US 2d Armored Division, September 1944

Earthican · Nov 17, 2013

One thing leads to another....

I found this narrative of the US 2d Armored Division for September 1944. Covering the final days of the pursuit from Normandy it is not particularly interesting but since I had a period map I thought I would unite the two.

http://www.2ndarmoredhellonwheels.com/war_stories/7_days_combat_reports.html

I'll copy the text here -- in the case the original disappears -- and place them in an order that moves the story from west to east though they actually overlap in time.

The first report covers A Company of the 82d Armored Reconnaissance Battalion. The recon companies of the ARB consist of M-8 Armored Cars and jeep mounted scouts supported by assault guns (75mm howitzers on light tank carriages) and attached light tanks.

***EDIT 8JAN2014 - improved map***

Co. A, 82nd Reconnaissance from 13 Sept. 1944 to 2 October 1944.

On 14 September 1944 We departed present location 1 mile N. of Gruitode and the company mission was to move south with "D" company [light tanks] attached, creating a diversion on the north flank of the company, clearing out Opglabbeek and Opoetern, cutting the road between those points and if possible cutting the main road running east and west between Asch and Willems canal. The Battalion Executive Officer Major Jack Gerard remained at the road block. The 1st and the 2nd platoons each with a tank platoon attached moved east through Neerglabeek, running into a road block approximately 1 kilometer east of that point. The 2nd platoon remained to reduce or bypass the road block and then move into Opoetern. The 1st platoon with attached tanks moved cross country through the forest and arrived in Opoetern. The 2nd platoon arrived at Opoetern first , having removed the road block which proved to be lightly defended by small arms fire. The 2nd Platoon with the tank platoon attached met resistance in the form of small arms fire at Opoetern. They inflicted probably a dozen casualties and took a few prisoners. The first platoon assisted in closing in on the town and taking some prisoners. At this point, artillery began to fall in the town and the platoon withdrew. The 1st platoon moved around the town to the right to continue its mission and to cut off the road leading into the town. In a large open lowland west of the town , the 1st platoon encountered the enemy dug in and well camouflaged fox holes. The enemy had a number of machines guns and bazookas and the personnel made of approximately one third paratroopers and the remainder air force, they fought quite well. Most of the men were killed in their holes by 75 mm WP smoke and hand grenades. There were 23 known to be killed and four wounded. 40 prisoners were taken in this locality. The tank platoon which had remained with the other tank platoon during this action, rejoined the 1st platoon and they consolidated their position to hold the town and the road net. Our 2nd platoon, and the attached tank platoon returned to Gruitrode. The 3rd platoon moved around the road block and into Opglabbeek, where they encountered a small enemy patrol which withdrew. The platoon moved east to Dorne. The 2nd platoon pushed through the forest to within 2 kilometers of the main highway running east from Asch. Here we dismounted and in a spread out formation, we cautiously proceeded to the highway on foot. Traveled five miles and arrived present location at Belgium, Map Hasselt sheet #47-52A7745 [perhaps coord. 5277] N of Dorne.

Discovering that the advance elements of CCA had already arrived there. The company assembled at Dorne for the night with the exception of the 1st platoon which remained at Opoetern . During the days operation Private 1st Class Jermiah Supple was seriously wounded in action and was evacuated. Weather cloudy and wet, morale excellent.

On 15 Sept 1944 We remained in the same location 1 mile N. of Dorne. The company mission was to locate the enemy west of the canal, establish outpost to keep the canal under observation, maintain contact with the British or the Princess Eugenia Regiment of the Dutch army attached to the British Army, and to patrol the area from the highway to the east out of Asch, the 1st British position which could usually be found around Bree about 18 kilometers to the north, The 2nd platoon maintained contact with the British and establish outposts near Oppites [Opitter] and in the woods near Waterloos. These outposts were frequently shelled and on three occasions our patrols encountered enemy patrols in the Waterloos and inflicted casualties The enemy could be observed across the canal near Tongerloo. The enemy destroyed by shell fire the church steeples in Oppites [Opitter] and in Waterloos which we had been using as outposts. The 3rd platoon was located down the road toward the canal near De Smets Berg [?]. From an outpost there , the Germans could be seen on the west side of the canal near the blown bridge in considerable strength of at least 250 or more men. As the roads which might have been used to flank them were either mined or exposed to direct fire of artillery and 88 mm guns from across the canal and the terrain was not suitable for cross country movement, there was little that 3rd platoon could do. The enemy frequently fired his mortars and artillery at positions that he thought were being occupied. The enemy also fired air bursts over the platoon position with 88 mm guns. Later in the day this platoon engaged the enemy in a gun fight. Co. D had been attached and left the company that morning. Today we captured 20 German prisoners. Weather clear and warm, morale excellent. Remained 1 mile N. Of Dorne.

On the 16th of September 1944 remained in same bivouac area, the mission was the same as the previous day. We are running short of fuel, experiencing delays because of the long supply lines to get all supplies to us. . As no artillery or infantry was available, the three assault guns we had were put in a battery. The assault guns were directed from an outpost about 1000 yards west of Opoeteren and from the outpost in the church steeple and from the outpost near De Smets Berg these guns harassed the main group of the enemy about 1000 yards southeast of De Smets Berg. They also fired on the foot bridges over the canal, on the ferry and at any targets of opportunity seen by the outposts. The number of casualties inflicted was unknown. No weather report today, but morale reported excellent.

On the 17 September 1944 the following men came into "A" Company, Pvt. Clayton Loehn, Pvt. Lawrence Tipsword, Pvt. Edwin Newby, Pvt. William Polk, Pvt. Enamuel Lichtenstein, Pvt. Charles Resetar, Pvt. William J. Russell, Pvt. Frederick G. Medel, Pvt. Earl Newcomb, Pvt. Donald Litz. and 18 September the company mission was the same as on 16 September, and was deployed the same way . 14 replacements joined the company in September, 1944. On 19 Sept 1944 departed this area at 0730B north of Dorne. The company moved with the 3rd Battalion, 66 Armored Regiment which had also remained west of the canal when CCA and the 82nd Armored Reconnaissance Battalion moved east. When the company moved out at 0730, we moved on to Maastricht, crossed the Meuse river at that point. Then north to Beek where the company went into bivouac. The company was in reserve the remainder of the day with the exception of the 3rd platoon which moved out at approximately 1900B to guard an underpass one mile north of Sittard. The company traveled 30 miles and arrived at new location at Belgium map 1/50/000 Sittard #48 #638681 1 mile NW of Beek, Weather clear and warm, morale excellent.

On the 20 September 1944 departed area NW of Beek, the 3rd platoon was relieved at 0800B by the 113th Cavalry and returned to the company command post at Beek. The company moved out at 1030B for an assembly area near Klimmen. After traveling a distance of 10 miles the company closed in an assembly area at about 1130B. In the evening the company was placed on alert status to move with the least delay with a tank destroyer platoon attached to meet the enemy and stop him until the 67th Armored Regiment could move up, deploy and take over the defense. A liaison officer was required at the CP of 3rd Battalion, 67th Armored Regiment at night and radio communications maintained. All routes leading to possible points of attack were reconnoitered. 2nd Lt. Roy Cole came into the company this date Arrived at new location 1/50,000.Aachen sheet # 702555 1 mile NE of Klimmen.

On 21 September 1944, the status of the company was the same as on the 20th except the company was placed under the direct control of the HQ. 67th Armored Regiment instead of the 3rd battalion, 67th Armored Regiment. From the 21 through the Sept 30th 1944 the company was on alerted status, however company participated in maintenance and rehabilitation The weather started to get cold and damp during this period, remained same location. Weather clear and warm, morale excellent. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, October 1944 remained still at Holland sheet # 1/50, 000 Aachen, Germany, sheet: #57, #702555, 1 mile NE of Klimmen cleaning equipment and arms weather cloudy and wet morale excellent. 2 October 1944, weather cloudy and cold, morale excellent..
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Bernard85 · Nov 18, 2013

good day earthican,sm.yesterday.05:35pm.re:us 2end armored division sept 1944;you say its not interesting particulary.i found your post most interesting.the men involved fought a brutal battle.lives were lost.may they rest in peace.and victory was achieved.i would say your recording this history is of interest to all of us.thank you for posting.regards bernard85

Earthican · Nov 18, 2013

Glad you appreciated it, Bernard85. Most veterans would agree that one day of combat is anything but "not particularly interesting".

I just realized I have a copy of the original report from the 82d ARB. The above transcription has several errors and omissions but is generally accurate.

Though I hate transcribing, I'll post the events from the day before (13 Sept 1944) since the action is on the above attached map and might be of some interest to a British audience.

A Company, 82d Armored Reconnaissance Battalion

On September 13, the Company CP remained at the same place [GRUITRODE]. The 1st platoon went north and east to the town of OPITTES [OPITTER], driving the enemy out of the town inflicting casualties and setting up an OP to observe the WILLEMS Canal. Position of OP had to be shifted because of heavy artillery fire. After considerable difficulty, artillery support came from the British to the north but the fire was not very effective. The 2nd platoon sent a patrol due east through NEERGLABEEK to WATERLOOS from the wooded area south of WATERLOOS. The patrol was able to count 186 Germans washing clothes and basking in the sun around a house. A British reconnaissance officer assisted and the platoon was put into position to fire, one vehicle at a time. After Mortars were set up, ammunition laid out and available weapons made ready for fire, the platoon opened fire with devasting effect as the Germans were not prepared nor were they dug in. Due to the terrain and to 88 mm guns across the canal, it was impossible to overrun the position. The platoon then withdrew leaving an OP. This OP reported that at least 150 casualties were inflicted and that German first aid men were carrying the Germans across the flat to the canal all afternoon. This position was saturated by German artillery and 88 mm guns firing air-burst. It is believed that the 88 mm guns could not depress sufficiently to actually hit this spot. The OP had to be shifted slightly. The 2nd platoon, later in the day, drove a German patrol out of WATERLOOS. The platoon then withdrew when the town was shelled by the Germans. The 3rd platoon remained in position [manning road block south of GRUITRODE] killing three Germans when the enemy sent forward a patrol. This platoon also received several rounds of artillery believed to be coming from one gun located to the south.
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Slipdigit · Nov 18, 2013

I have a friend with the 30th Recon/30thID. He was just south of the 2nd AD and spent 13 Sep maintaining contact with the 2nd AD & 30th ID. The next day, they went into reserve at Heerlen.

