What did Lt Gen Sir Henry Pownall do in Singapore

Lt Gen Sir Henry Pownall arrived in Singapore on December 23rd 1941, and replaced Air Chief Marshal Brooke-Popham as Commander-in-Chief Far East, four days later on the 27th December. His command was short lived, ABDA Command (American, British, Dutch, Australian) was formed on January 1st, 1942, five days later, command by General Wavell, which Far East Command was dissolved into, with Pownall taking on the role of Wavell’s chief of staff.

This is an incredibly short tenure, but the Fall of Singapore was one of Britain’s biggest, if not the biggest military disaster, and yet I have found no criticism of Pownall. Wavell didn’t arrive in Singapore until January 7th, and one of the first things he did was to consider replacing Lt Gen Percival, as commander of Malaya Command, commanding the land forces in Malaya/Singapore. The other generals in theatre, Heath, Barstow, Key and Simmons, as well as the Australian, Bennett, were all dismissed as not being any better, no doubt for a variety of reasons, so am I to consider Pownall as not capable of filling the role too?

In Pownall’s defence, he doesn’t have seemed to have commanded much, in the way of a field unit, other than in the First World War, serving in numerous staff positions post war. In 1939 he was made Chief of Staff of the BEF (British Expeditionary Force), in May 1941 he was Vice Chief of the Imperial General Staff.

Clearly a man of ability, but for fifteen days, 23rd December to 7th January, he did what? How come he made no impression on Singapore, indeed, seems to have survived the campaign with no blemish to his name.

 

Might be worth asking Karl Hack, now at the Open University; he has written books on the campaign - so might have commented.

Are there clues, even if not about Singapore, within this short bio: https://www.britishmilitaryhistory....OWNALL-Lieutenant-General-Sir-Henry-Royds.pdf

 

Can I suggest that you might like to have read the two volumes of his diaries, 'Chief Of Staff The Diaries Of Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Pownall’ edited by Brian Bond, preferably before wondering aloud how useless he was!

He was subsequently GOC Ceylon Army Command 1942-43 and Chief of Staff of SEAC 1943-44, as you would no doubt have found if you had checked Wikipedia first.

 

Didn't think my question was that offensive to deserve such a reply, and actually I took the details I did provide from Wikipedia, so was aware of those facts. Unfortunately not all of us are so gifted as to have a copy of every book on military history to hand, forgive me for being one of those ignorant few.

But being as you no doubt have a copy of those two volumes, perhaps you could take great please in enlightening me as to what he did in Singapore?

 

Thank you davidbfpo for the link, very informative, gave great detail about his career, confirming what I thought that he was a good staff officer.

The question I posed, as to whether Wavell could have replaced Percival with Pownall, was one of judgement, as whether Pownall, or anyone else for that matter, could have hoped to stop the rot, while at the same time, losing his services as a staff officer. I've often thought that Percival would have made a good chief of staff, but then probably wasn't the time to make a change. Its kind of ironic that Wavell didn't replace Percival, leaving the new incumbent holding the baby, so to speak, but Wavell found himself in that situation several times in his career.

 

I don't know enough about Pownall's career to say whether or not he would have made an adequate replacement for Percival. Pownall knew Percival during the 1940 campaign and did not think highly of him then or later. As to whether Pownall or anyone else could have stopped the rot...well, years ago I had a conversation with Ian Dobbie, the grandson of General William Dobbie who had been GOC Malaya pre-war. I asked Ian Dobbie if he thought his grandfather might have done a better job in 1941-42 than Percival. To this, he said that with due respect to his grandfather it would have taken a Marlborough to salvage anything from the Malayan mess. After the loss of Force Z, the mauling of RAF Malaya, and the retreat of the navy's main force to Ceylon, the army in Malaya was left naked and alone. Without air cover or adequate sea power the only thing to be done at that point was to get as many of the troops out as possible while there was still time. Unfortunately a withdrawal from Malaya was considered politically impossible by both London and Canberra, so more troops were poured in only to be lost as well. Certainly Percival, Torrance, and Bennett managed things about as badly as possible, but the army performed poorly at every level, not just at the top. That performance could only have been improved by revised tactics, realistic training, and more and better equipment. All that would have had to be done prior to Dec. 7th; later was too late. A better commanded and better trained army might conceivably have put up a better fight and delayed the Japanese long enough to pull off an Asian Dunkirk, but without adequate air and sea support the army alone could not have saved Singapore. The US Army in the Philippines fought better than Malaya Command in an analogous situation, but the end result there was the same as in Malaya. Atrocious as British leadership was, the fall of Singapore was not ultimately due to individuals. It was the fruit of 25 years of bad military and political decisions. The Singapore strategy never made sense, and not even a Marlborough could have fixed it.

