Would An Axis Invasion Succeed?

Hi all,

I was on hols at Reighton sands and the pill boxes got me thinking about an axis invasions chances of success.
If the RAF could have been defeated (thankfully not) or at least worn down could Germany launch an invasion against blighty?
How strong were the GB defences, how many troops and guns did we have left?
How could the Germans overcome the Royal navy and did they have the legistics etc to invade?
So many questions I hope you chaps can advise.

Stuart.

 

Massive subject.

Get your hands on "Operation Sea Lion," by Ronald Fleming, "If Britain Had Fallen," by Norman Longmate, "Sea Lion," by Richard Cox, and "The Last Ditch," by David Lampe. That will give you a lot of factual background on the plans and potentialities of See Lowe.

My feeling: Hitler's best shot would have been to go right over in July, while the British were still punch-drunk and virtually unarmed after Dunkirk. However, after that, with the appalling state of the German amphibious forces and the increasingly determined and tough British defenses, it would likely have been a failure.

The Germans planned to use tugs and river barges to tow lines of unpowered barges into position at a speed of less than two knots, and land horses in the first wave of the invasion. That alone should tell you plenty right there.

 

Knowing the state of the country at that time, if he could have got past the RN he could have taken Britain in a fortnight.......We were defenceless. My Divison was the only one, as far as I know, that was rearmed to operational standards... Monty's old Division. Third British infantry div, we had nothing to fend off a Bliztkrieg.
Sapper

 

An interesting question and one that has often intrigued me. Lets see if I can give a reasonable analysis to this very complicated proposition.

The simple answer to the first part of the question would be, yes, the Germans would have invaded in September (weather permitting!).

Phase one - The Invasion

The Royal Navy would have been committed in strength, but without adequate air cover would have been seriously crippled. They would have inflicted heavy damage on the German Navy, but would have been unable to disrupt the invasion fleet.

Phase two - The Beginning of the End

The German forces meet with determined resistance on the coast, but lacking air cover British forces would have inevitably been isolated and overcome. The vulnerable Stuka, being able to operate freely, would have wrecked havoc on Britain's land army.

Without sufficient manpower and equipment the British forces would have been forced to withdraw to the Stop Lines (a fortified static line running from Bristol to London and up the East coast) where a determined last stand would have been made to protect England's industrial heartland and protect the remnants of the RAF airfields in the midlands.

Lacking strong mobile reserves this resistance is gradually overcome. London becomes a "Stalingrad" type situation, but elsewhere the Germans begin to penetrate the fixed lines of defenses. The Government begins to plan evacuation to continue the War from Canada. British resistance cells start operations and begin sabotaging German lines of communication.

Phase 3 - Capitulation

Without interference from the air the German build-up continues. Britain's defenses buckle under the strain. The lead German units thrust for the industrial heartland and succeed in neutralizing logistical support to the armed forces.

The German Navy emboldened by the success of the land forces tightens its grip on the remaining British ports and shortages begin to become acute the unoccupied territory. The sabotage groups, after initial success, are ruthlessly dealt with and after a short time one cell after another is captured or neutralized.

Pockets of resistance continue to hold out, but the writing is on the wall. Hitler offers terms, knowing that he does not have to conquer whole country. These terms are similar in nature to those offered to the French at its capitulation and appear to offer Britain some autonomy: a sort of "Vichy" Britain.

Fearing further loss of life and greater destruction, a puppet government is established and agrees to the terms laid out. A cease fire is called and the capitulation is complete by March 1941 (possibly sooner).

Resistance does not cease completely. An exiled government having reached Canada continues the struggle via the Commonwealth, but as a force against German aggression it is effectively neutralized.

The end. Or is it?

Reading this through, it is a chilling thought to contemplate the inevitability of the outcome described above. However, it does help to demonstrate how important defeating Hitler's Luftwaffe was. Without a strong air force to counteract the Luftwaffe, it seems certain that Britain would have been defeated shortly after.