Earthican · Nov 18, 2013

Second report and map/overlay.

This report reads like 1940's news copy. I suspect it was generated from post-battle interviews by a US Army historian-cum-journalist. While I don't have the original text I suspect this transcription also contains errors.

I don't often find an overlay and map that can be viewed together. Unfortunately the overlay is pretty sloppy such that the unit routes and bridge sites in the southern half do not line up with features on the map. And while all the letter objectives line up with the towns in the north, the text does not cover all these movements. I would tend to trust the overlay over the text.

Order of Battle (roughly)

North Force, CCA, 2ndAD
--HQ., 66th Armored Regiment

Task Force Stokes (minus 82d ARB and attachments)
--3rd Bn, 66th AR (minus one platoon of G Co)
--99th Infantry Battalion (Norwegians) (minus one platoon of A Co)
--65th Armd FA, Bn.
--Platoon of Co. A, 17th Armd Eng.
--Detachment of Co. A, 48th Armd Med. Bn.

note:
66th Armored Regiment
1st Bn: C, F, I
2d Bn: A, D, E
3d Bn: B, G, H

Report on Task Force Stokes

By the evening of 15 Sept. 1944 the XIX Corps had established a bridgehead on the east bank of the Meuse River in the vicinity of Maastricht (Holland). Both the 30th Inf. Div. and CC"A" of the 2nd AD. had moved into the bridgehead ;and were ready to advance east. The 30th Div. had the mission of giving flank protection to the VII Corps, whose attack in the vicinity of Aachen constituted the current main effort of FUSA. The 2nd Armored [Division's] mission was to protect the area west of the [Willems] Vaart Canal and CC "B" had begun to advance in zone east of the Meuse River. Between the [Willems] Vaart Canal and the Meuse River, however lay a narrow corridor, extending halfway across the XIX Corps front and completely in enemy hands. Obviously, this had to be cleared out before the 2nd AD, could with safety continue its advance east of the Meuse. XIX Corps FO # 24 of Map. #152340 Sept. 44 ordered the 2nd AD to clear the enemy from this corridor. At 16 0500 Sept. 44 the mission was turned over to Lt. Col.Wm. M. Stokes, Jr., then commanding the North Force of CC "A", 2 AD. At the time its force had the mission of securing the XIX Corps boundary on the north and the Div. front along [Willems] Vaart Canal. It consisted of the following HQ., 66 AR, --3rd Bn, 66th AR--99th Infantry Battalion (Norwegians)--65th FA, Bn. ---Platoon of Co. A, 17th Eng. --Detachment of Co. A, 48th Med. Bn. To help Col. Stokes with his additional assignment, he was given 82nd Reconnaissance Bn. and Co B, 17 Armored Engr Bn. Task Force "Stokes," as the combined force was called, completely cleared this critical corridor on 16, 17, and 18 September. During this 3-day period it caused 918 enemy casualties and suffered only 93 casualties itself. The success of the operation was due to sound planning, good field tactics, unusually fine cooperation between tanks and infantry. Both tank and infantry commanders agreed on this point.

Col Stokes turned over the 82d Rcn Bn and Co. B, 17 Armored Engr Bn. Task Force "Stokes," as the combined force was called, 82d Rcn Bn, one platoon of Co G, 66 A.R., and one platoon of Co A, 99th Inf. Bn the security mission along the XIX Corps’ north boundary and the [Willems] Vaart canal. The rest of TF Stokes was ordered into assembly areas.

The first pre-requisite was a complete reconnaissance of the [Willems] Vaart Canal for possible crossing sites. Most of it had already been reconnoitered. The job was completed on the morning of 16 September. It showed that between Maastricht and the north boundary of the Corps there were two bridges left. A wooden one at Smeermaas (immediately north of Maastricht) was capable of supporting tanks. The other one at Neerharen had been partially wrecked by the enemy. Infantry in a single file could get across it, but major repairs would be necessary if vehicles were to use it. Col. Stokes felt that although he could put tanks across the Smeermaas bridge and thus give the infantry some support from the very beginning, he could not depend on this bridge for his MRS [MSR? - Main Supply Route]. Its wooden construction made it very vulnerable to destruction either by bombs or demolition charges. Furthermore, it was in the middle of a closely built up town and hence, in Col Stokes’ opinion, presented an easy mark for saboteurs. The repair of the bridge at Neerharen would have been very hazardous in view of enemy’s ability to observe all movement in its vicinity from the high ground east of the Meuse River. Col Stokes concluded that he would have to install a bridge for his MRS either at Reckheim or further north. He considered three possible plans of action: (1) bridge canal at Reckheim and work north up the corridor; (2) bridge canal in vic[inity] of Lanklaer and advance south to Maastricht; (3) bridge canal in the center of the corridor and work part of his TF north and part south. Col Stokes chose the first alternative because (1) it meant that he would have friendly troops in his rear instead of hostile forces in unknown strength; (2) he could bring small force up from Smeermaas to establish a bridgehead east of the canal for the crossing of the bulk of the infantry at Neerharen, and the enlarged force could make a bridgehead in vicinity of Reckheim large enough for a tank Bn to maneuver in; (3) a crossing at the center of the corridor would have forced him to fight two ways at the same time, permitted the enemy to bring tanks and AT weapons within close range of the crossing site (note narrowness of corridor at this point).

The decision to employ tanks in attacking up the corridor was based on the following considerations: (1) tanks were available; (2) speedy accomplishment of the mission was essential; (3) the enemy had had sufficient time to prepare hasty field positions; (4) the enemy was believed to be holding the corridor in considerable strength, with 500 troops reported to have crossed on to the corridor at Boorsheim on 13 Sept and 500 SS troops reported to have recently reinforced the Meeswyck area. No information on the presence or absence of AT weapons was available, with the exception that reconnaissance had failed to disclose any enemy in the narrow part of the corridor at Smeermaas and for 1km north thereof. North of this point the enemy’s defenses were unknown except for dug-in MG positions on the reverse slope of the east bank of the canal all the way to Lanklaer. Since the corridor varied from 30 to 250 meters wide for another two kms, it was obviously unwise to send any large tank force across the wooden bridge at Smeermaas.

As a result of this decision, Col. Stokes felt there were two distinct phases to the reduction of the corridor: (1) the establishment of a bridgehead across Reckheim, which would have to be an infantry job primarily, and (2) the attack north of Lanklaer. The latter would have to move fast to prevent hostile reinforcements coming onto the corridor, particularly at the narrow neck in the center; hence, it would have to be primarily a tank attack. Following this reasoning, the tanks taking part in the attack on the 16 and 17 of Sept were attached to the 99th Inf Bn; whereas on 18 Sept most of the 99th Inf Bn (Companies A and C) were attached to the 3d Bn, 66 AR.. As it turned out, this made little difference in the way in which the chain of command actually operated. During the first two days of the operation Col. Stokes sent most of his communications to Maj Harold D. Hansen, CO of 99th Inf Bn, through Lt Henry W. Johnson, CO of Co H, 66 AR. Lt Johnson relates that Maj Hansen was dismounted after the first 15 minutes; that he did not see him again during the operation; that his (Johnson’s) orders came from Col Stokes; and that in practice he communicated directly with his platoon leaders and they in turn with the infantry platoon leaders. On this point Major Hansen said that communications were very difficult throughout the operation and that messengers had to be used much of time. But he emphasized that Col Stokes "did not try to run the infantry. He is a tanker. He asked for my recommendations on the use of the infantry."

About 161700 September the 2d platoon (5 M-4’s) of Company H, 66 AR., the 2d platoon (5 M-5’s) of Company B, 66 AR., and all of Company C, 99th Inf. Bn, crossed the [Willems] Vaart Canal on the wooden bridge at Smeermaas. Captain Herbert C. Merlin, CO of Company C, had made no specific arrangements with the tank platoon leaders regarding tank-infantry tactics. The 99th Inf. Bn had worked with the 3/66 AR for or three days prior to this operation, and it was mutually understood that the infantry would be assigned to work with specific tanks. This was done. About 5 doughboys were assigned to each light tank and about 8 to each medium. The spearhead of TF"S" moved north in column, led by the light tanks. It met an outpost screen about one km north of the bridge but progressed almost to the bridge at Neerharen before meeting any resistance of consequence. More hostile force had concentrated in some woods. To clean it out, the tanks deployed, the lights mixed with the mediums, and the infantry dismounted. While the infantry protected the tanks from possible bazooka fire, the tanks took care of any hostile automatic fire that opened up. Resistance soon faded, but rear guards enabled a lot of Germans to get away. Near the Neerharen bridge the enemy occupied a pillbox. The tanks plastered it with 75 mm fire. This kept the defenders from manning their weapons and stunned them. After that the infantry had little trouble in capturing most of the occupants and killing a few who still showed signs of resisting. When the spearhead force had secured the east side of the Canal at this point, the rest of the 99th Inf Bn (-1 platoon of company A), then assembled vicinity Neerharen, prepared to cross over. At this point the infantry was subjected to a 20 minutes concentration of hostile artillery, estimated to have been at least one battery of medium artillery. From the high ground east of the Meuse River the enemy had direct observation. To avoid bringing down a concentration on the bridge itself, it was necessary to rush the troops across a few at the time. The situation required leadership. For example, the 1st platoon of B Company was pinned down after suffering 4 casualties. T/Sgt Roland I. Asleson, the platoon leader, demonstrated outstanding leadership in rallying his platoon and getting them across the bridge.

