Hello all, have recently come across some very interesting information, thought I'd share with you to get some opinions... As the title suggests, did 59/X attack U-383, after the attack of another a/c that is credited with the loss? _____________________________________________________________________________________________________ U-383. According to uboat.net from various sources. U-383 was attacked (later sinking) by Sunderland 228/V at 2002hrs on 01.08.1943. Sunk 1 Aug 1943 west of Brest, France, in position 47.24N, 12.10W, by depth charges from a British Sunderland aircraft (Sqdn. 228/V). 52 dead (all hands lost)." The sinking of U-383 20.02 hrs, Bay of Biscay, outbound: British Sunderland flying boat JM678 (RAF Sqdn 228/V, pilot F/L S. White), despite being hit by flak during an initial attack run, returned to drop seven depth charges, straddling the U-boat from the starboard quarter. The Sunderland then left to return to base, since flak hits had holed the hull and shot away the starboard float and aileron. U-383 was last seen by the aircraft (228/V) with a heavy list to port and men jumping overboard. Kremser reported to BdU (at 2137hrs) that they were unable to dive and the boat was out of control. U-218, U-454 and U-706 were ordered to give assistance, with air cover and an escort of three torpedo boats promised the following day. However, U-454 had been lost earlier that day, and U-218, despite hearing the attack from nearby, was unable to locate U-383 in the darkness. The search continued the next day, but both U-boats were attacked by aircraft, and the torpedo boats searched the area without sighting anything. U-383 apparently foundered during the night due to the extensive damage. (Sources: Franks/Zimmerman) _____________________________________________________________________________________________________ Liberator Mk.V - BZ719 - 59/X Base: St.Eval Take off time: 0955 hrs Op: SEASLUG 203 ORB states the following: "At 2055 a message was received from group "HUNT U/B position 47.24N 12.12W" Aircraft proceeded to position indicated and at 2147 while aircraft was flying at 4000 ft in 5/10 cloud. Sgt Harris (2nd Pilot) sighted a fully surfaced U/B 4 miles ahead bearing 60 degrees green. Pilot turned to starboard down sun and wind and losing height. When at right angles to U/B and 400 yards ahead, pilot turned 90 degrees and attack up track from bow. When 200 yards U/B turned hard to port and opened fire with multiple M.G's. At 2150 hours Navigator released 2 DC's, spaced 80ft from 100ft at 176 mph, angle 30 degrees to U/B (a third hung up). Rear gunner opened fire as aircraft passed over U/B. First DC hit approx 95 yards and second DC 65 yards from U/Bs bow. Thick black smoke was emitted abaft of C/T and firing ceased temporarily but then recommenced with 20mm cannons. Aircraft continued to circle until PLE was reached, U/B remaining on surface and turning in same direction and was last seen heading on a course of 360 degrees T at about 10 knots. U/B was 517 ton class, grey in colour with 2 guns on C/T." Crew on this day: F/L M. Charlton (Capt) - Sgt E.W. Harris (2nd pilot) - F/O F.R. Short (Nav) - Sgt D.E Peacock - F/O G.M Harvey - F/O F.J Bradley - F/O M.D Hutchings - Sgt L.E Proudfoot. _____________________________________________________________________________________________________ Report Similarities: - U-383 was attacked by 228/V at 2002hrs in position 47.24N, 12.10W. X/59 at 2150hrs attacked a U-boat on the surface in position 47.24N 12.12W. Not far between the two attacks. - Uboat.net states: U-383 was last seen by the aircraft (228/V) with a heavy list to port and men jumping overboard. Kremser (Oblt. Horst Kremser) reported to BdU that they were unable to dive and the boat was out of control. (2137hrs). During the attack and after (whilst shadowing until PLE reached) by 59/X at 2150hrs, the Uboat made no attempt to dive, and was reported "turning in same direction" possibly out of control? Rudderless as reported by Kremser? Although ORB did state the Uboat turned "hard to port"... _____________________________________________________________________________________________________ The "Historisches Marinearchiv - Duikboot" site: States the following for U-boats attacked on 01.08.1943. Translated from Dutch to English, could be distortedin translation, or misinterpreted by me... - 1902hrs 59/K attacked U-106 in area BE69 - (no such report in the 59 ORB for 1902hrs). Plus description of attack does not reflect that of 59/X. Probably the attack by a 407 Sqdn aircraft noted on uboat. net. - U-383 attacked (by 228/V) - signal received at 2009hrs - "U383 reported attack in BF44 , also 2019" - U-383 attacked by 228/V at 2137hrs - "Last signal from Uboat"..."guns , flak - vl = x , 7bm (7 bombs?) , SW / Ireland - 4724n 1210w - BE63,52 deaths, TV",. - another signal or part of the signal received at 2137hrs, "attacked, diving fouled, rudderless". - Where did the information come from for 59/K attacking U-106 at 