I am much more familiar, even with Germans, Generals in Africa and Europe than i am in "The Pacific". When i do Hear/Read something about MacArthur, it is usually in reference to his ego or political ambitions, or that his staff were a bunch of sycophants. No doubt he did have a large ego. I am sure he was not the easiest guy to deal with. But again, in The Pacific, i Hear/Read about ...pardon these spellings if wrong... Halsey, Spruance, Mitcher, Nimitz and others. I have never Heard/Reade much about MacArthur as a commander. He must have been retained for Some Reasons of Ability/Success. What was MacArthur good at.....what were some of his strong suits in helping to win the war in The Pacific.? Thank You
MacArthur graduated number one in his class at the US Military Academy with , quite obviously , a degree in Engineering. His first assignment was to the Philippines where his father , a Major General and MoH recipient , was based. That's the easy part. MacArthur learned to utilize General Casey to build airfields that General Kenny used to isolate Japanese bases and advance the offensive with the support of land based airpower. On the strategic level , and as I am sure you know , MacArthur's goal was to liberate Luzon and , if necessary , the entire Philippines. Admiral King and General Arnold and most of the US war effort in the Pacific targeted the Mariana Islands. It was the next move that was tricky. The USN brass , fully driven by Admiral King , insisted that Luzon be bypassed and that Formosa was the most logical approach. In an effort to support this strategy (which had not been approved) , and in fear of an IJN Airforce that simply did not exist , the USN launched the invasion of Peleliu. The greatest contribution that MacArthur made to help the US win the war , in my opinion of course , was his influence and irrefutable argument that Formosa made absolutely no sense and would have dangerous post war consequences. His administration of Japan is hailed as absolutely unique in history.
I have only read one biography of McArthur now long ago by William Manchester 'American Caesar', a well-written account, although now twenty years later only a small part is remembered, notably his magnanimous rule of Japan after the surrender.The book is still available. The only gap was the account of his defeat in the Philippines; an impossible task I would suggest.
MacArthur was a highly controversial character in his own time and is still so today. He is one of those historical figures who produces extreme reactions in the historians who write about him. I suppose Montgomery would be the nearest equivalent among British generals. Like Monty, Mac was not helped by his personality, and it is consequently very difficult to judge him fairly. As a commander, MacArthur was like the little girl with the curl; when he was good he was very good and when he was bad he was awful. There seems to have been no in between with him. He had a habit of making a picture of a situation and then bending his plans to his picture rather than to the realities. Throughout his career in WWII and Korea MacArthur employed a chief of intelligence (Willoughby) who encouraged this fault. Prior to Dec. 7th MacArthur had a far too optimistic picture of the Philippine situation and consequently made an unrealistic plan to defend the Lingayen beaches. In Korea, he had a similarly overoptimistic picture in November 1950, and so he left his forces badly exposed to the Chinese offensive. MacArthur also had a weakness for attacking prestige objectives. He battered away at Buna when a more patient approach might have worked better, and he diverted two corps to take Manila instead of focusing on cutting off and destroying Yamashita's main forces. These failures, plus MacArthur's well-known vanity and right wing views, have made him a favorite whipping boy. Max Hastings cannot write about MacArthur without flying off into a foaming rant. But there was more to MacArthur as both a man and a soldier. His series of operations along the New Guinea coast in 1944 constituted one of the swiftest and most successful amphibious campaigns in history. Indeed, after Buna MacArthur's forces racked up a practically unbroken series of successes against the Japanese, consistently inflicting more casualties than they suffered. For all his difficulties with King, MacArthur learned to work very smoothly with the US Navy and especially with Halsey and Dan Barbey. Airman George Kenney quickly became a MacArthur favorite and under MacArthur air, ground, and navy all worked together as a team. It is true that MacArthur's staff contained a number of sycophants and deadheads (Willoughby, Sutherland, Courtney Whitney, Ned Almond in Korea), but MacArthur could and did give opportunity and a receptive ear to talented subordinates, some of whom had been given up on by others. Walter Krueger was regarded by many as too old for field command and Bonner Fellers had blotted his copybook in Egypt, but MacArthur took them on and both did well under him. Joseph Stilwell was nobody's sycophant and after getting fired from his Chinese job he was a hot potato, but MacArthur wanted him for Tenth Army and got him. MacArthur was also fortunate to have a good operations officer, Chamberlin, who could take Mac's sudden inspirations and transform them into operational reality, often at very short notice. MacArthur may not have been a genius and you certainly had to watch him closely, but on the whole he was an asset to the Allied cause.