It was now about 1900. Major Hansen realized that the important thing was to get his force north out of the narrowest part of the corridor before dark. Fortunately, no AT weapons were encountered, only some foxholes along the east bank of the Canal, which were facing west. The tanks rolled up and pasted these positions with 75mm and MG fire. When they lifted their fire, the infantry advanced and took TF Stokes’ first large bunch of PWs. The CO of B Co, Lt Gunderson, was injured late in the day and had to be evacuated. Lt Murton Swenson became the company commander. By 2100 the troops had advanced into the broad part of the corridor and secured an outpost line stretching across it. The tanks were deployed inside the bivouac areas of the companies they work with (see attached overlay for positions).

The next morning Major Hansen attacked at 0530 with Company C on the left and Company B on the right. Company A was kept in reserve, as it was short one platoon that was guarding the west bank of the [Willems] Vaart Canal. The tank-infantry teams consisted of about one squad to a tank. Just as the troops were preparing to attack, the enemy opened up with fire from a stone wall or dike that ran at an angle across the corridor. This caused some delay, but then a mist developed, and under its cover the tanks followed by the infantry, advanced right up to the wall, receiving only inaccurate, sporadic fire. The enemy had fled. The tanks now turn left and go west nearly to the Canal in order to get around the wall. The infantry swung right and advanced northeast with troops on both sides of the wall. When they reached a woods in the vicinity of the road to Reckheim, they waited for the tanks to rejoin them, as Major Hansen felt that a combined tank-infantry attack on the woods would be the cheapest way to reduce them. The tanks arrived after about an hour and the woods were overrun without difficulty.

There were three main fights on 17 September: at Uykhoven, Boorsheim, and Cothem. At Uykhoven TF Stokes hit its really stubborn resistance, which came from young GAF troops. Presumably by friendly artillery. All of the enemy’s prepared positions faced west. Our tanks and infantry flanked these positions by attacking from the south and overwhelmed the defenders by volume of their firepower. A considerable quantity of material was captured at Uykhoven.

The rest of Company H, 66 AR., and its CO, Lt Johnson, now joined the task force, having crossed the canal at Smeermaas about 1000. Their arrival was tremendous help. The two infantry company commanders were able to assign all their men to specific tanks, whereas previously there had not been enough tanks to go around. Their arrival also made possible a well-conceived maneuver whereby Boorsheim, Cothem, and the "neck" of the corridor were secured simultaneously. B Company (-1 platoon) of the 99th Inf Bn, and a platoon of H Company, 66 AR., were sent to Cothem. C Company 99th Inf Bn, and H Company (-1 platoon), 66 AR., held positions east of Boorsheim, while the platoon of light tanks and the remaining rifle platoon of B Company started to clean Boorsheim. When the two towns were about half cleaned out, C Company, 99th Inf Bn, and H Company (-), 66 AR., hit straight for the corridor’s "neck" (just east of Mechelen) and secured it with little difficulty. Control of this neck by the hostile forces that might have retreated to it from Boorsheim would have held up our advance and cost us dearly to force a passageway. About 100 PWs were taken in Boorsheim and about 150 at Cothem. Cothem was the harder fight, as there were more troops there and they were protected by fires from across the bend in the Meuse River. A few did escape in boats across the Meuse, but most fought as long as they could and then surrendered. Prisoners were still being gathered in from this area the next morning.

During this time the 246th Engr C[ombat] Bn. having floated sections of a heavy pontoon bridge down the Canal as far as possible on the night of 16-17 September, went to work as soon as the bridgehead east of Reckheim was secured. They moved the section into place and completed the bridge by 1330, approximately three hours after the securing of the bridgehead. The rest of the 3d Bn, 66 AR., then proceeded across the bridge.

While Boorsheim and Cothem were being cleaned out, C Company of the 99th Inf Bn and H Company (-) of 66 AR. secured a line south of the dike that goes across the corridor at Vucht. Company A was brought up to tie in on the right of C for the night. Company H, 66 AR., bivouacked in the vic[inity], as did Company G, which had crossed the tread-way bridge at Reckheim about 1600, along with the rest of 3/66 AR. B Company (99 Inf.) and the light tanks outposted critical areas at the "neck" and south thereof that night and the next day (see attached overlay). The narrowness of the corridor made this a necessary precaution against a hostile attempt to interfere with the line of communications and/or the new bridge at Reckheim. B Company was given the assignment because, according to Major Hansen, it had taken quite a few casualties in the hard fighting from Daeluykhoven though Cothem, while Company A was fresh. Company A, however, was short one rifle platoon, and Lt Swenson of B Company speaks of only 16 casualties in his company during the operation.

On the third day of the operation, 18 September, Companies A [H?] and C [G?] of 20 M-4’s took up positions northeast of the towns [Vucht and Eysden?], five M-4’s approached the towns from the south and shot up everything in sight. The infantry - Company C and the platoon from Company A - then cleaned out most of the area. The infantry were unable to clean out the town completely in the time allotted to do this job. Col Stokes was pressing his subordinate commanders to get to Lanklaer, and the infantry were called away before they could finish the job.** Belgian resistance groups gathered close to 100 additional PWs from the vic of Eysden after TF Stokes had gone on to Lanklaer. Some of the hostile defenders were paratroopers. They retreated to the north, only to encounter fire from the 20 tanks waiting for them. On the northern outskirts of Eysden they put up a stubborn fight. They could not escape. They would not surrender. Most of them were killed in their holes.

** Capt Donald E. Svarstad, CO of A company, says that the reason C Company suffered heavier casualties than A Company on 18 Sep (approximately 40 against 12) was that Major O’Farrell’s tanks were in such a hurry to get on that they left the infantry behind in places. The mopping up by Major Zeien’s force was slower, but more thorough and caused less casualties.

The rifle platoon of Company A now rejoined Major Zeien’s force, though not the eight tanks of G Company. This gave Zeien five M-4’s and about 65 infantrymen (both Company G and Company A were under T/O strength). Major Zeien put all the riflemen on the tanks - it came to about eight on each tank - and set out to reduce about seven square Kms on the east side of the corridor. Fortunately, resistance turned out to be extremely light until the force approached Stockheim. There the infantry dismounted and Major Zeien’s force collaborated with Major O’Farrell’s force in reducing the strongest resistance encountered during the entire three-day operation.

Major O’Farrell’s force had advanced north from Eysden astride the Eysden-Lanklaer road. One platoon of tanks and a platoon of infantry worked on the west side of the road, and the balance was in two columns east of the road. No resistance was met until the force drew near Lanklaer. There, approximately 300 yards south of the Lankaer-Stockheim road, the enemy had recently dug a line of trenches. They were the first hostile positions encountered which faced south. Though expertly camouflaged, they were not completely finished.

The positions were supported by two SP 88’s close to the road. These were the first AT weapons encountered by TF Stokes. While the bulk of Major O’Farrell’s group was getting into position to attack the enemy line, the left column tried to outflank the enemy on the west. No satisfactory route of attack could be found, so the column retraced its steps and started to cross the road separating it from the rest of the group. As it did so, it came into the field of fire of a 47mm AT gun at the main intersection in Lanklaer. At a range of about 800 meters, the AT gun was knocked out by 75mm fire, and the column proceeded safely across the road.

At about the same time other tanks of Company H, 66 AR, spotted the two SP 88’s and went after them. One of the two had not yet gotten into position and was an easy mark. The other for some reason did not get off a round before it, too was put out of action. This left the Germans manning the trenches without any AT protection except for three direct fire guns, of approximately 75 mm caliber, which were "dug in" (i.e., firing in stationary positions) about one km northeast of Lanklaer. These were well hidden by a grove of trees, and either for this reason or because it was raining, or both, neither the artillery FO nor the AOP could spot the guns. Fortunately, however, most of the rounds from these guns detonated on striking tree branches, and the shots that did come through were wild. Company H did not have one casualty from this fire, and one of the three guns was eventually knocked out somehow.

Major Zeien’s force arrived about 1615 - approximately 45 minutes after Major O’Farrell had reached the vicinity. The two forces attacked the enemy dug-in positions in their respective sectors, the tanks spearheading the attack. The German troops were from the 22d Flieger Regt. Most of them were young and fought to the bitter end. In many cases they remained in their trenches even after the tanks came right up to them, and it was sometimes necessary to get them out by WP grenades and by pistol fire from tank turrets. During this action on 18 September Lt George Heald, a platoon leader of Company A, 99th Inf. Bn, accounted for four bazooka men, thus saving the tank with which his platoon was working. Four of the platoon members, however, were wounded by a fifth German. Lt Heald was in a position to get this man also, but his carbine jammed.

After the trenches were captured, the tanks crossed the Lankaer-Stockheim road and Major O’Farrell’s tanks fanned west to cut off any enemy retreating from Lankaer, while his infantry and a few tanks went into town from the south and east. Major Zeien’s force went clockwise around Stockheim, setting up road blocks at every road leading out of town (see attached overlay for routes of advance). Then a small force went into town and found it virtually deserted. Lanklaer did not fall so easily. Additional paratroopers were there, and both in and on the western outskirts of the town they fought stubbornly until they were killed. By 1730 all resistance had ceased and the line Lanklaer-Stockheim secured.

Lt Col Stokes, Major O’Farrell, Major Hansen, and all of the tank and infantry company commanders involved in operation of TF Stokes are in agreement that the use of armor was the key factor in speed with which the mission was accomplished and the disproportionate number of casualties suffered by the enemy. Lt Col Stokes says, "The enemy was very much surprised at our use of tanks. When the attack began in the late afternoon of 16 September, he had no AT weapons in the corridor. Not until the end of the third day - around Lanklaer - did we hit anything bigger than a bazooka."