1902hrs? _____________________________________________________________________________________________________ So, at 2009hrs approx. U-383 sent a signal that she was attacked (by 228/V) in BF44, in position 47.24N, 12.10W. According to uboat.net, 228/V was damaged during the first attack run but returned for a second run. When did they "return" as described above to deliver the stick of 7 D/C's? The "Historisches Marinearchiv - Duikboot" site states again (although translated from Dutch to English) - "U-383 attacked - signal sent "U383 reported attack in BF44 , also 2019". Also at "2019", is this suggesting attacked at 2002hrs and again at 2019hrs. Two attack runs. But then goes on to show 228/V attacking again at 2137hrs, when the last signal was sent from U-383? Not unusual for an a/c to return later after assessing the damage received, but the question is when, and how long between runs. Any one have access to the 228 Sqdn ORBs? Part of the signal of 2137hrs does correspond with the second 228/V attack, of 7 DC's. 59 Sqdn ORB - At 2150hrs not far from the scene of the first attack by 228/V, in position 47.24N 12.10W, Murray Charlton and crew in 59/X attacked a Uboat on the surface. Having been sent to the area at 2055hrs - "HUNT U/B position 47.24N 12.12W" by group (command?). Were they sent to aid the Sunderland that had been damaged in their first run in at 2002hrs? Still yet to make their final attack at 2137hrs? Uboat.net further states that Bdu sent U-218, U-706 and U-454 to aid U-383. None of them found U-383. U-218 was apparently in the vicinity and "heard" the attack but in the dark were unable to find them. There is no report of an attack on U-218 on this date or in the position of 59/X (that I have found) anyone else know of one? _____________________________________________________________________________________________________ - Further more, the report of U-218 states "U-218, despite hearing the attack from nearby, was unable to locate U-383 in the darkness". Whereas the 59 ORB states "Pilot turned to starboard down sun and wind and losing height". Suggesting that U-218 was possibly searching in the area after 59/X had left... Butat 2150hrs, what kind of light could be expected, given they sighted Uboat from 4 miles? This isnt the north Atlantic, re long days? Or is "down sun and wind" just tech talk? - There are no attacks noted in the 59 ORB to correspond with attacks on U-218 and U-706 on Aug 2nd and 3rd (U-706 sunk on 3rd) mentioned on Uboat.net. - Given the very close proximity of the attack by 228/V at 2002hrs (with possible later 2nd at 2137hrs) and that of 59/X, only 13 mins after U-383 sent its last signal, it seems possible that 59/X made another attack, maybe only causing very minor damage, on top of that already received from 228/V. U-383 was still on the surface at 2137 hrs regardless... So, My question is, was 59/X the last aircraft to attack U-383? Did 59/X find U-383 at 2147hrs, on the surface shortly after the last attack of 228/V at 2137hrs (after which it left), with U-383 later sinking before sending another signal, or unable to do so? Or are we looking at ORB entry faults? Any assistance greatly appreciated. Any thoughts? Thanks, Lorenzo.
Ok, just checked the 228 Sqdn ORB, which has JM678, recorded on uboat.net also as 228/V, damaged on second run (damage as per above). First run was thwarted by the "violent evasive action" of pilot, due to accurate and rapid return fire from the Uboat. Not as suggested previously, and that 2nd run was (possibly) initiated quickly, "aircraft turned to port and attacked again", and aircraft damaged on second run in dropping 7 DCs. Uboat enveloped in spray, listed heavily to port and men seen jumping into water... Aircraft was unable to attack again due to damaged aileron, and unable to turn. Visibility 6 miles at 1000ft. Cloud 6/10ths sta. cu. Conditions rough and showery. No time given as to when they left area but they landed Pembroke Dock at 2350hrs. The question for me is still, when was the second attack made by 228/V? ORB seems to suggest very quickly, as it wasnt damaged in the first run. The time between DCs dropped, Uboat listing to port and men being seen jumping into the water, seems to be in quick succession. Theres no mention of shadowing after second attack, seems more likely they left soon after due to damage... so what to make of the last signal from U-383 at 2137hrs? Were they indeed under attack again but this time by 59/X, not as suggested on the Dutch site, by 228/V? Msg from group to hunt uboat was received at 2055hrs by 59/X, so had 228/V left? Theres no mention of assisting an aircraft, or that a uboat had already been attacked and no mention of another aircraft in the area when they arrived. Had U-383 recovered enough to continue on? If indeed the last signal was received from them at 2137hrs? Then thats 1hr and 35mins theyve stayed afloat and manned the uboat since the first attack run of 228/V... Any thoughts? cheers
