Hi, I've just started to transcribe the war diary for 3 RHA for Nov 41 and come across the following rather cryptic signals, can anyone offer any suggestions for the meaning of the strength state in the 2nd signal? WO169/1428 – 3rd RHA MESSAGE FORM TO: H.Q. Sp. Gp. G.H.Q. 2nd Echelon FROM: 3 R.H.A. Originator’s Number: KW 39 Date: 25 Major STEWART missing LT YOUNG 2/LT LEWIS LT PASS. ALSO Wounded Captain HUMPHRIES R.A.M.C. attached. APPROX 95 Other Ranks still missing. Signed: K.S. WATT --------------------------------------------- MESSAGE FORM TO: H.Q. Sp. Gp. G.H.Q. 2nd Echelon FROM: 3 R.H.A. Originator’s Number: KW 39 Date: 25 Strength State. Ax 3 and 11 / Ay 4 and 21 / Az nil and nil. B 2 and nil. C Figures to follow. D Killed Major PINNEY 2/LT GUNN LT KINNERSLEY Wounded 2/LT COLT WILLIAMS 2/LT DIXON 2/LT NICHOLL Regards Tom
Tom, where are you working? That's a very historic return, reporting the death of Ward Gunn VC and presumably the personnel strengths post Sidi Rezegh. The obvious is to see if there is an army wide standard personnel report that would be used. However , its 7 Armoured Division and the western desert, so it might be a 7 Armoured Divisoon form. I would usually interpret numbers such as 3 and 11 and 4 and 21 looks like strength returns in officers and other ranks. This might fit if Ax Ay and Az were the three three anti tank batteries in 3 RHA. These would be shockingly low if it refers to batteries in a Regiment. Though it might reflect a lot of missing as in wandering around the desert. One approach might be to check with Firepower who should have a lot more examples of strenght reports of this sort. This is a report of a VC action and more paperwork than usual may have been kept.
Appendix B3 on page 14 of this transcript of a set of standing orders exlains the X/Y/Z codes and the figures: CASUALTY & STRENGTH STATE (DAILY). CASUALTY & STRENGTH STATE BTY. Date ………………… “C” ... and ... (“Strength” – see Unit Doc’n 21 A Gp) “Y” ... and ... (Killed) “X” ... and ... (Wounded) “Z” ... and ... (Missing) “ZR” ... and ... (Missing rejoined since last return) The first figure to be inserted against each Code letter Refers to Offrs and the second to Other ranks. It is important that the P/No, Rnk & Name of all Offr casualties is stated either on foot or reverse of return.Not sure what the A & B prefixes refer to; A casualties are clearly 'in action' so perhaps B is sick?
That looks like the kind of report structure, except its a 21 AG report from 1944 and the headings might not be the same. I did wondered if x y and z might be killed wounded and missing - except it doesn't seem to fit. 1. If Az means "Missing" this seems to be contradicted by the previous signal stating 95 ORs and other named officers missing. 2. If the 3/11 and 4/21 refer to offrs & ORs Killed and wounded, then why are only three and not four officers named in the signal? If you are in the A cell at HQ Suipport Group, how do you interpret the first signal, which doesn't have any report headings? There are obviously officer casualties by name but, is it a report that all four officers plus the att RAMC Offr are missing, but some of them are also wounded, or that the major is missing and the others are wounded? Staff work was never 3RHA's strength in the 1980s, but it wasn't mine either
I'm thinking the X and Y in the standing orders are transposed: X/Y/Z = Killed/Wounded/Missing flows much better. I've had a strength return in front of me recently but can't think whose it was.
