS since. Under a good deal of suspicion, he proved his identity, and also that he had just an hour or two previously assisted the Maquis and men of this unit to round up Germans in the wood behind the location. About this time too Capt. T. Locke RASC 2IC 96 Coy RASC found and gave a lift back to, Wing Commander Davidson DSO DFC also shot down in the area and whose story was later widely published in the Press. He had brought back considerable information regarding rocket launching sites, on the construction of which he had worked, disguised as a civilian.


    11. On the evening of 4 Sept 44 the unit moved to IZEL and on the following day Os C 13 and 96 Coys visited HQs 160, 158 and 71 Bdes. Unit changed to 15 (S) Div., once again. Located here, the unit was only a few miles from its main location in 1940, which a few of the NCOs found time to visit.

    A very unfortunate case of a wrong map reference occurred on 5 Sept 44 in which a lift under command Capt. A.R. McInnes RASC was ordered direct by 12 Corps through 53 (W) Div. to report for a detail. The mistake hinged on the letter of the reference and OC unit spent considerable time touring around between 53 Div., Brigades., and Pl lifts in trying to trace them. It had been intended that they should go back to the SEINE for a lift of 15 (S) Div. to ST POL, but in fact they were traced near ST QUENTIN.

    On 7 Sept 44 the unit moved again to LUIGNE, near COURTRAI, having crossed the Belgian frontier at ROUBAIX. Maps of Belgium proved rather confusing at first as the legend did not correspond with that for France and major roads were mistaken for minor, etc. It was noticeable that there was a spontaneous and very warm reception to the British Troops in Northern France and particularly Southern Belgium, though of course the unit was one of the first of British Troops to reach many of the places.


    12. By 8 Sep 44, the control and organization of troop carriers had become exceedingly difficult. The very long hours, continuous movement, distances covered, and difficulties of inter-communication were beginning to tell on all ranks; perhaps particularly on the officers, due partly to the very considerable responsibility resulting from almost entirely independent work, in the forward area. At this stage platoons were spread over both 53 (W) Div. and 15 (S) Div., it having been impossible to get notification of change of command through to all Bns. This applied equally to 13 Coy RASC.

    The following extract from the War Diary may well be quoted here.

    “10 Sept, 0350 hrs. All officers and men exceedingly tired and company becoming somewhat disorganized due to being spread over a considerable area and many formations.

    1500 hrs. Moved out to IMPDE, N of Brussels, and arrived 2000 hrs. in good location. 2 drivers wounded by shell splinters in ANTWERP, one seriously.”

    O.C. 96 Coy RASC had tried to see CRASC or AA & QMG of 53 (W) Div. at YPRES on 8 Sep regarding the return of some TCVs which had been temporarily lent back to that formation, but Div. HQ had just moved an hour previously. In this connection, see letter attached at Appx ‘A’. It should also be pointed out that fuller details of individual troop lifts are contained in the Operational Log referred to in para 3.

    13. In the period 8-10 Sep 44, Rear Coy HQ and W/S were located at CASTER N of River DENDER somewhat between the two Divisional lines of advance. Officers and NCOs were also acting in many instances as Liaison Officers and messengers for the staffs of Divs (Main and Rear) and of Bdes, who had been unable to keep touch with developments in some directions.


    14. The promised 24 hours rest did not materialize for a large proportion of the unit however, as it was impossible to get them all together even at IMPE on 11 Sep.


    It is worth recording that the only case of the loss of a vehicle from any cause during the first part of the Campaign, occurred at this time. Both driver and vehicle disappeared without trace on 10 Sep 44, no other vehicle was lost or evacuated despite the speed of the advance and the astonishing mileage covered.


    On 12 Sep 44 the unit moved again to AERSCHOT. The first location, in this case allotted to the unit, proved to be a bog and a further move was made that night. Pls were carrying Bns in area of GHEEL. The following day, OC was instructed that the unit reverted to Comd Second Army, and he reported to S & T there. On 14 Sep unit moved back to the same location at IMPDE, under command 34 Tpt Coln to carry rations to assist the buildup of 30 Corps for the push to meet the parachute drop in HOLLAND. CRASC 15 (S) Div. visited the unit and complimented all ranks on the work done, on behalf of the two Divisions. See appendices B & C summarizing the difficulties.


