1/6th Queens Royal Regiment

Discussion in 'NW Europe' started by Kieron Hill, Sep 30, 2004.

  1. Kieron Hill

    Kieron Hill Senior Member

    This account of the Battle of the Escaut River is taken from the Queens Regimental Diary. I hope you enjoy Especially DirtyDick

    April 22nd. 1940.

    The Queens Brigade took over from units of the 51st Highland Division, which was moving south to the Sarr. The Sector taken over lay between Armentieres and Bailleul: 1/7th was on the right about Nieppe, 1/6th in the centre in front of Steenwercke and the 1/5th left about La Creche. The line ran a mile or so from the frontier, which was quite unmarked.

    May 10th 1940.

    The 1/5th and 1/6th Queens remained in those frontier positions until May 10th, on which day the Germans launched their tremendous invasion of Holland and Belgium. These two countries had, up to the last maintained the strictest neutrality, so no previous liaison or co-ordination by the Allies had been possible. But alternative plans for helping them had been carefully worked out, and of these Plan D (River Dyle) had been decided on. For the British Expeditionary Force this involved in the first case a rapid advance by M.T. to the River Dyle (east of Brussels), which was to be held from Warve to Louvain by (from right to left) 1 Corps (2nd Division and 1st Division) and 2nd Corps (3rd Division). The first French Army was to come up on the right and their Seventh Army on their left. This plan was put into action at once and the advance of these forces was quite unopposed. The 12th Lancers reached the line of the Dyle on the 10th, and the leading infantry Battalions the following day.
    The role of the 44th Division in the operation was to march south-west of Audenarde and there organise the defence of the River Escaut, on which it was later to be joined by the remainder of 3 Corps. In pursuance of the role, the 1/5th and 1/6th Battalions moved off by march route on the afternoon of May 10th.
    The first warning they had received of the approaching storm had been an air alarm at ten o’clock the evening before, followed by others throughout the night. Bombs could be heard but none fell in the brigade area.
    At dawn the warning order was received to be prepared to move in six hours. Billets were scrubbed in order, as one pessimist prophetically remarked, to be ready for the Germans.
    The Battalions crossed the frontier about 1600 hours, and billeted north of the Menin after a march of about twenty miles. There was widespread bombing throughout the day but none was close. The troops were everywhere received by the Belgiums with the greatest enthusiasm, the roads through villages and towns being lined with cheering crowds. An extraordinary spate of spy rumours began and for the next few days platoons and sections were constantly searching the countryside for mysterious parachutists whose descent had been seen by the most seemingly reliable people. They were reported to be in every sort of disguise, that of a priest being the most popular, which caused great inconvenience and even danger to many innocent cures.

    May 11th 1940.

    Next day the 131st Brigade marched on through Courtrai, were they received tremendous welcome and where they dropped the 2nd Buffs as garrison. The two Queens Battalions went on some miles farther to the area of Kleine Ronssse. ‘A’ Company 1/5th Queens, were bombed en route but had no casualties. The transport which moved by night, was also attacked. Incendiaries rolled under two of the ammunition trucks, but the drivers left their cover and drove the trucks clear. Two men were wounded the first Queens casualties in the war. Tha roads were now congested with refugees: first cars with mattresses strapped on the top as protection against air attacks, later cyclists and carts, and last of all those on ffot pathetically pushing or pulling every form of handcart, barrow or perambulator loaded with their most valued possessions. The stream seemed never-ending, and during the following days the presence of those tragic crowds must not be forgotten.

    May12th/15th.

    The battalions remained in the Kleine Rossne area until May 16th. Meanwhile the general situation was worsening. Holland had been quickly overrun, and on May 15th the Dutch Army laid down its arms. Ominous news came too from the Ninth French Army to the south, were on the 12th an enemy armoured thrust had been reported which by the 14th was across the Meuse on a wide front. The forward British troops on the line of the River Dyle had not been seriously engaged but the First French Army on their right had lost some ground and was threatened by the breakthrough to the south. It was accordingly decided that the Dyle position could no longer be held and that the Allied Forces should pull back to the lines of the Escaut, starting their withdrawal on the night of 16th/17th May and reaching the Escaut on the night of the 18th/19th. In order to be ready to cover this withdrawal. 131st brigade moved forward to occupy its sector of the Escaut Line. This lay south-west of Audenarde, with the 1/6th Queens forward on the right, and the 2nd Buffs on their left and the 1/5th Queens in reserve.

