Would Hitler really have invaded Britain?

Discussion in 'General' started by spidge, Nov 26, 2008.

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Did Hitler really have the intention to invade Britain or was he bluffing?

  1. Yes

    6.8%
  2. No

    93.2%
  1. Thunderbox

    Thunderbox Member

    The channel islands could never be defended ,It is a fact that no enemy trod their jackboots on the UK mainland.

    I am sure that if the other vets here were asked "could we defned our Isle".The answer would be no....After dunkirk we had nothing. It is on record that the MOD gathered together all they could to make one Division a fully equipped unit (Third Div)

    THose days were full of imminent danger


    At Britain's weakest point, just after the fall of France on 22 June 1940, Germany had no sea-lift capability, no troops trained for amphibious operations, no specialised equipment - and no staff planning. UK had at least two ready divisions, and enough hardware (small arms, artillery) to field about 250,000 troops in unarmoured formations. The RN remained largely intact and had about 60 units in home waters ready to interdict a crossing attempt.

    Three months later in September - the start of the Battle of Britain - Germany still only had a rudimentary plan and a collection of completely inadequate sea-lift assets concentrated - the infamous Rhine barges, etc. UK had about five divisions fully armed by then, and about another 500,000 men under arms (depending how you classify units under training, etc). Again, the RN had about 80 units on standby.

    For a reality check, just look at the effort that had to go into D Day - even when the allies had 5,000+ dedicated ships, a million men available, and overwhelming air power...


    Whatever the mood in UK during 1940, or whatever is perceived as result of the whole WW2 "legend", the military facts are extremely clear: the Germans were never capable of achieving more than a suicidal airborne bridgehead, and UK's defences were relatively strong even at their weakest point. Note that not a single German general is known to have even bothered to take Sea Lion seriously....


    Edited to add: with regard to the OP question, I think most Hitler biographers conclude that he wasn't even expecting the fall of France, but rather expected vaguely to be concluding an armistice with UK/France from the strength of occupied territory similar to WW1. Whilst he ordered the preparation of Sea Lion, it appears to have been simply on the basis of exploiting an unexpected situation. The fact that it took less than three months for him to completely abandon the idea - instead spending the entire time planning Barbarossa - arguably indicates that he'd never contemplated more than a continental land defeat of UK. There is no evidence at all of long-term pre-planning for a UK invasion, ie the concentration of war material, the build up of sea power, the full integration of his three fighting services, etc.
     
  2. Ron Goldstein

    Ron Goldstein WW2 Veteran WW2 Veteran Patron

    Further to my posting #237

    In October 1942, at the age of 19, I entered the army and I show below a map of Nazi Occupied Europe, as it was then known.

    Am I now being told that there was never a threat of invasion ?

    You could have fooled me...........and a few others !

    Ron
     

    Attached Files:

  3. Wills

    Wills Very Senior Member

    If we take the time to look through speeches prior to hostilities there is indeed plenty of evidence of intention. The belief that Germany and her future was only going to be secure if the two great threats were taken care of - France and Britain. Did he not say so to the Reichstag in 1937 and prior dates, did he not say that Britain's Empire would fall if he could deal with it here. Perhaps we are reading this now as bluff, would we if listening to his threats then? As for using D day a 'reality check!' Maybe we can see it that way it had not occurred then for planners to refer to. Not many had experience - Montgomery ran beach assault exercises in 1938. Yet another reason why I prefer to seek out the records than look at 'fact' cherry picked to suit the book authors slant.
     
  4. Thunderbox

    Thunderbox Member

    Further to my posting #237

    In October 1942, at the age of 19, I entered the army and I show below a map of Nazi Occupied Europe, as it was then known.

    Am I now being told that there was never a threat of invasion ?

    You could have fooled me...........and a few others !

    Ron


    There might have been an apparent threat, but there was no real likelihood.


    You could show the same map of the Spanish Empire or of Napoleon's Empire; the strategic situation is the same - a continental land power cannot take Britain without a powerful Navy and a good grasp of seapower, if there is a good Navy in defence.

    Spain and France both had strong navies in their time, and still failed in their invasion attempts (Armada - which was admittedly a close-run thing -and Trafalgar). 1940 Germany had a weak navy and no grasp of seapower whatsoever.

    Ironically, the only time Britain's naval guard has been down was in 1066 - and .... today.....


    In many ways the "invasion scare" was probably deliberately stoked by Britain's government to (a) focus the population on the war effort (b) ramp up the propaganda effort on the US.