Here's chapter and verse from the Field Service Pocket Books of 1939 and 1943. The quoted example above looks like a hybrid of the two. http://www.ww2talk.com/forum/attachment.php?attachmentid=97767&stc=1&d=1358549863 http://www.ww2talk.com/forum/attachment.php?attachmentid=97768&stc=1&d=1358549863
Gents, Many thanks for all the information and suggestions. I'll have another look at the way the signal is set out and see if it is my transcription that is confusing us. BTW there are quite a few papers referring to Major Pinney, including letters sent to his widow from members of the Regt. Hopefully I'll be able to put them up here as well, as I get time. Regards Tom
Hi all, first excerpt of 3 RHA war diary for September 1941 (WO169/1428): War Diary 3 Regiment R.H.A. Lt-Col. C.P.B. Wilson, RHA 1 September 1941 GERAWLA 1500 Colonel returned from “D” Battery. 2 September 1941 0700 Colonel, 2 i/c and R.Q.M.S. left in advance. 0800 R.H.Q. left GERAWLA. 1500 R.H.Q. arrived HAMMAM. 3 September 1941 0740 R.H.Q. left HAMMAM. 1500 Arrived ALMAZA, B.D.R.A. 4 September 1941 ALMAZA Settling in at ALMAZA. 1st (Ind) A/Tk Troop with Capt. BURLINGHAM and 2/Lieut. GROVER posted to the regiment. 5 September 1941 ALMAZA Training begins. 6 September 1941 ALMAZA NIL. 7 September 1941 ALMAZA 0900 Church Parade. 8 September 1941 ALMAZA NIL. 9 September 1941 ALMAZA 2/Lieuts. REID and GROVER promoted Lieut. 10 – 14 September 1941 ALMAZA NIL. 15 September 1941 ALMAZA Lieut. REID proceeded on I.O’s course. 16 – 18 September 1941 ALMAZA NIL. 19 – 20 September 1941 ALMAZA Lieut. Grover took a party to MENA to take over and dispose of various stores left by the sudden departure of the 149 Regiment to TOBRUK. 21 September 1941 ALMAZA 2/Lieut. HEWAN arrived from AMRIYA, where advance parties of “J” and “M” had arrived. 22 September 1941 ALMAZA Message received stating that “D” Bty would arrive ALMAZA on 25 Sept. 2 i/c, Capt. BURLINGHAM and the O.M.E. proceeded to AMRIYA. It had been learned that “M” and “J” were to take over certain equipment which had been left there by 149 Regiment. Capt. HUMPHRIES, M.C. proceeded on leave. 23 September 1941 ALMAZA Message received from 2 i/c to effect that “M” and “J” Batteries had arrived at AMRIYA. 0930 C.O. left for AMRIYA. 1800 C.O. returned. “M” and “J” were expected in on 24 Sept. 24 September 1941 ALMAZA 1430 “M” and “J” arrived at ALMAZA. 25 – 26 September 1941 ALMAZA “M” and “J” settle down in the tents and area prepared for them by R.H.Q. 27 September 1941 ALMAZA 2/Lts DAVIS, BAXTER and HARDY proceeded on leave. 28 September 1941 ALMAZA “D” Battery less one tp arrived ALMAZA. They had handed their portées over to 65 A/Tk Regt. Training for remainder of regiment began, so far as was possible with the numerous duties. 29 September 1941 ALMAZA Remainder of “D” Battery arrived. Various 3/R.H.A. men taken in as reinforcements from B.D.R.A. 30 September 1941 ALMAZA 34 15-cwts drawn from TEL EL KEBIR. More to follow, inc details of "M" and "J" being evacuated from Tobruk Regards Tom
Appendix “A” “D” Battery R.H.A. WAR DIARY September 1941 1 September 1941 One M.E.110 machine gunned the O.P. at WARANI. No damage was done. Shortly after this an officer from the other column arrived in an 8-cwt at great speed – and left with equal speed. The result was an almost immediate shelling by 105 mm guns which forced the O.P. and Sgt. HALE’s section to retire. 2 September 1941 [no entry] 3 September 1941 Work was carried out on the North Point position. Concrete aprons were made, camouflage improved, they were heightened and new pits for Tp Commanders commenced. R.H.Q. proceeded to ALMAZA somewhat unexpectedly. News was received that Brigadier GOTT had been appointed to command 7 Armd Div. 4 – 7 September 1941 [no entries] 8 September 1941 General CUNNINGHAM and General MESSERVY paid a visit to NORTH POINT position. They paid scant attention to this position but they wished to see the escarpment. So General CUNNINGHAM came to look at one of the portées and asked numerous questions. 