Major O’Farrell said: "The infantry took a good many casualties (see tabulation below). But by themselves the doughboys would have a terrible time. The krauts had a hell of a lot of automatic fire and the defense was extremely stubborn."

Major Hansen emphasized the fast advance which the presence of the tanks made possible. The Germans, he felt had no time to prepare their defenses. "They had plenty of ammunition - they were burning piles of it as we came up to Uykhoven - but they had no heavy weapons in the corridor. Those at Lanklaer had been brought down from Maseyck to stop us. Then, too, our tankers were good. For example, when someone pointed out the AT guns at Lanklaer, they went right out after them and knocked them out. We picked up 75 or 80 prisoners afterwards in the rear areas. They said, "We can’t fight tanks." I am sure that is what scared them. It was a tougher fight than Elbeuf for us, but without the tanks it would have taken a long time to clean that corridor. . . . The tanks are only afraid of places like buildings and hedges where bazooka men can hide without being seen. If the tanks are working with infantry who are not afraid to stay up with the tanks, the combination can’t be beat. Of course, the infantry think tanks should always go ahead and often have to be booted."

Tank-infantry teamwork. The tank commanders and infantry commanders interviewed tended to emphasize the work of their respective arms. There was no basic conflict, however, as to what generally happened: Each group of infantry followed wherever its assigned tank went; except that the tanks got stuck at a stream or dike, Major Hansen would order the infantry advance without the tanks to a designated objective. In other words, the infantry advanced and cleaned out objectives in the immediate wake of the tanks.
Click to expand...

Earthican · Nov 19, 2013

The action of CCB will come from the reports of the three battalions of the 67th Armored Regiment. The 3d Bn will lead off on the Maastricht-Sittard highway. Due to strong resistance their attack will move slightly east of the highway while the 1st Bn takes over the drive to Sittard. The 3d Bn will rejoin the 1st Bn just west of Sittard. Using secondary roads the 2d Bn will advance on the right, or east, of the 3d and 1st battalions.

Note I added the paragraphs to these reports for easier reading.

***EDIT***
See Post #8
http://ww2talk.com/forums/topic/50645-us-2d-armored-division-september-1944/#entry602816

TF 2
41st AIR (minus 2d Bn and minus one company each from 1st and 3d Bns)
3d Bn 67th AR
3d Plat, Co B, 17th Armrd Eng Bn
??elements 702d TD Bn

***EDIT***

note:
67th Armored Regiment
1st Bn: A, D, H
2d Bn: B, E, F
3d Bn: C, G, I

3d Bn 67th AR Report.

On the 15th of September, the Battalion received orders that they, with the 3rd Battalion 41st Armored Infantry Regiment (less Company "G") attached would cross bridges over the Albert Canal and the Meuse River at Maastricht, Holland, and then would push on to the north along road to Sittard until contact was made with the enemy. When the contact was made the unit would coil for the night.

Lt. Bobroff , 9th T. A. Force, Air Support Officer, reported with another officer, some enlisted men and a tank to replace W. O. Donald O. Manning who had been acting as Air Support Officer.

The Battalion moved out after some delay and the Albert Canal was crossed at about 18.15 hours. The Battalion entered Holland, at 19.00 hours, and continued on thru the city of Maastricht. The streets were packed with the people, dressed in their finest clothes, who had come to bid them welcome to their city and country. The Albert Canal and the Meuse River were crossed on pontoon bridges that had been constructed the previous night and during the day. They continued on along the Maastricht-Sittard highway until the advanced elements were stopped by blown bridges and small arms fire along the Geul River. The Battalion coiled for the night and established the necessary blocks and out posts, along the three main river crossings.

During the night, the 3rd platoon, Company "B", 17th Engineers, commanded by Lt. Reed, prepared a bridge for the battalion to make the river crossing, amid continual mortar and small arms fire. The bridge was not completed after another bridge was found to be intact a little farther upstream.

The next morning (16 Sept.), the battalion was alerted to be prepared to move across the Geul River and support the Infantry companies, then push thru them and continue the attack thru Hoogveld [Moorveld?], Holland, and take the high ground near Beek, Holland.

At 1330, Company "I", 67th , Armored Regiment with the mortar platoon attached was ordered forward across the river. Company "G", 67th Armored Regiment was attached to the 1st Battalion, 41st Armored Infantry Regiment. Later Company "I" and the mortar platoon were instructed to push forward as quickly as possible and after passing thru the infantry, to secure the high ground at Kruisberg. The remainder of the battalion was ordered to move closer to the bridge and to cross as soon as space was available.

After moving to the new area, the battalion halted temporarily, while Company "I" (less 1 platoon), plus the combat elements of the 41st Armored Infantry Regiment moved forward to secure their objective. The 3rd platoon, Co. "I", commanded by 1st Lt. Harry S. Woods, pushed up the Maastricht-Sittard highway, supported by one platoon of infantry and secured the objective. During the attack, 2nd Lt. Tom G. Katsilometes, platoon leader, Company "I", 67th Armored Regiment, and two infantry officers were killed by artillery fire. During the day the attacking forces captured over one hundred prisoners and destroyed many others. The terrain was very unsuitable for tank warfare because of the impossibility of getting off the road.

On the morning of the 17th of September, Company "G", 67th Armored Regiment was attached to the 1st Battalion, 41st Armored Infantry Regiment for the coming operation. All company commanders reported to the Battalion Command Post for orders at 05.30 hours. At this time orders were issued for the assault force commanded by Lt. Col. Crowley, which consisted of "I" Company, 67th AR, "H" Company 41st Inf. and the mortar platoons of the 3rd Bn. 67th A.R. and also of the 3rd Bn. 41st Inf., to press the attack along the axis to the objective No. 1 (620 580) and No. 2 (632 582) and be prepared to assist the 67th AR force in securing objective No. 3 at (650 585). Company "B" , 702nd T. D. Battalion (less one platoon) was ordered to follow the assault force. This organization would in turn be followed by the advance Command Post, engineer platoon, assault platoon, "C" Company, and "I" Company, 41st Infantry (less one platoon). The rear Command Post and trains were ordered to remain in their present area. The rear guard consisting of one platoon of "I" Company, 41st Infantry and the Assault platoon of the 3rd Battalion. The platoon of "C" Company at the bridge was ordered to be attached to "A" Company, 41st Infantry.

At 10.05 hours, the Battalion was heavily engaged along the line of departure. Heavy fire was received from artillery and direct fire weapons in the north. As this fire was coming in on the left flank, it halted the advance of the Battalion. At this point word was received that the 1st Battalion, 67th AR, would pass through the Battalion's position and advance to the N.E. along the Maastricht-Sittard highway. This was accomplished about 13.30 hours. Heavy resistance was encountered by the 1st Bn, 67th AR, but this action relieved the pressure on this Battalion and enabled them to advance and secure objective 1 at Ulestraten where elements of the 2nd Bn. were also encountered advancing to the north.

[1st Bn, 67th AR Report below]

The Battalion then proceeded to objective No. 2 and on to the town of Oensel which was secured and outposted by 19.30 hours. The results of the day's action were 3 enemy artillery pieces and 3 tanks destroyed; over 200 prisoners captured. Our losses were: one tank disabled, tank can be repaired. During the night Lt. Bert C. Holmes, Reconnaissance platoon leader, while on patrol with two of his 1/4 ton vehicles, ran into a friendly minefield. Lt. Holmes and six enlisted men were evacuated. One 1/4 ton vehicle was destroyed. S/Sgt. Pastierik took over command of the platoon.

During the afternoon, an AP shell hit a 67th AR. Service Company truck parked in the trains area. The shell hit a 75 mm. ammunition cluster, passed through the roof of the truck and on through the windshield into the ground about 10 feet in front of the truck. Personnel standing only three or four feet away were not injured. Lt. Koath A. Beichley, Mortar Platoon leader, was evacuated to the hospital. Staff Sergeant Capbell took over command of the platoon.

During the night orders were received from the Division Reserve commander, At 15.10 hours [18 Sept], Lt. Col, Hillyard issued orders for movement of the Battalion to an assembly area in the vicinity of Beek. Upon arriving in this area the Battalion reverted to Combat Command "B" control and was designated as Combat Command "B" reserve.

A meeting was held at 11.15 hours [19 Sept] to brief organizational commanders. The Battalion again returned to control of the 41st Inf., with the 3rd platoon, "B" Company 17th Engineers and "I" Company 41st Infantry attached and with "G" Company still detached. The Battalion was ordered to move following the 1st Battalion, 41st Infantry, gain contact with this organization, move around it and take objective "A" (town of Limbricht) about 6 miles to the northeast. The order of march was: advance guard, one platoon, "I" Company, 67th Armored Regiment plus one platoon "I" Company, 41st Infantry with Mortars prepared to protect and extend flanks. The rest of the column was made up of the command group, 17th Engineers platoon, "I" Company 67th Armored Regiment (less one platoon), one platoon "I" Company 41st Infantry, Trains, and infantry platoon as rear guard.

Orders were received to move the Battalion forward and find routes to objective "A". The Battalion moved to the line of departure at 14.00 hours. Commanders were again briefed on the ground and attack ordered to jump off at 16.15 hours. Infantry was dug-in along Berg-Voorstad road. The attack started as scheduled and proceeded without incident except for cleaning up infantry pockets to a point 1000 yards from Guttecoven. At this point orders were received to "cease forward advance and consolidate positions and clean out Krauts". A force was sent to secure the towns of Limbricht, Einighausen and Guttecoven. The Command Post closed at 20.45 hours. An attempt was made to block road junction at Beukeboom but direct fire from heavy weapons held off the force. A listening post was established. Enemy mines were located at that point.The operations for the day were very successful. 400 enemy prisoners were taken. At least 75 were killed throughout the day.

