Yanks in the Vosges, 1945

Discussion in 'NW Europe' started by Earthican, Feb 14, 2011.

  1. Earthican

    Earthican Senior Member

    I have looked but have still not found any better place than ww2talk for placing potentially useful information that was fun to find. So I hope members will find some interest in this thread that has a US focus.

    The operations of the US Seventh Army in France have taken a backseat to the western Allies main effort in Northwest Europe. Other writers have pointed this out, and at first, I did not see any oversight, just a matter of the relative magnitude and importance of operations. However as I read more closely and tried to flesh-out the details of operations at the level that I had become accustomed, I found it was a major effort to piece together what happened.

    Of particular interest to me, at this time, is the German NORDWIND offensive. Here's a direct link to the starting chapter of the US Army official history. IMO, it is well-written and complete, but not down to the (loving?) detail found in the other volumes.

    HyperWar: Riviera to the Rhine

    So, I've turned to the Internet and found some pretty good gems (and all they needed was a decent map, from me, of course).

    Most accounts of NORDWIND start with the German effort east of Sarreguemines. This, combined with an effort in the Low Vosges mountains (German Hardt mountains) was intended to seize the Savern Gap and cut-off US and French forces in Strassbourg and the Alsace plain. IMV, mountains is probably the wrong term but we appear to be stuck with it.

    I found this article on the defensive effort by the 44th Infantry Division.

    The German Offensive


    Here's an excerpt that covers the actual fighting that I illustrated below.

    The 44th Infantry Division of the American XV Corps deployed between Sarreguemines and Rimling bore the full impetus of the enemy's right flank drive. In the space of a few hours the entire divisional front was engaged. On the left flank between Sarreguernines and Polpersviller the 114th Infantry Regiment with the aid of concentrated artillery fire smothered a determined enemy effort to exploit his Blies River bridgehead at the bend north of the Sarreguemines airport. In the center the enemy attempted three crossings southeast of Habkirchen without success, as the 324th Infantry Regiment held inviolate the line of the Blies River.

    The enemy unleashed the full fury of his attack against the 71st Infantry Regiment which held a line extending from Bliesbruck eastward to Rimling. A five company assault north of Rimling curled about the right flank of the 2nd Battalion forcing a withdrawal of about 1,000 yards. The 3rd Battalion of the 71st Infantry moved out to help restore the overrun positions. However, three companies of the enemy had driven through the 1st Battalion on the regimental left flank and had penetrated the Bliesbrucken woods 2,000 yards to the rear of the lines. The 3rd Battalion was diverted to meet this penetration and plunged into a pitched battle in the forest. Although assisted by a reserve battalion of the 324th Infantry, troops of the 71st Regiment failed to dislodge the enemy from his positions in the woods; but they contained his penetration and reformed the line along the southern edge of the forest.

    Elements of the 2nd Battalion of 71st Infantry aided by a platoon of tanks restored "their original positions" by 0600 hours on 1 January only to be dislodged again at 0730 hours. A see-saw battle raged throughout the day. At nightfall the right flank of the battalion rested on Maronviller form, which was attacked and set afire in the middle of the night. This action necessitated an additional withdrawal to a north-south line one mile, west of Rimling. Here the 2nd Battalion covered the readjustment of the remainder of the regiment before being placed in reserve. After dislodging or destroying isolated enemy groups behind the lines, reorganized troops established a line which ran west-east just below the Bois de Blies Brucken. At the eastern edge of the forest the line slanted southeast for over two miles to cover the northeastern approaches to Gros Rederching. The 3rd Battalion of the 253rd Infantry, which had been one unit of the recently disbanded Task Force Harris, was attached to the 71st Infantry and sent into the line on the right; the 1st Battalion of the 71st Regiment was in the center and the 3rd Battalion on the left.

    During the night of 1-2 January XV Corps had ordered the 12th Armored Division to establish and maintain a counter-reconnaissance screen west of the Sarre River and south of the Maginot Line to neutralize any infiltration of enemy armor. East of the Sarre River Combat Command A of the 14th Armored Division was given a similar mission which the 2nd French Armored Division was to be prepared to take over on 2 January. This relief was completed, and French armor blocked the western end of the Vosges passages from Meisenthal south to Phalsbourg. The unit also prepared to counterattack either in the direction of Drulingen-Sarre-Union, or along the line Drulingen-Rahling. Armor was poised for an equalizing blow should it be required.

    On 3 January the line of the 71st Regiment was again assailed by enemy tanks and infantry. The 2nd Battalion of the 114th Regiment, now also attached to the 71st Infantry, helped the 3rd Battalion of the 253rd Infantry to stabilize the situation after the latter unit had been pushed back a few miles. Although the 71st Infantrv had been able to weld its elements into a line capable of withstanding severe enemy attack, strong enemy groups appeared behind that line. Elements of the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 255th Infantry, the second regiment of Task Force Harris to be attached to XV Corps, supported by Combat Command L of the 2nd French Armored Division, were required to stop the gap and to recapture Aachen which is three miles southwest of Gros Rederching. The appearance of powerful armored reserves at this point of penetration and the severe losses that the enemy had suffered during these attacks may have been factors in the German decision at High Command level to curtail the Sarre offensive.

    Remnants of the enemy in the vicinitv of Aachen were eliminated on 4 January as the 2nd Battalion of the 71st Infantry made its way south toward the town, while the 2nd Battalion of the 255th Infantry cleared Aachen itself. The enemy in this sector became active again when elements of Combat Command L were driven from Gros Rederching by American tanks manned by Germans. After repelling an effort by the 2nd Battalion of the 71st Infantry to retake Gros Rederching the enemy withdrew. The Sarre pincer of Operation Nordwind had failed in its mission.



    Here's a shaded-relief map using data from Google Maps. In the area of the attack there is only scattered patches of woods. To the southeast, where the ground becomes broken (the western Low Vosges), that area is densely forested, with few open spaces.

    EDIT: 9 May 2013: The 776th Tank Destroyer Battalion supported the 44th ID and 100th ID. This page has links to the After Action Report for Jan 1945.

    http://www.tankdestroyer.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=274:776th-tank-destroyer-battalion&catid=44:battalions700s&Itemid=102
     

    Attached Files:

  2. Slipdigit

    Slipdigit Old Hickory Recon

  3. stolpi

    stolpi Well-Known Member

  4. Earthican

    Earthican Senior Member

    ^ MacDonald had the excuse that he had to cover all four armies: First, Third, Ninth and Seventh in the The Last Offensive. (but he got himself a cameo appearance with his rifle company across the Rhine, IIRC). :wink:

    He did better with The Siegfried Line Campaign though.
     
  5. Earthican

    Earthican Senior Member

    Re: When the Odds Were Even

    I've read the book, however I recall it was more of an analysis of the effectiveness of US Army units (when the odds were even).

