In 1918, the RAF had achieved an independent status, next to navy and army; they would not be subordinated to their sister services. The British airmen were already independent, so why were some key British airmen anti-army ("unhelpful"/"non-cooperative" to the ground forces) in 1944?
OP, it's a brief answer to a quite complex question - but the advocates of strategic bombing...including many airmen involved in their operational days in flying sorties to suppress colonial uprisings in the far distant parts of the Empire...were firmly wedded to the idea that they could win the war by air power alone - and that subordinating air power to any other task was a dilution of the strength and effort they needed to do so.
I was thinking of Normandy. It took 7 weeks to achieve the final breakout. Since the Allies had air superiority they could have done a lot more to help the ground forces. Until Eisenhower on 25 June promised Montgomery all the air power he wanted, there had been a lot of non-cooperation (Tedder refused the usage of heavy bombers and Coningham's restricted close support). I mean, why the refusal and why a restriction?
I was thinking of Normandy. It took 7 weeks to achieve the final breakout. Since the Allies had air superiority they could have done a lot more to help the ground forces. With strategic bombers? Like what? There's just so much that a four-engined heavy can actually do from even medium altitude...bar create the soprt of landscape that can give the defenders better cover! Harris actually surrendered the Heavy Force for several weeks, impinging greatly on his own campaign - Pforzheim, Dresden, Potsdam etc., all those campaign targets were pushed back further and further and weren't in the end attacked until 1945. The Heavy Force was used for bombing right up and down the French coast for some time before D-Day...and afterwards - it was them that plastered Caen, remember...and were always on call, albeit it with bad grace - they plastered Cleves for the British thrust through the WestWall, for example... Plus, they had enough to do themselves in support of OVERLORD - they did a huge amount of damage to the French rail network and marshalling yards, and carried on the campaign against Hitler's V-weapons, as well as their "own" strategic objectives.
I know what the heavy bombers did in Caen, it provided cover for the Germans and little progress for the ground forces. But the usage of heavy bombers was only made possible after Eisenhower approved it, on 25 June, and a massive bomber raid did allow the Americans (operation Cobra) to exit the 7 weeks old bridgehead. So, why did the air force refused it, for almost 3 weeks?
the usage of heavy bombers was only made possible after Eisenhower approved it, on 25 June RAF - Bomber Command No.3 Group Through the D-Day build-up, the liberation of France and conquest of Germany, formations of No. 3 Group attacked railway junctions, marshalling yards, troop concentrations, etc. RAF - Bomber Command No.1 Group No. 1 Group had heavy commitments in May and June, smashing the V-sites, gun emplacements and railway centres, and weakening German resistance generally. This was not done without losses. On the night of 3rd May the military centre of Mailly-le-Camp was hit in bright moonlight. Bombers and fighters were mixed up in dogfights over the target and 28 aircraft of No. 1 Group failed to return. In June 1944, the Group broke all records by dropping 15,062 tons of bombs. This exceeded the total weight for the whole of 1941-42. The loss rate was the lowest for 16 months - 1.9 per cent. The attack on Le Havre was the first big daylight effort with fighter escort. A few hours before the invasion of France No. 101 Squadron played an historic part, undertaking prolonged patrols over France and around the coast, and all the time jamming the enemy's radar system. June saw 36 operations in 22 days RAF - Bomber Command No.4 Group The whole war situation was transformed in 1944 by the invasion of France. In March attacks began on French marshalling yards. No. 4 Group eventually undertook a new role as daylight bombers and also operated as a semi-tactical force. Gun emplacements on the French coast, choke points and troop concentrations were attacked with almost uncanny accuracy. In addition to disorganising enemy communications a vigorous offensive was waged against V-weapon sites. They had spent 2 (some squadrons almost three) very intensive months BEFORE D-Day attacking OVERLORD-related targets in France...then were released back to Harris. Their operations from the 25th-on were the second prolonged interruption of Harris' campaign. The Heavy Force wasn't a finite resource By the end of the war it numbered some 3,500 aircraft of ALL types - but that total on paper still included Halifaxes etc. that Harris didn't rate...and the high rate of operations from the spring of 1944-on meant a return to relatively high mechanical unserviceability rates; it took that number of aircraft to ensure 500-800-1,000 aircraft available for the really large raids. It might also be worth checking how many "dark periods" that particular three weeks contained, periods without a moon when even with blind bombing raids and pathfinders, the Heavy Force couldn't operate.