Orders were received at 06.30 [20 Sept] hours that the Division would continue the attack to the north and east Combat Command "B" would advance with the 1st Battalion, 41st Infantry, advancing at 07.00 hours to clean out Sittard and continue the attack to the east. The Battalion was to hold the present position until relieved by the 82nd Reconnaissance Battalion. Upon release, the Battalion was to send patrols to Limbricht and Millen to secure Millen.

At 11.45 hours the commanding officers were instructed that the 82nd Reconnaissance had taken over the battalion's positions and they could continue their advance to secure Millen. The Battalion was ordered to move into Germany at Millen with following order of march: Covering force, "C" Company (less two platoons), the advance guard made up of one platoon "I" Company, 67th Armored Regiment and one platoon "I" Company, 41st Infantry, the Mortar platoon, the Assault platoon and the Command Post group. The main body consisted of "I" Company, 67th Armored Regiment, "I" Company, 41st Infantry and trains. The rear guard would be the 1st platoon of "I" Company, 41st Infantry.

By 12.00 hours, the platoon of "C" Company with the reconnaissance force was at a railroad underpass which was found to be blown. Enemy was spotted along the railroad and a few prisoners were taken. By 12.30 hours, another crossing of the railroad was located. This crossing was made through underpass, and the force continued across country to the site of a double bridge over a canal and stream. At this point Mortar and artillery fire was received. The first bridge was discovered intact but. blocked by logs. 2nd Lt. Peter Kostow dragged the logs away with his tank while under fire. The second bridge was blown so the platoon continued looking for a crossing. Heavy anti-tank fire eventually forced withdrawal, but not before it was determined that a crossing could not be made without the help of the Engineers.

The Battalion Commander moved his advance Command Post to the underpass and received artillery fire in the area throughout the day. While the above moves were being made by the platoon of "C" Company, Lieutenant Hines, with a reconnaissance platoon of "C" Company, was sent to the forward Command Post. The platoon commanded by Lt. Delaney with the scout section of the Reconnaissance platoon and a platoon of infantry was sent to find a southern crossing to the objective. A crossing was found at Overhouen and the platoon crossed and proceeded north along the trail to Millen. The bridge just south of this town was found intact and the attack continued. A force of infantry just south of town was encountered dug-in. Fire was laid on them and they surrendered. The force continued through town and blocked all roads leading into town. Additional Germans were killed and captured.

The Battalion Commander ordered the rest of the Battalion forward. Major Batchelder was bringing the remainder of the Battalion forward when he was pinned down by direct fire from a self propelled gun located on high ground. This fire was neutralized by one section of the 2nd platoon, Company "I", 67th Armored Regiment which was holding the underpass and one section of the 1st platoon, Company "I", 67th which was in the main body. These tanks continued to fire until the entire column passed. Captain Paul A. Bane was evacuated to the hospital during the day and Lt. Harry S. Wood assumed command of Company "I", 67th Armored Regiment. The total number of prisoners captured was 70; the number killed was large but the exact number is unknown.

During the day, Lt. Reed, with his Engineer platoon, was reattached to the Battalion. He contributed an alternate bridge just south of the bridge into Millen. During the night this platoon fired on an enemy patrol and captured one prisoner. Two other prisoners were captured at road blocks during the night and another German was killed. The line was held from Millen to contact point with the 82nd Reconnaissance. Reconnaissance patrols were made during the night to contact road blocks to the west of the Battalion Command Post location.

Next morning [21 Sept] at 07.00 hours, orders were received from higher headquarters that the Battalion would be relieved by the 744th Tank Battalion and upon its arrival the Battalion was to move to the Combat Command "R" assembly area 5 miles northeast of Maastricht. A meeting of commanding officers was held at the Battalion Command Post at 03.30 hours at which orders were issued for the march to the assembly area. The order of march as given was: Reconnaissance platoon, platoon from "I" Company, 41st Infantry, Battalion Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Engineer platoon, "I" Company, 67th , "I" Company, 41st , "C" Company, 67th AR, the Medical Detachment and Maintenance. The march was made by way of Millen, Sittard, Geleen, Beek, Oensel, and Hulsberg without incident. Upon arrival in assembly area, "G" Company returned to battalion control and the 17th Engineer platoon and "I" Company 41st Infantry were released to their organization. Two road blocks were established by "C" Company to the north.
Click to expand...

***EDIT***
See Post #8
http://ww2talk.com/forums/topic/50645-us-2d-armored-division-september-1944/#entry602816

'reserve CCB'
1st Bn 67th AR
one company 41st AIR [likely Co B, 41st AIR]
??elements 17th Armrd Eng Bn
??elements 702d TD Bn

***EDIT***

note:
67th Armored Regiment
1st Bn: A, D, H
2d Bn: B, E, F
3d Bn: C, G, I

1st Bn 67th AR Report

In the evening of 9 September 1944 the Battalion moved to an area near Neerveld, south of Herck La Ville. Outposts and patrols were maintained, but no enemy contact was established. The battalion remained in this bivouac until the 14th of September, when it moved to an area just southwest of the Albert Canal in the vicinity of Maastricht. On the 17th, the Battalion, still Division Reserve, crossed the canal and the river, moved through Maastricht to an area 3 miles north of the city. Here orders were received to attack along the Maastricht-Sittard highway to seize the railroad and the surrounding territory at the point where the highway crossed it just south of Sittard.

As the attack jumped off, "D" Company under Captain Lester M. Rice deployed to the right of the road, with "H" Company under Lieutenant William H. Hough on the left. "A" company with the mortars and assaults was in support of both elements initially. While deploying, the tanks were attacked by enemy anti-tank guns. "D" and "H" Company lost each 3 tanks before the guns were silenced. While rounding up prisoners, Lieutenant Lee caught a German officer attempting to pull a palm pistol from his shoulder holster. Lee a giant of a man, picked him up and slammed him against the building beside he had lined up the prisoners, breaking his neck and back. Enemy artillery and mortar fire was extremely heavy; one shell burst close to Lee’s tank, wounding two of his crew and inflicting neck and thigh wounds on Lieutenant Lee. Despite his own painful wounds, he picked up his two wounded crew members and carried them down the road ¼ of a mile to the aid station. He then returned to his tank, but the Battalion Commander ordered him to permit himself to be evacuated.

The attack continued against bitter opposition. An "A" Company tank was struck by a heavy artillery shell, wounding all of the crew. By nightfall, the objective was secured.

In the morning (18 Sept.), the Battalion and attachments proceeded to push toward Sittard, white the objective of securing the high ground to the north of the town. Because of intensity of enemy artillery concentrations, it was decided to leave the rear command post north of Maastricht, and establish a forward command post of the command tank with advanced elements. Lieutenant Francis M. Wilson, in attempting to reach the forward command post, was killed by a German sniper, and his peep driver, Technician Fifth Grade Jesse Sykes, narrowly escaped as a group of enemy riflemen sent slugs whistling into the steering column, the radio, and one of the tires.

An enemy plane attempting to strafe the Battalion came a little too low for safety, and was sent crashing in flames by the well-directed 50 caliber fire of the medium tankers. "A" Company’s light tanks with some of the infantry from "A" Company 41st Armored Infantry Regiment, succeeded in pushing their way into town [Sittard], where they set up security for the night. The enemy had consolidated behind them, and the remainder of the battalion stayed just south of the town until the next day. During the night, one of the "A" Company tanks was knocked out by bazooka fire. Civilians reported that the enemy repaired the tank and drove it away.

On 19 September the rest of the force continued into town [Sittard], and after 12 hours of fighting in the streets succeeded in clearing it. In the meantime, Lieutenant Oliver A. Lewis led his platoon of "A" Company tanks in a dash over the German border to Tuddern, which, with the help of the infantry, they succeeded in capturing and outposting. During this action, Lieutenant Lewis flushed over 300 prisoners from the hedgerows on the outskirts of the town.

On 20 September, the Battalion was relieved and moved south to an area 1 ½ miles northeast of Valkenburg, Holland, where it was attached to Combat Command "B". Here a program of maintenance and rehabilitation was undertaken. Recreational facilities were limited to movies and an occasional camp show. The battalion intensified its training of personnel for the coming campaign to smash through the Siegfried Line into the heart of enemy’s territory.
Click to expand...

***EDIT***
See Post #8
http://ww2talk.com/forums/topic/50645-us-2d-armored-division-september-1944/#entry602816

TF 1
67th AR (minus 1st, 3d Bn and Rcn Co) [read as 2d Bn, 67th AR]
Co G, 41st AIR
one platoon Co B, 17th Armrd Eng Bn
one platoon Co B, 702d TD Bn

***EDIT***

note:
67th Armored Regiment
1st Bn: A, D, H
2d Bn: B, E, F
3d Bn: C, G, I

2d Bn 67th AR Report

On 14 September 1944, less the force that had been sent to the Third Battalion, 41st Armored Infantry Regiment, the Battalion moved at 07.00 hours and closed in another assembly area at 08.20 hours near Vlijtingen, where Company "F" and the light tank platoon joined the Battalion at 10.00 Hours. They were preparing to cross the Albert Canal; all that delayed them was the completion of the bridge at Canne. The bridge collapsed at 19.00 hours and the Battalion remained there all night. Company "G" of the 41st Armored Infantry Regiment joined them at the same time that the rest of the force rejoined.

While waiting for the bridge to be put up again the Battalion remained in its present position until 20.00 hours [15 Sept] at which time it moved through Kesselt and crossed the Albert Canal at Canne, continuing the march through Maastricht and across the Wilhelms Canal. At about 23.30 hours it crossed the Meuse River (Maas) and moved into an assembly area two miles east of Maastricht at 0200 hours on 16 September.

Reports indicated that the enemy was in the immediate vicinity. Patrols were sent out and they returned about 07.00 hours with the information that the bridges were blown and that the Germans were entrenched in the area just north of these bridges.