In favor of this argument, one must remember that Germany, in 1941, came very close to defeating a much larger country with greater resources than England ever had at her disposal, that being Russia. In this context what chance would England realistically have had in defeating the German Army of the Blitzkrieg era once it had got a toehold on the British coast.

Britain's other trump card was its Navy. However, later battles showed how vulnerable ships were to air attack. An unfettered Luftwaffe would have caused great losses to a Navy that would have had to keep one eye on conserving some strength for any realistic attempt at continuing the conflict at a later stage.

In contrast to this one cannot with certainty predict the reaction of America to an Invasion of Britain in 1940. If one examines tha attitude prevalent in America at the time, it is debatable that America would have come to our aid, but what if they had, given that they realised in time, the inplications of Hitlers invasion. If British forces could have held out for 6 months would this have been time enough for America to have prevented Britains being knocked out of the war.

Britain's defeat would have had far reaching consequences, but it is difficult to speculate accurately what the ultimate outcome may have been with any certainty.

I may have taken a rather pessimistic (and simplistic) view of Britain's fall, but I have tried to be objective in my assessment. I would be most interested to see if someone could construct an argument that would give a credibly different outcome, given the RAF's defeat as a starting point.

I have one or two ideas myself, but I am interested to see what others think first.

Chris

 

The Operation Sealion Senario was 'fought through' at the RMA Sandhurst in 1974.

The scenario is based on the known plans of each side, plus previously unpublished Admiralty weather records for September 1940. Each side (played by British and German officers respectively) was based in a command room, and the actual moves plotted on a scale model of SE England constructed at the School of Infantry. The panel of umpires included Adolf Galland, Admiral Friedrich Ruge, Air Chief Marshal Sir Christopher Foxley-Norris, Rear Admiral Edward Gueritz, General Heinz Trettner and Major General Glyn Gilbert.

I have the summary of the outcome as they played it if anyone is interested, which coincidentely enough was posted recently on another forum. It's a little long, but I will post it if anyone is interested. Either that or I could just tell you who won

 

Plant-pilot

Get it posted - the suspense is killing me!

 

I'd also add the point of whether there was the political will to fight. The lack of one in France undermined any military effort in that country.

Bear in mind there was talk in the Cabinet on May 26-27 1940 on whether it would be worth asking Hitler for terms if Britain wanted to extricate herself from the war. However, these were not taken seriously at the time though if an invasion did occur and was going badly these people may have tried again and had a better argument the second time round. You have to remember there were still appeasers in Churchill's government at the time and they tended to coalesce around the figure of Halifax. It was one of the reasons he was givem the post of ambassador in Washington, to remove him from the centre of any possible intrigue.

I feel that London would not have become a Stalingrad but would have been left as a free city, if I am right none of the Western capitals occuppied by the Nazis were fought over to any great extent.

 

Operation Sealion - summary of an exercise held at the
Staff College, Sandhurst in 1974.

The full text is in 'Sealion' by Richard Cox. The scenario is based on the
known plans of each side, plus previously unpublished Admiralty weather
records for September 1940. Each side (played by British and German officers
respectively) was based in a command room, and the actual moves plotted on a
scale model of SE England constructed at the School of Infantry. The panel
of umpires included Adolf Galland, Admiral Friedrich Ruge, Air Chief Marshal
Sir Christopher Foxley-Norris, Rear Admiral Edward Gueritz, General Heinz
Trettner and Major General Glyn Gilbert.


The main problem the Germans face is that a) the Luftwaffe has not yet
won air supremacy b ) the possible invasion dates are constrained by the
weather and tides (for a high water attack) and c) it has taken until late
September to assemble the necessary shipping.


22nd September - Morning
The first wave of a planned 330,000 men hit the beaches at dawn.
Elements of 9 divisions landed between Folkestone and Rottingdean (near
Brighton). In addition 7th FJ Div landed at Lympne to take the airfield.