    My copy is buried somewhere, but if you are up for it, I would welcome any additional details or contradictions. I do intend to post more links and maps, somewhat in sequence, so if you could wait until I cover a topic before adding additional details.

    At some point I was going to mention Aberjona Press. They have a number of titles covering different aspects of the fighting in the Vosges and Alsace. WtOWE is probably the most general account, but I don't recall it being a complete narrative of operations. The excerpt in the first post is the most detailed I have found for the 44th ID, printed or otherwise.

    Here's a link to the 44th ID website. They have some information on the Presidential Unit Citation awarded the 2d/71 Infantry (the excerpt in the first post is from the 70th ID website, go figure).

    Home: 44th Infantry Division
     
  6. Earthican

    Earthican Senior Member

    The excerpt in the first post covers the 44th Infantry Division nicely, but is oddly silent about the 3d Battalion, 397th Infantry, of the 100th Infantry Division. But that's OK, it dovetails well with this account:

    Military History Online - American Stubbornness at Rimling


    Here's an excerpt from the middle of the article, in case the site goes down (or away completely)

    American Stubbornness at Rimling
    by Allyn Vannoy

    "Only minutes after midnight veteran troops of the 37th SS Panazergrenadier Regiment, 17th SS Panzergrenadier Division, attacking along the entire battalion front, hit Company K. Apparently hoping to surprise the Americans, the Germans advanced without artillery preparation. They came at the American lines rushing forward bold and upright, shouting obscenities. In a determined attack about 200 men approached the positions of the 1st and 2nd Platoons, Company K. In the 2nd Platoon’s area, on the top of the hill, the right-flank heavy machine gun, manned by Private Leon Outlaw, Company M, tore holes through the advancing Germans. To the east along the highway, however, the Germans overran the positions of 1st Platoon. At least 18 Germans reached the north edge of Rimling where they attempted to set up machine guns at the rear of the 1st Platoon. While returning fire, the GI’s also called for support from the tanks in Rimling. After a few hits and near-misses the Germans fled, leaving guns and equipment behind.

    Although the first wave had been stopped, small groups continued to fire on Company K’s front. Often they stood upright and hollered “American gangsters” or “Yankee bastards” as they fired. This behavior allowed the Americans to kill or wound many of them. Frequently, with a kind of insane heroism, the wounded Germans continued to fire from where they had fallen. Small groups also tried to infiltrate through the American lines. Many wore white camouflage snow suits making it nearly impossible to see them against the snow, but when they moved they were revealed in the bright moonlight and were cut down by rifle fire.

    The main assault had been against the western two platoons of Company K on Schlietzen Hill, but there was also heavy patrol action against the 3rd Platoon and against Company L along the Epping-Urbach road and around the crossroads. Coming from the north, one German patrol was able to enter the outskirts of Rimling. Two Germans came within rifle range of the Company L CP, which was situated in a building in the east end of the town. A Sergeant Steen, at the doorway of the CP, fired at them, killing one and wounding the other. The wounded German was persuaded to come into the house to have his wound treated.

    Company L had its machine guns situated to fire on an area 75 yards to its front. During the night, Sgt. Robert L. Madren reported a German patrol that was attempting to assault his position from the northeast. He waited until the four leading Germans were close to his foxhole and then opened up, killing all four and driving off the rest of the patrol.

    The GI’s of the 3rd Battalion could hear the sounds of heavy fighting on the 71st Infantry's front to the west. After about an hour the Company K outposts heard the Germans regrouping to their front. They preceded their next onslaught with an artillery barrage. Immediately after the artillery and mortar fire lifted more than 300 Germans, screaming and shouting, rushed toward Company K from the north and northwest....".


    Sadly I only have this portion of the battlefield around Rimling, but it was a lucky find (more later).

    http://www.ww2talk.com/forum/attachment.php?attachmentid=45647&stc=1&d=1297800857

    Edit 23 March 2012: I've come across another source of period maps (thanks to this forum) and have pieced together a map that covers the terrain surrounding Rimling.
     

    Attached Files:

  7. Slipdigit

    Slipdigit Old Hickory Recon

    Re: When the Odds Were Even

    I've read the book, however I recall it was more of an analysis of the effectiveness of US Army units (when the odds were even).

    My copy is buried somewhere, but if you are up for it, I would welcome any additional details or contradictions. I do intend to post more links and maps, somewhat in sequence, so if you could wait until I cover a topic before adding additional details.

    At some point I was going to mention Aberjona Press. They have a number of titles covering different aspects of the fighting in the Vosges and Alsace. WtOWE is probably the most general account, but I don't recall it being a complete narrative of operations. The excerpt in the first post is the most detailed I have found for the 44th ID, printed or otherwise.

    Here's a link to the 44th ID website. They have some information on the Presidential Unit Citation awarded the 2d/71 Infantry (the excerpt in the first post is from the 70th ID website, go figure).

    Home: 44th Infantry Division

    Yes, it was a comparison, but was focusing on the units fighting in the Vosges and their success fighting without the benefits of many of the force multipliers found elsewhere. It's been a long time since I read the book, so your requests for specifics will cause me consernation, as I can't remember.
     
  8. Earthican

    Earthican Senior Member

    ... It's been a long time since I read the book, so your requests for specifics will cause me consernation, as I can't remember.

    That's OK, you're welcome to enjoy the ride. I still might come to an issue that forces me to dig out my copy.

    Have a goodn' :rolleyes:
     
  9. Earthican

    Earthican Senior Member

    I was searching for something related to NORDWIND when I came across this article posted to some Answers site. Another one of those lucky finds by Google search.

    This is a good description of the initial German thrust through the Low Vosges. Recall this drive was directed southwest in order to meet-up with the drive through Rimling. I have noticed the apparent attempt to surround the US 100th Infantry Division near Bitche. This was a similar maneuver to the one that trapped the green 106th ID on the Schnee Eifel. If successful a large hole would have opened-up in the American line, allowing the capture of the Saverne Gap. However it does not seem the Germans would have had the strength to 'reduce' the 100th ID if surrounded.


    A note on Task Force Hudelson. This was essentially CCR of the 14th Armored Division, minus 25th Tank Battalion; plus 94th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron (Mechanized) from the 14th AD - a divisional unit; plus 117th Cavalry(Mecz) from the VI Corps pool of attached units.

    They had taken over their sector from the 106th Cavalry Group (two cavalry squadrons) - a Seventh Army unit - that was covering the Low Vosges between the XV Corps (on the west) and VI Corps (on the east), during the early December drive north to the frontier.


    -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    This is from a manuscript written by LTC Hugh Foster III, U.S. Army Ret.