Narrative of attack on U 383 by V/228 on 1 August 1943. Taken from The Coastal Command Review - August 1943. No mention of second aircraft / attack. A Determined Attack and First-class Airmanship On August 1 Sunderland V/228 was on Musketry patrol flying a westerly course at 800 ft. below 6/10ths cloud. The aircraft was actually searching for a dinghy when, shortly after 2000 hours, a U-Boat was sighted 3-4 miles away on the port beam. Visibility was 6 miles and the sea moderate. The U-Boat was believed to be a 517-tonner. It had a big gun forward and a small one in the conning tower ; this gun was seen to be manned. Her course was 180° and her speed about 6 knots. The Sunderland began to circle and was met with light flak. At 2013 hours the aircraft lost height and began an attack from up sun. The U-Boat put up very rapid fire and the aircraft took violent evasive action and thus failed to track over the target. During the approach the air gunners opened up accurate return fire and two of the German crew were seen to fall. The Sunderland then turned to port, circled, and began another attack. The U-Boat turned slowly to port and ceased fire. When the aircraft was 600 yards away the enemy again opened very accurate fire which carried away the starboard float and put the starboard aileron out of action. The hull was holed in several places and a shell exploded in the port mainplane. There were, however, no casualties in the aircraft, and the front gunner and port galley gunner accurately raked the conning tower. The attack was delivered from the U-Boat's starboard quarter at 15° to the track seven depth charges, set to shallow depth and spaced at 60 ft., were dropped from 75 ft. The depth charges straddled the target just abaft the conning tower and the U-Boat was completely enveloped in spray. When the plumes subsided the U-Boat had a bad list to port and was turning sharply. Six men, who had not been seen before, jumped from the conning tower into the sea. The Sunderland left the scene immediately, as the damage to the lateral control prevented it from turning. Remarks of the Naval Staff A very determined approach on the two runs with very good front gun fire. An excellent low-level attack pressed home against accurate flak which damaged the aircraft and prevented the full results being observed. From the evidence available there are indications of serious damage and possible destruction. Remarks by the Air Staff A very commendable performance. After conducting an outstandingly gallant and determined attack, the captain of the aircraft showed first-class airmanship in flying his damaged aircraft back to base and making a skilful night landing in difficult conditions. .................................. Axel Niestle in ' German U-boat Losses During World War II' gives credit for this loss to the above action.
These 48 hours from August, 1st and 2nd saw a lot of action in the Gulf of Biscay: 1.8. U 454 (Kptlt. Hackländer) sunk by Sunderland ‚B’ of RAAF-Sq. 10 at 45°36' N - 10°23' W, 0405h U 383 (Kptlt. Kremser) sunk by Sunderland ‚V’ of RAF-Sq. 228 2.8. U 706 (KKpt. v. Zitzewitz) sunk by Liberator ‚T’ of USAAF A/S-Sq. 4 together with Hampden ‚A’ of RCAF-Sq. 415 at 46°15' N - 10°25' W, 0630h U 106 (Oblt.z.S. Damerow) sunk by Sunderlands ‚N’ of 228. Sqn. RAF and ‚M’ of 461. Sqn. RAAF at 46°35' N - 11°55' W (42 sm SE of U 383) U 218 (Kptlt. Becker) damaged by Wellington ‚B’ of RAF-Sq. 547 T-Boote T 22, T 24 und T 25 (alarmed by distress call of U 383) rescued some survivors of U 106 in early August dusk is at 2140/2150h, dawn 0640/0650h U 383 had massive technical problems: 19.07. and 21.07. it was forced to return to base with a mechanical breakdown and submersion problems. If the records of the Lib crew are correct there is a slight possibility they bombed the wrecked sub regards Olli
Thanks for the replies guys. Sorry realised I was noting a/c and sqdn incorrect. V/228 correct etc etc... Certainly is an interesting one... Just found this, F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log, 1 - 15 August on uboat archive site... "After several previous aircraft attacks U 383 was rendered unable to dive and out of control by a stick of bombs at 2130 in BF 4453. U 218, proceeding in company with U 383, and U 454 and 706 were ordered there immediately to give assistance. Aircraft assistance was promised for 0830. 3 large torpedo boats were also sent out, which could arrive by about 1500. No further report from U 383 by morning". On uboat.net the sinking of U-383 states that U-218 was unable to locate U-383, owing to darkness although in the vicinity... (Franks/Zimmerman). The above fdu/bdu states that it is proceeding in company with? Also interesting is that it notes an attack on U-383 at 2130, and also earlier attacks. V/228 attacked at 2002, and reading the Coastal review, the two attack runs seem close together... Not as the "historisches-marinearchiv.de" site suggests, nearly 2 hours apart... ( I wonder how much is being lost or misinterpreted in translation?)