OK i would like to know who ya feel the worst commander in ww2 is.. with one small kicker... the nominated commander has to be from youre country. and a reason why he was so terrible. ME im nominating General loyd Fredendall.. US ARMY For the following reasons. Fredendall was assigned to command the U.S. Army's II Corps in its advance into Tunisia against German forces. As such, he was the second oldest corps commander (of 34 who served as corps commanders) to serve in the U.S. Army in World War II (only Innis P. Swift, First Corps commander in the Pacific, was older). His British commander, Lieutenant-General Kenneth Anderson, considered Fredendall incompetent well prior to the loss at Kasserine. Fredendall was given to speaking and issuing orders using his own slang, such as calling infantry units "walking boys" or artillery "popguns." Instead of using the standard military map grid-based location designators, he would make up confusing codes such as "the place that begins with C." This practice was unheard-of for a general and distinguished graduate of the Command and General Staff School, who had been taught to always use standardized order procedures to ensure clarity when transmitting orders to subordinate commanders under the stress of combat. Fredendall's informality often led to confusion amongst his subordinates, and precious time was lost attempting to figure out his meaning. During the advance into Tunisia, Fredendall used an entire engineer company of the 19th Engineer Regiment to build him a large, dug-in Corps headquarters bunker 70 miles behind the front in a place called Speedy Valley (nine miles southeast of Tébessa). Blasted and drilled out of solid rock, the bunker (actually two U-shaped complexes running 160 feet into the hillside) took three weeks to construct.An entire anti-aircraft battalion was emplaced to protect the headquarters. Fredendall also ordered a bulletproof Cadillac similar to Eisenhower’s, and regularly phoned Oran to find out why it wasn’t being delivered faster. General Omar N. Bradley called the headquarters "an embarrassment to every American soldier," and General Eisenhower, after viewing the elaborate structure, reminded his senior commanders that even generals must assume personal risk in combat. Fredendall rarely visited the front lines, and had a habit of disregarding advice from commanders who had been farther forward and had actually reconnoitered the terrain. He split up units and scattered them widely, and at critical defense points had positioned (against advice) U.S. Army forces too far apart for mutual support or effective employment of artillery, the strongest American arm. During the Battle of the Kasserine Pass, General Ernest Harmon was sent by Eisenhower to report on the fighting, to assist Fredendall and the other Allied commanders, and to determine if Fredendall or his 1st Armored Division commander, Orlando Ward, should be replaced. Harmon thus had the opportunity to observe Fredendall in action as commander of the US Army's II Corps, as well as his superior, the British General Kenneth Anderson. Harmon noticed that the two generals rarely saw each other, and failed to properly coordinate and integrate forces under their command. Fredendall was barely on speaking terms with General Ward, whom he had deliberately left out of operational meetings after Ward had repeatedly protested the separation of his command into weaker 'penny packet' forces distributed across various sectors of the front Allied forces were bereft of air support during critical attacks, and were frequently positioned by the senior command in positions where they could not offer mutual support to each other. Subordinates would later recall their utter confusion at being handed conflicting orders, not knowing which general to obey - Anderson, or Fredendall. While interviewing field commanders, Harmon received an earful of criticism over what many Allied officers viewed as a cowardly, confused, and out-of-touch command. Noting that Fredendall seemed out-of-touch (and at one point, intoxicated), he requested and received permission to go to the front and intervene where necessary to shore up Allied defenses.[13] On 5 March 1943, after the American rout at Kasserine Pass, Eisenhower visited II Corps headquarters and conferred with Bradley. Eisenhower asked "What do you think of the command here?" Bradley's response was "It's pretty bad. I've talked to all the division commanders. To a man they've lost confidence in Fredendall as the corps commander." I almost picked general Mark clark due to the Rapido River disasster with the 36th infantrys crossing but Loyd in my mind was even worse.. Sources used:wikipedia
Fair comment, I believe you have read An Army at Dawn and drawn your own conclusions, did Hoke (Howling Mad) Smith do the same to the 1st Marine Div General for building a Beach House and give the Div to A A Vandergrift. I nominate Lt Gen Arthur Percival commander of Singapore who just capitulated without putting up much of a fight at all
Interesting point. I read someplace General MacArthur in the liberation of Manilla refused to allow artillery support or air support to units fighting in the area due to the fact he owned several properties theyre... I wished i remebered where i read it
Is that the same McArthur who refused to give the marines a unit citation saying they had enough already, then asked for a combat trained and blooded marine division for a scheme he had devised?
I would trump Percival with Brooke-Popham. He was Percival's superior. He guaranteed that the RAF could defend Malaya and Singapore but didn't ensure that he received the tools to do the job. It was the RAF that scattered airfields all over the peninsula and forced the army to dissipate its strength to protect them. Percival's pre-war appreciation of what the Japs would do was pretty much spot on. Forces were poised to 'invade' Siam (Op Matador) but the political will to use them wasn't there. Being fair to Brooke-Popham and Percival, there wasn't a great deal of political will or practical support to hold Malaya, anyway.
Ranger - excellent appraisal of Gen Fredendal and completely true - just one little point however - it was not until Gen. Fredendal was fired - and Gen. Patton took over - that Gen. Bradley flew in from Washington to act as deputy to Gen. Patton... and I would agree with your Gen. Mark Clark. as probably the worst of your Army as not only did he nearly massacre the 36th Texas Division at San Pietro en Fine but did the same to the 34th behind the Monastery in the first Cassino battle when he hauled the three French Divisons back to help out when they were within inches of cutting Highway six...and we won't even talk about Valmontone - or the British Xth Corps at the Garigliano Our worst was probably Gen. Alan Cunningham when he nearly lost the 8th Army in the desert to be replaced by Gen. Ritchie who wasn't quite so bad but did redeem himself as Corps Commander 12th Corps at D Day and beyond. Cheers