A great critique, Than You And a point well taken......we ALL have opinions. You have to be careful, when judging a person "You do not like"
https://podbay.fm/p/the-ww2-podcast/e/1471237200 Podcast - 59mins - Posted Aug 15, 2016 Attached content description... "MacArthur is one of those personalities that war throws up which I find hard to pin down. They have a big personalities and seemingly a huge confidence within themselves that overrides everything else (another two examples for me would be Monty and Patton). The media generated about them at the time seems to put them on a pedestal, its hard to see through that hype to figure out how good they actually were. Since I started the podcast MacArthur was in my top ten of topics to cover, so I was thrilled to see a new book on him “MacArthur at War: WWII in the Pacific” by Walter Borneman. I highly recommend you give it a read, its a balanced look which at times has you disbelieving he was allowed to continue in command, at other times you see his ability shine through. He undoubtedly was a very complex man."
"Prior to Dec. 7th MacArthur had a far too optimistic picture of the Philippine situation and consequently made an unrealistic plan to defend the Lingayen beaches." MacArthur had no delusions about successfully defending Lingayen Gulf with 3 absolutely green and ill-equipped Philippine 'divisions' and some better trained and more effective Philippine Scouts. The had no tanks , effective artillery or air support to slow what amounted to an invasion force of about 43,000 combat experienced Japanese troops (including logistical and other support units). Admiral Hart's 29 submarines (assuming a portion of them were deployed in a position to intervene) had no impact off Lingayen Gulf due to heavy destroyer escort , shallow waters and defective torpedoes. Two days after the initial Japanese move at Lingayen Gulf , 7000 IJA soldiers landed at Lamon Bay , completing a pincer threat on Manila. The fact is that MacArthur conducted a successful twin retrograde maneuver against a far superior force that enjoyed air supremacy. Prior to December 8th , Filipino time , and when it became obvious that if Imperial Japan concluded that war with the US was the only option , the IJN would target the anchorage at Manila bay and the IJA was fully capable of seizing this objective. This is why the entirely defensive strategy employed by the US was to deny this for as long as possible. The final version of War Plan Orange (5) presumed that by April of 1942 force levels would be sufficient to fortify and retreat to Bataan , and possibly hold their position for four to six months. MacArthur never agreed with the defensive posture of any version of WPO regarding the Philippines , but he was painfully aware that the US was in no position to commit the resources necessary to defend Luzon.
"These failures, plus MacArthur's well-known vanity and right wing views, have made him a favorite whipping boy." You have absolutely no idea what sort of political views MacArthur had , you are talking about historians that claim that he was positioning himself to challenge FDR. That is nonsense and MacArthur issued a release pointing out very carefully that his career will end on the battle fields against Imperial Japan , not the White House. He was forced to do so because the 'right wing' was clutching for straws looking to find anyone that could defeat FDR in 1944. They tried and failed to recruit him. It frustrates me when weak minded historians staple such meaningless and tired phrases as 'right wing views' to the legacy of Douglas MacArthur. As far as 'favorite whipping boy' is concerned , with few exceptions undereducated and biased historians dare to use that phrase. I am amused by your comment about MacArthur's 'well known vanity' and I could not possibly care less about your references to Max Hastings or Monty.
An interesting factoid just occurred to me , FDR Churchill and MacArthur were related as distant cousins.
Australian historians are generally dismissive of Macarthur as vain and and unwilling to understand the conditions in New Guinea. . They say he claimed unearned glory for battle successes, but cast blame on Australians for “cowardice” when there were early setbacks. General Blamey, head of Australian troops in PNG said “everything you heard about Macarthur, both good and bad is correct”. In the book “The Fight for Australia” by Perry Roland, he explains that Australia was completely ill equiped to defend itself as Japan swept through South East Asia. When Darwin was bombed, our soldiers had a few mortars and rifles to aim at the zippy Japanese fighter planes and bombers. The British had our troops fighting in Nth Africa and had no intention of releasing them or helping in the Pacific. Then Prime Minister, John Curtin had to insist on recalling our troops from Europe and make overtures to the Americans by offering bases in northern Australia. Though it was the pure grit of Australian soldiers that won in PNG, the American planes and fighter ships made that win possible with air and sea support. Curtin felt he had to give the Americans the head position running the PNG campaign and keep Macarthur happy for fear of losing US support. Macarthur included no Australians in his advisory group. He awarded battle medals to these people, forgetting most of the real fighters on the ground. He controlled the reporting of campaigns and ignored the amazing performance of Australian soldiers, because it suited his career.
The US patrician class was pretty much worn out by WWII. Mac's pomposity was the nether end of that, I believe. His statement that "...with the task, as I understand it, of returning to the Philippines..." could have gotten him court-martialed.