    15. On the 17 Sep instructions were received to move further back near 34 Tpt Coln and rear Rear Army at HALLE. During the whole of the campaign up to this date, the unit had nominally been under adm command of 2 Tk Tptr Coln RASC and a DR had been attached there, though he was never sent to contact the unit. The officer liaison mentioned in para 5 had of necessity been cancelled. It now became apparent, in view of the very specialized role of troop carriers and of their working conditions, that a Troop-Carrying Column was highly desirable. This idea was discussed and was mentioned at ST Rear Second Army. The reasons for this conclusion are best summarized in App “C” and may be amplified as follow; -

    a) The drawing and delivering of rations to forward elements was always the responsibility of this unit and it was as well it remained so. POL was later undertaken by Bdes.

    b) Equipment with R/T seemed highly desirable. It required to be on a fairly liberal scale to be of much use however.

    c) With rations, mail, NAAFI rations, and newspapers to be collected and delivered by this unit, domestic transport was worked to the utmost, and the extra 3-tonner held on strength with approval of Second Army was quite invaluable. It would have been quite useless to try to draw the three items on any lower level than they were i.e., Corps F.M.C., due to the frequent changes of Div.

    d) No jeeps were available to the unit, though again they would have been most useful – though not if issued in lieu of Utilities, owing to their small carrying capacity.

    e) It was just as well that Workshops was very well stocked indeed with spares on leaving the beachhead – the unit was living on its fat for a considerable time – and was based on Army Troops throughout.

    Such points as these could well have been handled by a Coln HQ moving on a Corps level, and also assistance provided in staffing Report Centres etc., and general liaison.


    16. It is felt that a strong case can be made out for the provision of some form of office lorry for mobile RASC units such as this. A 3-ton GS Bedford OY had been converted and fully fitted out as an office lorry in U.K., but this alone proved insufficient.

    A Bedford QL TCV was fitted out as an Adm Office in Belgium and the OY became the Advanced HQ and/or Transport Office, which arrangement proved very satisfactory. These conversions were effected with plywood and other local resources and were designed so as in no way permanently to affect the vehicles general utility.


    17. It was found that the unit sign often aroused interest, and always provided a ready means of identifying vehicles in all conditions. Prior to leaving U.K., no ready means of identifying vehicles had been allotted to the unit, and in view of this, permission was obtained just before ‘D’ Day to put on some distinguishing mark. A white “question mark” was stencilled on the red and green as a makeshift, as had previously been done in Middle East. Soon after arrival in the Beachhead, a number was after all allotted and a design for a unit sign had to be submitted to ST Second Army. At first a black diving lady on a yellow square ground was favoured, it having been the OCs sign in the Middle East, but it was found that another unit had adopted one very similar in this theatre. By general consent the present question mark in black on a yellow ground, outlined in black was submitted and approved. This became very well known and was popular in the unit – its design and colouring making it easily distinguishable in all conditions. Pl lifts were often known to formations and Bns as “the question mark troop carriers”.


    18. Losses of ORs, mostly due to normal sickness, without replacement were beginning to tell by now and deficiencies of 26 to 30 were the position about 22 Sept 44.


    On 23 Sept 44, the unit changed command to 22 Tpt. Coln. and was again engaged in the move of HQ Second Army from HALLE to EEKT, just North of LOUVAIN. On 24 Sept 44 one Pl was detailed to clear the supply railhead which had been opened at TESSENDERLOO. On 28 Sept the unit moved to a location some 4 miles N of DIEST, which included an empty house for the HQ.

    The Austin P.U.s were giving a lot of trouble by this time as valves burned out very quickly and spares were running out.