    Apart from the expected contingency planning, there is little trace of real crisis amongst British military commanders in 1940. It must have been clear to them as much as to modern military analysts that Germany simply wasn't capable of a successful invasion.

    IIRC (I don't have my sources with me), UK industry had more less replaced all of the "Dunkirk losses" as early as mid-September. UK war production was outstripping Germany's in many areas and, for defensive purposes, ensured a decisive superiority in an invasion scenario.

    June 1940 is surrounded by many fondly-held myths and misconceptions. E.g. take the excellent "Dunkirk losses" thread: my special research interest is rifles (I collect Lee Enfields). Its commonly held that Britain lost 90,000 rifles and was "helpless" or "disarmed". Apart from the fact that no-one knows how the 90k figure was established and it was probably substantially less than 60k - in 1940 Britain owned about 2.1 million rifles, most of which were still in the country....
     
  5. Wills

    Wills Very Senior Member

  6. Ron Goldstein

    Ron Goldstein WW2 Veteran WW2 Veteran Patron

    Thunderbox

    There might have been an apparent threat, but there was no real likelihood.

    I thank you for pointing out to me the difference between something being apparent as opposed to it being merely likely.

    Like other veterans who post on this site, during those heady days of ww2 I often experienced the phenomena of unpleasant material being directed towards me by the enemy.

    This varied in type, according to the situation, but invariably included bombs, shells, mortars and even small arms fire.

    In hindsight, I can't help thinking I could have benefited immensely by having someone such as yourself alongside me at the time, to point out which items were apparent as opposed to those that were likely.

    Regards

    Ron
     
  7. phylo_roadking

    phylo_roadking Very Senior Member

    Your comments about workers being moved into and out of London and Londoners being unaware of how the battle is being fought are, surely, contradictory. Or was this mass movement of workers done so precisely that there was no risk of them learning that airfields were no longer being occupied?


    As precise as a railway timetable ;)

    Biggin Hill, Hawkinge, Kenley etc aren't exactly the middle of nowhere. It would be noticed. People in the 11 Gp area, who'd seen fighters taking off daily, would notice the removal of said aircraft and would certainly start to worry, potentially moving into London for fear of the expected German invasion.

    First of all - the withdrawal of combat aircraft doesn't mean the actual evacuation of airfields; looking at the example of Lympne again, the airfield was manned with a small ground and maintenance detachment even when it had been closed as a forward dispersal field for Biggin Hill; two Hurricane pilots landed there in extremis to rearm and refuel later during the BoB, only to find the men were willing - but there was no .303 ammunition on hands! The abandoned fields WOULD also of course still have to be defended against the Germans taking them!

    Then there's the issue of those said workers being at home to actually see/hear aircraft taking off/landing during their working day ;)

    As for potentially moving into London - don't forget ALL official advice and instruction was against the panic evacuation of coastal areas etc., or of people leaving their homes to clog the roads as refugees. Some of the orders I've seen ibrought up in various threads on various forums regarding defensive operations make it quite clear that main and "B" class roads were going to be made available to Home Forces for forward movement
    I.E. refugees were going to herded into the nearest field and propably kept there :p

    More importantly, those who walked the halls of power would know. More than a few politicians and Lords wanted Edward restored to the throne. Halifax was a constant thorn in Churchill's side who made unilateral peace overtures to Germany - it wasn't until December 1940 that Churchill could get rid of him by "promoting" him to become the ambassador to the US.

    Churchill drew Halifax' sting on the 20th of July when he found that he had been negotiating with the Germans AGAIN via Lord Lothian in Washington. From then on, ALL Foreign Office correspondence and communications to Lothian was to pass through the Cabinet Office first :p He also severely embarassed Halifax politically by not only ordering Halifax to order Lothian to cease contacts with the German minister in Washington...he ordered Lothian directly himself, in parallel I.E. bypassing Halifax.

    Churchill did survive a couple of no-confidence votes in 1941 and later but that was after the Battle of Britain "saved the nation". One wonders how well he'd have done if his political adversaries moved for such a vote because the defence of Britain was noticeably damaged.

    1/ the defence of Britain HAD already bee seriously damaged on his watch I.E. Dunkirk...and no vote of no-confidence appeared;

    2/ those votes were IIRC "single members'" bills with very little support on the floor of the House, usually defeated with HUGE majorities

    Much talk of intrigue - Hard to believe the German general staff would advise on leaving the UK to be sorted out politically. They had just crushed much of Europe - were they really going to leave a fortress with a moat protected by the 'iron fist' of the Royal Navy out on the left flank of Europe.