    THE OPENING MOVES

    2300 HOURS, 31 DECEMBER 1944 - 2359 HOURS 1 JANUARY 1945

    Holding the line between Sarreguemines and Rimling on this cold, clear
    night, XV Corps' 44th Infantry Division bore the full brunt of the
    westernmost attacks. The Germans jumped the outposts in the last hour of
    1944 and, howling and screaming as if drunk, crazed or drugged, charged into
    the main defense line just as the new year began. Most of the division's
    line held firm, and hundreds of the attackers fell writhing or dead in the
    snow. But a vicious assault by the 17 SS-Panzer-Grenadier-Division crashed
    into the right flank and folded it back like an opening gate, penetrating
    the defenses at the juncture of the 44th and 100th Divisions, just west of
    Rimling.

    The 100th Infantry Division, stretched between Rimling and Bitche, was hit
    frontally, and then by-passed on both flanks. The 397th Infantry Regiment,
    on the left, managed to hold on to Rimling in the face of the assault by the
    SS troops, but when the 44th Division flank hinged back to the southwest
    some SS formations managed to drive through the gap and, guiding on the
    railroad tracks, they headed southeast toward Rohrbach and Bining.

    On the 100th Division's right flank -- also the XV Cores right flank -- the
    559 Volks-Grenadier-Division's two regiments (1) plowed into the 399th Infantry
    line. Staying to the northwest of the road to Lemberg, the 1127
    Grenadier-Regiment attacked directly from the outskirts of Bitche. It ran
    into mines and. fire and temporarily foundered before the American
    positions. The 1126 Grenadier-Regiment, attacking to the southeast of the
    road, shoved past and over the extreme right flank of the 399th Infantry,
    and pushed south along the railroad tracks toward its objectives -- Lemberg,
    and the hill directly south of it. By the end of the day the 1127 Grenadiers
    had regrouped and renewed the assault; Reyersviller and the heights to the
    southwest were seized. However, the 399th had thrown up secondary defenses
    in front of Lemberg, and the attack there failed.

    TF Hudelson, named for its commander, Colonel Daniel H. Hudelson, stretched
    "paper thin"(2) on VI Corps' left flank from south of Bitche to Neunhoffen,
    fell like a house of cards to the combined assaults of 257, 361, and 256
    Volks-Grenadier-Divisions, which struck all along its front. The American
    motorized cavalry units -- which made up the bulk of the task force -- were
    wholly unsuited for employment in defense of forests or mountains, and
    totally inadequate in size to even slow down a three-division attack(3). For
    the most part, they simply evaporated.

    -----------------------------

    1. The division's third infantry regiment had been disbanded in order to
    increase the strength of the other

    2. This line was so weakly held that shortly before the German assault two
    German NCOs walked through the outpost and defensive lines and into the
    command post of the 62nd Armored Infantry Battalion, where they surrendered.
    They had not been noticed until they presented themselves as captives.

    3. TF Hudelson occupied a line almost ten miles wide in heavily forested
    mountains, a defensive area which, in a few days' time, would see three
    regiments fighting tooth and nail to stop the Germans from further advances.
    In the author's estimation, TF Hudelson has taken undeservedly bad press for
    its failure to hold this ground. In fact, VI Corps and 45th Infantry
    Division well knew how unsuited IF Hudelson was for this terrain -- at the
    moment of the German attack, the 275th Infantry Regiment (TF Herren) was
    arriving in the area; it was attached to the 45th Infantry Division and was
    to relieve TF Hudelson on 1 January.

    -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The cavalrymen and armored infantrymen were operationally tied to their
    vehicles - mostly M-8 eight-wheeled scout cars, half-tracks, and
    jeeps -which doctrinally provided them mobility, some armor protection,
    heavy firepower, and an abundance of radios. The cavalry units, and to a
    lesser extent the armored infantry battalion, were designed to move, shoot,
    and communicate, not to defend ground. Traditional missions were scouting
    ahead of or on the flanks of the main force, disruptive raids against weak
    targets in the enemy's rear, and confusing the enemy as to the location of
    the main force. The vehicles provided rapid movement on the battlefield; the
    vehicle-mounted weapons permitted devastating fire on unsuspecting targets
    or to break contact with an enemy combat unit; and the radios gave them the
    ability to report and coordinate while on the move.

    In the Vosges, these vehicles became a liability rather than an asset. They
    were noisy, road-bound and, even with tire chains, slipped and skidded on
    the icy surface. When the soldiers climbed into their vehicles to withdraw,
    reinforce, or reposition they found that all of the valued qualities of
    "mechanization" had been changed by the weather and the terrain into deadly
    burdens. Scout cars, jeeps, and even half-tracks progressed slowly in a
    series of one uncontrolled skid after another. They collided with other
    vehicles, and they drifted into trees and houses. They flipped over, and
    they slid into ditches, blocking the road to others. Recovery vehicles could
    not find tractive purchase to enable them to drag scout cars or half-tracks
    back onto the road. Even slight inclines defeated traction. Those few
    vehicles that could ease down a road were limited to a crawl and were
    ambushed at every turn by faster-moving enemy foot troops who could hear
    them coming long before they slithered into view. Certainly, some vehicles
    managed to escape, but most of the soldiers were forced to take to their
    heels when the situation became impossible.

    The 117th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, on the American left, was
    steamrollered by the 477 Grenadier-Regiment (257 Volks-Grenadier-Division),
    which was headed for Lemberg(1). The 117th fell back to Mouterhouse,(2) but was
    quickly surrounded and overwhelmed there by the 457 Grenadier-Regiment,(3)
    which had

    --------------------------

    1. The 477 Grenadier-Regiment tried twice during the day to take Lemberg,
    but failed; it was too weak to do the job alone, and its right flank
    neighbor from the 559 Volks-Grenadier-Division was not yet close enough to
    Lemberg to assist.

    2. According to the 100th Infantry Division history, The Story of the
    Century, someone in the 117th called the headquarters of the 399th Infantry
    Regiment shortly after midnight to announce, "We're falling back a little."
    When the 399th's Operations Officer asked "How far is 'a little'," the
    cavalryman responded "About two thousand yards." The next thing the
    operations officer heard was a click as the field telephone at the other end
    was disconnected.

    3. The division's third infantry regiment, 466 Grenadier-Regiment, was
    designated as korps reserve and was not available to the division for the
    initial assaults.

    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    plowed through the 94th Cavalry Squadron in the center of the TF Hudelson
    line. Attacking west down the road from Baerenthal, pushing elements of the
    94th Cavalry in front of it, the grenadiers ran right over the reorganizing
    cavalrymen in Mouterhouse, took many of them prisoner, captured several
    armored and thin-skinned vehicles, and put the survivors to flight. Those
    lucky enough to escape infiltrated farther to the rear through the forest,
    mostly to the area west of Reipertswiller(1).