    May 17th 1940

    The 1/6th Battalion went forward on the 17th, moving inconspicuously in small parties, and occupied its positions on the river line.
    These positions had been reconnoitred and sited with the uppermost care during the previous few days. The sector allotted to the Battalion stretched about 3000 yards from Beuwhoek hamlet to Scheldekant Chateau, both exclusive. The windings of the river made it difficult to follow its course from any distance and so the siting of our posts and the laying of fixed lines was of the greatest importance. About 500yrds from our side of the river ran the main road from Kherkove to Audenarde, and the ground between it and the river bank gave generally good cover for the defence, but the whole sector the whole sector was overlooked from the enemy side by a ridge of high ground culminating in a wooded spur east of Melden.
    Another important feature on the enemy side was the strsggling village of meersche. Running down from towards the river were numerous irrigation channels. These were full of water when the position was occupied, but later as the river fell, dried out and provided covered routes to our positions. The 1/6th Queens front was held fromright to left by ‘A’ Company (Maj.J.V.Godfrey)’B’ (Capt.K.Lockwood) and ‘C’ (Capt.R.H.Pontifex). ‘D’ Company (Capt.R.N.J.Rutherford) was in reserve in the Kwaadestraat Chateau grounds, and H.Q.Coy (Major E.S.Bingham.MC.) in their western edge. Battalion Headquarters was at the lodge in the north-west corner of the grounds.
    The transport of both Battalions was withdrawn to the Brigade Parks. The first signs of a breakdown of the British lines of communication appeared in the hold-up of both the in-going and out-going mails. This breakdown was caused by the very dangerous threat of the German armoured drive. With twelve armoured divisions it had made spectacular progress, and on May 18th reached Peronne and later Amies, leaving Abberville as the only main bridge available across the Somme. In front of the 44th Division I and II Corps of the British Expeditionary Force were falling back to the Escaut Line according to plan, but the state of the roads, packed with refugees and under constant harassing fire from the air, caused some disorganization. Major Lord Sysonby and Capt.A.G.Neale of the 1/5th Queens were detailed for traffic control of the retiring columns. The former writes “Every sort of army vehicle came through in there thousands, drivers had not slept for four nights and were so tired that they did know their destination, their regiments or even their names. The streams of traffic never stopped and at times all four roads were doubled banked as far as the eye could see.”
    However things sorted themselves out and Major Bingham in a reconnaissance of the 1/6th Queens right flank found the 5th Northampton’s of the 4th Division getting into position and made touch with their Brigade Headquarters.
    The 1/6th Queens had spent the last two days still further improving their defences, inspecting them from the enemy side of the canal, altering them where necessary, digging alternative positions and putting up as much wire as available. There was an ominous drop in level of the river and the irrigation channels, much lessening their value as obstacles. This drop was partly due to the fine weather, but mainly to the defensive inundations carried out further south.
    On may 20th “Stand To” was at 0330 hours and all was ready for the enemy; but nothing happened until early noon when cyclists were seen moving down the steep hill into melden. Our artillery engaged them with good effect. By 1530hours there was a good deal of activity on the whole of the 1/6th Queens front. It was difficult to deal with it effectively owing to the crowds of refugees.
    Enemy parties attempting to reach the river over the open were wiped out but the Germans then started working up the many covered approaches and mortar fire and sniping broke out all along the front.
    On such an extended front and with the Escaut no longer a real obstacle it was impossible to prevent small parties of the enemy from penetrating the positons. These incursions were quickly dealt with by the reserve ‘D’ Company, gallantry led by Capt.R.N.J.Rutherford until he was mortally wounded leading one of the many counter attacks. Throughout the evening and well into the night there was enemy fire followed by attempts to cross the river. These called for frequent counter attacks in which all and sundry, including the attached Pioneer Platoon of the Staffordshire Regiment, took part. Carriers were effectively used on the more exposed parts of the front with marked moral effect to both sides. The lack of mortar H.E. ammunition was acutely felt throughout the battle.
    The 1/6th completely dominated all the open ground on its front, but small arms fire could not deal with the many covered approaches which unexpectedly became available as the river level sank.

