Is there a link between the two? A bit off topic, but maybe worth mentioning. When I was studying the original German drafts of the Ardennes Offensive at the Military Archives in Freiburg i.Br., Germany, I noticed that the maps were printed on the back sides of the maps of England (!). Maybe due to a shortage of paper. Anyway, it can be safely said, that by the fall of 1944 Sealion had no longer the attention of the German High Command.
In WWII it was often the case of maps being printed onto the backs of others that were surplus to requirements - I have seen several Allied maps printed on both sides, it is a fair assumption to think that the Germans thought that all that could be achieved by a major victory in the West would be a separate peace with britain and the USA and returning the western countries of France Holland & Belgium to their original owners - leaving German Forces to concentrate on the Eastern front. This was the geo-politcial solution Hitler hoped for - but of course had no chance of getting.
But Edna "did Hitler really intend to invade England"-I appreciate the preparation, but how firm was the intention ;when considered against such frightful odds. jainso31 Yes, JS, I think he did; he thought he had a great deal of support from the Mitfords and their friends and contacts, and people like Mosley, but I think he changed his mind after he discovered what the opposition was likely to be. Edna
I answered no! Quite simply you need a surface fleet capable of dominating the local sea area and troop carrying ships and the specialised vessels (and skills) to land enough troops on a hostile defended shore and then supply them with everything they need. Germany had none of the above. Norway saw the loss of the majority of the German Navies Destroyers several of their crusers and many of their troop transporters. I may be wrong but I believe that due to losses and damage to capital ships they could have mustered in August 1940 4 destroyers and a Heavy cruser. On top of this the Germans had been impressed with the fighting ability and training of the British Army during the brief but hard fought campaign in France where even reserve British units had given them a tough fight. No I believe that they had no serious intention nor the ability to mount an invasion. Edit: Also at the height of the Battle of Britian didn't an entire Armored Division get sent from the UK to North Africa? If the powers that be seriously believe that Germany was going to invade why send away one of your most powerful divisions?
Though the answer is only a guess, I have found the book the making of modern London 1939-1945 LONDON AT WAR by Joanna Mack and Steve Humphries a good book for provocative thought on the matter. Best regards, Fernon
I had this to say on an earlier thread back in 2008 and yes, I still think that Hitler originally intended to invade Britain. Quote: Originally Posted by 51highland Dunno if any of the veterans on here can comment but, My father said that after Dunkirk, when on guard duty at change over, the limited ammunition that they had was handed to whoever was relieving them, sometimes only 3 rounds.The only ammo of any real amounts was for the anti aircraft machine guns on aerodromes. Hi 51 Highland Your Dad was spot on, even two years later it was still 5 rounds of ammo and I mentioned this in another thread: In December '42 I was stationed at Whitby being trained as a Driver/Wireless Operator in the Royal Artillery. Most nights, after a hectic day's training, we would find ourselves on guard and manning pill boxes strategically placed on the cliff tops of nearby Robin Hood's Bay. Two men to a pill box, armed with Lee Enfield rifles and 5 rounds of ammo each. The pill box had no creature comforts whatsoever, just the bare bleak concrete walls, the only light coming through the weapon slit facing seaward. Toilet arrangements non existent, ditto for seating, and food was what you had been issued with if the cooks were in a good mood. However many layers of clothing we donned before going on guard we froze and by the end of our shift we were comatose having exhausted whatever conversation we used to keep ourselves awake. You could say that England was slightly un-prepared for a German attack ! The full thread is here: http://www.ww2talk.com/forum/other-r...uard-mate.html Regards Ron
There is no doubt whatsoever that Hitler intended to invade the UK. His failure to do so cost him the war. For he lost the UKs industrial capacity and its man power. I recall there were quite powerful voices in the ruling Tories to make peace with Hitler. There was a very different mindset amongst the MPs. A way of finding out how they thought is illustrate very clearly; when a Tory MP complained forcibly in the commons. "We should not bomb German arms factories, They are private property" Had Hitler got hold of this land he would have won..Hands down...He would soon have control of our services, Army, Air force, and a huge Navy.... and our huge manufacturing capacity. A huge potential, and a 55 million souls that could be worked to death for the Fatherland ! Sapper
A way of finding out how they thought is illustrate very clearly; when a Tory MP complained forcibly in the commons. "We should not bomb German arms factories, They are private property" IIRC even Churchill didn't change the policy of dropping nothing more leathal than leaflets over the Ruhr for some moths! And under th same policy in late 1939, Bomber Command had been ordered not to bomb German ports, only vessels in port roads' could be attacked - leading to the disasters over the German Bight. But on this... There is no doubt whatsoever that Hitler intended to invade the UK. I was checking other details for a thread on AHF the other day; particularly Student's input to the FJ's preparations for Sealion. This is what I posted up there... Student...was in a sanatorium for half the summer of 1940! MacDonald notes that he kept a "lively interest" in all Putziger's discussions and attempt to alter/expand the role of the FJ in Sealion, but it's questionable of the day-to-day minutiae of logistics were brought to his attention. He didn't leave hospital until August, and then Goering told him at his medal presentation at Karin Hall that Hitler wouldn't be invading England, and..."Nothing will happen this year at any rate".....and he wasn't to trouble himself with the preparations but to concentrate on his health! Student didn't see his superior again until the end of September...