The invasion fleet suffered minor losses from MTBs during the night
crossing, but the RN had already lost one CA and three DDs sunk, with one CA
and two DDs damaged, whilst sinking three German DDs. Within hours of the
landings which overwhelmed the beach defenders, reserve formations were
despatched to Kent. Although there were 25 divisions in the UK, only 17
were fully equipped, and only three were based in Kent, however the defence
plan relied on the use of mobile reserves and armoured and mechanised
brigades were committed as soon as the main landings were identified.


Meanwhile the air battle raged, the Luftwaffe flew 1200 fighter and 800
bomber sorties before 1200 hrs. The RAF even threw in training planes
hastily armed with bombs, but the Luftwaffe were already having problems
with their short ranged Me 109s despite cramming as many as possible into
the Pas de Calais.


22nd - 23rd September
The Germans had still not captured a major port, although they started
driving for Folkestone. Shipping unloading on the beaches suffered heavy
losses from RAF bombing raids and then further losses at their ports in
France.


The U-Boats, Luftwaffe and few surface ships had lost contact with the RN,
but then a cruiser squadron with supporting DDs entered the Channel narrows
and had to run the gauntlet of long range coastal guns, E-Boats and 50
Stukas. Two CAs were sunk and one damaged. However a diversionary German
naval sortie from Norway was completely destroyed and other sorties by MTBS
and DDs inflicted losses on the shipping milling about in the Channel.
German shipping losses on the first day amounted to over 25% of their
invasion fleet, especially the barges, which proved desperately unseaworthy.


23rd Sept dawn - 1400 hrs.
The RAF had lost 237 planes out 1048 (167 fighters and 70 bombers), and the
navy had suffered enough losses such that it was keeping its BBs and CVs
back, but large forces of DDs and CAs were massing. Air recon showed a
German buildup in Cherbourg and forces were diverted to the South West.


The German Navy were despondant about their losses, especially as the loss
of barges was seriously dislocating domestic industry. The Army and Airforce
commanders were jubilant however, and preperations for the transfer of the
next echelon continued along with the air transport of 22nd Div, despite
Luftwaffe losses of 165 fighters and 168 bombers. Out of only 732 fighters
and 724 bombers these were heavy losses. Both sides overestimated losses
inflicted by 50%.


The 22nd Div airlanded successfully at Lympne, although long range artillery
fire directed by a stay-behind commando group interdicted the runways. The
first British counterattacks by 42nd Div supported by an armoured brigade
halted the German 34th Div in its drive on Hastings. 7th Panzer Div was
having difficulty with extensive anti-tank obstacles and assault teams armed
with sticky bombs etc. Meanwhile an Australian Div had retaken Newhaven (the
only German port), however the New Zealand Div arrived at Folkestone only to
be attacked in the rear by 22nd Airlanding Div. The division fell back on
Dover having lost 35% casualties.


Sep 23rd 1400 - 1900 hrs
Throughout the day the Luftwaffe put up a maximum effort, with 1500 fighter
and 460 bomber sorties, but the RAF persisted in attacks on shipping and
airfields. Much of this effort was directed for ground support and air
resupply, despite Adm Raeders request for more aircover over the Channel.
The Home Fleet had pulled out of air range however, leaving the fight in the
hands of 57 DDs and 17 CAs plus MTBs. The Germans could put very little
surface strength against this. Waves of DDs and CAs entered the Channel, and
although two were sunk by U-Boats, they sank one U-Boat in return and did
not stop. The German flotilla at Le Havre put to sea (3 DD, 14 E-Boats) and
at dusk intercepted the British, but were wiped out, losing all their DDs
and 7 E-Boats.


The Germans now had 10 divisions ashore, but in many cases these were
incomplete and waiting for their second echelon to arrive that night. The
weather was unsuitable for the barges however, and the decision to sail was
referred up the chain of command.


23rd Sep 1900 - Sep 24th dawn
The Fuhrer Conference held at 1800 broke out into bitter inter-service
rivalry - the Army wanted their second echelon sent, and the navy protesting
that the weather was unsuitable, and the latest naval defeat rendered the
Channel indefensible without air support. Goring countered this by saying it
could only be done by stopped the terror bombing of London, which in turn
Hitler vetoed. The fleet was ordered to stand by.