    Don't forget how much of a hold Adolf had over his generals following the defeat of "the old enemy", France ;) He had overruled the majority of them and gone with Manstein's plan...and it had worked. As far as they were concerned, right then - he was the leader who produced miracles, who walked on water.

    One thing to remember about whether or not Hitler actually intended to invade Britain...is Goering's words to Kurt Student at the very beginning of September 1940, on the 2nd, when Student went to Karinhall to be decorated; he raised several issues reagarding the preparations in hands by the FJ for SEALION...and was told by Goering not to worry, and pay more attention to his health - and that Hitler had never intended to launch an invasion anyway, Sealion was postoned! ;) At the end of September Student was back at Karinhall, and this was reiterated, that Hitler was hesitating because he still hoped for negotiated settlement - but of course, by then the Autumn weather was against the prospect for 1940.
     
  8. arnhem44

    arnhem44 Member

    uuhhhm... your question cannot be properly answered by the yes/no answer.
    "Did Hitler really have the intention to invade Britain or was he bluffing?"
    Is 'Yes' the answer to Yes, he had the intention...or Yes, he was bluffing ... (duh).

    From what I gathered is that YES the desire was there and would have proceeded in earnest IF the victory/invasion would present itself EASILY (as was promised/boasted by Goering).
    However, the KriegsMarine (Raeder) was more realistic (perhaps more defaitist?) than the Luftwaffe and foresaw a bloodbath/impossibility to cross over a constant stream of armies and material warding off the HomeFleet.

    The nazis were right at least to not to invade before there would be an absolute domination over the skies of Britain..later downplayed to Domination over England only..
    Since that result was not achieved (within a few weeks in end of summer) an invasion (in mid autumn; bad weather..only deteriorating) could not take place (with tanks rolling from Dover till Edinburgh in mid winter).

    In Hindsight with all production and order of battle data available it was a foolish enterprise from the beginning...but considering the lack of data AND the sheer optimism after having defeated France (THE largest opposing Army against Germany) and the BEF, quite understandable.


    However, the REAL purpose of it all was to force Britain in a peace deal (hence stopping tanks before Dunkirk as a first signal) , and as germans were aware that the Americans had serious doubts of Britain's determination to fight on, a mere show of force (by the Luftwaffe and perhaps paratroopers) would be the next step to throw the Churchillian "warmongers" out of the Parliament so to start truce negotiations.
    The same naive thought the Japanese had when bombing Pearl harbour; ordinary democratic civilians would not have the heart to fight and would demand their government to start peace negotiations and give in to demands.
    The fact that the Germans had no detailed plans (only ad hoc in the course of july 1940, with modified riverboats still to be assembled) on how to put tanks and footsoldiers in England is proof that that part of the invasion was not seriously conceived before the invasion of France.

    edit: golly , I see now this original post was from 2008 :(
     
  9. sapper

    sapper WW2 Veteran WW2 Veteran

    Your post was Reality Ron mate..Reality..... The idea that Hitler did not want to invade is ...Well you name it.....proof of the pudding was the preporations that had been planned in depth for ther running of the country after they had won int he UK........not nice!
     
  10. phylo_roadking

    phylo_roadking Very Senior Member

    In regards to the timing issue - it's also worth remembering that the FJ were only surveying likely sites in the Low Countries for forward dispersal from their barracks in Germany in the last week of September, and drawing up forward deployment timetables after that...

    Very few people seem to have ever credited Hitler with the capabiltiy of creating a fictional invasion to maintain pressure on the British to bring them to the negotiating table; after all, the BEST way of doing this is by preparing a real invasion...simply one that never happens ;) Even those taking part in the preparations on the German side had to believe 100% it was actually going to happen...