IIRC even Churchill didn't change the policy of dropping nothing more leathal than leaflets over the Ruhr for some moths! And under th same policy in late 1939, Bomber Command had been ordered not to bomb German ports, only vessels in port roads' could be attacked - leading to the disasters over the German Bight. But on this... I was checking other details for a thread on AHF the other day; particularly Student's input to the FJ's preparations for Sealion. This is what I posted up there... The individual who opposed the bombing of private property in Germany was not merely an MP, but the Minister for Air, Sir Kingsley Wood. Apparently, the proposal was put to him that German forests should be fire bombed in order to bring about a shortage of timber. His response was something along the lines of 'Do you not realize that these forests are private property? Why, you will be asking me to bomb Essen next!' As to the possible German use of paratroops and an Air Landing Division as part of Sealion, in mid-August 1940 the Luftwaffe only had about 230 Ju52 transport aircraft on strength, not all of which were operational. Given that a Ju52 could carry 15 paratroopers at most, the Germans were never in any sort of position to launch an airborne assault during the Sealion period.
Once Churchill had taken over the reins of power any idea of a British peace with Hitler went out the window and it as it turned out it was a fight to finish, before that there were a number of people in power that would have settled for some form of peace treaty
Once Churchill had taken over the reins of power any idea of a British peace with Hitler went out the window Not necessarily. It's hard to know exactly what was going through Churchill's mind in the critical weeks of May 1940 because the record is incomplete and sometimes contradictory, but there is some evidence that he may have been willing - at least in principle - to consider a compromise peace. Chamberlain, for instance, recorded in his diary on May 26 that Churchill had said that: "'If we could get out of this jam by giving up Malta and Gibraltar and some African colonies, would jump at it." At the War Cabinet meeting held the same day Churchill is supposed to have said that: "If Herr Hitler was prepared to make peace on terms of the restoration of German colonies and the overlordship of Central Europe," that might in theory be a basis for negotiation. Now, Churchill stressed in both cases that he doubted either deal was likely to be offered by Hitler at that particular moment in the war. And it's possible that he may have just been placating his colleagues who were more eager to open negotiations. But it's also possible that he was at least theoretically open to the idea of a deal. When Churchill insisted in May 1940 that the war should continue he may not, then, have been signalling an absolute unwillingness to ever deal with Hitler under any circumstances. Rather, he may have been taking the less romantic but (arguably) more realistic position that if Britain gave a good account of itself in the remainder of 1940, then it might be able to secure better terms in an eventual peace deal. Best, Alan
Once Churchill had taken over the reins of power any idea of a British peace with Hitler went out the window and it as it turned out it was a fight to finish, before that there were a number of people in power that would have settled for some form of peace treaty Actually - this is not quite true... 1/ during DYNAMO were was several days of discussions in the War Cabinet in relation to the Italian offer (via the Swedes) to facilitate talks with the Germans. Churchill wavered at least once under pressure from Halifax, until he addressed the full Cabinet on what was happening and he came out of that more convinced than ever to fight on. The offer to mediate/facilitate was rejected for several reasons; A/ the cost I.E. what would Mussolini ask for such a favour - Churchill was of the opinion it would be MALTA and after wavering for a day (see above!) decided that that was too high a price to pay; B/ a fear that any subsequent treaty/agreement would leave britain too militarily weak to defend itself; C/ a fear that if a German Control Commission or something similar was posted to britain to ensure treaty compliance that this, plus increased activity by a renewed German diplomatic presence in London, would result in a growth of pro-German and anti-war sentiment, and a strengthening of the position of Mosley's Fascists etc. 2/ Immediately after his return from Dunkirk, Bill Tennant wrote a book seerely criticising the conduct of the war to date, particularly Winston's. He and Ralph Edwards at the Admiralty, later DNO, seem to have spent the next fortnight canvassing support in London for the removal of Churchill and the selection of Halifax as PM, with abrief to negotiate an end to the war. Apparently Walter Monckton