The RAF meanwhile had lost 97 more fighters leaving only 440. The airfields
of 11 Group were cratered ruins, and once more the threat of collapse, which
had receded in early September, was looming. The Luftwaffe had lost another
71 fighters and 142 bombers. Again both sides overestimated losses
inflicted, even after allowing for inflated figures.


On the ground the Germans made good progress towards Dover and towards
Canterbury, however they suffered reverses around Newhaven when the 45th Div
and Australians attacked. At 2150 Hitler decided to launch the second wave,
but only the short crossing from Calais and Dunkirk. By the time the order
reached the ports, the second wave could not possibly arrive before dawn.
The 6th and 8th divisions at Newhaven, supplied from Le Havre, would not be
reinforced at all.


Sep 24th dawn - Sep 28th
The German fleet set sail, the weather calmed, and U-Boats, E-Boats and
fighters covered them. However at daylight 5th destroyer flotilla found the
barges still 10 miles off the coast and tore them to shreds. The Luftwaffe
in turn committed all its remaining bombers, and the RAF responded with 19
squadrons of fighters. The Germans disabled two CAs and four DDs, but 65% of
the barges were sunk. The faster steamers broke away and headed for
Folkestone, but the port had been so badly damaged that they could only
unload two at a time.


The failure on the crossing meant that the German situation became
desperate. The divisions had sufficient ammunition for 2 to 7 days more
fighting, but without extra men and equipment could not extend the
bridgehead. Hitler ordered the deployment on reserve units to Poland and the
Germans began preparations for an evacuation as further British arracks
hemmed them in tighter. Fast steamers and car ferries were assembled for
evacuation via Rye and Folkestone. Of 90,000 troops who landed on 22nd
September, only 15,400 returned to France, the rest were killed or captured.

In less than a week, the German invasion of Britain ends in disaster.

 

The New Zealand General Freyberg also felt that a German invasion would not succeed. Here is his letter to the New Zealand Minister of Defence dated 4th July 1940.

http://www.nzetc.org/tm/scholarly/tei-WH2-1Doc-c8-90.html

 

Plant-pilot,

Thanks for posting the summary. Great stuff. And Eddie, have not read the full letter yet, but great contribution.

In response to the Staff College exercise outcome the crucial proviso here is contained in the second paragraph i.e.

a) the Luftwaffe has not yet won air supremacy

The basis of my assessment was that the Luftwaffe HAD won air supremacy. This was also the basis of the original posters question:

"If the RAF could have been defeated (thankfully not) or at least worn down could Germany launch an invasion against blighty?"

I think what is very clear here is the crucial factor of the air battle in terms of its influence on the course and success of the any invasion.

The other factor which I deliberately avoided was the influence of the weather which the above account takes into consideration and which causes the German side some problems in sustaining their beachhead.

The other factor which emerges is the crucial part played in capturing a port in order to continue the build up of German forces. By denying this to the Germans it prevented them from sustaining the troops ashore and developing the bridgehead.

It is interesting to note that 4 years later the critical importance of all these factors, (air supremacy, the weather, port facilities) had a major bearing on the outcome of another amphibious operation only this time in the opposite direction. It would seem if you tied your planning to these factors you stood a good chance of success. If not you were taking a huge gamble.

The Staff College exercise, assumed that the Luftwaffe had not won the Battle of Britain, thus the scenario, as played out, was to see what would have happened if the Germans had chanced their arm and invaded anyway. It reassuring to know that they would not have got away with it in this example at least.

The question also remains as to whether Britain could have contained an invasion given that the luftwaffe had obtained air supremacy.

What might be interesting now is to examine how the RAF might have been defeated to create the circumstances for which a successful invasion would seem to require. Any takers?

