1 Airlanding Recce Squadron, less one troop, was to have attempted a 'coup-de-main' on the main brid

Ist Battalion were originally intended to follow the same route that the Recce Sqdn were to go on. So it was only special in that the Recce Sqdn had first rights on it.The move further north along Wolfhezeweg came about when they were advised that their intended route was blocked by the Germans, following the ambush at the culvert.
I understand the dilemma that Allsop must have found hinself in when the Recce regrouped after the ambush. Remember Gough had left to meet up with Urquhart ( and so begins the chase with Gough following after Urquhart who is moving after Lathbury who is going to hurry up Frost). I would imagine that at that time Alllsop is still expecting Gough to return and to advise him of the new orders from Urquhart. Or failing that Gough to radio through new orders.

The question arises that in the absence of such an order being received should he have ordered an advance, but if so where to. Their culvert route was clearly out of the question. Ist battalion were running in to stiff opposition to the north. 3rd Battalion were held up on the middle route, and although progress was being made on the lower road, the poor communications and lack of knowledge about what was happening down there, would not have made it such an obvious choice as it is for us with the benefit of hindsight. If he had ordered an attempt at a breakthrough on one route, only for orders from Gough/Urquhart to then come through with instructions to use a different route, then he would have looked foolish.

For the Recce, the whole concept of the Coup de Main dash, was really contrary to their normal modus operandi, which was much more about observation and stealth, rather than an SAS in the desert dashing attack. So to a certain extent it was understandable if they reverted to a cautious approach, particularly given the shock that must have been felt by the unit at the loss of men in the Bucknall Ambush. My guess is that by the time it became clear that Gough was not going to be returning with fresh orders, darkness was already approaching and like one or two other units, the decision was taken to stop where they were and start afresh the next day.

Hindsight suggests that might not have been the best option, but it was perhaps an understandable one.

Certainly the Squadron displayed great bravery in advancing in to some very sticky areas over the next couple of days, taking many casualties as a result, and they fought gallantly in the perimeter in the final days of the battle.

 

One further observation regarding the assembling. The Recce Sqdn were to be accompanied to the Bridge by elements of 9th Parachute Squadron Royal Engineers. Half of No 1 platoon that were to be amongst the sapper party were killed when their glider broke up in the UK. The sappers that did arrive were understandably delayed by waiting for their colleagues. The RE were incidentally landed north of the railway, whereas the Recce were south.There was no communication between the two parties and ultimately there was no link up between them. So this was another reason why the Recce were delayed.

 

The war diary of 9 Field Company RE mentions that the party of Captain Heggie who were to join Recce Squadron left the company RV at 1430. Not much delay, on their part.

 

Fair Point.
Firstly let me correct my error above. I was writing from memory and erred when I suggested the 9th FC RE were north of the railway. They were in a different zone of the LZ, but were still south of the railway. There RV was in fact in the extreme SE corner of LZ-Z. So of all the units that landed on LZ-Z and DZ-X they were just about the farthest away from the Recce RV - not the best bit of planning.

You are quite correct in that the war diary records Captain Heggie as departing the RE RV at 14.30. But, regrettably he fails to meet up with the Recce Sqdn, even though they are delayed and do not leave there are own RV until 3.40. So where on earth did he get to and what was he doing during the 70 minutes?

I have to be honest and say that I believe there is a question mark as to the accuracy as to the timings recorded in the diary. The gliders we are told land at 13.40 and they include number 386 with Major Winchester aboard. This lands badly, severely wounding one man,who dies shortly after, and wounding two others. Despite this we are to believe that most of the company reach the RV by 14.15. Furthermore, Winchester then has time to ascertain that gliders 383, 385 and 389 have not and will not be arriving, hastily reorganise and order Heggie to take on a task that was not his original assignment, all by 14.30. Quite a tall order.

Equally, the war diary records 14.30 as the time that Lt Wise returns to the RV, having originally been one of the first to arrive at the RV and who decided to recce the route to the Wolfheze Hotel, which was to be the Company HQ. He ran into enemy machine guns some 400 yards north of the hotel, was wounded in both legs,his arm and nose and was left only able to walk slowly. Yet the diary records him as returning at the same time as Heggie departs. To me it doesn't stack up.