... This is from uboat archive site and the interrogation report of surviving crew from U-706: "During the evening of 1st August, "U 706" picked up a signal instructing her to proceed to the help of a U-Boat which had been attacked and had serious water entry forward. It was stated that two other U-Boats were also going to her assistance. The Second Lieutenant said that this U-Boat was commanded by Kapitänleutnant Kremser. Throughout the night "U 706" proceeded on the surface at full speed. SINKING OF "U 706". On the morning of 2nd August, 1943, "U-706" was still proceeding on the surface to the assistance of the U-Boat commanded by Kremser. (N.I.D. Note. This may have been the U-Boat sighted and attacked by aircraft "V" of 228 Squadron in position 47° 30' N., 012° 10' W. at 1814Z 1st August. (Totally different time and coordinates for the attack of "V"...) The supposed attack on U-106 by a 59 Lib on the above mentioned "historisches-marinearchiv.de" site, could be in part responsible by the following... Hi Lorenzo, in Norman Frank's book Conflict over the Bay [1986], pages 204-205, it mentions the sinking of U454, where HMS Wren and HMS Kite rescued survivors from her and aircrew survivors from the aircraft that had also been shot down, then states that the ships then headed north to where a 59 squadron Liberator flown by F/L Charlton, despite return fire, had made an unsuccessful attack on U-106 at 9.50pm, but made no contact. The Ubootarchiv however does not mention any attacks by 59. Regards John (aka jcrt). This report on uboat.net for attacks on U-106: 1 Aug 1943 - The boat managed to fight off a Canadian Wellington bomber (RCAF Sqdn 407) which dropped six depth charges and then shadowed the boat, vectoring in other Allied forces. They arrived the next day and sank the boat. (Sources: Blair, vol 2, page 393) Seems to elude to certain factors mentioned by Norman Franks, but the "historisches-marinearchiv.de" site notes the 59 Lib attack at 1902hrs. Was the attack by 407 at this time? Other details on the site for the attack are "in BE69,6 bombs, flares , guns , 1 dead + 2 injured, no damages"... Thats certainly not the X/59 attack at 2150... Nor does uboat.net make note of an attack on U-106 at this time... Plus its an IXB class boat, is this different from one viewed as a "517 tonne class", reported by both the Coastal review and the X/59 report? Lets say that X/59 did attack U-106 at 2150, and given the close proximity of both V/228 and X/59 attack positions, in what seems to be approx. BF4453... If U-106 was indeed attacked at 1902 in BE69 by a 407 Wellington, it is likely to be in BF4453 just under 3 hours later? The fdu/bdu report states the following for August 2nd. "U 706 was also attacked, towards 0900, by an aircraft near U 383's position. At 0920 she reported that the aircraft was still shadowing. U 218 was obliged to dive by destroyers at 0700/2 in BF 4454 and started on her return passage towards 1800 owing to some casualties. Air reconnaissance sighted a large patch of oil in BF 4450 and several English vessels making off in the vicinity. It must therefore be assumed that U 383 sank. No wreckage or survivors were found. The 3 T-boats covered the sinking position at about 1600 in broad formation on a W. course. Nothing further was found of U 383. U 706 was ordered to continue on her outward passage. The same goes for U 454, who has not so far reported. U 106 was again attacked by aircraft at 0937 in BE 69. She was temporarily unable to dive and several times urgently requested air assistance. The 3 torpedo boats sent out to search for U 383 were making for BE 6940 at maximum speed..." Seems that U-106 remained in the vicinity of BE69... and that U-383 or U-218 was attacked in the position (or very close to) that was recorded by the fdu/bdu on 1st Aug, BF4453. Only time given for U-218 being close by, is in area BF4454 at 0700/2 (2nd August) when forced to dive by destroyers. If U-218 did meet up with U-383, and proceed in company, why is the latter still persumed sunk? Is there no surviving record of them meeting? If BF4453 is approx. 47.24N 12.12W, then the only two craft officially recorded there between 2130 and 2147 are X/59 and U-383... According to ltdan, 2150 would be getting on dusk, so was it this attack that U-218 were in the vicinity to hear, and then in the fading light, unable to find U-383? According to X/59, the Uboat they attacked continued course at 10kts, so if it was reported "attacked in BF4453" did she continue course to BF4450, where German air reco sighted a large oil patch on the morning after... If the attack of "V" at 2002 had been so severe (not saying it wasnt) why is U-383 sending a distress signal after an attack at 2130? Is it inability to do so, could the supposed "serious water entry forward" mentioned in the U-706 interrogation report, have hampered efforts to operate communications? Last signal received 2130/2137... Its all getting a bit confusing... Ill take a step back and ask for your further opinions? I appreciate the replies so far. Thanks Peter and Ltdan.