9 September 1941 [no entry] 10 September 1941 A curious incident occurred which might have been much more serious. A patrol of 1 K.R.R.C. went out to ABU SAID passing through the WARANI O.P on its way out. They said they would be returning at 0530 hours. At 0400 hours two vehicles were seen coming in from a flank and the guns laid on them. As they came nearer they were identified as the patrol and 2/Lieut. SHURLOCK went out to speak to the patrol commander. At that moment a round from one of the guns went off narrowly missing both 2/Lieut. SHURLOCK and the patrol. The explanation was as follows. As the patrol approached from a flank the gun had to be traversed around at right angles. In traversing the gun back the No. 1 neglected to extract the shell, and as the layer traversed back he pressed the firing pedal. It seems to be a point worth noting for future reference. 11 September 1941 2/Lt. P.C. DIXON returned from hospital. In hospital he was in the next bed to Captain Redhead, who is now in hospital in ALEXANDRIA with a chronic septic ulcer. 12 September 1941 Whilst C Tp were changing over with A Tp at WARANI the enemy shelled with 25-pdrs. Having searched the area they landed a shell 15 yards from one of C Tp’s portées, and pierced the differential. 13 September 1941 6 N.C.Os from the Northumberland Hussars were attached to the Battery for training. They were from the batteries who are coming up to relieve the Batteries here now. 14 September 1941 On the evening of the 13th Little Brother column heard some suspicious rumbling and on moving forward from leaguer the next morning the carriers of D Coy 60th had a pre-arranged Verey light signal that they would fire if they contacted the enemy. At 0650 hours the signal went up and enemy tanks could be seen on the horizon about 2 miles away. These approached at great speed, shelling as they came and T.S.M. McCLARRON was able to put 2 guns of B tp and 2 of A tp in to stop the advance and allow the 25-pdrs of H/I to withdraw unmolested. The other section of B Tp had moved out to ARAD having changed over with A Tp, and they narrowly escaped being cut off. They managed to slip South and then East and rejoin the column, which withdrew to North Point position but luckily were not closely followed up. It is impossible to say what McCLARRON’s guns hit, but as a dense mass of vehicles and tanks were coming at ranges from 1200 – 800 yards, but an independent witness said 5 tanks were left behind, but this does not say they were knocked out by A/Tk fire. In the meantime C Tp who were in reserve had listened somewhat anxiously to the firing and the rumble of tanks, and had got ready to move. Most unfortunately, however, the telephone line between the battery and column H.Q. was broken and orders were not received until 0800 hours, by which time of course Little Brother column had withdrawn through North Point position and was somewhat perturbed to find none of the reserve troops there. By 0815 hours 10 guns were in position in their pits. The two guns missing were those from the WARANI O.P. with 2/Lt. SHURLOCK. These had leaguered 3 miles south of WARANI during the night and on their way forward they were ordered to withdrew to GARET EL RUWEIBET because the enemy were on RUWEIBET EL WARANI and GARET RAMLIYAT (529342). They were then released by the South African Armd Car Regt, but as their line of withdrawal was cut by the enemy and had to go south and eventually arrived back about 1300 hours, by a very circuitous route. At 0830 hours the enemy column that had attacked Little Brother earlier, appeared on a ridge 1000[?]x West of the NORTH POINT position about 353338 and moved off Southwards. Had they advanced there were no 25-pdrs really securely in action to deal with them. The enemy seemed convinced that a large minefield existed from the