I'm not sure that it's true that the RAF was anti-army; however, I wouldn't be surprised to hear that the army thought that it was! Roxy
This nonsense of lack of co-operation started in the desert when Monty asked Tedder and Coningham to spare some time to develop a closer support of the 8th Army by training together - this went over like a lead balloon as they were still fighting the BoB - nothing happened as "who did he - the new boy think he was telling them what to do etc " Monnty theen moved his HQ cloe to their HQ - still nothing happened - El Alamein came and went - the the trek through the desert until around Medenine - then the Torch force HQ was being enlarged by Eisenhower and both Tedder and Coningham took off for Algiers This left Harry Broadhurst in charge of the DAF - and he and Monty then developed the "Cab Rank " air support which was put into operation at El Hamma and again at Tunis .... THEN D Day found the duo in charge of Air and wanted complete control and conspired to remove Monty and the man in charge of the Air who was finally killed on his way to take over in Burma..... In my view both Tedder and Coningham should have been shot for treasonable conduct - as it was Coningham finished up in the slammer for looting ..... Cheers
Would agree with Roxy.Never heard of it in a serious sense. But digressing,on the other hand,there was some civilian irrational conflict with RAF personnel during the London blitz when there was a risk of anyone wearing RAF uniform was accused of not pulling their weight.
I'm not sure that it's true that the RAF was anti-army; however, I wouldn't be surprised to hear that the army thought that it was! Roxy I've read that the Army felt they were let down by the RAF at Dunkirk. I don't think they were correct but I'm typing that from the comfort of my office.
But digressing,on the other hand,there was some civilian irrational conflict with RAF personnel during the London blitz Yep, I've heard of that - and also some anti-RAF blue sentiment on the beaches at Dunkirk in 1940... But I'm sure the average Tommy just didn't know about the huge losses the AASF and BEF Air Element had already suffered by the time DYNAMO began.... However - up at command level there had been a number of major operations compromised to a greater or smaller degree by Harris' unwillingness to front up with the levels of Bomber Command support he initially promised - St Nazaire and Dieppe both come to mind...
And, by the way, my previous comments were, in no way, meant to be a slur on the army. I think that it is perfectly understandable that those in the thick of the fighting might think that 'the brylcreme boys' safe at home and able to go down the pub, go on dates etc weren't pulling their weight. That banter is still here! Roxy
The Air Forces at Sicily didn't do a very good job in halting the escaping German Divisions to Italy - with all their equipment - but then they were flying all the way from Malta because the 8th Army hadn't bothered about capturing the airfields at Catania - that was after they dropped the Paras and Gliders anywhere except the DZ's...but it was raining and blowing a bit - then they shot us up a few times ..but then it was hard to tell what was a Churchill Tank from a Tiger...but they did a grand job overall... Cheers
Phylo We had some sort of clue about the Air Force losses from the BBC and our own witness to three Liberators with some 36 men colliding after returning from the Rumanian Oilfields within 20 miles of base at Lucera near Foggia - difficult to accept when you are in battles which cost 14,000 KIA in less than a month-the many hospitals were overflowing with wounded and that was after Cassino Cheers
It was probably fortunate that after the breakout from Normandy the Allies never again felt the need to call upon the heavy bombers for tactical support. The heavies did outstanding work attacking transportation targets in preparation for D-Day. But then they were bombing targets for which they had been designed. Large stationary targets, such as railyards,that could be attacked from high altitude. Whenever they were charged with close support missions, they failed miserably. Two incidents come to mind on the American side. One was the day of the actual invasion when American bombers probably killed more Norman cows than German soldiers when they overshot their target by miles. But at least that time they erred on the side of caution. The next time during "Operation Cobra" they didn't, and many American soldiers died. The USAAF may have been a victim of its own press. Their claims of "pickle barrel accuracy" may have induced American ground commanders to assume that the heavies were as accurate as fighter-bombers and mediums, but with alot more firepower. They weren't. Not even close. Sorry, I've wandered abit from the RAF/RA theme of this thread. So, to paraphrase Douglas MacArthur, "I shall return to the original question". From what I've read neither Coningham, Tedder nor Leigh-Mallory were huge fans of Montgomery, and the feeling was probably mutual. So, maybe it was more a case of anti-Montgomery than anti-Army. That, when added to the inter-service rivalry which exists in almost all military forces, is going to effect operational planning even at the highest level.