As The loss of U 454 is mentioned in this thread I thought I would add details of its loss....... On August 1 1943, Sunderland B/10 W4020 (R.A.A.F.) was on Musketry patrol flying on a track of 045° at 1,700 ft. Cloud base was 2,000 ft., sea very heavy and visibility seven miles. Shortly after 1630 hours the aircraft saw five sloops and a Catalina engaged in a U-Boat hunt. The captain altered course towards them and sighted a U-Boat two miles away on the starboard bow. The enemy vessel was about six miles from the sloop, and was steering 310° at 10 knots. She carried one big gun forward, one 20-mm. gun on the bridge and two 20-mm. guns on the single bandstand. The Sunderland flew over the U-Boat and made a tight turn to attack from the U-Boat's starboard quarter at 60° to the track. During the approach the front gunner opened fire, but the aircraft was subjected to very accurate return fire from the 20-mm. gun on the bridge. First the aircraft's inner engine was hit, and then, when the aircraft was about 400 yards away, a hit in the starboard main fuel tank caused petrol to pour out on to the bridge. It is believed that all three pilots were seriously wounded. The attack was nevertheless gallantly pressed home, and six depth charges set to shallow depth and spaced at 60 ft. were released from 50 ft. Three depth charges fell on either side of the target; and the rear gunner saw the U-Boat lift out of the water and then sink by the bows. After the attack the Sunderland maintained course for about six miles, turned 180° to port and ditched down wind at about 45° to the swell. Apparently the captain was trying to get as near as possible to the sloops. The aircraft bounced twice and then settled, with the hull very seriously damaged. Six members of the crew succeeded in getting out on to the starboard mainplane which had broken away from the rest of the aircraft. They used this as a raft for about half an hour, and were then picked up by one of H.M. ships. Fourteen survivors from the U-Boat, which sank in 30 seconds, were also picked up. Remarks of the Naval Staff An excellent attack in the face of accurate flak. The U-Boat was obviously making a get-away from the sloops, which were carrying out an Asdic hunt. It is confirmed that the U-Boat was sunk, and survivors were picked up by H.M.S. " Kite." This is yet another fearless and gallant attack pressed home in the face of accurate flak.
Likewise, the loss of U 106 on 2 August 1943....... On August 2 shortly after eight o'clock in the evening two Sunderlands, M/461 and N/228, destroyed a U-Boat. For several hours before this three Elbing class destroyers had been occupying most of the attention of our aircraft, and the sinking of the U-Boat was the climax to a fine day's work. The aircraft were originally on Musketry patrol, and when M/461 was flying a westerly course at 5,500 ft. above 2/10ths cloud, she sighted a U-Boat a mile and a half away on the starboard bow. The U-Boat was a 740-tonner, painted light grey, and was steering 050° at 6 knots. The sea was calm with a moderate swell. The U-Boat took violent evasive action and tried to keep the aircraft on her beam. Considerable flak was experienced but the Sunderland's front gun kept spraying the enemy's decks and bodies fell into the sea. Just before the depth charge attack the aircraft's front gun fire was so accurate that it prevented the relief crew from manning the U-Boat's guns. Meanwhile N/228 had arrived on the scene and saw M/461's attack. This was delivered from the U-Boat's port bow at 80° to the track while the U-Boat was still on the surface turning to starboard. From 50 ft., seven depth charges were dropped set to shallow depth and spaced at 60 ft. The depth charges straddled the U-Boat, the centre of the explosions being just abaft the conning tower. At the moment of attack the U-Boat was still turning to starboard, and in doing so she presented her starboard quarter to the waiting N/228. Before the plumes of the first attack had subsided N/228 ran in and dropped another seven depth charges with the same setting and spacing. This attack was made only 30 seconds after the first, and also resulted in a straddle. After the attacks the U-Boat stopped and began to settle by the stern. Black smoke, white smoke and oil were pouring from her. The crew rushed out of the conning tower and began to jump into the sea. Some, however, attempted to man the guns again, but were mowed down by the concentrated fire of the two Sunderlands. M/461 then left for base, but N/228 was able to stay, and 40 minutes later saw the U-Boat blow up and sink as the demolition charges went off. Remarks of the Naval Staff M/461. An excellent attack and very good work by the front guns. The follow-up by N/228 completed the kill. A fine example of co-ordinating. N/228. A very fine follow-up after M 1461' s attack and an excellent piece of co-operation resulting in the U -Boat being destroyed. I think (the crew having taken to the water) that the demolition charges inside the U-Boat were fired