escarpment south to the PLAYGROUND position. At 1230 hours two enemy trucks came slowly down the track near the escarpment and began to examine the wire guarding the minefield. They had been reported and watched and not fired on because one of them was a Chevrolet truck and it might be one of our own that was lost. The 60th platoon watching in pits near Nos. 1 and 2 guns, and our gunners were tearing down the camouflage to try and bring a gun to bear on the trucks. The Chevrolet truck made off before 2-pdr fire could be brought to bear. But the other truck was knocked out and two men ran away. The Battery Commander and 2/Lt. COLT-WILLIAMS went out and inspected it. It was a semi tracked artillery tractor. It had been hit in numerous places by shell and .303 fire. One man had received a direct hit and saw merely a torso. The tractor was later burnt by the 60th. After this things were quiet and the enemy were reported to be passing in some strength south of the PLAYGROUN position at about 552320. The afternoon was quiet but at about 1730 hours rumblings were heard, and the enemy were reported on the move moving Northwards. A plan was in operation by which on a code word “VICTORIA” both Brother and Sister column back to the 595 grid line. The enemy now moved very rapidly, skirted PLAYGROUN and moved N.E. towards SOFAFI WEST. At this moment “VICTORIA” went. Brother column got out quickly, but owing to the speed that 25 German tanks were moving it was obvious that part of the force would be caught before it could clear the dangerous wadi at 560335. For the first time since the battery fought in the desert the battery commander was able to command his entire battery. B Tp were pushed out South of the 25-pdrs and A Tp were brought well South with instructions to keep the enemy away from the retreating column. In the meanwhile C Tp were discovered on the escarpment side of the ridge and brought down to the battle. A Tp had done sterling work and were firing slowly and steadily and had knocked out 4 tanks. A and C tps were under fairly heavy fire from every sort of gun but the enemy fire was mostly over and very inaccurate. One most interesting point occurred in that instead of continuing across the front even at 1100x rang the tanks turned North and came straight for the guns. This naturally had the effect of lengthening the distance between the retreating column and the tanks, who obviously did not care to expose their thinly armoured flanks to 2-pdr fire. This was exactly what was required and the 8 guns withdrew in good order towards SOFAFI WEST. The enemy, continued to keep up a very heavy fire but the battery never even had a puncture. In fact the only loss was that of the Officers Mess Tent which fell off the mess lorry unnoticed in the shelling. On the guns withdrawing the enemy recced northwards to the main track and with the sun low behind them sent forward some smaller vehicles to shell the battery. This was again inaccurate and not in the least effective. The complete column leaguered for the night at SIDI ABBASS (500345). During the afternoon of the 14th Glen Martin bombers did two most successful attacks on the enemy. Subsequent recce showed two lorries, one tank and one staff car destroyed. 15 September 1941 As was to be expected the enemy withdrew well back during the night, but owing it is understood to some disorganisation in the Armd Car patrol system the move forward of columns was delayed until 1400 hours. This was a pity as the enemy might not have had so much time to recover his damaged tanks. At 1730 hours Little Brother column moved west to take up its old position but hurriedly returned on hearing 20 enemy tanks were reported in the area. Then began a period of order and counter order, guns moved backwards and forwards until dark when the force leaguered in two portions. At 1145 a rumble was heard and both columns stood to, C Tp moving to a more central position at Pt. 221. The night however passed without incident. 