facilitated a meeting with Queen Elizabeth with a view to having her influence her husband towards an uncharacteristic political involvement and the removal of Churchill. It's in turn known that some hint of this pending "coup" was communicated to British diplomats in Sweden (possibly by Halifax) and in turn to the Swedes...and the Germans were informed; Hitler was waiting for news of "events" upcoming in London during the strange 4-week hiatus after the Armistice... This COULD be put down to some sort of black op to KEEP Hitler hanging on and give the British time to recover and prepare, as many events in that operiod have been, BUT 3/ In the middle of July it was reported to Churchill that Lord Lothian, the then ambassador in Washington, was sounding out the German ambassador there with regards to what terms the Germans would ask to end the war! Again in Halifax' purview as Foreign Secretary... Churchill called Halifax in and hauled him over the coals; he not only ordered Halifax to order Lothian to break opff contact and have no further contact on this matter, he himself in parallel ordered Lothian to do this, direct from the PM's office - a direct snub to Halifax, and an indicator to anyone that knew to look that Winston didn't necessarily trust his Foreign Secretary! By the end of the year, Halifax himself was shipped out to replace Lothian.
By the end of the year, Halifax himself was shipped out to replace Lothian. Seems a fair deal. "I trade you one Halifax for a Joe Kennedy. Now what about those 50 destroyers you were talking about?"
Actually - this is not quite true... 1/ during DYNAMO were was several days of discussions in the War Cabinet in relation to the Italian offer (via the Swedes) to facilitate talks with the Germans. Churchill wavered at least once under pressure from Halifax, until he addressed the full Cabinet on what was happening and he came out of that more convinced than ever to fight on. The offer to mediate/facilitate was rejected for several reasons; A/ the cost I.E. what would Mussolini ask for such a favour - Churchill was of the opinion it would be MALTA and after wavering for a day (see above!) decided that that was too high a price to pay; B/ a fear that any subsequent treaty/agreement would leave britain too militarily weak to defend itself; C/ a fear that if a German Control Commission or something similar was posted to britain to ensure treaty compliance that this, plus increased activity by a renewed German diplomatic presence in London, would result in a growth of pro-German and anti-war sentiment, and a strengthening of the position of Mosley's Fascists etc. 2/ Immediately after his return from Dunkirk, Bill Tennant wrote a book seerely criticising the conduct of the war to date, particularly Winston's. He and Ralph Edwards at the Admiralty, later DNO, seem to have spent the next fortnight canvassing support in London for the removal of Churchill and the selection of Halifax as PM, with abrief to negotiate an end to the war. Apparently Walter Monckton facilitated a meeting with Queen Elizabeth with a view to having her influence her husband towards an uncharacteristic political involvement and the removal of Churchill. It's in turn known that some hint of this pending "coup" was communicated to British diplomats in Sweden (possibly by Halifax) and in turn to the Swedes...and the Germans were informed; Hitler was waiting for news of "events" upcoming in London during the strange 4-week hiatus after the Armistice... This COULD be put down to some sort of black op to KEEP Hitler hanging on and give the British time to recover and prepare, as many events in that operiod have been, BUT 3/ In the middle of July it was reported to Churchill that Lord Lothian, the then ambassador in Washington, was sounding out the German ambassador there with regards to what terms the Germans would ask to end the war! Again in Halifax' purview as Foreign Secretary... Churchill called Halifax in and hauled him over the coals; he not only ordered Halifax to order Lothian to break opff contact and have no further contact on this matter, he himself in parallel ordered Lothian to do this, direct from the PM's office - a direct snub to Halifax, and an indicator to anyone that knew to look that Winston didn't necessarily trust his Foreign Secretary! By the end of the year, Halifax himself was shipped out to replace Lothian. Are you sure that Bill Tennant wrote such a book? If so I would be interested to know the title as I have never come across it. For a serving naval officer to have become involved in politics, to the extent that he was actually intriguing against his own Prime Minister, would have been virtually unprecedented at that period, and given the fact that Tennant was given command of 'Repulse' on 28 June 1940, having been made a Companion of the Bath on 7 June, it is hard to see when he would have found the time!