And also the loss of U 706 On August 2 Liberator T/4 A/S Squadron, U.S.A.A.F., was on Musketry patrol, flying on a track of 204°. At 0912 hours when the aircraft was flying at 2,500 ft. above 4/10ths cloud, an S/E contact was obtained at 20 miles. The visibility at the time was 10 miles and the sea moderate. The aircraft altered course and at 0917 hours sighted a large wake 10 miles away. Immediately afterwards, from a height of 1,500 ft. the U-Boat herself was sighted steering 030° at 12 knots. The Liberator captain maintained his course as he was approaching out of the sun hoping to achieve a surprise. The U-Boat was thought to be a 740-tonner, painted darkish grey, and had a single bandstand type conning tower. When the aircraft was about a mile away the U-Boat opened up with light flak. The fire was not very accurate, though one shot hit the aircraft's port wheel. The top turret gunner returned the fire at 1,500 yards, and the front gunner at 600 yards. The U-Boat's decks were well raked and the flak subsided before the actual attack. At 0920 hours the Liberator, coming in from the starboard side at 50 ft., delivered an attack directly across the U-Boat's beam. The American A.1 low level bomb sight was used, and 12 depth charges were dropped set to shallow depth and spaced, it is estimated, at 50 ft. The aircraft tracked directly over the conning tower and the rear gunner saw that the depth charges straddled the U-Boat. When the plumes subsided he saw the whole U-Boat lift out of the water and then settle quickly by the stern until the bow was sticking up at an angle of 30° to the horizontal. About 10 seconds after the attack the U-Boat sank. The Liberator turned to port and returned to the scene. At least 15 men were in the water surrounded by a large patch of oil and much white and yellow wreckage. Marine markers and a dinghy were dropped. Five men were seen to climb aboard. Other aircraft had now arrived and the Liberator returned to base after 1 z hours. Remarks of the Naval Staff An excellent SIE pick-up and approach ; also very good tactics on the run in. An excellent and accurate attack confirmed by photographs. The U-Boat was destroyed. 141/10 saw a sloop pick up the survivors at 1315 hours.
Thanks for the posts Peter. Especially the one on U-106, which Norman Franks stated that a 59 Sqdn Lib had attacked at 2150 on 1st Aug and H.M.S Kite and and Wren had left (the area that U-454 was lost) to go hunt U-106. However its possible that they actually travelled to area BF4453, where the attack actually took place. Franks got the aircraft, crew and time right, but I believe he got the Uboat involved wrong. The evidence so far, indicates to me that it was indeed U-383 that Charlton and crew attacked. One thing I noticed was that the report says "three Elbing class destroyers", when the UbD reports states that three Eboats had been sent out. What we do know: - V/228 attacked U-383 in position 47.24N 12.10W at 2002 on 01.08.1943. We know that Franks and Zimmerman's description of the attack had one inaccuracy, that being the order (in attacks runs) that V/228 was damaged. They stated it was on the initial run in, when in fact it was on the second. This is important because it answers two questions. 1, when did they "return" for the second run and 2, when did they leave the scene of the attack. The answer to both is, "straight away". In turn why is this important? Because signals exchanged between U-383 after the attack and BdU state that she was attacked again at 2130 or 2137 depending on the source. Due to the damage received by V/228 in the "second attack run", the aircraft left the scene asap thus was no longer in the area at 2130/37. If it had been the first attack run, it could be conceived that the aircraft "returned" after assessing the damage at 2130/37 to deliver the second attack. A scenario that the "historisches-marinearchiv.de" site incorrectly states. What we do know: - Murray Charlton and crew in X/59, at 2055 on 01.08.1943, received a message from group to hunt a Uboat in position 47.24N 12.12W. Arriving at the destination, at 2147 they sighted a fully surfaced Uboat. At 2150 they attacked with 2 DC's and a 3rd hung up. The Uboat made no attempt to dive at anytime and that directly after the attack, thick black smoke was observed from abaft the C.T. An event that was troublesome enough to silence the A.A gunners, although they did recommence firing. We also know, that the Uboat was to some extent still under control (before the attack) as it had turned "hard to port" to face the oncoming aircraft. After the attack, it is observed to be "turning in the same direction". Why is this observation important? Because the UbD signal stating that U-383 had been attacked "again" at 