The force attempted to cross the stream [vicinity St. Gerlach] at 08.00 hours [16 Sept] with a platoon of infantry and a platoon of tanks, but the infantry was held up by heavy, mortar, artillery and small arms fire. The remainder of the infantry was brought up and they were supported by Company "F", the mortar and assault gun platoons, and the artillery. Company "E" and Company "B" remained in reserve. In spite of the heavy fire one platoon of infantry crossed the stream at 13.00 hours and another crossed at 14.00 hours. The engineer platoon began work on a treadway bridge, but the progress was slow because of the heavy incoming fire. A request for air support was fulfilled at 16.00 hours and they bombed and strafed till 18.00 hours. At 20.00 hours the bridge was completed, and the Battalion prepared to hold for the night, using Company "B" light tanks to protect the flanks and to reinforce the infantry and engineers.

Prior to crossing the bridge the next morning (17 Sept.) patrols were sent out to determine the enemy's strength. They received heavy small arms fire. At 09.00 hours, watches having been set back one hour, two platoons of medium tanks were across and an attack was launched against the town of St. Gerlach which was captured by 12.00 hours, and the remainder of the Battalion was then brought across. Immediately it pushed toward an objective 1000 yards northeast of St. Gerlach. This was reached at 13.00 hours. It continued toward the second objective, 1000 yards north of objective 1. Company "F" passed through Company "E" which had led the attack to this time. The second objective was attained by Company "F". Patrols were sent out toward the third objective, but reported no contact. Very close air support, commencing at 11.00 hours and continuing through-out the afternoon, helped considerably. An enemy 75 mm anti-tank gun, in ambush, near the first objective scored a hit on the Battalion Commander's tank, causing slight damage and wounding one man. Company "E" destroyed this gun in short order. That night the Battalion set up on the three objectives, splitting its forces to hold them.

The next day (18 Sept.) Company "E", reinforced with a platoon of infantry and a platoon of light tanks moved out and crossed the Line of Departure. Company "F", with two platoons of infantry, one platoon light tanks, and one platoon of engineers, followed. Company "F" reached the first objective at 08.00 hours and continued toward objective 2. Light enemy resistance was encountered so Company "F" deployed and the engineers were brought up to repair the bridges in this area. A bridge was found intact and the second objective was gained by enveloping it from the left flank.

At 15.00 hours the Battalion moved toward objective 3, and soon occupied it. There the Battalion consolidated and pushed on to objectives 4 and 5. The patrol to objective 4, reported no opposition, but did encounter some light resistance on 5, Wintraak; this opposition withdrew, and the position was taken and secured by 16.30 hours.

Preparations were immediately made to attack the sixth objective which was a piece of high ground just to the north of Wintraak and inside the German border. The first platoon of Company "F" commanded by Lieutenant George Adler was the first element of the Battalion to enter German soil, and they quickly gained the high ground which was Objective 6. Thus, the Second Battalion, 67th Armored Regiment became the first unit of the Second Armored Division to enter, conquer and occupy German soil. Company "E" then passed through. Objective 6, led by Lieutenant Kiley who led the attack on Objective 7, the town of Wehr, Germany. Company "E" gained a high hill overlooking the town from the south and cut all roads leading into the town from the east, west and south.

As darkness fell the Battalion consolidated its positions, again placing its forces in three objectives, 5, 6 and 7. Shortly after dark Lieutenant Colonel John D. Wynne, Battalion Commander, and Lieutenant George Hore, commanding Company "F", while on an inspection tour near the tank destroyer platoon, ran into a series of entrenchments still occupied by the enemy on Objective 6. A short fight at very close range soon ended with several German dead and 24 taken prisoner.
Click to expand...

Earthican · Nov 21, 2013

I have the 66th AR (CCA/2dAD) report but it is not clear without the overlays (which are missing from the PDF file).

For now I'll post this link to a XIX Corps report which covers the 2d AD.
http://www.xixcorps.nl/XIX_Corps_Chronology_September_1944.htm

Also found on that site is this report from the German LXXXI Corps.
http://www.xixcorps.nl/Foreign_Military_Studies_B-816.htm

Excerpt for sector opposite the 2d AD:

14 Sept 1944
...
Contact with the 176th Division, on the left wing of the First Parachute Army, was now established 1 kilometer north of Bunde. The 275th and 49th Infantry Divisions manned the fortified positions Meerssen - Valkenburg - Orsbach, where contact was established with the West Wall, manned by troops from Aachen combat command. In neither of these sectors was there much enemy action during 14 September. The two divisions were therefore able to strengthen their defense preparations, and on the 49th Division front an enemy attack developing toward Gulpen was repelled.
...

15 Sept 1944
...
During the afternoon the enemy made a penetration at Valkenburg. They crossed the brook at several places and major artillery and fighter-bomber activity were reported south of Gulpen. Here an enemy attack, delivered at 1800 in the direction of Schin op Geul, was repelled.[30thID]
...

16 Sept 1944
...
As expected, the enemy launched a major attack that morning. In the 275th Infantry Division sector 25 enemy tanks entered Valkenburg, and a counterattack by that division failed, although an enemy battalion attacking Schin op Geul was repelled. [30thID]
...

17 Sept 1944
Beginning early in the morning, there was heavy enemy artillery fire and much artillery air reconnaissance all along the LXXXI Corps sector. Nevertheless, contrary to our expectation, the enemy attack on the right sector, with infantry and tanks, did not develop until the afternoon. Its main effort was directed against Meerssen, on the right army boundary, and there a German battalion whose commanding officer was killed in action was overrun and suffered heavy casualties.[CCB/2dAD]

After a while the attack extended along the whole front. By evening the remnants of the 275th Division were driven back on the line Schimmert[CCA/2dAD] - Klimmen[30thID]. In the 49th Division sector the enemy reached Heerlen [30thID]...
...

18 Sept 1944
That morning the enemy continued to attack. At noon attack on Brunssum failed, but in the afternoon the remnants of the 275th Division were driven out of the area [CCA/2dAD], and the line of security was penetrated in the 49th Division sector, south of Nieuwenhagen[30thID]. A pocket northeast of Terwinselen was cleared in a counterattack by an armored force from the 10th SS Panzer Division.[30thID]
...

19 Sept 1944
By morning the remnants of the 275th Division were along the southwestern edge of the forest west of Geilenkirchen. The motorized battalion Riedel was southwest of Waubach.[CCA/2dAD]

That afternoon the enemy drove back a Luftwaffen battalion assigned to the 275th Division and broke into the forest. The division commander by his personal efforts, succeeded in establishing a new line of security on the western border and on both sides of Teveren, with elements of his division. We no longer had contact with the forces adjacent on our right. An attack by the 183d Volks Grenadier Division, launched from Geilenkirchen westward with a task force of two battalions, the 902d Assault Gun Brigade, and a antitank company, was intended to close the gap and establish contact with the adjacent sector, but it was halted by an enemy armored counterattack via Gangelt. Our casualties were heavy and the 902d Assault Gun Brigade lost 7 assault guns.[CCA/2dAD]
...

20 Sept 1944
While enemy artillery laid harassing fire on the entire LXXXI Corps sector, the 183d Volks Grenadier Division reached Waldenrath and Birgden and established contact with the 176th Division on its right. It was ordered to continue the attack toward Gangelt and set up a defense front on the line Gangelt - Geilenkirchen. When the enemy attacked, with armor, from the Gangelt area, toward Geilenkirchen and farther north, and entered the forest south of Waldenrath, their attack was stopped at Beuchte and 7 enemy tanks were destroyed. In the evening, after this engagement, the 183d Volks Grenadier Division held the line Waldenrath - Bauchem, western border of Geilenkirchen - West Wall.[CCA/2dAD]
...
Click to expand...

Earthican · Jan 7, 2014

Somehow I forgot I had the After Action Reports for the 67th Armored Regiment (they are mislabeled online as 5th Armored Division).

Though I hate transcribing, this report was so useful for filling-in the details of the previous battalion reports I put myself through the tedium of a word for word transcription (below).

A careful review of all the reports allows what I think is an accurate order of battle which shows the symmetry of the starting task forces. Note the infantry heavy task force under the 41st Armored Infantry Regiment, used for the assault crossing at MEERSSEN, and two other task forces build around a tank battalion with an attached infantry company. Through the course of the battle the composition of all of the task forces change.

CCB

TF 1
67th AR (minus 1st, 3d Bn and Rcn Co) [read as 2d Bn, 67th AR]
Co G, 41st AIR
one platoon Co B, 17th Armrd Eng Bn
one platoon Co B, 702d TD Bn

TF 2
41st AIR (minus 2d Bn and minus one company each from 1st and 3d Bns)
3d Bn 67th AR
3d Plat, Co B, 17th Armrd Eng Bn
?? 702d TD Bn

'reserve TF'
1st Bn 67th AR
one company 41st AIR [likely Co B, 41st AIR]
?? 17th Armrd Eng Bn
?? 702d TD Bn

Since the previous map was reduced in quality by the forum software I'll try adding another map of a reduced area and hope we get better results (nope, still degraded).

For this action, the Headquarters 67th AR only had command of its second battalion and attached infantry so the AAR only covers that one battalion. This situation seems to make the regimental headquarters unnecessary which was probably one of the arguments for the deletion of all the regimental headquarters from the 'light' armored divisions.

For some reason the coordinates of some objectives do not exactly match their description as "high ground", however the second set of bridge coordinates were spot-on so, barring a typographical error, the coordinates are as intended.

