1st Alamein - Panzerarmee SitRep translations

New project just dropped.

1st Battle of El Alamein

Updates will be daily.

All the best

Andreas

 

Fascinating

 

Thanks mate.

All the best

Andreas

 

Top stuff and of direct interest to me.

I'm curious as to whether German and Italian historiography recognises 'First Alamein' as a coherent/distinct battle as the British narrative has mostly come to do?

(i.e. after Monty's star had waned sufficiently to allow others to be seen?)

The Montgomery school seemed to view it as the mess at the end of the Gazala Gallop where by some happy chance the ball came out on our side of a confused scrum.

 

I have read Andreas's updates and yes, the early days of July 1942 are of interest to my very narrow research into the battle @ Deir el Shein on 1/7/1942.

It is curious that the Germans did not know the 10th Indian Infantry Brigade had been destroyed in 'The Cauldron' battle almost a month earlier. Even the brigade's C.O. was captured (he later escaped in Italy in 1943). Only after the 18th Indain Infantry Brigade was overwhelmed, with many POWs taken (one daily report refers to two thousand), were they identified.

Elsewhere in the northern sector of the Allied line the Germans reported on the 50th (Northumbrian) British Division being there, it too had been mauled, losing one of it's three brigades in the Gazala battles and had been pulled back to refit. More significantly the 1st South African Division had not been identified as holding the El Alamein 'box' defences, nor it's two brigades deployed to the south in the gap up to Ruweisat Ridge.

 

Hi David,

According to Hamilton and Turner (pp.273-274), those "two [S.A.] brigades deployed to the south in the gap up to Ruweisat Ridge" were actually two 'mobile columns', "each based on a battalion of infantry and two batteries of artillery" that Auchinleck had ordered to be created on 29 June 1942 during a visit to the Alamein box. The rest of the two brigades were sent "back to Alexandria". Very reminiscent of Leathercol and Gleecol at Matruh. 3rd S.A. Bde in the Alamein box was also very understrength and it's eastern flank was apparently completely undefended (same source, p.274).

In my 'umble opinion, Auchinleck and Eighth Army were enormously lucky on 1 July 1942 in that 90th Light Division blundered into the perimeter of the Alamein box rather than skirting it to the south and the DAK allowed itself to become embroiled with a static infantry brigade defending a patch of unimportant desert! Or, alternatively, Rommel's luck finally ran out and his exhausted and depleted force was unable to find and exploit the gaping holes in the so-called Alamein line.

Regards

Tom

 

Tom,

Looked up my notes from what you provided in Posts 15 & 16. They refer to 'brigades' being deployed and that after a meeting between Auchinleck and Pineaar led to:

The 18th also had such an order during the night, which caused confusion and no-one actually left. Leaves me wondering if the South Africans followed the order. Pineaar had actually been to Deir el Shein, sending engineers and mines; Norrie too had visited.

 

Hi David,

Post 15 includes the relevant page from Hamilton and Turner (p.274) - see footnote. That makes it clear that these bde groups were actually much smaller than their titles suggest. David Katz's "South Africans versus Rommel" (p.233) includes a statement by Brigadier "Scrubbs" Hartshorn (who commanded the "Scrubbsforce" at Alexandria) which suggests Pienaar took every opportunity to thin out his forces even before Auchinleck's visit on 29 Jun. I suspect only a look at the primary sources would establish how strong those "bde" groups actually were in terms of personnel. Fancy a trip to South Africa?

What does "Chink" have to say about the whole episode?

Regards

Tom

 

Tom,

A visit to South Africa has long been vetoed by the significant other.

Update 31/7/25 I have updated the main thread for Chink, where a discussion ensued..

No, I have not pursued the book about Brigadier Eric 'Chink' Dorman-Smith / Dorman O'Gowan; it is 'Chink: A Biography' by Lavinai Greacen, published 1989 (Foreword by Correlli Barnett). Will try to see if any local libraries or RUSI have it. Yes, it is in my local library. Standby.

In November 2024 a second book was published: 'Military Maverick: Selected Letters and War Diary of 'Chink' Dorman-Smith' by Lavinia Greacen.

The Amazon summary has:

From: https://www.amazon.co.uk/Military-Maverick-Selected-Letters-Dorman-Smith/dp/1036102270 With one 5* review.

Partly listened to an Irish RTE 2017 audio documentary about Brigadier 'Chink' Dorman-Smith / Dorman O'Gowan here: The Brigadier Alas as it reached (29m) El Alamein it stopped. Id'd by Charley Fortnum in 2019.