    Night 20th/21st May

    During the night there was a comparative lull for a short period. The enemy having failed to gain a footing on the 1/6th Queens front, transferred their pressure to that of the 2nd Buffs on their left flank. Armed mainly with Tommy-guns and showing considerable skill in the street fighting (both then novel methods of attack), they penetrated to and obtained control of the village of Petegem to the left rear of 1/6th Queens

    May 21st 1940

    We shall now return to the doings of the 1/6th Queens during the same day. Throughout the morning they were heavily shelled and mortared and there were spasmodic attempts by the enemy to cross the canal, especially on the Battalions left front.. by midday the reserve Company ‘D’ had been fully committed, so the officers and mrn of Battalion H.Q. had to take on the task of driving out intruders. During one of these fights the Battalion Second-in-Command, major J.G. Bevington was severly wounded.
    Shortly before this the Brigades Commander had arrived at Battalion Headquarters. He told them that the Germans were across the canal on the left in large numbers and that the situation was dangerous. After a short rest he left again for Brigade Headquarters. Soon afterwards contact with Brigade H.Q. was lost and in spite of many attempts was not regained for the rest of the Battle.
    At 1500hours the left ‘C’ Company reported much activity on their left front and large enemy forces moving through the Scheldekant Chateau woods. Its left forward platoon (No 14) was shortly afterwards attacked from the left and rear. Its Commander Second Lieutenant G.L.M. Woods, was last seen leading a bombing attack at close quarters with the enemy.
    The Germans then pressed on in the rear of 14 Platoon and encountered ‘C’ Company Headquarters and the reserve platoon. At 1720 hours Coy. Commander (Capt. R.H.Pontifex) spoke to the Commander Officer on the telephone. He reported that a strong attack from the rear was imminent and gave a warning that any further telephone calls should be treated with suspicion. A few minutes later he was killed and his headquarters overrun by greatly superior forces.
    The whole Battalion front was now continuously engaged and the enemy could be seen working round the left and rear of ‘B’ Company. Kwaadestraat Chateau grounds were badly shelled by guns in the rear, presumably our own, and small parties penetrated the grounds, but were driven out by counter attack members of Battalion Headquarters. The recaptured posts were occupied by ‘C’ Company 1/5th Queens, which had just arrived as a reinforcement. At about 2000 hours the Germans had reached Elsegem and were firing into the flank and rear of Kwaadestraat Chateau grounds. At the same time news arrived that the enemy was also across the Escaut on the right of the 1/6th Queens front, and this appeared to be confirmed by a display of white fairy lights to the north and west of Eeuwhoeh. At 2030 hours, a strong German attack was made from all sides against ‘B’ Company Headquarters and reserve platoon. This attack could be clearly seen from Battalion Headquarters, who vigorously engaged the enemy, killing the German Commander. But the attackers were too strong and the ‘B’ Company posts were overwhelmed after a stubborn fight. At 2100 hours Capt. Voolatt of the Lancashire Fusiliers of the brigade on the right, arrived in a carrier, the only one left of twelve which had been sent off to help the Battalion to the right. He expressed surprise that the positions were still held and confirmed that the Battalions to the right had withdrawn and that the enemy were across the river in that area.
    Firing was now continuous; several fresh parties of the enemy had again got a foothold in the Chateau grounds and no more reserves were left to deal with them, so at 2215 hours. Lt. Col. Hughs decided to extricate the remainder of the Battalions before the position was completely surrounded. Orders were issued at once and at 2145 hours the withdrawal began in small parties to high ground above Anseghem. It was covered by ‘C’ Company, 1/5th Queens under Maj, R.E.Clarke, who did excellent work, and by Capt. Wollatt in his carrier.
    Most of the wounded had been evacuated earlier and as many as possible of the later casualties loaded on to the carriers and got away.
    The 1/6th Queens reassembled outside Vichte about five miles back. They had had very heavy losses of the officers Capt. R.H.Pontifex, Capt. R.N.J. Rutherford had been killed: Maj. R.M Burton and Maj. J.G. Bevington and Capt. PE. Trench wounded; 2nd Lt. G.L.M. Worke was missing, but later reported killed in action; and Capt. K. Lockwood, Capt A.R. Trench, 2nd Lt. W.W. Wagstaff and 2nd Lt. J.E. Pearson were prisoners. (Capt. A.R. Trench shortly after escaped in company with Sergeant A.G. Horwood and rejoined the Battalion in England.)
    There were over 400 other rank casualties, of whom about 130 were afterwards reported prisoners. But as the divisional diary states, the 1/6th Queens had fought a great battle and held their front with magnificent skill and courage. Lt. Col. Hughes received an immediate D.S.O. as recognition of the Battalions splendid performance and his own leadership.
     
  2. DirtyDick

    DirtyDick Senior Member

    Excellent stuff, Kieron, thanks for posting it.

    According to his paybook, my g-father was evacuated on or about 31/5/40: would this shed any light about to which company/battalion he belonged (he was TA from near Guildford and, I believe, was attached to the scratch-built Petre Force since his unit was posted to the BEF as pioneers whilst they completed their infantry training)?

    Cheers
    Richard
     

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