Hi Philo In a couple of books (one of which was called Fateful Decisions) I read that the main reason for not giving Halifax the green light to take up Mussolini's offer of mediation was that this action in itself would weaken Britain's case - a slippery slope which would badly affect the morale to continue. In the drawn out War Cabinet argument, Churchill's early view was that it would be better to put up a good show of resistance against Hitler throughout the autumn before even considering any negotiation. Furthermore, he argued that Hitler was unlikely to allow Britain to continue to re-arm whatever the outcome of the negotiation. I got the impression that Churchill did not absolutely rule out a peace with Hitler (and certainly he would have returned the old German overseas empire) but he thought that the British requirements including continued re-armament etc would never be accepted by Hitler and the very fact of agreeing to negotiate would weaken Britain's resolve.
Are you sure that Bill Tennant wrote such a book? If so I would be interested to know the title as I have never come across it. Yes - I once leafed through a copy online, but I javen't seen it, or been able to find my way back to it, for some years now. For a serving naval officer to have become involved in politics, to the extent that he was actually intriguing against his own Prime Minister, would have been virtually unprecedented at that period, and given the fact that Tennant was given command of 'Repulse' on 28 June 1940, having been made a Companion of the Bath on 7 June, it is hard to see when he would have found the time! Nevertheless - it does seem to have happened; 1/ Hitler heard of it via the Swedes! 2/ Edwards' diaries are still intact and open to view in the Churchill Collection in Cambridge - with his account of the activities of the period equally open to view. 3/ in 1965 the Foreign Office refused a requst from the Swedes for the period diplomatic communications to be opened for the public; it since has been, at the Swedish end, and does seem to confirm an upcoming "change of government" was expected by Ambassador Bjorn Prytz in London :mellow: 4/ The Independent on Sunday March 5, 2000 Queen Mum wanted peace with Hitler By Sophie Goodchild, Home Affairs Correspondent When Oxford University's Bodleian Library released a tranche of papers relating to the royal family last week, one box of documents was missing, the rapidly notorious Box 24. Experts assumed that the papers had been suppressed because they contained vitriolic remarks by the Queen Mother about the Duchess of Windsor. This, senior government sources have told the Independent on Sunday, is not the case. The reason that papers were withheld is potentially far more embarrassing: they spell out the true extent of the Queen Mother's pro-appeasement views on the brink of the Second World War. The papers, part of a collection of letters belonging to the first Viscount Monckton of Brenchley, a close friend of Edward VIII, dwell on the relationship between the Queen Mother and the pro-appeasement foreign secretary Lord Halifax (left). The letters are said to show her hostility towards Churchill and her desire that the deeply unpopular Halifax be Prime Minister instead. The letters, which include private correspondence between the Queen Mother and Halifax himself, suggest the battle to preserve the monarchy was a concern which weighed above all others. As leader, Halifax was likely to have sued for peace with Hitler on the understanding that he allowed the monarchy to continue under a Nazi occupation. Lord Halifax was foreign secretary between 1939 and 1940 but was sent to Washington by Winston Churchill to be British Ambassador from 1941 to 1946. He died in 1959. Philip Ziegler, who wrote the official biography of Edward VIII, said he had seen only the letters relating to the abdication but confirmed that the Queen Mother had a close relationship with Halifax. "She was known to be very fond of Halifax indeed," he said. © 2000 Independent Digital (UK) Ltd. At least one researcher I'm aware of who's been chasing down the Tennant-Edwards-Monckton connection has been refused permission to access the contents of Box 24, in 2005. 5/ interestingly - the date set in Edwards' diary for a new European peace to be settled was...the 28th of June 1940! In other words - was Tennant forced up to Scapa away from London??? 6/ Even MORE interestingly - the naval officers involved was actually a TROIKA! The third officer apparently involved was - Ernie Spooner, Tennat's immediate predecessor in that command! 7/ Tennant's movements in London are inded rather puzzling - he actually seems to have been given command of Renown after returning from Dunkirk; this was rapidly changed within a few weeks to Repulse! 8/ According to Edwards' diary, Max Beaverbrook ( who's relations with Winston swung back and forth like a pendulum) and Leo Amery, a persistent thorn in the side of the Conservative hierarchy and even more rebellious than Churchill, were also involved. 