 

1 SA Div on 1 July was organised as follows.

3 SA Bde was complete in fighting troops, but anyone not needed for fighting had been sent to the delta. Reinforced by artillery etc.
18 Indian Bde (under command) with reinforcements.
1 & 2 SA Bdes had been instructed to form a mobile battle column as follows:

• Tac Bde HQ
• 1 Inf Bn
• 1 Fld Rgt (2 btys)
• 1 ATk Bty
• 1 LAA Bty
• 1 pl MMG
• Det Eng
• Det Fd Amb

Everyone else back to the delta.

The eastern perimeter of the Alamein box was not occupied because it had not been built to the degree the western and southern sectors had.

All the best

Andreas

 

Italians do portray 1st Alamein as a separate battle. They see the fighting between July–Nov as three distinct battles just as do the Allied side, although they often call the Battle of Alam el Halfa the 2nd Battle of Alamein and the 2nd Battle as the 3rd Battle. The name 'Battle of Alam el Halfa' is so prevalent in the historiography that one can't simply ignore it.

The Italians view the 1st Battle as a hope more than well orchestrated pursuit. Remember that «Operazione C3» was to follow the fall of Tobruk, so the change of orders caught the Italian units unprepared. Given the sudden change, the limited amount of motorization impacted the Italians far more than the Germans. The Italians also had to organize a much longer LOC for the entire army.

Pista! Jeff

 

I think it is arguable that up to about 7/8 July was the 'mess after Gazala/Tobruk'. Thereafter the Axis is making a deliberate attempt for several days break into the Alamein Box, and from 9/10 July the Australians are there to rip Rommel a new one. That to me is the actual start of the first battle of Alamein, which ended 27 July.

The Germans at the time however considered the whole thing just one. Their Schlachtbericht starts 26 May and continues to 27 July, even though they had given up any real attempts to break through by 13 July.

All the best

Andreas

 

Great stuff, many thanks for posting the translations up.

Agar-Hamilton & Turner, p.274:

"3rd South African Brigade (Brigadier R.J. Palmer) now took over the defence of the Box but, having fewer than 1,100 infantry (the battalion averaged about 350 men apiece), could only spread out to hold the western and south-western faces. The eastern half of the box were undefended. Within the perimeter, however, were 1st South African Field Regiment (1st and 3rd South African Field Batteries), together with 7th Medium Regiment of the Royal Artillery."

The detailed make up of the 'columns' that 1st and 2nd S.A. Brigades were broken up to form are provided as a foot note on p.274 (see post 15 on this thread).

They also quote the draft history of the Rand Light Infantry as saying:

"It was realised that a determined attack on the Battalion front would probably succeed. In addition it was soon evident that many of the units which were thought to be in the line had actually been withdrawn to the Delta. This caused much comment from all ranks."

I bet it did!!

The more I read into the events of 1st July 1942, the more it appears to me that Eighth Army were very lucky. Rommel, whether through impatience (i.e. lack of reconnaissance) or sheer bad luck, seems to have blown a great opportunity to penetrate between the relatively widespread Commonwealth forces. Given the lack of trust between the formations of the latter and their low morale, I doubt whether either Corps would have come to the other's rescue - more likely, as per Matruh, Gott would have led 13th Corps back to Cairo and kept it triumphantly "in-being"!

Regards

Tom

 

Hi,

Is that based on a primary source? The map on p.270 of Agar-Hamilton and Turner shows plenty of "localities" [actually company positions] on the eastern flank of the Alamein box that were simply "unoccupied" as so much of the infantry of the division has been sent back for safe-keeping to Alexandria.

A reading of the daily sitreps/Int Sums from Eighth Army would give a much better understanding of the contemporary Commonwealth assessment of the situation. Anything produced later is inevitably unreliable owing to the delicate manner in which Montgomery described the army he took over and the commander he succeeded!!

Regards

Tom

 

Positions not defended were:
West 3, 8, 9, 12 (all second-line)
East everything from 23 and 22 position

RLI 22/322 (Off/OR)
ILH 21/319
RDLI 21/273
Total 64/914 (Orpen, War in the Desert)

In addition they had:
1x Rifle Coy 2 RB
1x Rifle Coy NMR
A Coy CTH with attached Vickers and Mortars

Vickers MMG
No. 3 Coy RPS
1x platoon RPS with 2 RB
1x platoon DMR

Artillery
20th Fld Bty (unless this was the other battery of 1st Field) seems to have stopped while retreating with the rear guard
3rd LAA Bty
2nd A/Tk Bty

11th Field Regiment supported from 3pm to 6pm from outside the box, i.e. during the second German attempt after 90th Light had been rallied by Rommel.

