Unit :- A.D.O.S. 2nd Division Commanding Officer :- Lt. Col. R.C.S. Turton Month and Year :- May 1940 ORCHIES FRANCE 1/5/40 Spares for portable cookers unobtainable. 2/5/40 Paint for maintenance of vehicles unobtainable. Represented to Corps & LP arranged. 3/5/40 Great scarcity of sacks & containers. All units warned to conserve and return to salvage. 10/5/40 Plan "D" put into operation. 1430 hrs ORCHIES bombed. Railway line damaged & signal box demolished close to D.A.D.O.S. Dump. No damage to Ordnance stores involved. 12/5/40 Moved from ORCHIES over the frontier into Belgium to Fm. ROUGE Area GROENENDALE south of BRUSSELS. The Germans allowed us to carry out the move intact. This was very significant in view of the subsequent happenings. HQ (REAR) CLAREMONT - FÔRET DE SOIGNE 13/5/40 Arrived in our area 0400 hrs. No guides met us. It was therefore necessary to put the vehicles under cover before dawn. This was done and subsequently the Camp Commandant was found and he guided us to the billets. R. DYLE HQ (REAR) CLAREMONT FÔRET DE SOIGNE 13/5/40 Fifth Columnists very active. Spies appeared to be everywhere. Signals cable was soaked in petrol and fired. O/C Signals asked for immediate replacement of 30 miles. This was obtained from O.F.P. at once The gunners suffered in the same way & replacements were also made for these from O.F.P. without delay. 14/5/40 Bombs continue to fall in vicinity of Div HQ. There are a surprising number of "duds" but we view these with suspicion as time bombs are suspected.Most of them however never went off as far as is known. The I.O.O. 1 Corps was kept busy with calls to deal with these "duds" but the task became impossible owing to quick movement and the quantities dropped. Units therefore had to make their own arrangements to mark dangerous areas and indicate deviations. CHATEAU LA FOUGERAIE BRABANT 15/5/40 - 16/5/40 Withdrawal ordered. REAR HQ closed CLAREMONT 2100 hrs Opened CHATEAU LA FOUGERAIE near the Race Course. Proceeded to BRUSSELS & requisitioned petrol cookers & some spares also ??? Pressure Petrol. Some units lost their cookers in the withdrawal. RACE COURSE BRUSSELS 17-18/5/40 General retirement commenced. Rear HQ moved to Race Course.Occupied the Pavilion. Germans attacked the French Arab Division on our right with tanks & "Flammen Werfer" Inadequately armed & inexperienced in such warfare, they retired in considerable disorder & left our flank in the air. A further withdrawal became necessary. Rear Div HQ was ordered back to BOIS STEHOUX. The column formed up at 2200 hrs on the Race Course. The night was extremely dark. No lights at all could be shown on the vehicles. Direction was lost by the leading vehicles & we found ourselves almost into the line being held by the infantry. An "about turn" had to be carried out on a very congested road. The traffic became thus ?? & movement was snail's pace. The target offered to the enemy was enormous but providentally he was busily engaged elsewhere & the block gradually thinned out. Map reading was extremely difficult as a torch had to be shaded downwards with the utmost care. Carelessness in this direction might have unleashed a load of bombs the result of which could only have been a massacre. BOIS STEHOUX 18/5/40 Arrived BOIS STEHOUX AREA after one of the most trying journeys made suring the campaign. Ceaseless bombing is going on. It would appear that "Air Superiority" is definitely in the hands of the enemy. The direct result of this is that communications are becoming difficult & the organisation is breaking down. Touch with 4th & 5th I.B. has been lost. Touch with 6th I.B. remains owing to the energy & initiative of the Brigade Warrant Officer Sub. Cdr. Bullock. This W.O. won the confidence of his Brigade Commander & was able to obtain transport at any time in order to contact Div HQ. As a result it was possible to feed this Brigade with Bren Guns, Bren magazines, mortars & vehicles required to replace quite large quantities lost to enemy action. The lesson is that a B.W.O. should never lose touch with the D.A.D.O.S. & the Brigade should see that sufficient facilities are given to him to enable him to visit D.A.D.O.S. & collect stores from the O.F.P. if necessary. Although stocks were running low the O.F.P. was still producing replacements at this time. For this