9/ Ralph Edwards - Captain Ralph A. B. Edwards (later Admiral, Sir), Deputy Director of operations (Home), both with Churchill and, later, Alexander as First Lords, then Third Sea Lord in the Sixties - was a very harsh critic of Churchill's amateur leadership as First Lord; his diaries were often quoted by David Irving in his Churchill's War, Vol. I and II. Roskill used them too in his corrosive Churchill and the Admirals. In the drawn out War Cabinet argument, Churchill's early view was that it would be better to put up a good show of resistance against Hitler throughout the autumn before even considering any negotiation To sum up the period, then - at the end of June, Churchill was in favour of eventual peace when Britain's negotiating position was stronger....but Halifax was in favour of peace "now".
Yes - I once leafed through a copy online, but I javen't seen it, or been able to find my way back to it, for some years now. Nevertheless - it does seem to have happened; 1/ Hitler heard of it via the Swedes! 2/ Edwards' diaries are still intact and open to view in the Churchill Collection in Cambridge - with his account of the activities of the period equally open to view. 3/ in 1965 the Foreign Office refused a requst from the Swedes for the period diplomatic communications to be opened for the public; it since has been, at the Swedish end, and does seem to confirm an upcoming "change of government" was expected by Ambassador Bjorn Prytz in London :mellow: 4/ At least one researcher I'm aware of who's been chasing down the Tennant-Edwards-Monckton connection has been refused permission to access the contents of Box 24, in 2005. 5/ interestingly - the date set in Edwards' diary for a new European peace to be settled was...the 28th of June 1940! In other words - was Tennant forced up to Scapa away from London??? 6/ Even MORE interestingly - the naval officers involved was actually a TROIKA! The third officer apparently involved was - Ernie Spooner, Tennat's immediate predecessor in that command! 7/ Tennant's movements in London are inded rather puzzling - he actually seems to have been given command of Renown after returning from Dunkirk; this was rapidly changed within a few weeks to Repulse! 8/ According to Edwards' diary, Max Beaverbrook ( who's relations with Winston swung back and forth like a pendulum) and Leo Amery, a persistent thorn in the side of the Conservative hierarchy and even more rebellious than Churchill, were also involved. 9/ Ralph Edwards - Captain Ralph A. B. Edwards (later Admiral, Sir), Deputy Director of operations (Home), both with Churchill and, later, Alexander as First Lords, then Third Sea Lord in the Sixties - was a very harsh critic of Churchill's amateur leadership as First Lord; his diaries were often quoted by David Irving in his Churchill's War, Vol. I and II. Roskill used them too in his corrosive Churchill and the Admirals. To sum up the period, then - at the end of June, Churchill was in favour of eventual peace when Britain's negotiating position was stronger....but Halifax was in favour of peace "now". I must confess that my knowledge of this period is largely of the military, and particularly naval, situation, with the politics coming a poor second! However, I have grave doubts that two or three comparatively junior naval officers ( i.e., none of them of Flag Rank) and a courtier who was neither a Member of Parliament nor even a member of the Conservative Party could, even if they did gallop around London complaining about Churchill, have brought about the collapse of his administration in favour of one led by Halifax, especially as Halifax had effectively turned the job down once. I would certainly accept that Churchill's habit of back seat driving caused considerable annoyance within the navy, and I agree that he was largely responsible for the Norway debacle, though I cannot accept the suggestion elsewhere that he engineered the disaster for his own political ends. I also agree that the Queen was no great admirer, but I doubt that her attempt to meddle in politics could have been anything other than counter-productive. In short, where are the big political beasts who could have made such a coup possible? My own, admittedly amateur, view is that Monckton rather over-estimated his importance in the overall scheme of things, and I still do not understand how Tennant could have had a book such as is described written and published so quickly! Renown was commanded continuously between 15 May 1939 and 15 January 1941 by Captain C.E.B. Simeon. There is no reference in his service record to a short period in June 1940 when he was replaced by Tennant, and it must surely be considered unlikely in the extreme that this happened. Finally, I notice the name of David Irving has appeared. Personally, I always view any of his opinions with extreme caution, given that, like a certain other individual who infests sites like these, he has his own agenda! As I say, however, I would not claim any particular depth of knowledge in this area, so would not wish to make it a big issue!