2130, also infers that is "now" unable to dive and out of control. "out of control" being the more important aspect, as I suspect U-383 was already unable to dive. However, does "turning in the same direction" mean its turning in circles, in the same direction as X/59, to perhaps keep the A.A guns in better position? The interrogation report from the survivors of U-706, makes note (in part) of the condition that U-383 was in, when they had been sent to aid the stricken boat. "During the evening of 1st August, "U 706" picked up a signal instructing her to proceed to the help of a U-Boat which had been attacked and had serious water entry forward." X/59 then shadowed the Uboat until PLE reached, having already been in the air for just over 12hrs, PLE could have been reached upto 2hrs (maybe more) later, given the range of a VLR Liberator. What we do know: That unidentified allied destroyers were in the area BF4454 at 0700 on 2nd Aug. The BdU report states that U-218 was forced to dive at this time for presence of said vessels. We also know that no sign of U-383 had been found by either Uboat, Eboat or aircraft. Although the latter had sighted a large oil patch in area BF4450 and also allied vessels leaving the attack area. The Eboats passed through the attack area and left at 1600 to area BE6940 to assist U-106. What we need to confirm: - The details of all signals sent from U-383, to confirm the order of damage reported. It seems odd that U-383 would wait nearly two hours to report "unable to dive, out of control" when after V/228's attack, it was clearly damaged. It seems odd to me, that if the boat was taking on water after the attack at 2002, they would continue on. Unless the later attack had aggravated the damages already received to a higher level. - The details of the Coastal review of X/59's attack. It may give clues as to what Uboat they were determined to have attacked. - Whether U-218 had, as suggested by the UbD report, met up with U-218. Had they been attacked at 2150 with two DC's. I have found no information showing that either U-218 or 706 were attacked on the evening of the 1st, but in confirming that they were not, would make U-383 the only candidate for X/59's attack. I am, leaning more and more towards an attack on U-383 by X/59. However, one part doesnt quite add up for me. The time difference between the UbD report of 2130 and X/59's of 2150... Any chance of a Coastal review of X/59's attack Peter? Thanks again for the posts
My sincerest apologies, have just discovered that the aircraft flown by Charlton was actually, K/59. That atleast puts an end to one mystery... note to self (get eyes tested...)
IF the documented U 383 to FdU radio messages are correct there is a good possibility the K/59 Liberator in fact finished up the already crippled U 383. The Sunderland disengaged after serious battle damage. The crew clearly observed hits, how the sub listed and crew members jumped overboard. Hence they assumed they sunk it. But german subs were very tough pieces. We cannot rule out the possibility U 383 barely survived the attack and shortly after fell victim to the Liberator. After this detailed and painstaking research I personally would believe this scenario, too... regards Olli
Does the serial number remain the same (BZ719) ? I have a little more re the loss of U 454 and U 706 in which V/228 is mentioned. I'll post this later today.
Thanks Peter, yes still BZ719... Thanks Olli, but I think the theory may be sinking... Rainer on uboat.net posted the following for the K/59 attack on U-106... The attack carried out by Liberator K/59 was made in 46.44N/11.26W and assessed as "U-boat present, no damage" by the Admiralty because the depth charges dropped undershot. According to the survivors of U-106 this attack in BE6695 did indeed no damage, but strafing killed one crew member and wounded two others. The attack of Wellington C/407 the next morning forced U-106 to return to port with only a limited ability to dive, so the U-boat had to remain on the surface when discovered by two Sunderlands in the evening and was subsequently sunk. This really has made me reassess the situation as there are circumstances here that explain observtions made by the Lib crew... - Strafing killed one, wounded two... hence firing of A.A by boat ceased temporarily, then resumed - In both reports, the DC's undershot, closest 65ft. However, theres still a possibility. What of the coordinates in the 59 ORB? Possibly incorrect so only way to verify, is find record of the message from group... To the best of my knowledge, the Uboat described by K/59 crew, "517 ton class" is a Type VII (U-383) not a Type IX (U-106)... As you pointed out Olli, verification of the BdU and boat signals is vital too... Another thing to check is where HMS Kite and Wren were ordered to go... Confirmation of the coordinates sent by group, maybe the only saving grace?