    A Hitler who had begun the summer of 1940 with all sorts of psi-war ops to ramp up the pressure on the British public...who had exaggerated the Wehrmacht's military readiness at the time of the re-occupation of the Rhineland by, among other things, ordering the SAME two squadrons of bombers to fly round and round to pretend to be a much larger force of bombers...who had invented huge dissaffected Volkdeutsch populations in several Central European nations as a pretext for invading them...who's Luftwaffe had managed to pull the wool over to inspecting Allied air staff officer and bluffed them into thinking in early 1938 that the Luftwaffe on the eve of the Czechoslovakian Crisis was twice as strong as it was...this was a sneaky little sh1t who frequently proclaimed to friends that he preferred to achieve his aims by sneakiness and covert action ;)

    After all - didn't we in a way do EXACTLY the same in FORTITUDE/FORTITUDE NORTH/FORTITUDE SOUTH? :)
     
  11. arnhem44

    arnhem44 Member

    Against THIS "mighty" fleet, the RN mustered a destroyer force of thirty-six destroyers divided into three flotillas each under a cruiser as command ship, based at Medway, Southampton and Portsmouth. Together with these they had all the vessels of the RN Patrol Service in the South of England for ASW and anti-mine duties - literally hundreds of assets.

    When gamed at Sandhurst in the famous reconstructions of the 1970s, the Home Fleet sortied from Scapa Flow on the first day of the invasion, cleared the North Sea in two days and entered the Channel on the third - cutting the "sea bridge" to the South of England and shelling the bridgehead to bits. Three days wouldn't have been enough for the Germans on land to advance out of naval gunnery range...

    Did this 'famous' (?) reconstruction take into account the sheer overweight of german aircraft in this small area ? Wouldn't those 36 destroyers divided over ..hmm say 200 stukas, 50 Bf110 and 100 Me109 be sunk within half an hour ? ..not counting landbased artillery on the French coast and a number of torpedo planes/bombers?
    All that without any of german's battlecruisers around...

    So, no way of telling which direction it would go.
    You'll need a proper simulation (game) to work this out..and then still it all comes down to the right timing of all forces involved.
    :p
     
  12. phylo_roadking

    phylo_roadking Very Senior Member

    You'll need a proper simulation (game) to work this out..


    It was. It was a Sandhurst Military College fully umpired game, with guest advisors like Adolf Galland in attendance. The "events" and outcome were written up by Richard Cox as his book on Sealion.

    Did this 'famous' (?) reconstruction take into account the sheer overweight of german aircraft in this small area ?


    Aircraft can't be in two....or even three...places at once ;) Those Luftwaffe aircraft that survive a Lutwaffe-successful BoB would be supporting the invasion bridgehead on the ground, providing CAS, continuing their attacks on the coastal crust, defending the beachhead against Operation BANQUET, escorting bombers etc. etc...

    Wouldn't those 36 destroyers divided over ..hmm say 200 stukas, 50 Bf110 and 100 Me109 be sunk within half an hour ? ..

    Didn't happen off Norway ;) Properly-trimmed destroyers can manouver to avoid fall of shot; some survived days of this off Norway a few months previously...

    And there's always NIGHT - when the destroyers can close up to the invasion beachhead and the transit ports on the other side of the Channel...one of the small, forgotten details of the summer of 1940 is that the RN's destroyers DID bombard Channel ports by night and do their share of bargebusting.

    ..not counting landbased artillery on the French coast
    Even the largest/longest-ranged of these only reached halfway across the Channel. And it's worth taking note of exactly HOW many ships were ver sunk in the Channel during the long-range artillery duels 1940-44...

    and a number of torpedo planes/bombers?

    Really? Check when the first torpedo-armed He111s were in service ;) Before that...there's only the Luftwaffe and Wekusta's seaplanes and flyingboats.

    All that without any of german's battlecruisers around...

    1/ the German plan was to sortie these in the southern half of the North Sea to block Home Fleet's path south; they would have been used up against Home Fleet...and there were so few serviceable after Norway that they were having to rely on uboats and minefields doing the same for the southern approaches to the Narrows.

    2/ Given that Home Fleet's larger units couldn't operate in the Narrows...how could the Kriegsmarine's? ;) Sandbars, shallows and narrow channels are quite neutral, they affect both sides...
     
  13. Thunderbox

    Thunderbox Member

    Did this 'famous' (?) reconstruction take into account the sheer overweight of german aircraft in this small area ? Wouldn't those 36 destroyers divided over ..hmm say 200 stukas, 50 Bf110 and 100 Me109 be sunk within half an hour ? ..not counting landbased artillery on the French coast and a number of torpedo planes/bombers?
    All that without any of german's battlecruisers around...

    So, no way of telling which direction it would go.
    You'll need a proper simulation (game) to work this out..and then still it all comes down to the right timing of all forces involved.
    :p


    The 1974 Sandhurst wargame gave a walk-over to Britain even though (a) the British particpants tried to be "fair" to the German participants, and (b) in 1974 there was almost no public domain information about the true prepared defences of UK in 1940 - the plans & evidence being still lost/secret.