    The 62nd Armored Infantry Battalion (on TF Hudelson's right flank, extending
    from Eguelshardt east to Neunhoffen) momentarily stood fast in the face of
    assaults by the 257, 361 and 256 Volks-Grenadier-Divisions. Eguelshardt was
    bypassed on the left by part of the 457 Grenadier-Regiment (257
    Volks-Grenadier-Division) and then hit head-on by the rest of that regiment.
    The armored infantrymen and a few men from the 94th Cavalry managed to hold
    off the attackers for awhile, but soon noticed German forces (the very same
    457 Grenadier-Regiment, and probably some of the 361
    Volks-Grenadier-Division as well) to the rear, on the Mouterhouse-Baerenthal
    road. To avoid encirclement, the squadron reformed into small groups and
    escaped into the hills.

    Scouts from Generalmajor Alfred Philippi's 361

    Volks-Grenadier-Division flitted through the American security line with
    ease, and the following assault battalions also managed to get through the
    outposts without a shot being fired. This division was the only attacking
    Northwind unit that jumped off from its previously-held battle positions;
    the men and the leaders were familiar with the terrain, had reconnoitered
    well in the few hours of planning time available to them, and knew exactly
    where the gaps were in the American screen. Also, since the division did not
    have to move in order to conduct the attack, its soldiers had had some rest
    in the previous days(2). The division pushed forward through the dark forest
    in two attack columns, each on a narrow front. On division order the
    assaulting regiments were to advance in battalion column, the lead
    battalions by-passing enemy resistance and striking deep for the American
    rear; by-passed positions would be cleared out by the trailing battalions.
    The division's mission was to take Reipertswiller and Wimmenau.

    Luck and stealth were with the right-flank 953 Grenadier-Regiment only as
    far as Bannstein. Screaming "Yankee Bastards!"

    -----------------------------

    1. A widely held view is that TF Hudelson -- at least the cavalry
    elements -- ran, rather than fought. Lieutenant Colonel Charles Hodge, who
    commanded the 117th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron wrote a memoir after the
    war (unpublished, but on file at the US Army Military History Institute) in
    which he tried to show that his men fought like savages until overwhelmed.
    He points the finger at the 94th Cavalry Squadron, on his left, as being at
    fault for the collapse of the line. Unfortunately (for him), he cited the
    squadron's casualty and loss figures: 1 killed, 13 wounded, and 25 missing
    soldiers; 38 jeeps, 12 armored cars, six light tanks, and two half-tracks
    lost. The figures do not demonstrate fanatic resistance. Nonetheless, it is
    clear from the sheer number of attacking Germans that holding the line was
    more than should have been expected of TF Hudelson, and losing it in the
    face of such massive attacks should not be held against the men or the
    units.

    2. The division had received many reinforcements and had managed to boost
    infantry battalion strength to around 400 and infantry company strength to
    80-100 men, but it had disbanded one battalion (II/951 Grenadier-Regiment)
    to do so.

    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    and "Die, Sons of bitches," the Grenadiers charged the village. They were
    held up until dawn by the men of C Company, 62nd Armored Infantry Battalion,
    who fought bravely until the situation became untenable. T-5 Augustine
    Bojorguez, a mortar man, was one of the many soldiers who fought with
    distinction on this freezing morning. He dismounted his 81mm mortar from a
    half-track and single-handedly placed it into operation on a railroad bed.
    From this position, totally devoid of cover or concealment, T-5 Bojorguez
    engaged an advancing German platoon with mortar fire. Although wounded in
    this action, he refused medical treatment and continued to fire until he had
    scattered or killed the Germans(1). But even such heroic stands could not stop
    the Germans for good. Eventually, the Germans brought up a couple of tanks,
    which drove slowly into the village blowing down one house after another
    with main-gun fire.

    Three men from I Company, 275th Infantry, were in Bannstein that night to
    coordinate the relief of C Company, 62nd. They were quickly caught up in the
    swirling fight. The C Company CP house came under direct assault, and the
    three I Company men joined in shooting and hurling grenades from the
    windows. A few men made repeated trips to an ammunition pile in the basement
    to supply the soldiers at the windows. Others cared for the many wounded
    lying on the floor of the building. Things looked grim, but the GIs fought
    with renewed vigor when a couple of ambulances pulled up to the rear of the
    house and started loading the wounded. Just as soon as the ambulances drove
    away, a German tank hove into view and blew the roof off the building with
    its 75mm gun. Everyone went piling out the back doors and into the forest on
    foot. C Company had been driven from its positions with the loss of all
    vehicles. The Germans captured 15 half-tracks, two cargo trucks, and several
    jeeps.

    After the village fell,(2) the regiment (with I/ 951 Grenadier Batallion
    attached) continued south along both major roads, but pockets of cavalrymen
    and infantrymen -- but mostly men from A Company, 125th Armored Engineer
    Battalion -- offered stiffening resistance and for awhile the attack slowed
    to a crawl. However, after being reinforced with a few assault guns, the
    Grenadiers finally broke through the defenses at 1500 hours. Moving along
    the railroad tracks the Germans seized the hamlet of Forneau-Neuf and before
    dark they controlled the entrance to the Reipertswiller road, just east of
    Melch(3)

    Penetrating deep into the forest in TF Hudelson's right-hand sector, the 952
    Grenadier-Regiment, on the division's left, crossed the Bannstein-Lieschbach
    road and, still unnoticed, occupied the heights north of
    Fischerhof-Baerenthal before

    -----------------------------

    1. T-5 Bojorguez was later awarded a richly deserved Silver Star Medal.

    2. The Germans pushed on through Bannstein and continued south. Soon after
    the last German had departed, survivors of the 62nd Armored Infantry
    Battalion, who had escaped into the forest, returned to the abandoned
    village, later to be joined there by other cut-off and routed elements of
    the 62nd. Until they infiltrated to American lines the next day, this small
    group of men constituted a small pocket of American resistance behind the
    German lines.

    3. During the day's exploits the regiment captured 200 American soldiers and
    20 armored reconnaissance cars.

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    daylight. The regiment's attack to seize the twin villages was held up
    awaiting displacement of supporting artillery, which was severely hampered
    by the icy-slick roads, undulating terrain, and American mines. The German
    cannoneers persisted, however, and in time, managed to drag their
    horse-drawn pieces through every obstacle. At noon, supported by the weight
    of the whole of division artillery, the attack kicked off, to be met with
    immediate, although limited, success. Fischerhof fell by 1400 hours and a
    counterattack from Baerenthal along the road from the west was repulsed.
    Thalhaeuseln fell at about 1600 hours. However, in Baerenthal elements of
    the 62nd Armored Infantry Battalion and Colonel Hudelson's command post were
    still holding out. One of those hold-outs was a staff sergeant from A
    Company, 136th Ordnance Battalion, who had come forward the day before to
    give classes to the infantrymen, subject: care and cleaning of the Browning
    Automatic Rifle. (Needless to say, he did not present the instruction!)

