Would An Axis Invasion Succeed?

Originally posted by Kiwiwriter@Aug 25 2005, 08:20 AM
Well, as I've said, See Lowe was planned, but never contemplated. The Germans did not know what they were getting into. Their real hope was that the threat of it would make the British national morale and/or government collapse.
[post=38114]Quoted post[/post]

Hitlers' delusions let him believe he could break British will through attack from the air and the mere threat posed by the assault forces of See Lowe. When this didn't prove enough he resorted to the terror bombing of British cities. I don't think he ever understood the determination of Churchill, and the British people as a whole, to pay almost any price to defeat the Nazi cause.

 

1) Is it too simplistic to go back to the German decision to start bombing London rather than continuing to bomb Fighter Command airfields in early September 1940? If they had not made this decision, then would they have largely eliminated Fighter Command, and if so to what extent would that have been the key to a successful invasion?

The RAF was doing their best to replace both aircraft and pilots, but October 1940, the Fighter command had more pilots than aircraft. Whereas the Germans were not even replacing their losses from Norway; In fact the German's Scandinavian losses included a lot of experienced instructors, who were never replaced.

that brings in a interesting point, the RAF sent combat experienced aircrew off to become instructors and so pass on their knowledge.


In addition, the Luftwaffe aircraft could only strike at certain parts of Britain because of their range. Therefore there were certain areas which were "safe" from attack.

However, I thought that I would include these words from Dr Horst Boog, Chief Historian for the Luftwaffe.

“The first days of “Eagle Attack” quickly revealed the Luftwaffe’s weaknesses: The Me110 escort fighter’s lack of speed and manoeuvrability; German fighter pilots’ inexperience in escort duties (they were more used to free chase); and the inadequate range of the fighters, and thus their short combat time over target. This last factor also limited the range of the bombers (and the escort fighters, which needed fighter protection in daylight themselves) in daylight – particularly in the case of the Ju87 dive bombers, which were slow and very vulnerable when pulling up after the dive. The number of Me109s was insufficient, because each bomber, dive bomber and escort fighter unit theoretically needed fighter protection of three times its own strength. The shortcomings of the Luftwaffe became evident on “Eagle Day”, 13 August, and on 15 August, when Luftflotte 5 launched the first and last attack across the North sea, suffering high losses. The Germans believed that Northern Britain had been depleted of fighters, and were surprised to find this was not true.

In addition, the objective of the raids during the first days – to gain air superiority over the projected invasion area – was not strictly adhered to. Airfields were attacked that had nothing to do with fighter defences, and the existence of factories producing Spitfires and four-engined bombers does not seem to have been sufficiently clear to Luftwaffe intelligence. Finally, the Luftwaffe’s awareness of the importance and method of operation of the radar system left much to be desired. Attacks on Radar sites were therefore sporadic and soon stopped, because the Lattice-work masts could not be destroyed, and it was believed that the sites’ operations rooms were located in bomb proof underground concrete shelters (they were generally in above-ground huts), so that attempts to put them out of operation were soon considered as futile as searching for a needles in a haystack. Such views were reinforced when, despite some heavy attacks, the radars continued to operate; the Germans did not realize that their operation was frequently feigned. Another factor behind their misconception of radar’s role was that German doctrine was essentially offensive, radar research had been well advanced before the war, but experiments related to air defence has led nowhere, and the main effort had been concentrated on aspects such as navigational aids. In sum, therefore, too many targets were attacked by day and night, but often not those whose destruction would help to paralyse the fighter defence system…”

"The Luftwaffe and the Battle of Britain” by Dr Horst Boog, in The Battle Re-thought – A symposium on the Battle of Britain, Bracknell Papers 1, London, 1990 PP25-26

 

Hitler would have needed a giant fan to dry up the English Channel.

In a stright-up fight, say of there were no Channel, which is a huge stretch already, Germany's ground forces would have Blitzed GB good.

No Channel aside, Hitler's forces were not at all ready for such an abitious operation. Any plan was doomed to failure at it's conception.

 

Could Germany invade?

No.


As already stated the barges were possibly the worst idea for a sea crossing as on the whole they were flat-bottomed boats and the channel would have played merry havoc with them! It aint no mill pond that stretch of water! Add in the RAF, RN, gas, oil fires and some VERY tenacious defenders then it all looks a bit bleak... Germany simply had no expertise in amphibious operations. Look at what happend to the sea-borne invasion fleet for Crete!

One point not mentioned (I think), is the state of the Fallschirmjager at this point. After actions in Denmark, Norway, Holland and Belgium, the 7th Flieger Div. was in no fit state to contemplate landings in the UK. Lack of time for adequate recce, specific training, planning and intel, the serious losses in the transport fleets, losses in personnel (including their divisional commander who was wounded in Holland) and the likelihood of lack of ground troop link up would make it a very hazardous operation.

I dont think Sea-Lion was ever really that seriously considered. I feel the Germans planned to starve the UK into submission as they had tried in WW1.

 

Redcoat
This has to be one of the greatest myths of WW2.
On the 7th September Fighter Command had 750 operational Spitfires and Hurricanes, which was 150 more than at the start of the battle.
Hitler did not order the Luftwaffe to change the focus of their attack, he merely lifted the order banning attacks on London.

Thanks for this correction; at their best forums like these enable us to gain insights beyond that of popular history.

It seems that the conclusion is that the Germans would probably not have been able to successfully invade Britain. But we must not forget that this was probably not obvious at the time. Facing an enemy that had destroyed all our allies, it took courage and nerve to believe that we should and could stand against them. With hindsight it may well be that Hitler was more interested in the Soviet Union, but this was also not obvious at the time especially given the non-aggression pact. The Battle still had to be fought to convince the Germans not to try an invasion.

Adrian

 

there was neva a chance of the coming near are countary because are navy and raf would of kept the at bay if no the the home gaurds would of.

 

Some of this is interesting stuff, but fiction. I spent 10 years studying (and translating) the Geman plans and visiting coatal defences. To use the famous quote "I don't say they won't come, but they won't come by Sealion".

The Royal Navy would have been the key to UKs survival. The RAF would have put up the maximum resistance possible until crushed. The sea lanes for the invasion barges would have been protected by mine fields. Churchill was prepared to sacrifice he majority of the destroyer/cruiser force to breach these minefields and then wreck havoc on the barges. A fully laden Rhine grain barge had something like four inches of freeboard before it would get swamped. The wake of a destroyer would sink it without a shot being fired. It is threfore doubtful if a viable force could have been put ashore. The Fallschirmjaeger were tasked take Hythe airfield and also the heights above Dover. It is my opinion they would have been initially successful in the Hythe area, but could not have sustained operations for long and would have required resupply by air. Such a lot to discuss and argue on the proposed Unternehmen Seelowe...... David

 

Red Baron makes some good and valid points re Fallschirmjaeger. I did find a nice quote that the Luftland Sturm Regiment (LLStR) were to be equipped with a limited number of captured 100mm French mortars.

 

My two cents-
A German invasion would have succeeded easily for the simple reason that with the RAF defeated, Germany would have had the trump card of total air supremacy.
Sure, the Royal Navy would have attacked the invasion fleet, but ships (even battleships) are easy meat for aircraft and would have quickly been neutralised.
After the invasion, it'd have then been a typical blitzkrieg all the way to London and beyond with Stukas and tactical bombers paving the way for the ground forces, a straightforward repeat of the French Campaign.
With his failure to wipe out the RAF, Adolf knew he had no choice but to cancel the invasion plans and go sulk.