Although the reports make the general route of the task forces clear, given that the ground conditions were good for off-road maneuver, I am curious about the actual terrain used by the leading tank companies. Open high ground objectives make sense for a tank force which can use the reverse slope for cover and concealment. Towns and woods required sufficient infantry to clear and hold those objectives.

note:
67th Armored Regiment
1st Bn: A, D, H
2d Bn: B, E, F
3d Bn: C, G, I

AAR 67th AR

16 Sept.: Regiment, less 1st and 3rd Bns., Rcn. Co., Mt. Co., with the same attachments moved at 0600B and closed in new area at 0730B at K598525, passing through MAASTRICHT. 2nd Bn leading elements had advanced to vicinity 625535 and coiled to reconnoiter for a crossing over the GEUL river. Bridges had been blown and enemy were in defensive position on North side. The terrain made it virtually impossible for anyone to approach to cross without being under enemy observation and fire. Engineers decided to throw treadway across the double stream at 639540 [629540?] where original bridges were blown. Some delay was caused waiting for the engineer equipment to arrive. The bridge construction was done by "B" Co. 17th Engrs. after the Infantry company attached to 2nd Bn ("G" Co. 41st Inf) had secured a bridgehead. The Engineers worked under continuous mortar and artillery fire, and the bridgehead was not too great. 2nd Bn had tank elements placed in strategic positions to cover the bridgehead, and was in continuous fire contact with the enemy dug in on the North side. Air support and artillery support were directed on enemy positions. This concentrated fire caused the enemy to start a withdrawal late in the afternoon and the air and artillery support continued. The air worked the targets over continuously and their support was excellent. At 1930B the Engineers had finally completed the first bridge and were able to start the second. First bridge had a span of about 40 feet and the second bridge about 25 feet. Complete bridge was finished in the early evening but it was too late to move any of the tank elements across. Bridgehead was held by the Infantry Company for the night with all other weapons in support. Regimental C.P. remained at K598525. CC"B" F.O. #45 received for operations on 17th Sept. Regiment did not issue a F.O., but distributed the CC"B" F.O. with a memorandum, to C.O. 2nd Bn that one medium tank company would remain on our side of the bridge as CC"B" reserve, and would move across on order C.O. 67th AR.

17 Sept.: Regiment less 1st and 3rd Bns, Rcn Co., Mt. Co., with same attachments prepared to push across the stream and attack the enemy. Report received from C.O. 2nd Bn 67th AR at 0704B that Rcn. was out feeling out the enemy and that the tank elements were ready to move across. The bridgehead area was still receiving 170 to 240mm enemy fire. At 0826B the first of the tanks began moving across. Rcn. out front was drawing considerable small arms fire. At 0900B, 2 platoons of "E" Co. medium tanks were across and moving to their positions for the attack. The tanks moved out to cover the infantry. At 0930B, one platoon of light tanks were also across and moved to protect the flanks. Enemy apparently was organizing a defense along the RR tracks about half-mile North of the crossing. The attack advanced slowly with the infantry supporting the advance of the tanks. By 1100B all of "E" Co. was across and a short time later, all of "B" Co. light tanks (-1 Plat.) were across. The tanks had reached a line along the main road just South of the RR tracks, at about 1145B. They were under constant enemy fire and had started to receive direct fire from guns on the right flank. The air-ground tank was working with the forward elements, and the fighter-bombers were doing an excellent job of close-in support. The air was straffing and bombing the enemy as close as 300 yards from our leading elements. The infantry moved to the left to clean out woods on the left flank of the advance. At 1200B, C.O. 2nd Bn reported that the enemy showed signs of withdrawal. At 1250B, tank elements had reached the main enemy defense line, and reported killing many enemy during the advance, and taking quite a number of prisoners. The advance was slow due to the fact it was necessary to do a lot of mopping up of all houses and buildings [ST GERLACH?] before attacking on. Had there been more infantry available, the attack would have been able to progress much more rapidly. The attacking force up to this time was composed of: one Company Medium tanks; two platoons of light tanks, and one company 41st Inf., with the assault guns and mortars of Hq. Co. 2nd Bn. 67th AR, and artillery in support. By 1503B, 2nd Bn 67th reported reaching their second objective, which was the high ground vicinity 644573[?]. C.O. 2nd Bn. reported that his force had shot up a lot of enemy infantry, vicinity the second objective. Regiment Forward C.P. moved to the crossing site and took an O.P. on the top floor of a large hotel building, where observation on progress of the attack was fairly good up to the first objective. 2nd Bn 67th reported that they were consolidating on the 2nd objective, before moving on. C.O. received order from CC"B" to push the attack to objective 3, and secure there. At 1735B, objective #3 was reached (vicinity KRUIS). Contact was established with CC"B" left force, in this vicinity. Regimental C.P. and Headquarters moved to orchard at 630563. C.O. reported to CC"B" that force was consolidating on objective #3, and would secure for the night. Contact was already established on left and patrols were out to contact CC"A", on the right. C.O.,"B" Co. sent light tank patrol to clear highway through RAAR to MEERSEN and contact friendly troops there. An interesting note may be mentioned at this time. A determined enemy gun crew had remained in hiding, vicinity RAAR, and sometime after the attack had passed them, they set up their AT gun, and shot a number of rounds at the tanks and other targets, which were visible to them. Not one of their shots hit anything, and the gun was quickly knocked out by our tank fire and artillery. The defense of the area was set up for the night, and road blocks placed. CC"B" F.O. #46 was received and copies passed on to the subordinate units without issuing a separate Regimental F.O., since the attack was to be continued. No unusual events during the night, except for a few P.W.'s taken.

18 Sept.: Regiment with same organizations as on previous day started the attack at 0655A, with a force of one medium tank Co., 1 light tank Co., and 1 Platoon 41st Inf., under the control of C.O. 2nd Bn 67th AR. First objective for the day was high ground at 660605. First objective was reached at 0805A, and attack continued. Regimental C.P. moved up to vicinity KRUIS, where reserve force was in assembly area. In order to keep one medium tank Co. in reserve C.O. 2nd Bn. alternated the two medium Companies from one objective to the next. Three enemy fighter planes came over, but did no damage. Reconnaissance was pushed out ahead to determine if bridge across stream, vicinity 678625, was blown. Reports later indicated bridge could not be used. Reconnaissance pushed to crossing at 668634, and this bridge found to be intact. C.O. ordered advance elements to route the attack over this bridge and then attack East towards objective #3 (vicinity PUT[PUTH?]). Objective #2 taken at 1518A, and reconnaissance pushed out. Woods in vicinity 2nd objective were thoroughly mopped up. Received information that our fighter-bomber support would be available at about 1645A, and information relayed to air-ground tank. Attacking force on our left along same general line as our leading elements. Regimental C.P. moved at 1550A to move up to 682630 (2nd Obj.). 2nd Bn 67th AR force, by this time, had secured 3rd objective, and were approaching 5th objective, which was WINTRAKEN. 4th objective, vicinity 705635, was visible from #3, and observed to be clear, and was covered by flank elements. At 1620A, C.O. 2nd Bn 67th AR reported that he was sending a patrol up ahead to objective #6 (715665 just inside the German border). This patrol crossed into German territory shortly later, and was the first element of the 2nd Armored Division to enter German soil. Objective 5 secured at about 1600A, and the forward elements continued to move on objective #6. Regimental C.P. and Headquarters arrived new C.P. at 682630, at 1630A. Tank block was sent back to secure and hold the bridge at 668633. At 1700A, C.O. 2nd Bn 67th AR reported that forward tank elements had reached objective #6, and patrols were pushing out to #7 (Town of WEHR, GERMANY). Enemy force seemed to be withdrawing in front of our advance. Several AT gun positions had to be cleared out, and most of the opposition was enemy infantry who were killed, captured, or driven off. C.O. 67th AR ordered a securing force left on objective #6, and the advance to continue. Platoon of "B" Co. 702 T.D. Bn attached was ordered to move out to objective #4, secure there, and protect the right flank. C.O. 2nd Bn 67th AR reported an enemy force in the vicinity JABEEK, to the right of the advance. 2nd Bn succeeded in taking objective #7 (WEHR) at about 1900A, and secured there, after cutting the main highway SITTARD - GANGELT, with road blocks. Situation for the night remained as follows; a holding force was left on objective 5; a security force was left to hold object #6, and the remainder of the combat force secured objective #7. The T.D. block was moved up to secure GROOTDOENRADE, and one light tank section (+) was sent to secure the CR at RAAT[RAATH?], and wait for a contacting force from CC"A" to make contact there. From positions vicinity WEHR, enemy vehicles and horse-drawn guns or carts could be heard, and artillery fire was placed. There was some sniper fire in WEHR. Civilians occupied the town, but remained in hiding. Regimental C.P. remained in orchard at 682630, for the night. CC"B" Field Order #47 received late at night, with plans for our Task Force #1 to seize and secure objectives #8 (North edge of woods at 790740[740690?]); #9 (GANGELT); and #10 (HASTENRATH). 1st Bn 41st AIR, which had been in combat in the drive on SITTARD, was to be relieved and move to WEHR (objective #7), and come under Task Force #1 control there. Regimental Overlay issued at 190400A covering the plans for attack for 19 Sept. Generally, 2nd Bn 67th AR was to continue holding present ground and attack North through the woods to secure objective #8. 1st Bn 41st AIR upon arrival at WEHR would attack generally East down the WEHR - GANGELT road, dropping off a force to take HASTENRATH, on the way. No unusual occurrences during the night. 2nd Bn 67th AR called for artillery fire on various enemy movements heard in the woods towards objective #8, but fire was not observed. Enemy artillery was fairly active during the day, but offered no serious trouble. CC"A" on our right had progressed to a line a little north of the OORSBEEK[OIRSBEEK?] - HEERLEN highway, and the right flank of Task Force #1, was somewhat exposed.