    19. All three platoons were now engaged in clearing the R.H. at TESSENDERLOO, in conjunction with CRASC 27 Supply Units. On 4 Oct OC went to HQ 22 Tpt. Coln. To meet Major General Kerr DST, War Office, who was on a visit to Second Army. Brig. Eassie, new DDST Second Army was also there. On 5 Oct the unit was transferred to 46 Tpt. Coln., then located to the South of LOUVAIN. On 6 Oct all platoons were relieved of the R.H. detail and were given 12 hours rest before going out to lift amn for 8 Corps and make a troop lift back for 15 (S) Div., now under command 8 Corps. Platoons were operating in area of MILL in the NIJMEGEN salient on 9 Oct, and on 11th HQ and workshop moved to REITHOVEN S.W. of EINDHOVEN, occupying a large school and a dairy produce store. The unit, continuing under 15 (S) Div., moved to heathland just E. of HELMOND on 14 Oct with Workshops under a certain amount of cover in a slaughterhouse. From this date until 18 Oct platoons were standing by for an operation with 15 (S) Div., designed to clear VENLO, but when this was finally cancelled, command was changed to being directly under DDST 8 Corps. On 20 Oct and for a period of several days Pls were engaged in clearing lunatics from VENRAIJ to EINDHOVEN. The latter in a very poor state and two old women died in the TCVs. There was some bother in disposing of the bodies, which it was seriously suggested by the Burgomeister of EINDHOVEN, should be taken back to VENRAIJ for burial. VENRAIJ was under a fair amount of shell fire at the time and was practically in ‘no mans land’. The suggestion was firmly declined.


    20. On 23 Oct the first major reinforcement arrived, largely consisting of personnel ex 59 Div., now broken up.


    Major Dickson DADST, 8 Corps visited the unit on 25 Oct, and on 26th Pls lifted 227 and 44 Bde of 15 (S) Division across to take TILBURG. As the last vehicles were entering the town however, the first were coming out again, as the enemy attack S. of DUERNE was making some progress and the further switch was required. The unit moved on 28 Oct to MARIAHOUT, shown on the map as GINDERDOOR, near LIESHOUT, rather hurriedly, as the enemy advanced, not yet halted, was getting rather too close. This was the first time all men were accommodated in billets. Things were very quiet now for some time, with just sufficient work carrying ammo for 8 Corps to keep everyone occupied.


    The organization of the unit had been evolving during the advance into HOLLAND and by now the whole Administration was concentrated in the Q.L. TCV office lorry which was fitted with long desks down each side, a long window about 9” above and fixture trays above this. There was space for 8 to work, including O i/c ADM, Chief Clerk, clerks and CSM. HQ Platoon office was given two spaces at the end, and this vehicle carried all security boxes, field stationery boxes, files, typewriters etc.


    The OY office was now the ‘Ops’ office and was re-modelled in Helmond, completely lined inside with thick plywood, provision made for the talo covered wall maps, racked trays, a map store cupboard, and battery lighting. It had desks for OC, 2IC, Tpt Clerk and Tpt. Capt., if required.


    21. After being transferred to 30 Corps, there was a lift of 43 Div., and of 53 (W) Div., on 7 and 10 Nov 44. On 12 Nov the unit returned to 46 Tpt. Coln. u/c Second Army, and the following day moved to CORSPEL, S of BOURG LEOPOLD. On 14 Nov the unit was involved in the lift of 82 U.S. Airborne Division., back to RHEIMS, France. This went quite smoothly except that 1 TCV, being led by the Americans, crashed and turned over near the end of the 200 mile journey, carried out in the day. One driver of this unit, travelling spare was killed and 2 Americans unfortunately. OC Coy remained in RHEIMS area to straighten up matters for 4 days. The second flight of this lift was carried out 16 Nov.

    Covered accommodation for W/Shops was found on 24 Nov in the engine shed of the mine at BEERINGEN and this location was retained until 1st Feb 45. The unit took part on 25 Nov 44 in the lift od 101 U.S. Airborne Div., also back to France.

    22. The opportunity was taken for the general check up of M.T. Maintenance and internal economy and adm, in fact a general ‘blitz’ was instituted, which was continued for some while. A PW party was employed for the first time making an entrance to W/Shops in the mine at BEERINGEN. A visit by Brig. Eassie and Lt. Col. Weiner, of Second Army to W/Shops on 7 Dec 44 was made. There was little further of note until 20 Dec when all pls reported to 53 (W) Div., at GHEEL for a lift to SEMPST, N. of Brussels, where advanced HQ was established.