    Colonel Hudelson had no idea what had happened to the 117th and 94th
    Cavalry -- all communications with his subordinate units had been knocked
    out. All he knew was that he and his men were fighting for their lives in
    Baerenthal(1). German infantrymen had occupied portions of the town and were
    working their way from building to building. Hudelson called his division
    for reinforcements, and was told the 19th Armored Infantry Battalion and A
    Company, 25th Tank Battalion, were on the way, with columns heading for
    Mouterhouse, Philippsbourg, and Baerenthal. The group that slithered and
    crashed into Baerenthal arrived none too soon. A German machine-gunner was
    firing into Hudelson's command post from a building directly across the
    street when, in finest Hollywood fashion, the "cavalry" came to the rescue
    at the last second. An M-4 "Sherman" medium tank rumbled up the street and
    rocked to a halt just outside the command post. Emitting a high-pitched
    whirr, the turret rotated toward the German machine gun position, and from a
    range of about twenty yards the tank fired one 75mm high explosive round
    into the building, putting a definite end to that threat.

    The tanks and armored infantrymen dispatched to Philippsbourg arrived in
    time to help the remnants of the 62nd Armored Infantry hold that town, but
    they were too late and too fragmented to save either Baerenthal or
    Mouterhouse. Under cover of his rescuers, Colonel Hudelson withdrew his
    command post to Reipertswiller. He got out of Baerenthal just in time. After
    the 953 Grenadier-Regiment seized the entrance to the road to
    Reipertswiller, the remaining five guns of the Assault Gun Company were
    shifted to the attack on Baerenthal, which fell at about 2300 to attacks
    from three sides.

    The 19th Armored Infantry Battalion set up its command post in Mouterhouse
    and tried to send its A Company to reinforce Bannstein. However the roads,
    and Mouterhouse itself, were clogged with wrecked, abandoned and destroyed
    vehicles and

    -----------------------------

    1. American artillery, firing in support of the defenders at Baerenthal
    pulled out all the stops. In a single five-minute period A Battery, 500th
    Armored Field Artillery Battalion, fired 511 rounds at the attackers!

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    cavalrymen on foot. German artillery fire splattered the town and its
    approaches. While A Company was trying to pick its way through the clutter
    and keep most of its vehicles out of the ditches, the Germans attacked from
    two directions. Chaotic to start with, the situation now turned to absolute
    pandemonium. Those who could do so got the hell out. The 19th Armored
    Infantry Battalion withdrew to Sarreinsberg with B and C Companies; A
    Company was scattered. The 117th Cavalry fled to Wingen sur Moder.

    Behind them, the Germans pushed on through the snow and the mountains, in
    some cases pausing to strip the American dead of their winter clothing. Many
    dead GIs were stripped to the skin so that their overcoats, woolen pants and
    shirts, shoe-pacs, and gloves could be divided among several Germans. The
    bodies were not abused; this was a simple, desperate act to fight the
    biting, searing cold from which there was seemingly no other protection. In
    one case, a wounded and unconscious GI was taken for dead and stripped of
    everything but his underpants -- miraculously, he managed to hobble through
    the snow to the salvation of the American lines and medical evacuation.

    Two regiments of 256 Volks-Grenadier-Division, the easternmost of the
    Northwind attacking divisions -- charged with taking the mountain exits near
    Windstein, Niederbronn, and Zinswiller -- ran into more of the 62nd Armored
    Infantry at Lieschbach and on the battalion's right, near Neunhoffen. The
    476 Grenadier-Regiment, the right (west) "wing" of the 256
    Volks-Grenadier-Division thrust, attacked through the forest initially
    against weak resistance, but the attacking battalion was exhausted from the
    start and the attack moved slowly. As the regiment approached Lieschbach,
    just at daylight, it launched an attack from the march. However, the attack
    failed, and the regiment pulled back into the woods north of the town.
    Around noon (after the town had been bypassed by other units) the attack was
    renewed and a stiff fight ensued. When the armored infantrymen defending
    Lieschbach found that the unit on the left had disappeared, they broke into
    small groups and conducted fighting withdrawals to Baerenthal and
    Philippsbourg to avoid envelopment(1). Lieschbach was in German hands by
    evening.

    In the center of the 256 Volks-Grenadier-Division sector the 456
    Grenadier-Regiment was to take Neunhoffen, force a crossing over the flooded
    area of the Rothenbach Stream to the north, and seize Dambach in conjunction
    with the 481 Grenadier-Regiment. The Germans ran into F Company, 157th
    Infantry, which had outposted Neunhoffen, and fighting began in and around
    the town before daylight. The Germans captured the bridge intact and finally
    forced F Company to fall back to Dambach before daylight. At dawn heavy
    artillery fire followed by a strong American counterattack

    -----------------------------

    1. Those elements of the 62nd which withdrew to Baerenthal probably arrived
    just in time to be overwhelmed along with the rent of the defenders.

    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    from Dambach(1) held the 456 Grenadiers in Neunhoffen. Although this and
    several other counterattacks during the day were repulsed, the Grenadiers
    had sustained so many casualties that by dark the prospects for holding
    Neunhoffen against further counterattack were grim, and an attack on Dambach
    was considered impossible.

    With one of its two battalions withdrawn as a division reserve, but with a
    Luftwaffe (Air Force) infantry battalion attached, the 481
    Grenadier-Regiment executed the 256 Volks-Grenadier-Division's left flank
    attack. It had the mission of assaulting Dambach from the east in
    conjunction with an attack on that town by the 456 Grenadier-Regiment.
    Second and Third Battalions, 157th Infantry Regiment, were waiting for the
    attackers in excellent defensive positions. Surprise was not achieved by the
    Germans and their casualties were high; the attack on Dambach was aborted.
    The Luftwaffe battalion captured Obersteinbach (which was undefended), but
    elements of Third Battalion, 157th Infantry, resolutely held out at
    Niedersteinbach.

    When the Germans bowled through and around the 399th Infantry, taking the
    thin screen of TF Hudelson cavalrymen and armored infantrymen with them, the
    100th Division found itself threatened with envelopment of its right flank.
    Hastily, the 399th Infantry fell back from the high ground south of Bitche
    and began to establish new positions facing east to refuse the division's
    right flank. On the division's left flank, 44th Division was taking steps
    with reserve battalions to re-establish its connection with the 100th near
    Rimling.

    By the end of the day there was a huge hole on the VI Corps left boundary
    and the flanks of the 399th Infantry (100th Division) and the 157th Infantry
    (45th Division) were wide open. There was little hope that the remnants of
    TF Hudelson in and around Philippsbourg and west of Reipertswiller could do
    much to plug the hole. There was also a deep penetration of the XV Corps
    line between the 44th and 100th Divisions through which scattered elements
    of the 17 SS-Panzer-Grenadier-Division were curving southeast behind the
    100th Division and moving toward the VI Corps boundary.