    When Sea Lion is wargamed today, using latest archaeological evidence (eg the MG bunkers covering the German para landing grounds above Dover), the games ends quickly - whichever advantage you give the Germans, the RN decisively wipes out the sea-lift and reinforcement. Even if you give the Germans a beach landing (a) they cannot be resupplied and typically expend their csups (combat supplies) in about 48 hours (b) they are easily contained by the defending forces.

    Whereas UK might have been short of armour for a few weeks in June/July 1940, there was still a very large amount of artillery available. If you factor in a few of the more obvious advantages of Britain fighting on its own territory (civilian motor & rail transport, telephone communications, short aircraft sortie times, excellent logistics, etc) it becomes easy to generate a solid defence and annihilating counter-stroke.


    As noted, the RN didn't just have 30 destroyers, it had 60-80 major units available (battleships down to destroyer/frigate) plus about a hundred other armed craft or one sort or another. I.e. even a trawler mounting a 20mm Oerlikon and a determined crew might be fairly lethal against a French tug boat towing three barges at about 5 knots...


    In 1940 the Luftwaffe had very little experience or ability against shipping. Note that relatively light damage was done at Dunkirk/Crete against ships that were unable to properly manoeuvre - i.e. which were engaged in picking up and transferring troops. No serious historian or analyst thinks the Luftwaffe could have dealt with 50-80+ fast-moving warships - especially when those warships would be mixed in with German "friendlies".


    Sea Lion is still war-gamed today at UK and other staff colleges, but only for amusement. It always ends up so one-sided that it is not useful as a training exercise. When I did it, my group decided to cancel the invasion bit and try to war-game the UK land-battle part - i.e. assuming a successful & reinforced invasion. Even then it soon proved pretty futile - in 1940 the germans simply didn't have the millions of troops available, or the urban fighting skills - or the appetite for mass casualties. Remember that even the German General Staff (vide William L Schirer) estimated that they would suffer a MILLION casualties just trying to clear London, if the British defended the city...
     
  14. Jack_Goulding_info

    Jack_Goulding_info Junior Member

    Do not think technology was the answer, in the Battle of the Atlantic the sonar was near useless in heavy weather. HF/DF did help a lot though. Sheer training and instinct won us through. If in any doubt - Captain Walker RN - History

    I'd say that the Enigma machine capture, HF/DF, longer ranged aircraft equipped with radar and depth charges, escort carriers, and greater numbers of escort corvettes and destroyers were the tools that really put it to the Germans in 1943.

    Cheers,

    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_the_Atlantic_(1939%E2%80%931945)#Convergence_of_technologies

    "
    By spring 1943, the British had developed an effective sea-scanning radar small enough to be carried in patrol aircraft armed with airborne depth charges. Centimetric radar greatly improved interception and was undetectable by Metox. Fitted with it, RAF Coastal Command sank more U-Boats than any other Allied service in the last three years of the war.[44] During 1943, U-boat losses amounted to 258 to all causes. Of this total, 90 were sunk by Coastal Command and 51 damaged.[45]"
     
  15. red devil

    red devil Senior Member

    a pretty good, fair, assessment Jack. And Alan Turing inventing the computer did wonders to decoding speed.
     
  16. arnhem44

    arnhem44 Member

    The 1974 Sandhurst wargame gave a walk-over to Britain even though (a) the British participants tried to be "fair" to the German participants, and (b) in 1974 there was almost no public domain information about the true prepared defences of UK in 1940 - the plans & evidence being still lost/secret.

    When Sea Lion is wargamed today, using latest archaeological evidence (eg the MG bunkers covering the German para landing grounds above Dover), the games ends quickly -

    I agree that on paper germany never stood a chance to keep the invasion going once the whole home fleet moved in.

    But so too were the French optimistic about their own defense (more tanks than germany, more heavier tanks than germany, more troops than germany). Even if someone (a french general , I forgot his name, and Alan Brooke as well?) pointed out to the weaknesses in the area in front of Sedan (perfect Tank corridor in Belgium), nobody felt worried.

    Even the belgium fortress Eben Emael had on top a few MG bunkers that could cover parts of its "roof" (I have been there to be amazed) against the para's.

    Yet all of that FAILED on the moment when it had to prove its worth.

    An element often overlooked in simulations is that not all troops (especially the defenders) are focussed/concentrated as much as you'd want them to be.
    And if something goes wrong in the coordination of combined troops (land, air, navy) than all plans and calculations are meaningless (goes for the Germans as well as the british).