Further details re the loss of U 454 and U 706 taken from The Anti-submarine Division of the Naval Staff 15 October 1943 " U 454 " and " U 706 " left La Pallice in company on 23rd July, 1943, apparently under orders to operate together in the North or Central Atlantic, but at the mouth of the Gironde " U 454's " compass was found to be out of order and both boats put back. They sailed again six days later. In the Bay their orders were to proceed submerged, except for periods on the surface between about 0830 and 1230, and 1930 and 1930 to charge batteries, but the routine broke down on the second day out, At about 1430 on 311th July " U 706 " heard depth-charges exploding in the distance and the afternoon surfacing was put off until 1710. At 1830 " U 454 " obtained a G.S.R. contact and both boats dived. They lost touch next day but sighted each other for the last time on 1st August. They had both proceeded slightly northward of the usual course in order to avoid those areas where there would probably be destroyers, but "U454 " had waited a day longer than " U 706 " before making the decision. This last sighting was said to have taken place early in the forenoon and must have occurred at tout 0830, for " U 454 " was forced to dive almost immediately after making her first " routine " surfacing of the day. She was somewhat luckier in her second attempt and about noon managed to get no less than three-quarters of an hour for charging, but her next surfacing at about 1400 was very brief indeed. By the evening she was in a had way, with her batteries exhausted and the air foul. At 1640 she surfaced and at once obtained a G.S.R. contact. The aircraft, Sunderland " B " of 10 Squadron, R.A.A.F,, came in sight two minutes later. She crossed from port to starboard ahead of " U 454," altered course to starboard until she was about a mile away and then turning sharply to port, came in to attack on the U-Boat's starboard quarter. " U454 " manned her twin 20-mm. guns and, despite the fairly heavy sea which was running, made good shooting; the aircraft's starboard inner engine was hit and the starboard main petrol tank damaged. It did not save the U-Boat from an extremely accurate attack. Three depth-charges straddles her forward of the conning-tower and the whole affair was over in a minute. The men, who had been on the bridge or in the conning-tower passing up ammunition, were the only survivors. Twelve in number, they were eventually picked up by H.M.S. " Kite." The Sunderland held on for 6 miles and then crashed, her crew being rescued by HMS " Wren." That evening " U 706 " received a signal ordering her to go to the assistance of another U-Boat which had been attacked by aircraft (Possibly by aircraft " V " of 228 Squadron, which made an attack at 1522 on 1st August) and had a water entry forward. All through the night and into the forenoon " U 706 " proceeded at full speed on the surface. At about 0900 an aircraft was sighted—" U 706's " Captain preferred to rely on his look-outs rather than on his G.S.R.--but at so great a range that it was at first impossible to see whether she was German or British. She was, in fact, a Hampden of 415 Squadron, R.C.A.F,, end, after making a wide turn ahead of the U-Boat, attacked with gunfire and depth-charges. " U 706 " returned the fire and, taking evasive action, escaped damage. Having made her attack, the Hampden began to circle outside the range of the U-Boat's guns. The bridge watch had followed her round twice when the Captain suddenly exclaimed " Aircraft dead ahead." He went hard port and fire was opened with machine guns and twin 20-mm. guns. It failed completely to keep off this aircraft, Liberator " T " of the 4th Anti-Submarine Squadron, U.S.A.A.F. "That pilot," said the Second Lieutenant afterwards "really could fly—he made a wonderful approach." She attacked before the U-Boat had completed her turn. With her gunfire she killed the Captain ; two of her 12 depth-charges were direct hits and the U-Boat was almost instantly destroyed. The blast of the first explosion blew in the bridge fairing and imprisoned the Second Lieutenant between it and the periscope casing ; the second explosion extracted him from his prison threw him and three ratings off the bridge into the water as the boat was sinking. H.M.S. " Waveney " rescued them an hour later. Sorry but no details re the attack made by BZ719 K/59
Firstly, Id like to thank you both for your time but sadly it appears that my theory has been undone, by a communique sent by K/59, submitted by Rainer on uboat.net... "The full details for the attack of Liberator K/59 are not included in the assessment made by the Committee because it was in the category "No damage", but the position is given as 46.44N/11.26W. This position is also confirmed by a radio message mentioned in the Admiralty War Diary on 1 August 1943: "U-boat previously reported course 180° speed 10 knots when first sighted in 46.49N/11.26W" sent by aircraft 59 Sqdn, Duty K, 012040B to 19 Group". As for the coordinates in the ORB, Im still interested to know if indeed they went to this area and then onto the area where U-106 was sighted. They in hindsight didnt give a time in the ORB for possible arrival at 47.24N 12.12W, only that they had "proceeded to position indicated" and that at 2147, sighted Uboat. The discrepancy in time of last signal from U-383 and time of sighting at 2147, did bother me, but I wonder now, had U-383 sunk between 2130 and 2147? Thus not sighted by K/59 when passing through? Will be interesting to get to the bottom of the UbD report stating U-383 was attacked again at 2130... possibly misinterpreted by UbD? Thanks again. Ill keep you updated...