    Every available vehicle was involved and, on the 25 Dec, news of the German ARDENNES offensive towards BRUSSELS being rather disturbing, part of 53 (W) Div., was lifted to area of DINANT, on the MEUSE. The rear HQ and W/Shops remained at CORSPEL, but later one section of W/Shops was sent out with platoons and Advanced HQ.

    23. After various lifts, including one of 6 Para. Bde., of 6 Airborne Div., platoons concentrated with Advanced HQ, staffed by 2IC and OC at EMPTINNE, near CINEY. The weather was now very bad and road conditions were appalling. Snow and ice with cold winds made work most trying and existence even a drudgery. During this period a very large number of engines in TCVs had to be changed and W/Shops at BEERINGEN worked day and night shifts for most of the month of January. It was only due to the helpfulness of 30 Corps Ordnance that a supply of 25 engines in all was obtained and these were all fitted in 29 days.

    On 9 Jan Advanced HQ moved to NEUVILLE-en-CONDROZ, S. of LIEGE, having been continuously employed in various troop lifts with 53 (W) Div., and also latterly with 51 (H) Div. At one stage the drivers of TCVs were employed in a reserve role as infantry, though their abilities in this respect were not tested. A number of NCOs of the unit did splendid work during this time, notably a Sgt., and Cpl, in taking command of lift where the Pl Cmdr was snowbound; the former received a Mention – in – Despatches. On 19 Jan the unit concentrated again at CORSPEL and a rather belated Christmas was celebrated on 21 Jan.

    24. Considerable warning having been received; the unit was transferred to 1 Cdn. Army and moved to EINDHOVEN on 1 Feb 45. At this date a total of 84 engines out of 90 TCVs had been changed since ‘D’ Day. Troop lifts of 53 (W) Div., and 15 (S) Div., for the beginning of operation ‘Veritable’ were carried out. One Pl was sent on 8 Feb on attachment to Gds. Armd. Div. to lift a new reserve Bn, 2nd Scots Guards. Shortage of domestic vehicles was very acute, and two Hillman utilities were drawn from the A.B.P. and very easily put on the road, despite being supposedly ‘B.L.R.’. They proved excellent vehicles. The unit was under command 27 Tpt. Coln. Which appeared to be for the first time a ‘Troop Carrying Column’. This worked out very satisfactorily all round. On 2 Mar 45 the unit moved to MILL to be nearer Pls working across the MAAS, with 51, 52 and 53 Divs. These lifts were again carried out in conjunction with 13 Coy RASC also located in EINDHOVEN. Comd., again changed to the regret of all to CRASC 30 Corps Troops, which meant the end of the ‘Troop Carrying Column’. On 12 Mar comd. again changed back to Second Army and 46 Tpt. Coln.

    A lift of 115 (Ind) Inf. Bde. From BRUSSELS to VENRAIJ was carried out on 15 Mar, and on the 19th the unit moved to GEMERT, into exceedingly poor accommodation. On 23rd unit was placed under operational comd. of 43 (W) Division., for crossing of the Rhine and the following day moved to GOCH. Command was changed to 45 Tpt. Coln. On 26 Mar while a lift of 214 Bde was in progress. Next day again switched to comd. DDST 30 Corps, and again on 29 to 3 (Br) Inf. Div. On 30th and 31st unit crossed the Rhine and went under comd. 31 Tpt. Coln.

    25. An officer was attached from the unit to HQ 43 Div., at this stage for liaison, and HQ subaltern staffed the Report Centre – the OC having been admitted to hospital. On 3rd Apr two Pls were with 43 Div., and one with 3 Div. A location at GROENLO for HQ and W/Shops was taken up on 5 Apr.