What I meant was that all units were there, not a comment on how strong they were. Keep in mind that 90th light was down to a similar number of infantry, and the Panzer divisions maybe less.

Not sure which post you are referring to, but the make-up given is that ordered by Pienaar. It's confirmed by Orpen and unit information given.

Not really buying this, but I don't have the battalion war diaries.

South African report on the initial defense of Alamein, I'm guessing dictated by Pienaar.

Yes indeed. Daily reports by both 13 and 30 Corps are available in the Eighth Army war diary, so that is helpful

13 Corps with Gott was a proverbial...

All the best

Andreas

 

I am in Germany at this time, but I will check to see which dates the Italians use for 1st Alamein upon my return home.

Pista! Jeff

 

Hi Andreas,

Thanks for that. Pretty much aligns with Agar-Hamilton & Turner's narrative.

post 15 in the Deir el Shein thread - sorry for the confusion. The detailed make-up of the columns is included as a footnote there.

Awesome, thanks.

Thanks for that reference, I found the Corps HQ war diaries somewhat confused and bedraggled! Perhaps an indication of there real condition at the time!

Gott does seem to have been exhausted and mentally shot at this point. I think he probably needed a long rest and a complete change of scene. I don't know how he would have got on in a more tightly controlled army.

Regards

Tom

 

I now have on loan 'Chink: A Biography' by Lavinia Greacen, published 1989. The chapter on The First Battle of El Alamein is pgs. 231-248.

Chink had been Chief of Staff for Middle East Command and Whiteley CoS 8th Army; on 30/6/1942 Chink took over both roles, he'd been visiting 8th Army TAC HQ if not in residence from 22-23/6/1942.

On 1/7/1942 pg.213:

More another day.

 

Back to Tom's question (in Post ):

I have read the 10th chapter 'The First Battle of El Alamein' pgs. 204-231 twice now and looked through the rest of the book. I have used Wiki a few times to provide an initial reference.

I had not realised Dorman-Smith acted as Chief of Staff to General Richard O'Connor who had led the first offensive against the Italians, Operation Compass (9 December 1940 – 9 February 1941). See: Operation Compass - Wikipedia and Richard O'Connor - Wikipedia

He was indoctrinated in Ultra then; which was to give an unusual insight into the Afrika Korps later and knowledge was very restricted - to six staff officers at 8th Army HQ @ El Alamein.

Auchinleck described him (pg. 204) as having a:

Upon arrival @ 8th Army Doman-Smith decided:

Note between 4-17/71/942 six Italian divisions were broken or knocked out.

The author describes Chink's optimism was irritating, his energy was wearing, had a strong will and was too academic and arbitrary to bother with diplomacy.

From the author (pg. 213):

Auchinleck (pg.213-214) overruled Pienaar's intention that morning (2/7/1942) to pull out the South African Division ...an intention Auchinleck had in this case had been able to overrule.

After two days of attacks (pg. 216) (against Deir el Shein on 1/7/1942, the "gap between El Alamein and Ruweisat Ridge the same day and the Ruweisat Ridge on 2/7/1942) Rommel ordered his men to dig in at 2259hrs 3/7/1942.

There was a clash with an armoured division C.O. over joint action was needed between armour, artillery and infantry, was swiftly followed by "Operation Amateur" a frontal attack (on 22/7/1942) by the inexperienced 23rd Armoured Brigade was to be wiped out. See: 23rd Armoured Brigade (United Kingdom) - Wikipedia and First Battle of El Alamein - Wikipedia

Auchinleck is cited (pg.220):

 

Quite a bit happened between 3-7-42 and 28-7-42.

Dates from memory, won't look it up now.

9/7 German attack in the south (successful then abandoned due to Australian attack)
10/7 Australian attack on Trig 33 and Tell el Eisa (successful)
11-13/7 German attack on Alamein (failure then abandoned due to New Zealand attack)
14-15/7New Zealanders/5 Indian attacking Ruweisat (failure)
18-7 New Zealanders/5 Indian attacking Ruweisat and El Mreir (failure)
22/7 Australians attack Miteyria (failure)
22/7 69 Bde attacks El Taqa (failure)
22/7 23 AB attacking on Ruweisat (failure)
27/7 Australians again attacking Miteyria (failure)

I'm sure 'Chink' (JFC) was very bright, but obvs not bright enough to see that he didn't need to toss away 4, 5, 6 NZ Brigades, 20, 24 Australian Bdes, 69 Bde, 5 Ind Bde, 23 Armd Bde in fruitless attacks.

But what do I know, I'm not clever.

All the best

Andreas