excellent service, Sub Cdr Bullock has subsequently been awarded the M.B.E. There is no doubt that but for his common sense & energy, the 6th I.B. would not have been able to obtain the replacements they did at a very critical time. This is mentioned to stress the value that a good B.W.O. has in a Brigade & the great help he can be to his D.A.D.O.S. especially during the course of a battle & when communications are cut. B.W.O.s should be carefully selected & receive some training in their war duties during peace. They undoubtedly ought to ba able to ride a Motor Cycle & drive a car. Sufficient attention has not been paid to this in the past. St. ANNE 19/5/40 Communications have become worse. Adv. & Rear Div HQ moved back to a tiny village off the main road. St. ANNE in order to escape the continued attention of the German bombers. It was also necessary to avoid the now continuous stream of refugees & slow moving French horse transport which block the roads. Traffic Control has become practically impossible. ESPLECHIN FRANCE 19/5/40 Rear Div HQ ordered to move back to ESPLECHIN. This move was carried out in daylight.Owing to the continuous bombing & the refugee congestion on the Route National, as much use as possible was made of the side roads. TOURNAI was found to be badly knocked about & the centre of the town was burning. It was necessary to find a road round the outskirts.Practically no ordnance work could be carried out at this time owing to continual movement. Touch seemed to be completely lost. Every commander had best ??? his own initiative. The daily duty duty consisted of reconnoiting a new position & carrying out the move. The Camp Commandant went back to carry out the reconnaissance & the D.A.D.O.S. & S.O.M.E. brought the convoy along to an agreed meeting point. There was no time for written orders of the move. They were carried out by mutual arrangement between "GS" branch, Camp Commandant & D.A.D.O.S. Every D.A.D.O.S. should therefore be conversant with regulations governing movement by road. Only a few hours were spent in ESPLECHIN. Rear Div HQ then continued their move back to CYSOING CYSOING 20/5/40 Adv. Div HQ remained in ESPLECHIN A large dump of R.E. and Ordnance stores was discovered abandoned. Valuable stores such as galvanometers were rescued from the dump & brought along with our transport. Other stores such as equipment, picks and shovels were issued out to units again. A number of secret documents were found and burned, including maps. On leaving, it was considered inadvisable to set fire to what was left as it may have jeapordised the safe withdrawal of the Inf. Brigades in front. Contact was once again established with Corps HQs at ASCQ. I visited the A.D.O.S. 1 Corps and obtained through O.F.P. replacements of Bren Guns, Bren mags, mortars, Trailers Artillery No.27, 3 15cwt trucks, one P.V. Truck. also some 18/25Pdr. guns All these items were issued to units except the P.V. Truck & 1 artillery Trailer. The P.V. Truck was therefore filled with stores from the dump and brought along with the column on the next move together with the trailer. The trailer was subsequently issued to a Field Regt. at SAILLY SUR LA LYS. For some time now the only source of supply has been the O.F.P. Contact with the Base was lost immediately operations started. The importance of a properly scaled O.F.P. therefore cannot be overestimated. It is however rather unwieldy to deal with in its present form & therefore very vulnerable to air attack. A complete reorganisation of the O.F.P. is desirable to reduce this fault & at the same time increase its utility to Divisions. It is felt that the Rec. Secs plus an O.F.P. Sect. under Divisional control would be much more satisfactory. Losses in the withdrawal have been extensive. R. Berks. Regt., R.W.F., and other inf. units are asking for 1000 Bren mags. The Manchester Regt. required 10 trucks replaced. 