The Goodwood bombing had a devastating impact on 21st Pz Division and sPzAbt 503. Both units operated at greatly reduced capability throughout the 18th. Rather claiming it was a failure we should say it failed to live up to expectations-not the same thing.
As I understand it Army and Air disagreed over both resource allocation and ‘calling the shots’ on targets. From the Canadian point of view, Paul Johnston makes a really good analysis of the inter-service debate in this article: http://scholars.wlu.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1086&context=cmh Basically, the Army wanted to direct air power to where it was needed. Many Air people were reluctant and wanted the right to accept only the targets they judged to be worthwhile. It was very labour and resource-intensive to operate ‘cab ranks’ and, as Phylo has pointed out, intense operations had a big impact on aircraft serviceability rates. Air people questioned the point of attacking targets where they couldn’t see the enemy – in forests, for example – and had to be persuaded by Army that the ‘super artillery’ the airstrike represented actually did some good. Air also worried about accuracy. I get the impression airmen really dreaded friendly fire incidents and didn’t especially like operating close to the ‘bomb line’ for that reason.
Air people questioned the point of attacking targets where they couldn’t see the enemy – in forests, for example – and had to be persuaded by Army that the ‘super artillery’ the airstrike represented actually did some good. Air also worried about accuracy. I get the impression airmen really dreaded friendly fire incidents and didn’t especially like operating close to the ‘bomb line’ for that reason. Two things on that.... 1/ while it might have been different for tactical and CAS squadrons and older "Army Co-op" squadrons - did the groups/squadrons operating heavies ever actually exercise providing ground support??? I know that as of 1940 they hadn't - according to Brian Lavery. 2/ on the accuracy question - don't forget that Bomber Command nearly reached the end of the line in 1941 due to "accuracy", with the Butt Report leading among other things to demands that it be broken up and it's aircraft divided between other Commands! BC had experienced over a full year of poor accuracy and ineffective attacks on the Continent by the late Spring of 1941 - I wonder what the reaction was to being asked to "bomb blind" again! :p
Air also worried about accuracy. I get the impression airmen really dreaded friendly fire incidents and didn’t especially like operating close to the ‘bomb line’ for that reason. IIRC the Army were pretty worried about accuracy too. Plenty of situations arose during WWII where Allied ground forces were mistakenly attacked by Allied air forces, hence the development of FAC capabilities.
Two things on that.... 1/ while it might have been different for tactical and CAS squadrons and older "Army Co-op" squadrons - did the groups/squadrons operating heavies ever actually exercise providing ground support??? I know that as of 1940 they hadn't - according to Brian Lavery. The approach, I gather, was to frame the operation as a pathfinder-led strategic raid on the assumption no special training would be necessary. The Canadian gunner, George Blackburn describes how British and Canadian artillery did a proving shoot in the beachhead before TOTALIZE to see whether the guns could place target indicator pyrotechnics as Bomber Command crews expected: While RAF strategic bombers are accustomed to flying in the dark to targets marked by Pathfinders, the need for accuracy has never been so critical. To ensure RAF Pathfinders do not make a mistake, the artillery is given the job of firing flare shells onto targets just before the Pathfinders are timed to arrive. And just to be sure it will work, the RAF insists on testing the effectiveness of the artillery-placed flares up near Ouistreham, on the coast north of Caen, the night before the bombing is to take place. I don't know if BC Pathfinders also dropped TIs using GEE or Oboe but it would make sense to have that backup. However, it seems to me this technique applied most reliably to night bombing and even then dust from the bomb bursts was a problem. By day I don't know how following crews were expected to hit their target area other than by dead reckoning. Blackburn says RCAF and RAF crews were supposed to time their bomb run from the coast for the TRACTABLE day bombing ... Presumably USAAF crews did the same? IIRC the Army were pretty worried about accuracy too. Plenty of situations arose during WWII where Allied ground forces were mistakenly attacked by Allied air forces, hence the development of FAC capabilities. I'm fairly sure a form of FAC for heavy bombers was worked out. I believe that's how the raid planned for Dieppe was called off. Prof Terry Copp states the Bomber Command aircraft were 20 minutes out from the FUSILADE airstrike when they were recalled and I'm fairly sure the recall came from 1st Canadian Army, not BC itself. I'm sure I've read a paper on the FAC question. If memory serves and I can find the paper I'll post a link.