    General Frederick was in a fix. He had just inherited the only part of the
    VI Corps line that had been blown to hell, and it was now his responsibility
    to fix it. All battalions of the 157th and 180th Infantry and 36th Engineer
    Regiments were committed to the line in the regimental sectors; these
    regiments effectively had no reserves to counter any local breakthroughs or
    to give up for division use. He had already ordered the 179th Infantry, the

    -----------------------------

    1. This counterattack was executed by A Company, 179th Infantry. The whole
    of First Battalion, 179th Infantry, had been rushed to the 157th's area
    during the day as a reserve for that regiment.

    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    division reserve, positioned vicinity Lembach,(1) to dispatch its First
    Battalion to back up Second Battalion, 157th Infantry, near Dambach. The
    275th Infantry, which was still arriving in the area at nightfall, was
    slated to shore up the line in the Philippsbourg-Baerenthal area. Frederick
    had only two reserve battalions remaining at his disposal (Second and Third
    Battalions, 179th Infantry) and that wasn't enough to plug the gaping hole
    southwest of Baerenthal and to protect against the SS troops driving toward
    the corps boundary behind the 100th Division. Hesitant to use his last
    remaining reserves for a mission beyond their capabilities, Frederick called
    for help.

    In efforts to directly address the crisis on the 45th Division's western
    flank there began on 1 January what in the days to follow would be a
    bewildering shuffling of units and parts of units to stamp out German
    threats wherever they appeared. Until the last few days of the month
    battalions, regiments, task forces, and whole divisions would streak back
    and forth across the Seventh Army sector in a dizzying succession of
    stop-gap missions.

    VI Corps began stripping units from the Rhine River defense and from the
    less-threatened 79th Division sector. By midnight one of TF Herren's
    regiments(2) and four of the 79th Division's infantry battalions had been
    attached to 45th Division and had arrived in the area. Most of the attached
    battalions were used immediately to attempt to plug the hole between the
    100th Division's right flank and the 157th Infantry's left flank. The 275th
    Infantry (TF Herren) established its CP in Niederbronn and in the evening
    pushed two of its battalions forward, toward Baerenthal and to
    Philippsbourg. First Battalion, 313th Infantry (79th Division), moved to
    positions north of Reipertswiller while the Second Battalion of that
    regiment assembled vicinity Reichshoffen to await further orders. Two more
    79th Division battalions -- First Battalion, 314th Infantry, and First
    Battalion, 315th Infantry -- arrived around midnight and were held in
    reserve near Zinswiller.

    Things were also hopping on both sides of the 45th Division. Late in the day
    Seventh Army secured the release of the 141st Infantry (36th Infantry
    Division) from SHAEF reserve and rushed the regiment to the 100th Division
    area, where it relieved the 399th Infantry and went into position along the
    newly established north-south line from Lemberg to Sarreinsberg. The 100th
    Division now had formed a second front in addition to the initial front
    line. On the VI Corps right, 79th Division was given TF Herren (less the
    275th Infantry) and extended its right flank

    -----------------------

    1. There is a need for caution when tracking the flow of battle on a map of
    Alsace; there are numerous villages with similar, and in some cases nearly
    identical names. Lembach is to the southeast of Niedersteinbach, well in the
    American rear -- this is where the 179th Infantry Regiment assembled.
    Lemberg is due south of Bitche -- this was the objective of several German
    attacks. Just to keep things from being too simple, there is a Lambach just
    a couple of miles northwest of Lemberg, and there are two villages named
    Wingen. Although the two Wingens are properly identified as Wingen and
    Wingen-sur-Moder, they are both referred to merely as Wingen in many
    contemporary documents, journals, etc.

    2. The 275th Infantry Regiment was actually stripped out of the Rhine
    defenses before the German assault. The regiment was enroute to relieve TF
    Hudelson when the Germans struck -- it was immediate response by this
    regiment that saved Philippsbourg, and contained the Germans just south of
    Baerenthal.

    -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    accordingly. On the southern right flank of VI Corps, TF Linden now defended
    much of the Rhine River line to a point well south of Strasbourg.

    The Germans had made significant penetrations in the left of the VI Corps
    line, driving as far south as Mouterhouse, Melch, and Baerenthal by the end
    of the day. However, they had been successful only against the weak defenses
    of TF Hudelson -- the 157th Infantry held its positions at Dambach and
    Niedersteinbach, and elements of the 62nd Armored Infantry Battalion had
    held out at Philippsbourg until reinforced by the 275th Infantry. Fifty-five
    Germans had been taken prisoner.

    However, the shifting of so many units to the left flank of the 45th
    Division had materially weakened the rest of VI Corps' line and had raised
    concerns about the ability of the corps to defend in other areas. It came as
    no surprise when, late in the day, a warning order was issued for VI Corps
    to begin withdrawing to that portion of the first rearward defense line
    still in American hands -- the Maginot Line from Dambach east to the Rhine.

    During the night the first troops of KG Schreiber, a reinforced SS mountain
    infantry battalion, arrived in the battle area. SS-Oberführer1 Schreiber
    reported to Generalmajor Philippi and received instructions to assemble his
    unit around and east of Melch (on the right flank of 953 Grenadier-Regiment)
    and to be prepared to attack Wingen sur Moder on 3 January, after the
    arrival of the balance of the kampfgruppe.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
     
  10. Earthican

    Earthican Senior Member

    I illustrated my interpretation of the previous post. The routes of the German units are speculative. Note most valleys had good roads, abeit snow and ice covered. There are fewer roads/trails over the hills but some. The whole of the map is covered with forest except the plain in the southeast corner. Attached below is a clean copy of the map with most town names.

    http://www.ww2talk.com/forum/attachment.php?attachmentid=45831&stc=1&d=1297893263
     

    Attached Files:

    Formerjughead likes this.
  11. dave500

    dave500 Senior Member

    Unless you had Hugh Foster's permission, posting such a substantial portion of his manuscript
    is not a good idea.


    Dave
     
  12. Earthican

    Earthican Senior Member

    Good point. Right now, I'm under the impression that this was generated from his work at an army research center. In the past this stuff has been public domain. I'll keep checking.

    PM me if you know otherwise, just to keep the thread somewhat on track.

    Thanks
     
  13. stolpi

    stolpi Well-Known Member

  14. Earthican

    Earthican Senior Member

    The quality of available information on the Internet goes down hill from here. This link provides an overview of the offensive in the Low Vosges from the American point of view. I excerpted the second day (2 January 1945) for illustration.

    Operation Nordwind

    By the second and third day, the Germans will make their deepest advance, but will realize their ventures west of the Vosges had failed. Plans were then hatched for offensives east of the Vosges on the Alsace plain, which we will turn to later.