16 September 1941 At 0800 hours Little Brother Column stated to move forward, but at 1000 hours for some unknown reason the last of the column was still in the NORTH POINT position. C Tp had a portée with electrical trouble; A Tp had one with leaky radiator. To make things easier the Captain came back to say the spare portée had been evacuated with a burnt out gear box. The rations were also with the spare 15-cwts which had not yet returned from the “soft vehicle” rendezvous. At 1500 hours permission was given for conditions to “resume normal” and the NORTH POINT position was evacuated. 17 September 1941 A reconnaissance of the forward area showed that the enemy had made direct for the Little Brother Column and had topped up there leaving their containers to be picked up by soft vehicles moving behind. This was not down however and the battery collected many of them. This probably accounts for the delay in following up Little Brother Column. They then went South East towards ZIODIN EL AKMAR (540335), one party coming due East before moving south. It was this party that was seen moving South from the NORTH POINT position at about 0830 hours. All tanks and vehicles then concentrated at EL KALATA (547322). Here they stayed until 1730 hours when they moved North East as has been already described. No tanks came further East than the 564 grid line. They shelled SOFAFI WEST camp as they approached it and appeared particularly interested in the wadis about 560335. 18 September 1941 [no entry] 19 September 1941 Major PUMPHREY of D Bty 102 (NH) Regt R.H.A. arrived in the forward area and the handing over commenced. 20 September 1941 Brigadier MIRRLEES and Colonel HARVEY, Commanding 65 A/Tk Regt were taken around the North Point position by the Bty Commander. The 65 A/Tk Regiment will soon man the position which is to be considerably strengthened. A Tp were relieved by a Tp of 102 Regt. 21 September 1941 [No entry] 22 September 1941 On night 21/22 B and C Tps of the Battery were relieved by tps of D Battery 102 Regt and by 0830 hours on 22nd the complete battery were concentrated in the B Echelon area. From here the Battery moved by tps at 15 mins interval to PICCADILLY (610339). From there the Battery moved as a whole to ZAWYET SHAMMAS (643367) on the coast North of Mile 90 on the SIDI BARRANI road. Here the hand over of portées to 65 A/Tk Regt was to take place. 23 September 1941 [no entry] 24 September 1941 C Tp handed over its portées to 257 Battery. 25 September 1941 A and B Tps handed over portées to 258 Battery receiving 8 English Type portées in return. These had been in continuous use since May and were in a very shaky condition. 26 September 1941 Owing to 259 Battery not arriving for 2 days to handover 4 English portées, it was decided to leave a tp behind and move the main body of the Battery to CAIRO. The first stage of the journey to MATRUH was done in the afternoon. 27 September 1941 Main body moved to Mile 160 on road ALEXANDRIA – CAIRO. 28 September 1941 Main body arrived in CAIRO and went to R.A. Base Depot ALMAZA. 29 September 1941 Settling in – digging slit trenches etc. A Tp arrived and the battery was complete. 30 September 1941 Dvrs. WHYATT and BLTRINGHAM who had been left with Capt. REDHEAD in TOBRUK rejoined the Battery after 5½ months absence. (sgd) W.B. STEWART Major R.H.A. 1.10.41.
Almost certainly Brigadier WHB Mirrlees, CRA 4 Indian Div. His BMRA is noteworthy - Maj GH Baker - http://www.ww2talk.com/forum/general/24495-field-marshall-sir-geoffrey-baker-gcb-cmg-cbe-mc.html#post268178
