And Leros maybe? As mentioned in that other thread Yes...but if you look back at the the post above and the context of my post - Leros isn't in Norway! Also - Leros was different in that by then, the Wehrmacht had its MFPs for landing tanks etc., so still didn't necessarily NEED "marines" for amphibious ops; with the proper shipping to cross the sea-land interface, conventional land forces were suitable
I'm curious Opana, why did Germany need Marines, given that the war with Britain was an accident? As part of a well-developed force. I would think that they would be Heer units, like mountain troops, specially trained for the amphibious assault role. (Germany had launched an amphibious assault against Russia in WWI, with limited results.)
Dave "PT Dockyard" on AHF (who's interest is small coastal vessles), turned up a literary reference to it in an inventory about six months ago, and asked for more detail at the time. I'll try to find the thread again. Historically, the French Renaults at Narvik had to debark fron BRITISH lighters... Thanks. Probably no need to mention the landing problems at Gallipoli, except that they sparked the USMC interest in the '20s and '30s. Reading those reports was very interesting.
Actually, turns out to be THREE... The following website mentions the French having three French-built tank landing craft in LeHarve in June 1940 with the thought of using them for a landing behind German lines. http://www.stratisc.org/strat_062_durteste_tdm.html
Actually, turns out to be THREE... Excellent. Jane's does mention them in the "consolidated" WWII book. I should check the annuals.
Leros merely offered as another rare example of WW2 Amphibious assault by Germany, and one that gets little mention. I wonder to what extent the strong faith in airborne troops contributed to the atrophy in specialist marine/amphibious skills. Up until Crete there's an apparently firm belief in Germany that parachute and glider borne attack was the modern way for specialist stuff, and could carry out any of the coup-de-main raiding type jobs if and when needed. Maybe another way the influence of the fat pigeon weakened the overall pool of skills.
Perhaps you would like to have a vote http://www.ww2talk.com/forum/general/16372-would-hitler-really-have-invaded-britain.html
I wonder to what extent the strong faith in airborne troops contributed to the atrophy in specialist marine/amphibious skills. Up until Crete there's an apparently firm belief that parachute and glider borne attack was the modern way for specialist stuff, and could carry out any of the coup-de-main raiding type jobs if and when needed. It went a LONG time before that! In fact - it's in the first draft of the Sealion plans that you can see that the Wehrmacht was cheesed off with the very apparent weakneses of airborne ops, and firmly relegated them to two SMALL sets of Eben Emael-style combat engineer ops....and the General Reserve! Student got to hear about this and sent Putzinger (IIRC) hotfoot to lobby for a greater role - he himself was in an Austrian Sanatarium recovering from his Dutch head injury. Norway was costly - heavy in casualties, and 180 Ju52s lost, and the Oslo airfield op was SOOOOO close to being an abject failure, along with the phyrric victory that was the Dombas drop...and Holland was a similar costly mess for the FJ. The powers-that-were were NOT impressed! :p
I am not much of an expert on wartime politics & Hitler's backroom backstabbing shenanigens but I get the distinct impression (from a novice's outside POV) that He didn't have the attention span or self control to settle for victory over Czechoslovakia, Austria, Poland, France, the best part of Scandinavia, etc, etc which may have given Him (& the German people) the Liebensraum which he deemed so important. He simply continued overstretching the possibilities from one successful land campaign to the next, to the horror of German High Command, and for him naval operations had no Kudos or merit.
This might be informative. The Fuehrer Conferences on Matters Dealing With the German Navy-1940-Vol I - Office of Naval Intelligence The Fuehrer Conferences on Matters Dealing With the German Navy-1940-Vol II - Office of Naval Intelligence
As part of a well-developed force. I would think that they would be Heer units, like mountain troops, specially trained for the amphibious assault role. (Germany had launched an amphibious assault against Russia in WWI, with limited results.) I would state that Marines would be pretty low down in terms of becoming a well-developed force. At the time Germany went to war, it was looking no further than war with Poland and an eventual conflict with Russia. Again, there was no need for Germany to develop Marines. A proper tank force and increased motorised infantry formations might have helped out a bit better.
So, Sealion didn't really have a chance, but I'm curious -- did the general public know this at all? It seems like they were being bombarded with messages saying fear the worst. And obviously the government was preparing for that as well... Did the Allies have any idea? Obviously the whole point is that an island assault is a million times harder to blitzkrieg, and that's pretty obvious... Cliche or not, the idea of being the last holdout in Western Europe always seemed so powerfully scary, with your overworked pilots battling to the death overhead...The idea of waiting for invasion by a foreign dictator is one of the scariest things I can think of...
Possibly they needed to be as good as the allies at Camouflage as the RAF was destroying their landing craft at French ports day after day. At one stage in a two day period, aircraft of the RAF destroyed 20% of the accumulated landing barges tied up in French ports. If the RAF were being pro-active in bombing French Ports, what damage would be done when the RAF and RN were protecting those ports and landing areas at home.
It is interesting to have an insight into Jodl's paper to Hitler, entitled "The Continuation of the War against England".Jodl was a deep thinking strategist when away from Hitler who he regarded as a genius, a trait which would end at Nuremberg. After the fall of France Jodl thought deeply and came to the conclusion that the war was won and almost over,a view shared by all those at OKW.He simplified the actions to be taken against England in three proposed steps. Intensification of the German air and sea war against shipping,storage depots,factories and the Royal Air Force; Terror attacks against the centres of population This was something that Jodl emphasised in order to break the will of the English to resist; A landing of troops with the objective of occupying England; He added a rider that the fight against the Royal Air Force must have top priority.But he thought that this as well as other aspects of the assualt could be carried out with little trouible. Jodl also suggested the possibility of extending the war to the far reaches of the British Empire with the help of Italy,Japan,Spain and Russia.Italy and later,Japan would be eager to tackle England but Spain would turn out to be a reluctant enemy of England while Russia would find herself a victim of Hitler's expansion plans. Invasions across land frontiers do not present the enormous task that is imposed on an invader who has to secure sea lanes through actions by its navy and in the air by air supremacy.Achieve these and the likelihood is that an army may be shielded from destruction in those sea lanes and be capable of landing on enemy soil.The land battle would commence from there and be successful if sufficient men and materiel, with the appropriate battlefield strategy can be built up and maintained to defeat the defenders. As it turned out,it was a task that the Germans were incapable of starting,never mind the prospect of being successful.
GB be willing to accept terms from Germany - was this the ending Germany had hoped for ? To my mind she was never prepared for an invasion and the circumstances for invasion were never right. The navy knew they lacked the resources and they also lacked the resources to blockade Britain when the opportunity was at hand. Taking the war to the Med / Middle East might have produced results which could have been converted into political levers to make GB recognise Germany's lead in Europe. 1941 should have been the year to defeat GB ,secure the Middle East and extract the French Fleet for service in the Kgm. With the cards in Germany's hand Sealion could not have worked in any circumstances other than the most favourable and she was not in a position to achieve this.