99th Field Regt. lost 6 18Pdr. guns. Part replacements were obtained for them though not for hundred per cent. Ammunition Railhead was also sited at CYSOING. The Railway Station & vicinity was bombed & the French railway officials fled. The trains could not be moved.The Ammunition Officer & his staff issued to units in detail from the trucks & the small balance left was handed over to me. Ammn. Coy. eventually took this over. CYSOING 21/5/40 Work was continuously interupted by enemy bombers. The vehicles were succesfully hidden in an orchard on the outskirts of the town & the office was set up under the trees next to the 12cwt. van. The weather was exceptionally warm & it was felt to be safer in the open than in a building. Slit trenches were dug under the hedges to conceal them from the air & they were constantly in use. Concealment from the air was of paramount importance. Peace time training is not rigid enough in this matter & men do not learn until the machine gun bullets are actually spraying above them. 22/5/40 Operation Order No.7 received 2130 hrs. Rear Div HQ closed CYSOING 22.45 hrs. Opened TEMPLEUVE 22.45 hrs. TEMPLEUVE 23/5/40 Found supply train abandoned in TEMPLEUVE station. The P.U. Truck not having been issued, as many useful stores as possible were taken from the train and loaded in the truck. They consisted chiefly of M.T. Spares & a number of Cookers, portable which were badly needed. These were reissued immediately. Enemy planes machine-gunned the trucks & interupted our work. Rear Div HQ closed here & re-opened NEUVE CHAPELLE 05.00hrs NEUVE CHAPELLE 24/5/40 Enemy reconnaissance planes very busy trying to find our new HQ. Village very open - No cover. Bombing became intensive. Bomb wrecked C.R.E. office. Another severely damaged the church. Communications NIL. Little could be done except hide from the enemy planes.There was no air opposition in this area at this period. We are beginning to realise what "Air Superiority" really means. 25/5/1940 Warning order received to move to SAILLY SUR LA LYS. Rear HQ closed NEUVE CHAPPELLE opened SAILLY 1600 hrs. SAILLY SUR LA LYS Bombing ceased for a few hours only until the reconnaissance planes picked us up. The next result was SAILLY received a very severe bombing attack. The casualties involved were astonishingly slight. The houses next to Rear Div. HQ received a direct hit. The cellar roof collapsed but no one was in it. 26/5/1940 Units were now claiming for more replacements. Endeavours were made to Corps HQ D of P ? Location of Corps HQ was at NEUVE EGLISE but on arriving there found the town had been badly smashed up & HQ had moved over night. Information over anyone was difficult to obtain, but it was ascertained that they had moved to PLOEGSTEERT. On arrival there however this town had also received a severe bombing & there was no sign of Corps HQ. All touch with Corps HQ, O.F.P., A.F.W.s was entirely lost. It was not until we reached Dunkirk that any touch was regained. SAILLY SUR LA LYS 26/5/40 - 2400 hrs D.A.D.O.S. received verbal instructions through the D.A.Q.M.G. to hand over to the S.O.M.E. & proceed to DUNKIRK for embarkation to U.K. These instructions seemed ridiculous at the time & before complying D.A.D.O.S. rang up the A.Q.M.G. for confirmation to ensure there was not a misinterpretation of a verbal message. A.Q.M.G. confirmed however personally but would give no reason except that it was the Commander's order & that certain officers were being sent home for the purpose of reforming units in the U.K. D.A.D.O.S. therefore handed over to S.O.M.E. including the ??? A/C & left SAILLY the same night for DUNKIRK. DUNKIRK 27/5/40 Roads were extremely congested with all sorts of traffic moving back. No lights could be shown. Map reading was extremely difficult. Eventually reached DUNKIRK at dawn. It was imperative to push through before daylight to avoid the dawn raids from the air. DUNKIRK proved difficult to enter however owing to the mass of lorries outside & the oil tanks were blazing. It was necessary to make a wide detour. Reported Snr. area Commandant about 0600 hrs. He informed me that he had orders to evacuate every one at once. Baggage & cars had to be jettisoned. The town already a shambles was again bombed at 0700 hrs. Embarked with a Tank Brigade & steamed out of the harbour without further attack until well down the channel. Here nine Messerschmidts 110 attacked the vessel & machine gunned the decks. The shore batteries also opened fire & damaged the steering gear. Troops on the top decks suffered seriously. There was a considerable number of killed & wounded. Those below decks did not suffer at all. The vessel was towed into Dover some six hours later by the Tug "Lady Brassy"
