Why were some key British airmen anti-army?

Discussion in 'NW Europe' started by Nijmegen, Feb 14, 2013.

  1. Larry61

    Larry61 Professional liar

    As my mother says, it's amazing what you can find when you look.

    Here is A.T. Harris' report on the TRACTABLE short bombing which also details how methods for tactical target marking in Normandy were lashed up.

    http://scholars.wlu.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1438&context=cmh

    Harris emphasizes the short notice Bomber Command was given to prepare for the operation, but that’s disputed by later writers. The sequence of steps he lists at the end, designed to prevent a recurrence, is interesting.


    This paper by Prof Jody Perrun published in 1999 offers a lot of interesting fact in its Conclusion, as well as some useful analysis of the bombing role in TOTALIZE. Perrun’s grandfather was killed by short bombing on 8 August 1944.

    http://www.nlc-bnc.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk1/tape9/PQDD_0007/MQ43322.pdf

    There was a UHF radio link to the Master Bomber established for ASTORIA and for WELLHIT with an RAF Group Captain attached to the higher HQ involved in the operations.

    In his paper (http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/caj/documents/vol_09/iss_1/CAJ_vol9.1_06_e.pdf), Prof Terry Copp covers Harry Crerar’s diligent courting of Harris and his “unusually close partnership” with Air Vice Marshal Leslie O. Brown, AOC 84 Group of 2nd Tactical Air Force. First Canadian Army and 84 Group operated “a joint battle room that was next door to the operations/intelligence section of Headquarters (HQ) 84 Group”. This arrangement was explicitly encouraged by Montgomery. Copp says the cosiness led to Brown being replaced (November 1944) by Air-Vice Marshal E.C. Hudleston, “a more reliable supporter of an independent air campaign” who left the joint operations room alone but separated his staff mess from the Army mess. They had been combined.

    Copp contends Harris “was always willing to listen to requests to support the ground forces and did so especially in support of the battle for Walcheren”, but the RAF withdrew the direct air-ground link to Bomber Command before Walcheren. As Perrun points out, when Guy Simonds wanted bomber support later in the war he had to request it through several layers of air command structure and planned support was subject to cancellation without notice.
     
  2. Nijmegen

    Nijmegen Member

    Everyone, thanks for all the information! A lot of food for thoughts!
     

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