His statement was out of line his rank. The President establishes policy. Mac's "as I understand it" implied that he had been given orders to "return". There was a meeting at Pearl a few years later where this was finally settled. MacArthur, FDR, and the Politics of Leyte Gulf
To All, I just read article that OpanaPointer posted, nothing new there!! The reason we wen to the Philippines is discussed here: Luzon Versus Formosa It is 10 ages long and explains why we went the Philippines vs Formosa and then landing on the mainland of China, which would of been incredible stupid!! Mike
To All, if you are really bored you can read this thread which I started back in July 2012 on Axis History Forum. MacArthur, Kinkaid, and Halsey! - Axis History Forum Mike
It seems to me that this is far more simple than the complicated approach posted in this forum. The basic communications flaw was Halsey failing to notify Kinkaid that the balance of the 3rd fleet was headed north , exposing an approach route into Leyte Gulf. Kinkaid confidently deployed the 7th fleet to intercept and destroy any IJN attempt to force the passage at Surigao. Clearly , the absurd comments that MacArthur was somehow responsible for blocking communications have been recognized. And dismissed as revisionist history. MacArthur never blamed Halsey for this blunder largely because Kurita did not have stones to press the attack and assume that the plan was working. On the other hand , the 3rd fleet was just about the most lethal navy ever assembled. At the time. The issue of communications became a factor after it was too late. Nimitz had no problem sending a message to Halsey.
"Australian historians are generally dismissive of Macarthur as vain and unwilling to understand the conditions in New Guinea. ." They say he claimed unearned glory for battle successes, but cast blame on Australians for “cowardice” when there were early setbacks. General Blamey, head of Australian troops in PNG said “everything you heard about Macarthur, both good and bad is correct”. I greatly appreciate your reference to “The Fight for Australia” by Perry Roland. As an American , I am sure that I do not fully understand your point of view. I must add that to my reading list. I would only challenge the claim that MacArthur broadly accused Aussie troops of cowardice. "Curtin felt he had to give the Americans the head position running the PNG campaign and keep Macarthur happy for fear of losing US support." That is just not true on several levels. I think it's important to remember that MacArthur's presence in Australia on March 26 , 1942 , when I believe he was officially welcomed by Curtin in Canberra , stimulated a boost in Aussie morale. And perhaps some consternation at IGHQ. It's interesting to me that at this conference , an American minister to Australia announced that FDR has awarded MacArthur the MoH. Aussie newspapers described MacArthur's presence as proof that the US is fully committed. Recall that it was at about this time that Curtin and the Mother Ship in London began to part ways. In fact , Curtin proclaimed that "Without any inhibitions of any kind, I make it quite clear that Australia looks to America...". That certainly triggered useless infighting between Churchill and Curtin. The Aussie's demanded an equal say in basic strategy and deployment of its own while Churchill complained that this viewpoint was influenced by MacArthur. MacArthur agreed with Curtin that North Africa no longer required the presence of Australian troops. While it is true that MacArthur initially viewed Australia as merely a supply depot or springboard for future operations directed towards the Philippines , it became clear to the Joint Chiefs , once the Malay Barrier was breached , that Australia itself was highly vulnerable , as you pointed out. Moves to reinforce Australia were made prior to MacArthur's arrival. As we know , PNG was targeted by IGHQ as was the Solomon Island chain. I believe that veteran Aussie troops first began to dislike MacArthur due to his communique's which inevitably understated the conditions and the terrain difficulties , while always referring to Australian troops as allied forces. There is a popular ballad called "Doug's Communique!" which circulated among Aussie troops early in the campaign for PNG. I don't think the author has been identified , but clearly it originated among Australians on the Kokoda trail. General Blamey was a jovial combat veteran that had no problem with confronting MacArthur and on more than one occasion the SWPA commander altered his approach as a result. Australian troops , under Blamey , were deployed to contain bypassed Japanese forces on New Guinea. At first , operations were restricted to recon in force and limited attacks as opportunities presented themselves. This is where Blamey was wrong. He initiated full scale offensives aimed at destroying bypassed Japanese bases that he decided were stronger and more self sufficient than was actually the case , apparently in order to liberate the indigenous population. An army that is malnourished and disease ridden with few supplies or munitions is 'withering on the vine' and represents no strategic significance. MacArthur created the possible invasion of Borneo as a target for eager Aussie generals , knowing full well that shipping and landing craft would be busy elsewhere. The RN took it as an insult when they were treated as unnecessary by the USN. That was simply a matter of basic logistics , communications and focus. I really don't think that MacArthur understated the valor of Australian troops in order to advance his career.
"The commander of Australian ground forces in the Middle East , General Thomas Blamey , was recalled and arrived home on March 23. He was appointed commander in chief of the Australian Army three days later , the day MacArthur met the War Council. Blamey had run up a distinguished record on the Western Front in World War 1. Between wars he had served as police commissioner of Melbourne. Short , fat , jovial and perennially rumpled , Blamey had a reputation for getting drunk at parties and knocking people's hats off when inebriated. He was not a soldier MacArthur was likely to respect. Moreover , Blamey's long spell away from active duty made him an amateur in the eyes of many American generals. It would not be surprising if MacArthur shared that sentiment." From "Old Soldiers Never Die" by Geoffrey Perret , page 286. I wonder how first impressions were altered over the years.