Chris

p.s. smc66. Interesting point about London and it being declared a free city. You site as evidence other European cities. I think this could have come about if the Germans had overwhelmed our defences very quickly, however, I think the GHQ line ran through London. As this was part of the Stop Line this would have made it a main line of resistance to the German advance. Given this and England's stubborn will to resist and its political significance if lost leads me to the conclusion that it would have been heavily contested. The other way in which this may have been avoided is if the Germans had the opportunity to bypass it.

 

This is how I see the situation early in the BoB as this is the key to the whole “what if” scenario. Hitler and Goering were becoming very smug as their intelligence was poor (available British Aircraft numbers) and were led to believe that the prize of the British Isles would soon be theirs. Hitler’s subsequent "appeal to reason" was based on his poor intelligence. (Very close but no cigar)

Britain had the ability to defend due to the efforts in grit and determination of one man (Stuffy Dowding) who stood up to Churchill over sending squadrons of planes requested by the French government during the Battle for France. He knew he would need every single plane and more importantly, pilots to fly them. Had this loss occurred, Britain may well have been forced to capitulate, for as good as the navy thought itself to be, it could not have effectively competed in an arena where there was little or no control of the air by the allies. German aircraft would also have been in greater numbers due to the earlier control of that airspace.

Another Churchill quote September 3, 1940 “The Navy can lose us the war, but only the Air Force can win it. Therefore our supreme effort must be to gain overwhelming mastery of the air. The Fighters are our salvation, but the Bombers alone provide the means of victory”.

The success of the BoB provided the “TIME” to equip, re-arm and re-supply, accept Lend Lease and bluff Hitler out of invasion plans for Britain.

All scenarios are negated by the success of the BoB and Hitler’s greatest blunder of transferring his bombers to London and other cities whilst leaving airfields alone and allowing fighter command breathing space.


An invasion of Britain would have been Hitler’s first devastating defeat and would have altered the course of his war in many aspects. His “adoring” subjects may not have known much about the losses of the BoB however it would have been difficult to cover up the loss of 60,000 – 100,000 or so troops. His attacking land forces lost and his Air Forces decimated further in taking Britain – what next?

Together with this, his main intention was to defeat the British in the air quickly have them accept a peace plan and create a buffer zone to his mainland European conquests.

His intention IMO was to virtually encircle and close down the Soviet Union on all borders with the assistance of the Japanese and not have to overly defend the Atlantic wall. The second major error was of course the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour, which in my opinion again would not have occurred (in this form or timing) had Hitler taken Britain.

No one will ever convince me that the invasion of the Soviet Union was not his primary target of conquest at this time, whether or not it was actually called “Operation Barbarossa” as early as September 1940.

If Britain had capitulated, the Vichy French Fleet and Italian fleets would have been in the Mediterranean, Italian & German troops in the Middle East controlling the Suez, major oil fields and blocking the Soviet Union on this front with other countries declaring neutrality.

The United States would not have been able to get supplies to The Soviet Union, if at that time they had wanted to in any case as the people did not want their involvement in a European war. The British and Commonwealth forces may have fought on if Churchill and the government had transferred to Canada however that would be an unknown quantity.

Those other countries that did declare war on the Axis may have, with these scenarios, come out on the side of the Axis.

I am not saying the Axis would still have defeated the Soviet Union nor am I saying that America would have stayed in neutral isolationism however the scenarios are interesting enough to look at the "global" repercussions of a BoB loss.

 

I have the Cox book, and thank you for posting the summary of the wargame. Very interesting book it was...better than "SS-GB" and C.S. Forester's version of See Lowe.

I was re-reading Peter Fleming's "Operation Sea Lion" last night (this seems to be a popular topic on this and other boards), and he believes that the Germans' best chance would have been to go over the Channel right after Dunkirk -- June or July at the latest, which would require better planning and logistics by the Germans.

The British were exhausted from the Dunkirk ordeal, unarmed, nerves shaken, and one more big push could have toppled Churchill.

Still, while Sea Lion was a ******* operation, planned but never contemplated, poorly organized, and probably would have failed, with the German ability to improvise under fire, and their superiority in technology at the time, they might have triumphed in a September invasion.