“M” Battery R.H.A. C.O.: Major P.A. EDEN, D.S.O., RHA 1 – 13 September 1941 TOBRUK Normal routine, as per training programme. 14 September 1941 TOBRUK A distinct lull in air activity and hostile shelling all the week. Probably due to pressure on the Russian Front, but rather ominous even so. 15 – 20 September 1941 [no entries] 21 September 1941 Main body left Tobruk at 2335 hrs aboard HMS KINGSTON with “J” Bty and the 3rd Australian A/T Regt. The relieving Bty 433 [?] of the 149 Anti-Tank Regt had arrived the previous evening and took over the six BOFORS guns during the day. An advance party of 1 officer (2/Lt G.E. Hewson [??]) and 2 N.C.Os had sailed on the 18th and a rear party of 1 officer (Major P.A. Eden) and 3 N.C.Os stayed on in TOBRUK till the 27th. The advance party sailed on HMS HASTY and the rear party on HMS KANDAHAR. The only incident in all these voyages was one stick of bombs from such a high level that they fell about a mile from the nearest ship in the KANDAHAR convoy. 2/Lts M.H.H.H. DAVIS and J.A.C. BAXTER accompanied the main body. 22 – 23 September 1941 [No entries] 24 September 1941 The Battery arrived at ALMAZA having picked up 6 2-Pdr guns from 433Z [?] Bty of 149 A/T Regt with some other vehicles at AMRIYA. On arrival at ALMAZA the Independent (SUDAN) A/T Troop joined the Bty complete. They had originally been taken from the Regt in the summer of 1940 and were warmly welcomed back to the fold having seen service in the East Afican and Syrian campaigns. Captain H.W. Barbingham R.H.A. and Lt. C.A.H. Grover R.H.A. joined the Battery with this Troop. 25 – 27 September 1941 [no entries] 28 September 1941 D Bty arrived in at ALMAZA and the regiment was thus together again for the first time since March 1941. The strength is now 6 officers and 110 O.Rs. New 2 Pdr Portées and other vehicles are arriving every day. The whole Battery is anxious to lose not a single moment in getting out again to the desert and helping relieve TOBRUK and their many friends inside particularly of the 1st Regt R.H.A. which had been fighting alongside the Battery throughout the 5 months in TOBRUK and had enhanced their reputation higher than ever if that were possible. A/E Battery and M Battery have now formed a band of mutual friendship after the battle of EASTER MONDAY 1941 in TOBRUK. PA Eden Major R.H.A.
Mapshooter, Thanks for the clarification of the name which makes sense. I'll correct the post if I can. Regards Tom
3 Regt R.H.A. C.O.: Lt-Col C.P.B. Wilson, RHA During this period at ALMAZA, 60 new men from draught from England joined the unit on various days. 1 October 1941 ALMAZA The re-equipping of the regiment continued apace as it was still on top priority. One week’s leave was granted to all ranks. 2 October 1941 ALMAZA Party left for QASSASSIN to hand over vehicles of 149 Regt which had been brought in by 3 Aust A/Tk Regt to 73 Medium Regt. These were in the process of being converted to A/Tk. 3 October 1941 ALMAZA Various vehicles drawn up including 13 portées. Six 2-pdrs drawn. 4 – 6 October 1941 ALMAZA NIL. 7 October 1941 ALMAZA Lt-Col. VAUGHAN-HUGHES lectured on CRETE. 8 October 1941 ALMAZA 2/Lt. COLT-WILLIAMS took a portée and crew to 73 Medium Regt at QASSASSIN, and gave them a lecture and demonstration. 9 October 1941 ALMAZA NIL. 10 October 1941 ALMAZA A new W.E. (1/34/1) for an A/Tk Regt was received with information that it would shortly be promulgated. 11 October 1941 ALMAZA 2/Lt. W.H.H. LEWIS joined the Regt and posted to “D” Bty. 12 October 1941 ALMAZA NIL. 13 October 1941 ALMAZA A lecture on R.A.F. [R.A.P.?] 14 October 1941 ALMAZA The Colonel forwarded some pertinent observations on the new W.E. to B.R.A. Appx I The W.E. had proposed drastic curtailment in personnel, both in tradesmen and non-tradesmen gunners, which did not cater for the “desert establishment” or take into consideration the extreme dispersal used in desert operations. 15 October 1941 ALMAZA NIL. 16 October 1941 ALMAZA Authority received for promulgation of new W.E., but in view of its incompatibility with the requirements of desert warfare, no action was taken. Appx II 17 October 1941 AMARIYA 0800 Regiment left ALMAZA. Movement Order attached. Appx III 1600 Arrived AMARIYA. 