    And who knows ? once an initial german party (paras and a first batch of tanks and footsoldiers) has landed and made some aggressive progress, panic may easily strike the population and perhaps some collaborating forces would voice their distrust in current government ( hello Edward VIII ) and it would snowball things just as much as it did in France...

    Most of the french soldiers never saw a german (or were conquered) when France leaders already gave up hope/spirit.


    ..On paper FC Barcelona always wins from every other team on this planet... yet, they still lose some games B)
     
  17. phylo_roadking

    phylo_roadking Very Senior Member

    As noted, the RN didn't just have 30 destroyers, it had 60-80 major units available (battleships down to destroyer/frigate) plus about a hundred other armed craft or one sort or another. I.e. even a trawler mounting a 20mm Oerlikon and a determined crew might be fairly lethal against a French tug boat towing three barges at about 5 knots...

    Brian Lavery, the naval historian, puts the figure at ~625 armed trawlers and motor yachts of the Auxiliary patrol, and up to 150 RN coastal craft.

    The destroyer flotillas were noteworthy in that although they weren't permanently constituted - the destroyers asigned to them carrying out a wide range of duties on a daily basis - bargebusting at night, patrol sweeps, coastal convoy escort, even convoy escort right out into the Western Approaches...none were EVER to be more than five days' fast steaming from their assigned ports - the expected duration of the CROMWELL "invasion imminent" warning before hostilities broke out again.

    But of course there were plenty of other destroyers in Home waters also; these were just the ones reassigned to South Coast ports ;)

    Even the belgium fortress Eben Emael had on top a few MG bunkers that could cover parts of its "roof" (I have been there to be amazed) against the para's.

    Yet all of that FAILED on the moment when it had to prove its worth


    It didn't of course help that it's probable a sizeable part of the garrison was drunk...or at least hung over :p...the Belgian government having announced the day before that they were increasing home leave for Reservists from two days to three days a week to save on army pay! :lol:
     
  18. Paul Corrigan

    Paul Corrigan Junior Member

    Crikey: this has been going for four years.

    My first post in this group, and so my 2c worth.

    The poll asks for yes or no answers on two contradictory points: did he intend to invade - yes or no; or was he bluffing - yes or no.

    Which answer indicates what?

    I go with he never intended to invade. He didn't want to. The Heer wasn't prepared for it. Neither was the Kriegsmarine. The Norwegian campaign had been a disaster for the navy. The only big ship available was the heavy cruiser Admiral Scheer, which was being readied for the raiding sortie she (or he) made at the end of 1940. Nearly half the destroyers had been wiped out at Narvik. Bismarck, Prinz Eugen, Tirpitz were still in the future.

    But also: after France Hitler demobilised the army. He went for a holiday. The Kriegsmarine, despite scouring Europe for every barge it could find, didn't seriously believe the army could do the invasion. No planning had been done for an invasion of Britain before the war because Hitler and his leadership didn't believe Britain and France would go to war over Poland.

    He made peace overtures to Britain. Historians tend to regard these as insincere ploys, and they might have been.

    By mid-September 1940, when he 'postponed' Sea Lion, his main focus was already the Soviet Union.

    The Luftwaffe's failure in the Battle of Britain had given him his excuse to not invade.

    - Paul
     
  19. Ron Goldstein

    Ron Goldstein WW2 Veteran WW2 Veteran Patron

    Paul

    Firstly, welcome aboard!

    Well you may say Crikey !

    This thread is one of the golden oldies and I think most forum members have at one time or another offered their views on the subject.

    I see I said this back in November 2008.

    Not likely to change my mind either !

    When Spidge first posed this question he said:
    What is your personal view. Did Hitler really have the intention to invade Britain or was he bluffing?
    Yes or No!

    I answered then with an un-reserved "Yes" and today, for what it is worth, I now elaborate.

    I was a teen-ager when war broke out and at that age politics did not form a large part of my life.

    By the time I was 19 however and about to be called up, I had matured enough to recognise the evil that was the Third Reich and, as a member of a Jewish family, I had no illusions whatsoever of what would have happened to myself and members of my faith if Hitler were to eventually occupy the British Isles.

    I believed then and believe just as firmly today that Hitler, given his way, would have sought to occupy these Isles.

    That he was thwarted in his plans was the miracle of the times in which I lived.

    Ron
     
  20. Wills

    Wills Very Senior Member

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