    For now the Germans were trying to make the most of their advances to tie-down as much US strength as they could. The US had been finding ways to hold-out a reserve and still man the line however thinly. One un-answered question I had from reading the official history was how and when did the 45th ID manage to send two of its infantry regiments to the valley of the Moder River near Wingen-sur-Moder. In mid-December, the 45th ID had advanced into Germany north of Niedersteinbach (top-right corner of the maps) and wanted to hold those gains if possible. Before the Germans struck, the 36th Engineer Combat Regiment relieved the 179th Infantry. Then on, or about, 3 January 1945, the VI Corps pulled back from the frontier to the line of the Maginot forts. This allowed the later release of the 180th Infantry.

    I should try to explain the existence of Task Force Harris (63d ID), TF Herren (70th ID) and TF Linden (42d ID). These were the infantry regiments of the named infantry divisions, which were sent ahead of their artillery and other support elements. The command in Europe was hoping to use these units carefully while extending their training to make up for recent personnel disruptions in the rifle companies. However the crisis in the Ardennes, and then the Vosges, made their use in full combat roles un-avoidable and before they were considered ready.

    By the end of December, the 63d ID regiments had been distributed to the 44th, 100th and 3d ID's (one each). The 70th ID regiments were responsible for a sector along the Rhine north of Strasbourg. The 42d ID regiments held similar positions around, and south of, Strasbourg. Just before the Germans struck, the 275th Infantry (70th ID) was moving to relieve TF Hudelson (CCR 14th AD, plus and minus).

    When the Germans struck, the 276th then 274th Infantry were also attached to the 45th ID, along with the 313th Infantry, minus one battalion, plus one battalion each from the 314th and 315th Infantry of the 79th ID. The regiments of the 42d ID moved to cover the Rhine north of Strasbourg and along the positions that followed the Maginot forts.

    It's my guess that the regiments of the 42d were now operating under the 79th ID. Said otherwise, the 79th ID sector now covered the whole north Alsace plain with the 42d ID regiments attached. The French 3rd Algerian Division moved to cover Strasbourg and the Rhine to the south.

    The official history carefully maintains the distinction that these units belonged to the named Task Forces. I suppose this is to make clear that the named division was not deployed and not operational. I will generally refer to the named division as a way of crediting the division to which the veterans of these infantry regiments took great pride.

    (wow, more text than map)
     
  15. Earthican

    Earthican Senior Member

    Here's the excerpt:

    2 January '45
    6th Army Group



    In XV Corps area, pressure forces 44th Div's right flank to fall back ... and causes 100th Div's right flank to fall back further. In VI Corps the Germans maintain pressure against reinforced 45 Div, particularly on its west flank, former zone of TF Hudelson ....TF Herren's 276th Inf takes up switch position in Wingen, Wimmeneau areas. 79th Division takes over S. portion Rhine line held by TF Linden.



    45th Infantry Division
    As a result of enemy penetrations the left boundary is moved west again to take over the east shoulder of the German penetration. The division withdraws its right flank to Maginot Line defenses under enemy pressure. From right to left the disposition is: 36th Engineer Regt. responsible for maintaining contact with 79th Division on right; next the 180th Regiment and the 157th Regiment on the left.


    179th Infantry was committed to stabilize the West Shoulder of the penetration. The first two battalions left for Wingen at 0400. They moved immediately to the north west and launched attacks against enemy troops moving south. Strong resistance was encountered and local counter attacks were repulsed.



    275th Infantry (TF Herren) - 1st Bn and 2nd Bn attack against moderate to light resistance and took many prisoners. 2nd Battalion in blocking positions in Southern edge of Baerenthal.



    313 Infantry in vicinity of Reipertswiller, on the nose of the penetration, cleared town, placed road blocks on all roads. Repulsed estimated enemy counterattack. 314th Infantry (79th Div) lst Bn. remained in Division Reserve until end of day when attached 313 Infantry at Reipertswiller.



    315 Infantry (79th Div) 1st Bn remained in Division Reserve prepared to counter attack any enemy thrusts on order. (G-3 Report)



    Accounts from the 275th presented a different story at the grass roots than the view from Division Headquarters. The 3rd battalion was ambushed north east of Philippsbourg and their K Company never received orders to move forward. In the afternoon the Battalion pulled back to Philippsbourg. In the words of the S-3, "the 3rd Battalion got pretty well cut up last night!" Radio contact was out for most of the day with the forward companies of both the lst and 3rd Battalions.



    276 Infantry was attached to 45th Division. Moved to occupy Corps switch position along Moder River. 1st Bn.Wingen, 2nd Bn. Wimmenau to Ingwiller with COPL with 37mm AT gun across the Moder River and 3rd Bn in reserve south of Wingen. By the time the penetration was scaled off the 45th Infantry Division had command of eight regiments.



    Task Force Herren (274-/276 Inf) 274th Inf moved to new position to the west of Wingen to protect road and west flank of 276 Inf. Orders received, when en route to new position, for 1st Bn 274th to move to vicinity of Philippsbourg where it would be attached to the 275th Infantry which was under heavy enemy pressure.


    Here's a map. German movements come from my reading of Seven Days in January. At the Aberjona Press website they have many of the maps from the book at low resolution. Except for the detailed maps of Wingen-sur-Moder, I was not impressed by these maps, but appreciated the effort to provide as much as possible.

    http://www.ww2talk.com/forum/attachment.php?attachmentid=45899&stc=1&d=1297977934
     

    Attached Files:

  16. Owen

    Owen -- --- -.. MOD

    See a few Div signs from units that had served in Italy .
    I wonder what %age of the men in the Vosges were old Italian hands & how many were replacements.
     
  17. Earthican

    Earthican Senior Member

    Hi Owen,

    The US divisions from the Italian Theater were 3rd, 36th and 45th IDs. Divisions added from Third Army since link-up were French 2d Armored, US 79th Infantry. New divisions were 44th, 100th and 103d ID's plus 12th and 14 AD's.

    There is also the French First Army to the south. I'm afraid I can't provide a run-down off the top of my head. Will check later.

    The old Italian hands took light casualties on the Riviera but heavy casualties in the High Vosges. Given that not much time had passed for even the lightly wounded to return to their units I would guess maybe half the rifle strength was old Italian hands.

    I read a memoir from a 100th ID veteran, and I recall how impressed he was when he met up with the veteran's of the 45th and 3d ID. And how young their company leadership appeared to be. No old infantrymen.
     
  18. dave500

    dave500 Senior Member

    Hi Owen,

    The US divisions from the Italian Theater were 3rd, 36th and 45th IDs. Divisions added from Third Army since link-up were French 2d Armored, US 79th Infantry. New divisions were 44th, 100th and 103d ID's plus 12th and 14 AD's.

    There is also the French First Army to the south. I'm afraid I can't provide a run-down off the top of my head. Will check later.