 

Totally agreed with all you said, and you laid it out so much better than I would have.

The bit about Pownall knowing Percival, and not thinking highly of him, is one of those remarks that can distort the evaluation of an officers career, just how good he was. The danger is the comment is taken out of context. An example of this can be see by the sentence " when POWNALL met General Sir Alan BROOKE, (who was now Commander-in-Chief of Home Forces) on 17 August 1940, BROOKE was not impressed with the developments and proposals articulated by POWNALL."

see

Top of slide 13 of the PDF. Just reading that gives you a poor view of Pownall, if you only read that, but a slide earlier we learnt that Brooke had requested Pownall as his Chief Of Staff, when Brooke was being asked to lead a second BEF into France in June 1940. Also on slide 16 we find Brooke appointing Pownall to the role of COS to Mountbatten, to help guide him, considering Pownall aptly able to do that. So maybe the first remark was just Brooke being disappointed with the rate of progress.

And taking things out of context, it would be completely unfair to blacken Pownall's name with the loss of Singapore, which I think someone thought I was eluding to. But such an influential figure, and a thinker, he must have articulated something about the state of Singapore, when he found it.

 

Perhaps my response was a bit harsh.

I do understand the function of these forums; to let everyone demonstrate their military expertise, perhaps based on having seen all the episodes of ‘SAS Rogue Heroes’, and having watched both ‘The Bridge on the River Kwai’ and ‘A Bridge Too Far’, once again, over the Christmas holidays.

Discussion of the campaign in Malaya seems to provide a particularly safe space to criticise the professionals and to cast aspersions on their competence, bravery, etc. I’m just a bit fed up with it, that’s all.

I recall an account of a conversation that happened during the last days in Singapore, when Admiral Spooner, Rear Admiral (Malaya), and AVM Pulford, AOC AHQ Far East, were due to be evacuated, given that neither of them had very much left to command. They went to see Percival before they left, and one of them said to him something like “I suppose that you and I will be held responsible for all this, but, God knows, we did the best we could with what we had.”

Both Spooner and Pulford perished in their attempt to escape.
I find it hard to criticise these men, or indeed the ‘lucky ones’ who endured four years of captivity.

 

You’ve forgotten to mention Saving Private Ryan and The Great Escape

 

Thank you for that

I can understand that, how many times does it get mentioned that the guns were pointing the wrong way.

And if you've not done any service, and don't get paid to be a historian, then you can only be called an amateur, as I am regarding the loss of Singapore, which is where my interests lay.

Pulford and Spooner were indeed brave men, who displayed great determination in getting as many of their men (RAF and Royal Navy) away as possible, to live to fight another day. Both could have left safely much earlier, but believed in doing "the right thing" which cost them their lives. I have no doubt that had Percival had the opportunity to have got most of his men away, he too would have stayed until the end, to ensure they all got away. But his role was a much less glamorous one, having to surrender the island, and go down in history as the man who commanded probably the British Army's biggest defeat. He's always castigated as a failure, a bad general, and no doubt some of the things he did, we can critic as being poor choices. But he was left to manage over what was already a defeat, as soon as the shooting started, a situation created by others. In truth, he like just about everybody else is grey, not black and white, when it comes to judging him.

After the war he worked hard at helping and representing the former POWs of the Japanese, and was also required to write a supplement to the Gazette, Operations of Malaya Command, where he tried to present the fact, without attaching blame, quite a difficult thing to do, and no doubt spared the blushes of many by his tactful and limited report. Which leaves one to having to dig a little to find jig saw pieces which, while they will never give a full picture, but may help give a better picture that what we see now.

My enquiry regarding Pownall's part, is just that, scratching for a jig saw piece, as I did with a much earlier post about, funny enough, Megan Spooner, wife of the afore mentioned Rear Admiral Jackie Spooner, see Officer characteristics from the diary of Megan Spooner. I meant no offense towards any officer that I mentioned, and perhaps my initial post was poorly written.

 

Fatboy Coxy,

In Post 7 you wrote about Pownall:

I assume there is no indication, either in official documents, private papers and the like that Pownall did 'articulate(d) something'.

If before his arrival, with his official and private briefings, he understood what the strategy, policy and operational meant in reality then from my very limited reading arriving "in theatre" reality in Malaya / Singapore was not what Whitehall had told him.

There is ample, more contemporary evidence that 'truth unto power' often vanishes. I would contend Pownall knew no-one would listen or read what he could articulate.

 

You may find something useful amongst these, particularly around the setting up of CinCFE (very small unit with only 7 Staff Officers) and the command structure:

Far East
Singapore Defences
Malaya Command

Tim

 

With apologies for the wonky photography; I've just finished a bottle of chardonnay.