 

Originally posted by Kiwiwriter@Aug 23 2005, 02:55 PM
Still, while Sea Lion was a ******* operation, planned but never contemplated, poorly organized, and probably would have failed, with the German ability to improvise under fire, and their superiority in technology at the time, they might have triumphed in a September invasion.
[post=38030]Quoted post[/post]
The Germans had no superiority in technology as far as amphibious warfare was concerned, in fact they had almost no technology in this type of warfare, and that was the problem. Once they put their foot in the water, it was the British who held the edge in training, tactics, and technology

 

Originally posted by redcoat+Aug 23 2005, 07:09 PM-->(redcoat @ Aug 23 2005, 07:09 PM)</div><div class='quotemain'><!--QuoteBegin-Kiwiwriter@Aug 23 2005, 02:55 PM
Still, while Sea Lion was a ******* operation, planned but never contemplated, poorly organized, and probably would have failed, with the German ability to improvise under fire, and their superiority in technology at the time, they might have triumphed in a September invasion.
[post=38030]Quoted post[/post]
The Germans had no superiority in technology as far as amphibious warfare was concerned, in fact they had almost no technology in this type of warfare, and that was the problem. Once they put their foot in the water, it was the British who held the edge in training, tactics, and technology
[post=38050]Quoted post[/post]
[/b]
No, not in amphibious warfare. Their amphibious technique was absolutely deplorable. I was thinking of the rest of their weaponry, once they were off the beach and moving inland...tanks, guns, tracked vehicles, and so on.

The fatal problem for the Germans in See Lowe was the amphibious side. They seriously planned to use unpowered barges crewed by French and Dutch sailors, to land horses in the first wave of the invasion. Even Dieppe didn't see that.

 

Originally posted by Kiwiwriter@Aug 24 2005, 04:09 PM

No, not in amphibious warfare. Their amphibious technique was absolutely deplorable. I was thinking of the rest of their weaponry, once they were off the beach and moving inland...tanks, guns, tracked vehicles, and so on.

The fatal problem for the Germans in See Lowe was the amphibious side. They seriously planned to use unpowered barges crewed by French and Dutch sailors, to land horses in the first wave of the invasion. Even Dieppe didn't see that.



Surely, Sealion being an amphibious operation, is exactly the point. If you can't get that fundamental part, the crossing, right, then no matter how technically advanced and superior your fighting equipment is, it has to get there in large enough quantities and you have to keep it supplied to make it any use.

Not only was their assault shipping not really up to the job, they were devoid of the specialist AFVs that would have been needed for a beach assault. No specialist tractors to tow stuck tanks onto the shore, no mat laying tanks, no flail mine clearing vehicles. An assault on a beach isn't just another assault up a hill, not least for the fact that if things go wrong you can't fall back to cover behind your start point!

 

If the RAF had been defeated, the only real threat to any amphibious landing would have been Britains Navy. With the RAF neutralised, the Luftwaffe would have been able to tackle the ships with little opposition. If you include the German Navy in this effort that would effectively remove the last obstacle.

I am probably taking things to extremes to make the point, but with no real opposition you could sail across the Channel in a rowboat and invade in these circumstances!

It's true that in comparison to the invasion fleet of 1944, the Germans efforts must seem amatuerish to say the least. However the Germans efforts were far from useless especially when you consider at this stage of the war their was little experience of amphibious operations (unless you count the invasion of Denmark and Norway). The Germans were well famed for thier inginuity and they applied this in no small measure to the task of adapting craft to the task. They even designed an amphibious tank that could snorkel its way ashore!

Put an 88 on the front of a barge and you have some pretty effective seaborne artillery.

The factors mitigating against the Germans would have been the weather and their own attitude. How seaworthy the barges were would have made this aspect critical and I have read that they viewed the invasion as no more than a grandiose river crossing! How much they underestimated the task is an interesting point for comment. Any takers?