    The old Italian hands took light casualties on the Riviera but heavy casualties in the High Vosges. Given that not much time had passed for even the lightly wounded to return to their units I would guess maybe half the rifle strength was old Italian hands.

    I read a memoir from a 100th ID veteran, and I recall how impressed he was when he met up with the veteran's of the 45th and 3d ID. And how young their company leadership appeared to be. No old infantrymen.

    The third Bn of the 157th Infantry Regiment, 45th Infantry Division, was essentially destroyed at Reipertwiller in January 1945. The 157th had not sustained such losses since Anzio.

    The Battle of Reipertswiller

    In late January and Feb., the regiment replaced its losses and trained for the upcoming assault on the Siegfried Line.


    Dave
     
  19. Earthican

    Earthican Senior Member

    For the sake of acknowledgment for fighting in the Vosges.

    French First Army:

    * 1st Free French Division (1st DFL, later became the 1st Motorized Infantry Division and finally the 1st March Infantry Division)
    * 2nd Armoured Division (2nd DB, former 2nd Light Division)
    * 2nd Moroccan Infantry Division (2nd DIM)
    * 3rd Algerian Infantry Division (3rd DIA)
    * 4th Moroccan Mountain Division (4th DMM)
    * 9th Colonial Infantry Division (9th DIC)
    * 1st Armoured Division (1st DB)
    * 5th Armoured Division (5th DB)
    * Moroccan Goums (Four groups of Tabors equivalent to one brigade)
     
  20. Earthican

    Earthican Senior Member

    The two previous maps covered the initial German assault in the Low Vosges and the US reaction. It seems the US reaction map could have applied to January 3rd, not just January 2nd, as the excerpt implies. I'll repeat the link here, so if anyone is interested they can read the whole article.

    Operation Nordwind

    **EDIT: I recently found this eyewitness account of the attack on Philippsbourg. (Battle starts on the second page)
    Camp Roberts to Germany to Fight in 1944

    Excerpt
    3 January 1945
    ....
    The view from the 275th presented a much grimmer picture. The German 156th V.G. Division launched a strong infantry - tank attack on Philippsbourg. The 1st Battalion was driven back along with the 3rd Battalion in some disarray. The Regimental Headquarters was uninformed of this situation until late that night. As noted in subsequent reports there had been some disorder when the troops fell back. The scattered troops were soon rallied and linked up with units of other battalions.
    ....
    **End Edit**

    So this next map will somewhat cover 4-6 January. The excerpt includes events from the 7th of January.

    This mostly completes the formation of the "Bitche Bulge". While it did not succeed in driving through the Low Vosges to the exits in the west, it did tie-up a large number of American infantry battalions. This re-shuffling greatly weakened the US position in the north Alsace plain. Also bare in mind that the attacks around Rimling were just starting to die down.

    The histories speak of a change in German operations to gain the east exits in the Low Vosges to link-up with operations on the north Alsace plain. I have not seen a complete description of this effort. There are references to shifting the 36 VGD and Volks-Artillerie-Korps while maintaining the use of 6. SS-Gebirgs-Division Nord in the Low Vosges, but there does not seem to be any major actions, or least descriptions of major actions.


    "4 January '45 - 6th Amy Group: In VI Corps area 45th Div. continues fight to reduce Bitche salient, 180th Infantry moves to outskirts of Wingen, attacks NE across Wingen-Wimmenau road to ease pressure on Reipertswiller; Linden's line along Rhine is extended to include zone held by TF Herren.

    45th Infantry Division: Now reinforced with Regiments from 79th Division and Task Force Herren (strength 26 Infantry battalions, 10 Artillery battalions). Division attacks to maintain Maginot positions in the east. Strong enemy pressure continues against West Shoulder of penetration east of Sarreninsberg and against Reipertswiller. Heavy enemy pressure against East Shoulder of penetration vicinity of Philippsbourg.

    Town of Wingen located on Corps switch position attacked and seized by troops of newly arrived 6th SS Mountain Division. According to PW accounts the 1st and 3rd Bn 12th SS Mtn Regt. moved through gap between the 179th Inf. on the shoulder of the penetration and the 313 Inf at Reipertswiller. 180th Infantry moving north into position between 179th Infantry and 313th Infantry hit 2nd Bn 951st Regiment which was moving to support attack on Wimmineau. Continued German fighting on Western Shoulder. 180th Infantry finally opens road to Reipertsweiler.

    The 275th Infantry (+1st Bn, 274th) consolidated its positions south of Philippsbourg and conducted strong counter infiltration combat patrols in area. The 3rd Battalion moved back under heavy pressure, company K joined with 1st Bn and L company linked up with the 2nd Battalion. I company still out of contact. 1st Bn 274th launched attack on Philipsbourg. At end of day had seized half of town.

    Task Force Herren (-275 Infantry & 2nd Battalion 274th Infantry): 276th Infantry hit by strong enemy attack. Company B ambushed by German troops which seized Wingen.

    On the Following day, 5 January, the 276th Infantry launched attack by the 3rd Bn. and companies A and B of the 1st Battalion by tanks. As noted by the participants, it took heavy casualties and was a disaster. By now the German success at Wingen became the focal point of the German drive. The 45th Division's CG and staff's frustrations at the 276th Infantry's failure to regain Wingen before it could be reinforced through the gap in the front line is reflected in the Staff Journals.

    The 2nd Bn. 274th attack supported by two battalions of the 276th Infantry was launched on 6 January. It broke into the town but the lead company took heavy losses. Its company commander and executive officer were casualties and it suffered 19 KIA and 40 WIA out of 120 men. The Germans had also suffered very heavy casualties. The German veterans said that the 3rd Bn.12th SS Regiment had 450 when they attacked Wingen on the 4th. By the time they withdrew they only had 2 officers and 110 men left. On January 7th the renewed attack secured Wingen and over 250 prisoners were freed from the church where they had been held, most of them from the 179th. Regiment.

    Meanwhile to the north east of Wingen the gap between the east flank of the 313th Infantry and the pass at Rothbach held by the 3rd Bn. 274th Inf. remained a German infiltration route. The 2nd Bn. 276th was attached to the 313th. Infantry to assist in blocking this hole. On 6 January it joined a coordinated attack of the 179th., 180th and 313th Infantries. As noted in the 7th Army Report of Operations during this attack the 2nd Bn. 276th. Infantry seized the castle at Lichtenberg, a village east of Reipertswiller which they held against a fierce German counter attack. On the 7th. January "in conjunction with elements of the 313th Infantry the 2nd. Bn., 276th as it continued its attack to the high ground north east of Lichtenberg, trapped and eliminated elements of the 2nd Bn. 952 VG Regt." Its mission complete 2nd/276 Inf. moved south east to rejoin the 276th Regiment. "

    http://www.ww2talk.com/forum/attachment.php?attachmentid=45957&stc=1&d=1298058504
     

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