    The operational position was becoming slightly involved as the unit was, on 6 Apr working under, and for, 3 Divs. – 43, 51 and 3 Div. Location at NORDHORN and OLDENZALL were occupied for about 48 hours each. The following may be quoted from the War Diary of 9 Apr 44,

    “0800 hrs. 23 vehicles of the unit moved past Coy HQ on way forward with 130 Bde. Quite a change for operationally employed vehicles to move up past us”

    On the 10th a platoon completed a lift of 9 Bde to area N.E. of OSNABRUCK, distance 113 miles. This platoon was bombed near DIEPHOLZ on 11 Apr and 4 vehicles were damaged and 1 man seriously wounded; two others suffered from shock. The next night 31 Tpt. Coln. HQ was bombed, about 300 yards from this unit location at OLDENZALL, and CRASC was killed instantly.

    26. The next move was to FURSTENAU on 14 Apr and two days later to TWISTRINGEN, S. of BREMEN. By this time most of the men were very tired indeed, as it was not at all unusual for a troop lift to be on the road for 72 hours or more without more than very short halts. A number of accidents occurred due to fatigue.

    On 18 Apr 45 the unit reverted to command. Second Army and 46 Tpt. Coln., and the next day moved to LEVERN, and again on the 21 to LOHE. This made the ninth move of HQ and W/Shops in 4 weeks. Pls were now engaged in lifting PWX for 12 Corps from FALLINGBOSTEL. A move to a location at BARVER was made on 27 Apr where the unit concentrated and at last got some rest and maintenance and remained though generally fully employed, until 4 June. O.C. returned to unit 18 May.

    27. On 4 June, the unit moved by arrangement of OC, to LUNEBURG, where one platoon had been carrying Russian PWX to GRABOW, across the Russian border for a time. A part of the unit was then employed in carrying U.K. leave personnel back to OSNABRUCK railhead, and shortly afterwards accommodation vacated by Second Army HQ was taken over and W/Shops installed in the Infantry Barracks.


    28. It will have been seen from the foregoing that changes of command not only for operation but even for adm were extremely frequent, and particularly in 1944, this involved a very great deal of work for adm staff. It reached the stage where files of the routine and returns etc., for a fair number of formations were kept handy and pulled out, as it were, as required. This could largely have been obviated by the appointment of a ‘Troop Carrying Column’ as a permanency. It is suggested that a ‘Troop Carrying Column’ could administer and control 6 Troop Carrying Coys – or even 9 Coys and could conveniently operate on a Corps level, providing transport for 2 or 3 Inf. Divs. – if the Coys were working according to W.E.


    A point which it was found suffered severely from the frequent changes of basic comd. was the matter of honours and awards. Each new formation could know little of the work of the unit over a period and was, not unnaturally, not very interested in this aspect. So far the award of only one Mention-in-Despatches and a number C-in-C’s Certificates have been notified despite the number of individuals who did an exceptional job.


    29. To conclude, it may be noted that the unit worked under all the Corps and carried every Inf. Div. in Second Army except 5 Div., which arrived late; also 6 Airborne Div., 82 and 101 U.S. Divs., Gds. Armd. Div., and 115 (Ind) Inf. Bde.

    The Unit is proud of its fine record, in which it has never fallen down on an operational troop lift, and has repeatedly been complimented by the formations for which it was operating.

    BAOR.

    27 Oct 45
     
  6. Paul Bulmer

    Paul Bulmer Member

    A sentence in the first paragraph of the 96 Coy History says the following:

    The unit was split up, distributed over the various branches, and "phased in" according to a table prepared by Major Turner, Camp Comdt, and Major Kann of the 'Q' Branch.


    Does anyone know if more information is available about how the unit would have been split up into these various branches? The "phased-in" tables are they available anywhere? Could they lead me to determine the demarcation location at Portsmouth Harbour?

    Regards
    Paul
     
  7. JDKR

    JDKR Member

    If it is of interest, the aircraft taking part in this raid were in all probability Ju88 S-3 from I.KG66 flying from Tutow airfield, 80 miles east of Hamburg. Three sorties were launched to attack ground targets in the Diepholz area: the first taking off at 1930, the others at 2045 and 2121 respectively. The aircraft dropped a total of 4 x SC500 (500kg GP bomb), 1 x SC(D)100 (100kg GP bomb), 1 x AB500 (cluster bomb), 16 x SD70 (70kg fragmentation bomb) and 8 x SC50 (50kg fragmentation bomb). The aircraft bombed at altitudes between 2500m and 800m.
     

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