 

Wow thank you Charley, what a little gold mine, will need to digest this before replying. I salute you with my cup of Lemsip, confined to the 6ft by 6ft cupboard I grandly call my study, and the back bedroom, struck down with man-flu!

 

Thanks very much indeed for posting those - they answer the question very well indeed!

 

My immediate thought on reading the is post was "why ask about Pownall in particular?" Yes, he was Commander-in-Chief Far East, but what exactly did that mean? According to Percival's post-war report:

"In the first place a Commander-in-Chief Far East (Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham) had been appointed with headquarters at the Naval Base on Singapore Island. He was responsible directly to the Chiefs of Staff for the operational control and general direction of training of all British land and air forces in Malaya, Burma, and Hong Kong, and for the co-ordination of plans for the defence of those territories. It was intended that he should deal primarily with matters of major military policy and strategy, but it was not the intention that he should assume any administrative or financial responsibilities or take over any of the day-to-day functions at that time exercised by the General Officers Commanding Malaya, Burma, and Hong Kong, or the Air Officer Commanding Far East, all of whom came under his command. These officers continued to correspond with the War Office, Air Ministry, Colonial Office and Burma Office on all matters on which they had previously dealt with those departments to the fullest extent possible consistent with the exercise of command by the Commander-in-Chief, but kept him informed as and when he wished. It will be noted that the Commander-in-Chief Far East exercised no command or control over any naval forces. He was responsible for keeping the Governor of the Straits Settlements and High Commissioner for the Malay States fully informed of developments, though this did not absolve the General Officer Commanding Malaya or the Air Officer Commanding Far East from maintaining touch, subject to the Commander-in-Chief’s general direction and supervision, with the Governor and High Commissioner. The Commander-in-Chief Far East was also responsible for maintaining touch, where appropriate, with His Majesty’s representatives in various foreign states in the Far East.

The degree of “operational control” of British land and air forces, which the Commander-in-Chief Far East should assume, was defined as meaning “the higher direction and control” as distinct from “detailed operational control”.To enable the Commander-in-Chief Far East to carry out his Functions he was allowed only a very small staff, consisting of seven officers drawn from all three Services with the necessary clerical and cipher staff. For intelligence purposes he had at his disposal the Far East Combined Intelligence Bureau, though it remained under Admiralty control. Although the establishment of his staff was later increased to fifteen it was never, allowing for sickness, etc., sufficient for the work to be done. On the other hand, it must not be forgotten that, when this headquarters was created there was no war in the Far East, while there were insufficient trained staff officers to meet our requirements in the active theatres of war. He would be a bold man who would say that the decision was wrong.

On assuming command the Commander-in-Chief Far East had issued the following instructions to his subordinate commanders:

"You will correspond direct with Headquarters Far East on questions of policy affecting strategy or operations. On other questions you will repeat to the C.-in-C. Far East such of your communications to the War Office, etc., as you judge of sufficient importance"


When Pownall arrived on the 23rd December, Hong Kong had fallen, and responsibility for Burma had been put under Wavell’s India Command. He was therefore left with what seems to me to have been a vague mission in Malaya, with responsibility for everything and effective command of nothing, superimposed over men in the middle of a campaign that was already going very badly wrong. No wonder he welcomed Wavell’s arrival and serving under him as Chief of Staff!

 

Wow! There's some good stuff in there - thanks very much for posting those! (I never realised Percival was allowed to publish his report - I thought I read somewhere that it was all swept under the carpet after the War . . .)

 

Yes he had little time to make any difference, and indeed I've never took much notice of his contribution, while researching the Malaya Campaign of 1941-42. However, I have been recently doing some work over the major reinforcements that were sent or planned to be sent, with regard to who said what and when. This was mostly based on the Australian I Corps, but also included the British 18th Division. Decisions about whether to send the 18th to Singapore were being made around Pownall's time, which is why I asked. I do have some stuff on Pownall, which I'll post here soon.

 

The selection of Pownall to replace Brooke -Popham, as the story goes according to my understanding, and I apologise, I’ve left book loads out, but have tried to provide a simple thread to follow. But there’s quite a bit I’d like to know more about if anyone can help.

With the outbreak of War with Germany, there was no real prospect of fulfilling the Singapore Strategy, ie the fleet sailing to Singapore in time of need, and saving everyone from the Japanese, then that was compounded by Italy joining Germany, as well as the fall of France, the natural counter balance to the Italian Navy. The RAF, still very much the junior partner, stepped forward insisting they could take on the defence, just needed to build a lot of airfields in preparation, and so the local RAF commander went ahead with building airfields in strategic locations for that very purpose. However, this wasn’t done with any thought to how the Army was meant to defend them, and relations with the local Army commander were incredibly bad.