 

Surely, Sealion being an amphibious operation, is exactly the point. If you can't get that fundamental part, the crossing, right, then no matter how technically advanced and superior your fighting equipment is, it has to get there in large enough quantities and you have to keep it supplied to make it any use.


Part of the plan was for an airborne assault to capture airfields. this would allow them to bring in not only warplanes but men and materials.

On the subject of books about Sea lion, Kenneth Macksey wrote Invasion which is rather good.

However, IMO, any invasion of britian even just after dunkirk was doomed to fail, mainly because the Germans did not have the resources and the British would be fighting on their home territory.

 

I would just like to make a further point about the success of a German amphibious operation.

In the Sandshurst excersise where the Luftwaffe had NOT obtained air supremacy the initial German beach assault was a success:

The invasion fleet suffered minor losses from MTBs...Within hours of the
landings which overwhelmed the beach defenders, reserve formations were
despatched to Kent.

If the invasion fleet were that flaky I dont think this would have been the likely outcome.

In the Sandhurst scenario the invasion failed because the Germans could not provide enough logistical support to the troops already ashore (due to Navy, RAF and weather interference).

I know its just a scenario, but it was conducted by people who knew about warfare.

Food for thought...

 

Two points:
1) Is it too simplistic to go back to the German decision to start bombing London rather than continuing to bomb Fighter Command airfields in early September 1940? If they had not made this decision, then would they have largely eliminated Fighter Command, and if so to what extent would that have been the key to a successful invasion?
It is possible that it would have taken the rest of September to knock out F/Command by continuing to bomb the airfields, and by then they would have been too close to winter for a seaborne invasion.
2) If we had not achieved a successful evacuation at Dunkirk, then would not have an invasion been even easier? (Maybe that question just adds another layer of "what-ifs" and we could be here all night...)
3) (ok its more than two points now...) Look how close the D-Day invasion came to failing, even with far greater planning and technology on the Allied side than the Germans had in 1940. If Utah beach had been as bad as Omaha; if the weather had destroyed Mulberry; if the Pluto system had not worked.... The Germans in 1940 ran all these risks and more.
4) How did they manage to invade Norway? A much smaller defending force of course, but inhospitable territory with little opportunity to use tanks. Did the Germans just sail up to Oslo harbour and disembark? Had Quisling already ordered the Norwegian forces not to resist? The Germans didn't have it all their own way, losing the Blucher to a Norwegian shorebased torpedo.

Quote: "Put an 88 on the front of a barge and you have some pretty effective seaborne artillery"

I think you'd need a pretty big barge or the recoil would wreck any accuracy even if it didn't sink you!
Adrian

 

Originally posted by plant-pilot+Aug 24 2005, 12:29 PM-->(plant-pilot @ Aug 24 2005, 12:29 PM)</div><div class='quotemain'><!--QuoteBegin-Kiwiwriter@Aug 24 2005, 04:09 PM

No, not in amphibious warfare. Their amphibious technique was absolutely deplorable. I was thinking of the rest of their weaponry, once they were off the beach and moving inland...tanks, guns, tracked vehicles, and so on.

The fatal problem for the Germans in See Lowe was the amphibious side. They seriously planned to use unpowered barges crewed by French and Dutch sailors, to land horses in the first wave of the invasion. Even Dieppe didn't see that.


Surely, Sealion being an amphibious operation, is exactly the point. If you can't get that fundamental part, the crossing, right, then no matter how technically advanced and superior your fighting equipment is, it has to get there in large enough quantities and you have to keep it supplied to make it any use.

Not only was their assault shipping not really up to the job, they were devoid of the specialist AFVs that would have been needed for a beach assault. No specialist tractors to tow stuck tanks onto the shore, no mat laying tanks, no flail mine clearing vehicles. An assault on a beach isn't just another assault up a hill, not least for the fact that if things go wrong you can't fall back to cover behind your start point!
[post=38070]Quoted post[/post]
[/b]

Well, as I've said, See Lowe was planned, but never contemplated. The Germans did not know what they were getting into. Their real hope was that the threat of it would make the British national morale and/or government collapse.