However, I have grave doubts that two or three comparatively junior naval officers ( i.e., none of them of Flag Rank) and a courtier who was neither a Member of Parliament nor even a member of the Conservative Party..... But he did work at the Foreign Office IIRC, and that's how they gained access to Halifax...and almost certainly to Queen Elizabeth. ...could, even if they did gallop around London complaining about Churchill, have brought about the collapse of his administration in favour of one led by Halifax.... I also agree that the Queen was no great admirer, but I doubt that her attempt to meddle in politics could have been anything other than counter-productive. O I have no illusions that the whole affair would have caused mayhem and chaos - but this might have been as useful to the Nazis at this point in history as a peace treaty! , especially as Halifax had effectively turned the job down once Here's the awkward thing; the change of government was by no means as clean as popular sources - The World At War etc. - would have us think; Halifax didn't turn down the job....he was painfully aware he couldn't accept it (which was a major difference in emphasis) because one of the issues about his becoming PM is that the Labour Party would NOT have been prepared to join a National, unity government....which they were under Winston For much more detail on the "succession crisis" see Laurence Thompson's "1940". Thompson was for decades after the war the Daily Telegraph's parliamentary correspondent and was on first-name terms with all those involved in the events of early May 1940, had access to their diaries for the purpose of writing the book, and access to the Commons Library. It's a very useul little read.... and I still do not understand how Tennant could have had a book such as is described written and published so quickly! I'm not sure exactly how long it was - given that I viewed an online copy briefly - but it couldn't have been much larger than a pamphlet tho'. But there was in parallel to this a HUGE appetite in the country at that time for written material, particularly about the war, with reams of books being published unbound and/or uncut (I've a few in my collection), and small lending libraries in the W.H.Smith's concessions in railway stations etc. Finally, I notice the name of David Irving has appeared. Personally, I always view any of his opinions with extreme caution, given that, like a certain other individual who infests sites like these, he has his own agenda! So do I...normally - but in this case the mention of Roskill "clenses" the link between Edwards' diaries and modern historians Renown was commanded continuously between 15 May 1939 and 15 January 1941 by Captain C.E.B. Simeon. There is no reference in his service record to a short period in June 1940 when he was replaced by Tennant, and it must surely be considered unlikely in the extreme that this happened. Nevertheless, the record of Tennant as captain of Renown for a short time can be seen in naval-history.net and other places; I don't think, given everything that seems to have been going on, that he ever left London to take up his command....he may even have been on a "long date" to do so, or his remaining in the capital wa covered by Edwards at the Admiralty...but evidently everything both came to a head AND fell apart for the conspirators on the 28th of June...:p P.S.... In short, where are the big political beasts who could have made such a coup possible? The King? That's what the conspirators ultimately wanted - the ear of the King - and from the Independent article we can see that in this their aims were congruent (at least!) with the Queen's. But we won't ever know more unless sometime in the future we can see inside Box 24...before it gets conveniently mislaid....or eaten by mice....or "burnt in a fire" like so many old hospital records etc.