18 October 1941 AMARIYA Move of Regiment towards MATRUH cancelled, and C.O. reported to 22 Armd Bde, AMARIYA. C.O. proceeded on to H.Q., 8th Army, returning in evening. 19 October 1941 AMARIYA 1400 Regt left AMARIYA and proceeded East and South to BIR RIWAQ area (474891) 8 miles South of BURG-EL-ARAB. Areas allotted here for various units of 22 Armd Bde during training, but they had not yet arrived. 20 October 1941 BIR RIWAQ 0900 C.O. called a B.C’s conference and outlined the type of training intended. The new Bde had to get used to desert conditions and to carry on as regards air dispersion, etc. 21 October 1941 ALAM SHALTUT 2/Lieut. NICHOLL joined the Regiment, and posted to “D” Bty. Regiment moved to ALAM SHALTUT area. Movement Order attached. Appx IV Administration Instruction No. 1 for 22nd Oct 41 issued. Appx V 22 October 1941 ALAM SHALTUT Training begins to settle down. Troops go out on schemes. 23 October 1941 ALAM SHALTUT Brigadier SCOTT COBURN [sic] called. Regiment ordered to move again. 24 October 1941 ALAM SHALTUT 0815 “M” Bty and R.H.Q. set out to move to TALLET EL HIMIRA (520879), but course was altered during march to QARET EL ABD (511479), as previously arranged area had not been reconnoitred and was found to be covered with soft sand hills. “J” and “D” Btys, who were out training, came correctly to the new area, and “M” Bty were diverted in time, but many vehicles of R.H.Q. had a difficult time and were out all night. Brigadier CAMPBELL stayed the night. 25 October 1941 QARET EL ABD Preparations made for field firing at G. KHASIM EL QAOUD (504866). 26 October 1941 QARET EL ABD 4 lorries departed for CAIRO to draw essential stores and desert equipment still outstanding. 27 October 1941 QARET EL ABD Field firing by “D” and “M” Btys. The results were not good, but the layers were new and valuable lessons were learnt. 1300 Brigadier COBURN [sic] called and it was agreed that regiment should move NORTH into the new Bde area. 28 October 1941 QARET EL ABD Field firing for “J” Bty. Quite fair results. The Colonel of 2 S.G. called in the afternoon. Major COWAN, cmdg “C” Bty 4/R.H.A. stayed the night. Recent arrivals in the Bde area had been “C” Bty 4/R.H.A., “C” Bty 102 A/Tk Regt (NH), and B Coy 1/K.R.R.C. 29 October 1941 508892 0855 C.O. left for Bde HQ. 0900 Regt left, moving North to new Bde area. “J” and “D” Btys moved independently carrying out training and convoy schemes. 1015 R.H.Q. and “M” Bty arrived area West of Pt. 32 (510892). Lt. (QM) E.E. JONES joined unit, posted from 28 Field Regt R.A., vice Lt. (QM) H.V. WHITBY, posted to G.H.Q. as Staff Captain on his return from South Africa. With Lt. JONES, 14 reinforcements arrived, also 8 temporarily detached personnel, including Sgt. THURSTON, B.Q.M.S. LYE, L/Sgt. (Art) JACKSON and L/Sgt. DAY from South Africa. 30 October 1941 508892 1430 Lt. General CUNNINGHAM visited C.O. 1700 B.C’s conference summoned by C.O. to detail further training. 31 October 1941 508892 Demonstration by R.E. on forcing an A/Tk minefield attended by C.O., 2 officers and 6 O.Rs. 22 Armd Bde moved off West for a week’s training, leaving 3/R.H.A., 2 S.G. and R.E. behind.
According to Years of Defeat the 7th Armoured Division, including 3 RHA was deployed near Mersa Matruh from late April. On 11th June they supported the attacks on Fort Capuzzo & Sidi Barriani.
Hi alas TNA file does not have June or July diaries for 1940. The page for May 1940 has D & J Bty moving out to War Stations, to join M Bty who were already their with the Support Group. Since Aug 1939 were at Mersa
Hi, does anyone following this thread have a copy of page 11 (see -11- at top of the diary, just above Summary of Events ) for March 1945. TNA Ref is 3 RHA 1945 1945 Jan.- Apr WO 171_5079. Somehow. I managed to miss taking a photo of this one page and it is preventing me transcribing the diaries for 1945. It should have SCHREVENROT 25.3.45 a few lines up from the bottom from what I can see through page 10.