It is a problem of recording actions effectively in 15 minute chunks and to my mind the timetable of 14.15 RV, 14.30 Heggie leaves, 14.30 Wise returns, 15.00 O'Callaghan sets off to Bridge, is at best a rather vague approximation, which should be read with a degree of latitude.

In Airborne Engineers, The Shiny 9th, p51, Patrick Pronk relates that at approximately 15.00 hrs... O'Callaghan left....Approximately 10 minutes later Major Winchester heard from Lt Wise that he had met strong opposition around the Wolfheze Hotel. He then orders Binyon to clear the route and his platoon set off at 15.45.

To me, it beggars belief that there would be a 40 minute delay between Wise returning and him reporting to Winchester. I think it is much more likely that Wise didn't return until well after 14.30. That being the case, if the sequence of events is correct, even if the timings are in doubt, then if Wise returns after 14.30 it follows Heggie departed after 14.30.

If anyone has an explanation as to why the small party of 11 men Heggie had failed to meet up with the Recce jeeps I would be keen to know.

 

To make things more complicated - and instant food for more thoughts - extracts from an account by Winchester, written in September, in Nijmegen.

"One of the detachments from No. 3 Platoon (Captain Heggie) which was to have accompanied the Reconnaissance Squadron, failed to arrive. A second detachment was hastily organized and sent off in its place."

and

"Just after 3 PM my Intelligence officer (Lieutenant Wise) returned wounded to the company."

I think Winchester's account is more accurate than the war diary.

 

I had the pleasure of meeting Lt J Marshall Reece D Troop on the ferry in 1994, and am led to believe (not by him) he was smartly off the LZ and the first man to reach Arnhem bridge, on finding no one there he drove back towards Oosterbeek looking for them, and I doubt ever saw the bridge again
Did I read this somewhere, or is it just a story told to me, that has been exaggerated somewhat, can anyone add to this, Thanks

lofty

 

Never heard that one before mate

 

Hi Lofty, Remember Arnhem has the following description of Lt Marshall's movements that afternoon " D Troop, lacking one jeep in consequence of Major Gough's departure, had meanwhile discovered that one of its other vehicles, although last seen at the RV, had not arrived at Wolfheze. This was the jeep belonging to 10 section officer, Lt John Marshall, and the explanation was that, as one of the last vehicles to leave the landing zone, he had simply gone off in the wrong direction! Later, in retrospect he was to realise that he had become disorientated in relation to the RV. He had taken his jeep south to Renkum itself"
The lone jeep then ran in to some Germans, quickly escaped, headed east and having passed Kussins vehicle on Utrechtseweg, somehow worked there way down to the lower road in time to witness the Railway bridge being blown. They then in an effort to find there colleagues meandered there way for some time until eventually finding them all back at Wolfheze.
So no he didn't get to the Bridge, that was an exaggeration, but he had one hell of an adventure.

 

deleted double posted

 

Thanks for that Graham, just found the story in Remember Arnhem, and was just about to put it here when i read your post, I honestly cant remember reading it before, but my post 26, was based on what I was told by Trooper Jeffrey Williams a member of D Troop, who we took to Arnhem in my K2 a good few years ago now, and yes perhaps a little exaggerated As i have it at the ready I have added the relevant paragraphs----- OH and a picture of Trooper Williams sadly no longer with us,

regards lofty

 

Thanks Lofty, that's a nice picture of a brave man.
Fairley goes on to describe the fighting at the time that both Williams and Marshall were captured.Williams was shot in the shoulder, and Marshall was seriously wounded and eventually lost his right hand.So I suspect that Williams was actually one of the crew on Marshall's jeep.
We know that Irala had been killed a day earlier. I believe that Trooper Pagnell, also wounded and captured and Trooper Smith were probably the other two crew members. Smith, the only uninjured man avoided capture then and went on to fight with much gallantry before he to was captured.I have read that he was cited for a VC, but in the event received no medal.