The British High Command in London was made aware of this situation by early 1940, among others, Percy Noble, who was so concerned, that on returning from the Far East in February 1940, had obtained an interview with the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Lord Lloyd, to express his worries. Asked for his recommendations, he proposed both the Army and RAF commanders be replaced, and a senior officer from one of the three services be appointed in supreme authority above them, and the Governor of Malaya, Shenton Thomas (this arrangement happened in Ceylon in 1942). Unfortunately, George Lloyd died a couple of days later, (4th February) and nothing came of Noble’s suggestion.

However, by autumn 1940, the problem had been tackled, Brooke Popham being appointed Commander-in-Chief of the British Far East Command on the 18th November 1940, with new commanders for both the RAF and Army to follow in the new year. What wasn’t dealt with was how that worked with the Civil administration of Governor Shelton Thomas, but the commanders selected were all noted for their tact and ability to work with others, and so that wasn’t expected to be much of a problem.

Left as a backwater, that situation was allowed to muddle on, Brooke Popham didn’t upset anyone, but he didn’t install confidence, and the Japanese occupation of Southern Indo-China in July, followed by an increasingly bleak prospect of any kind of a deal between the Japanese and Americans being thrashed out in their talks, rang alarm bells in London. Duff-Cooper, a trusted friend of Churchill’s was sent to Singapore, to report back, and was crystal clear, Brooke-Popham needed replacing. The name put forward was Lt Gen Bernard Paget, currently GOC South East Command, the area most likely to be attacked in the Germans were to invade. We’re now into October-November 1941.

Now this bit gets very messy, a simple explanation is found in the link Davidbfpo posted following my initial post, but I’ll reword it, because there’s more I’d like to know here.

About this time Churchill had concluded he wanted rid of General Dill, his Chief of the Imperial General Staff, and now it gets messy with a bit of musical chairs, and I have no idea who was actually making the decisions as to who got what job, and would love to know more.

Personally, Churchill favoured Lieutenant General Archibald Nye as the new C.I.G.S., but sound judgement prevailed, and General Sir Alan Brooke was appointed instead. I have no doubt Dill would have lobbied for him, but being as he was out of favour with Churchill, I wonder if that helped? Who else had the ear of Churchill and helped press for Brooke, I don’t know.

Brooke is able to do sterling work in convincing Churchill that Dill would be better in the USA than as Governor General of India, the post he is initially offered.

Ok CIGS post is filled, but who takes Brooke’s former post, C-in-C of Home Forces, well Paget gets that, did Brooke have a say it that? Was there an alternative?

So, we still need someone to replace Brooke-Popham in the Far East, and Pownall is put forward, the current VCIGS, which can only mean Brooke is doing this, not wanting Pownall as his second, or needing to take Nye as his second to placate Churchill.

Finally, Nye takes VCIGS, and Pownall given the Far East.

Clear as mud!

But wait, there’s more. Pownall flies out of the UK on the 4th December, and he’s reached Cairo by the 8th December, when war breaks out with Japan. Now he’s told to sit and wait, while matters are assessed. So, what’s happened here, has Brooke finally got control, and is concerned about who’s he’s sending out there. A suggestion made is it might not be a good time to change commander, does that hold water?

Brooke knows things are a mess in the Far East, Dill told him when he handed over

“He (Dill) had told me (Brooke) frankly that he had done practically nothing to meet this threat. He said we were already so weak on all fronts that it was impossible to denude them any further to meet a possible threat. I think he was quite right in his dispositions and that he could not have done more to meet the probable Japanese entry into the war.” Source Alanbrooke papers, via Singapore 1942, Britain’s Greatest Defeat, Alan Warren.

Is Brooke trying to buy himself time, to be able to put forward a better command system, something that is immensely complicated by the need now to include the Dutch and Americans in, creating ABDA?

 

The one name I did not recognise was Percy Noble and his thin Wiki helps:

From: Percy Noble (Royal Navy officer) - Wikipedia , Commander-in-Chief, China (Royal Navy) - Wikipedia , HMS SHAMROCK H06 (1926) and the longest bio found is Google Books, though with pgs. not displayed: https://www.google.co.uk/books/edit...a_Station_1864_1941/2YxLDwAAQBAJ?hl=en&gbpv=1

Elsewhere he is fully named as Admiral Sir Percy Lockhart Harnam Noble.

Curiously one of his photos has a caption (cited in part):

From: EPISODES OF WWII: Acting Captain Frank Getting RAN, and Admiral Sir Percy Noble aboard HMS KANIMBLA. Photo Derek Simon [1919-2004] courtesy GKA.

Curious that Noble, citing Fatboy Coxy:

Not with anyone in the Admiralty.

His fame came later as Commander Western Approaches and the ASW campaign; though he does not appear here.