36th Brigade's Limited Attack on Green hill and Bald Hill Jan 5-7th 1943

Orders to conduct a "limited attack" were heartily disliked by most Brigade and Battalion commanders but Brigadier Bernard Howlett Commander of 36th Brigade received such an order in early January.

It came all the way down from Lt General Anderson GOC 1st army. Anderson had previously received a directive from General Dwight Eisenhower who having decided that the Allied forces in Tunisia must take the defensive nonetheless was keen to keep the pressure up on Axis forces. It is perhaps a necessary evil for senior commanders to talk in such phrases though the reality is that it translates into fighting and dying.

Professional soldiers hate the words limited attack for several reasons it usually means a) you have limited resources b) the enemy is far too strong for a proper full out offensive c) any minor success achieved is used to justify more limited attacks d) Intelligence is often poor and e) it usually results in the loss of valuable officers and men for very little return.

Howlett was assigned the task of capturing Djebel el Azzag (Green Hill) and Djebel Sidi Ayed (Bald Hill) which were near Jefna station. This area had been the location of the ambush of the Argylls and subsequent fighting. The Germans had since used Parachute Engineers to further improve the positions, had laid 2500 mines and created excellent shelters using railway ties. .

36 Brigade was short handed as the Argylls were elsewhere and the Queens Own West Kents had already had a bad experience here this led to the decision to commit the 5th Buffs to this attack supported by 6 Commando and initially one company of 3 Para. The attack was supposed to happen on the 4th January but was delayed by bad weather which may have reduced surprise. It took place on the night of the 5/6th supported by limited artillery and initially the leading companies of 5 Buffs had some success but then suffered when they tried to cross a bare patch near the summit. Another company having advanced separately also found itself pinned down near the village of Sidi Ayed.

6 Commando's experience was similar and it began to run out of ammunition so was withdrawn. One Company of 3 Para was committed the next day (the 6th) gained the crest repulsed a counter attack but then ran low on ammo. A further company was also committed, Eventually the decision was made to withdraw and by the following morning all troops were back in their old positions.

British casualties were lower than one might have expected given the German positions but still significant. The 5 Buffs had 150 casualties with at least 11 killed, 6 Commando lost 80 killed or wounded and 3 Para had at least 30 casualties. All told some 240 men were killed wounded or missing a steep price to pay one might think for a failed attack. It is of course easy in hindsight to criticise this operation and its outcomes. One point worth making is that the Green Hill - Bald Hill position was a very important one for the Germans as once it was taken they had fewer comparable obstacles before the town of Mateur. Taking the hills would have made it easier for 36 Brigade to defend the area and later launch an attack.

The flip side of this coin is that the attack mis-used both 6 Commando and 3 Para as ordinary battalions when they were specialised troops who were lightly armed and not designed to carry out such operations. This tendency to use specialised highly trained troops in standard infantry operations was in part forced on commanders because of their scarce resources but was sadly to continue in Tunisia and beyond.

The Germans did not get off that easily for 3 Para inflicted heavy casualties on German counter attacks by T3 battalion and Witzig's unit lost at least 60 men. The Jefna position remained in the hands of the Germans until late April when the Americans were assigned to capture it but that as they say is another story.