19 Sept.: Infantry Co. ("G" 41st AIR), with 2nd Bn 67th AR jumped off at 0700A to attack North through the woods and secure objective #8. Enemy resistance was met almost immediately. Enemy was well dug-in and used deep World War I type trenches. Mostly small arms and some MG fire. C.O. 2nd Bn 67th reported that a friendly patrol had come over from 1st Bn 67th, operating vicinity SITTARD and had made contact at WEHR. At 1008A heavy enemy artillery landed between objectives 6 and 7. 30 P.W.'s were taken, vicinity N.E. of Objective #6. At 1115A infantry had only advanced to South edge of woods and entire vicinity was receiving heavy enemy artillery. Radio contact was established with 1st Bn 41st Inf. as they were approaching WEHR. C.O. 1st Bn. 41st AIR was instructed to meet C.O. 67th AR in WEHR, to go over attack plans. 1st Bn 41st AIR was delayed some in moving to WEHR, as they had to pass around South of SITTARD in territory that was taken, but not yet cleared of the enemy. Cub plane ordered up to locate the enemy artillery positions firing on us. At 1130A the infantry had made some progress. The enemy was showing signs of withdrawing. All supporting weapons were being called for to help the attack. At 1430A, 1st Bn 41st AIR was nearing WEHR and C.O. 67th AR went forward to contact them. Information received that CC"A" on our right was nearing their objective, which was about 1 mile East of GANGELT. C.O. 67th AR ordered one medium tank platoon to advance towards GANGELT from WEHR and to continue until enemy contact was made. This platoon did not get far before it was engaged by the enemy, in the woods near SUSTERSEEL. Regimental C.P. moved to K705651 (WINTRAKEN). 1st Bn 41st Inf. started advance East from WEHR at about 1627A, and ran into road-blocks in the form of trees felled across the road. These blocks were by-passed. In the meantime, the 2nd Bn 67th AR attack on objective #8 was progressing satisfactorily, and the infantry was being reinforced by tank elements. By 1800A the Infantry and one medium tank company has reached the North edge of the woods and were engaging a group of enemy heavy caliber guns to their front, with the artillery supporting. Objective #8 was consolidated. At 1800A 1st Bn 41st Inf reported that they had reached GANGELT (Objective #9) and had sent a force to secure HASTENRATH (Objective #10). At 1955A objective #9 and #10 were secured and outposted. At 2012A, objective #8 was secure. 1st Bn 41st sent patrol towards objective #8 to make contact. 2nd Bn 67th AR had visual contact with friendly elements of the left (1st Bn 67th AR with Task Force #2) and sent a patrol over to make contact at TUDDERN. Report received that Task Force #2 on our left had secured their objective "B" (MILLEN) and "C" (high ground vicinity 720705). 1st Bn 41st Inf established contact on the right at 2035A. All objectives were secured for the night. No unusual events during night except for a large number of planes believed to have been friendly bombers, passed overhead going North.

20 Sept.: Regiment received CC"B" Field Order #48, ordering the relief of Task Force #1 by elements of Division Reserve. 1st Bn 41st had been reinforced in GANGELT by one Company medium tanks from 2nd Bn 67th AR. Upon relief 2nd Bn 67th AR and 1st Bn 41st Inf would pass from 67th AR control to Division Reserve control, and 1st and 3rd Bns. 67th AR would come under Regimental control. Relief was effected about 1200A and 67th AR was relieved of the command of the sector by CG, CC"B". Upon examination of part of the battleground North of WEHR, it was discovered that quite a number of enemy artillery guns had been knocked out, and approximately 187 enemy dead were counted. Under provisions of CC"B" F.O. #48. Regiment, less 2nd Bn, was to assemble in CC"B" assembly area, vicinity KLIMMEN (K680548) as shown by CC"B" overlay attached, prepared to exploit a break-through. (30th Division break-through against SIEGFRIED LINE). 1st and 3rd Bns. moved separately to new area. Regimental Hq. and Hq. Company moved from location at WINTRAKEN at 1400A over route WINTRAKEN - RJ at 678673 - S.W. on main highway to BEEK - KLIGENHOUT - KRUIS - SCHIMMERT - AALBEEK - EMMABERG - HEEK - Regimental C.P. location at K683546. 1st Bn assembly area vicinity K682547; 3rd Bn assembly area vicinity K692561; Rcn. Co. vicinity KROUBEEK (K705548)[CRAUBEEK?]. Regimental Headquarters arrived new area at 1552B. Continuous air lookout maintained on march. No unusual events during the march. CC"B" ordered 4 road blocks to the North, placed in 67th AR sector during hours of darkness. No unsual events during the night. No operations.
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Repeat 2d Bn, 67th AR Report

2d Bn 67th AR Report

On 14 September 1944, less the force that had been sent to the Third Battalion, 41st Armored Infantry Regiment, the Battalion moved at 07.00 hours and closed in another assembly area at 08.20 hours near Vlijtingen, where Company "F" and the light tank platoon joined the Battalion at 10.00 Hours. They were preparing to cross the Albert Canal; all that delayed them was the completion of the bridge at Canne. The bridge collapsed at 19.00 hours and the Battalion remained there all night. Company "G" of the 41st Armored Infantry Regiment joined them at the same time that the rest of the force rejoined.

While waiting for the bridge to be put up again the Battalion remained in its present position until 20.00 hours [15 Sept] at which time it moved through Kesselt and crossed the Albert Canal at Canne, continuing the march through Maastricht and across the Wilhelms Canal. At about 23.30 hours it crossed the Meuse River (Maas) and moved into an assembly area two miles east of Maastricht at 0200 hours on 16 September.

Reports indicated that the enemy was in the immediate vicinity. Patrols were sent out and they returned about 07.00 hours with the information that the bridges were blown and that the Germans were entrenched in the area just north of these bridges.

The force attempted to cross the stream [vicinity St. Gerlach] at 08.00 hours [16 Sept] with a platoon of infantry and a platoon of tanks, but the infantry was held up by heavy, mortar, artillery and small arms fire. The remainder of the infantry was brought up and they were supported by Company "F", the mortar and assault gun platoons, and the artillery. Company "E" and Company "B" remained in reserve. In spite of the heavy fire one platoon of infantry crossed the stream at 13.00 hours and another crossed at 14.00 hours. The engineer platoon began work on a treadway bridge, but the progress was slow because of the heavy incoming fire. A request for air support was fulfilled at 16.00 hours and they bombed and strafed till 18.00 hours. At 20.00 hours the bridge was completed, and the Battalion prepared to hold for the night, using Company "B" light tanks to protect the flanks and to reinforce the infantry and engineers.

Prior to crossing the bridge the next morning (17 Sept.) patrols were sent out to determine the enemy's strength. They received heavy small arms fire. At 09.00 hours, watches having been set back one hour, two platoons of medium tanks were across and an attack was launched against the town of St. Gerlach which was captured by 12.00 hours, and the remainder of the Battalion was then brought across. Immediately it pushed toward an objective 1000 yards northeast of St. Gerlach. This was reached at 13.00 hours. It continued toward the second objective, 1000 yards north of objective 1. Company "F" passed through Company "E" which had led the attack to this time. The second objective was attained by Company "F". Patrols were sent out toward the third objective[KRUIS?], but reported no contact. Very close air support, commencing at 11.00 hours and continuing through-out the afternoon, helped considerably. An enemy 75 mm anti-tank gun, in ambush, near the first objective scored a hit on the Battalion Commander's tank, causing slight damage and wounding one man. Company "E" destroyed this gun in short order. That night the Battalion set up on the three objectives, splitting its forces to hold them.

The next day (18 Sept.) Company "E", reinforced with a platoon of infantry and a platoon of light tanks moved out and crossed the Line of Departure. Company "F", with two platoons of infantry, one platoon light tanks, and one platoon of engineers, followed. Company "F" reached the first objective [vicinity GROOT GENHOUT] at 08.00 hours and continued toward objective 2 [woods north of stream]. Light enemy resistance was encountered so Company "F" deployed and the engineers were brought up to repair the bridges in this area. A bridge was found intact and the second objective was gained by enveloping it from the left flank.

At 15.00 hours the Battalion moved toward objective 3 [vicinity PUTH], and soon occupied it. There the Battalion consolidated and pushed on to objectives 4 and 5. The patrol to objective 4 [high ground East of PUTH], reported no opposition, but did encounter some light resistance on 5, Wintraak; this opposition withdrew, and the position was taken and secured by 16.30 hours.

Preparations were immediately made to attack the sixth objective which was a piece of high ground just to the north of Wintraak and inside the German border. The first platoon of Company "F" commanded by Lieutenant George Adler was the first element of the Battalion to enter German soil, and they quickly gained the high ground which was Objective 6. Thus, the Second Battalion, 67th Armored Regiment became the first unit of the Second Armored Division to enter, conquer and occupy German soil. Company "E" then passed through Objective 6, led by Lieutenant Kiley who led the attack on Objective 7, the town of Wehr, Germany. Company "E" gained a high hill overlooking the town from the south and cut all roads leading into the town from the east, west and south.

As darkness fell the Battalion consolidated its positions, again placing its forces in three objectives, 5, 6 and 7. Shortly after dark Lieutenant Colonel John D. Wynne, Battalion Commander, and Lieutenant George Hore, commanding Company "F", while on an inspection tour near the tank destroyer platoon, ran into a series of entrenchments still occupied by the enemy on Objective 6. A short fight at very close range soon ended with several German dead and 24 taken prisoner.
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Earthican · Jan 8, 2014

CCA, 2d Armored Division, advanced on the right (east) of CCB (above). The After Action Report for the 66th Armored Regiment, the principle unit of CCA, is not as detailed as that of the 67th AR and is missing some overlays. But the attached are bits of interesting information that are worth posting.

One is an overlay for Task Force "C", CCA 2d AD, placed over the map. To the southwest (bottom left) is Valkenburg and to the northeast (top right) is the Heerlen - Sittard highway, as found on the map of the previous post.

Second is an excerpt from the AAR for 17 Sept 1944 showing the composition of Task Force "C" from 1st Bn 66th AR. The mentioned Task Force "A" appears to be made up of the 2d Bn 66th AR and perhaps elements of the 2d Bn 41st AIR.

Note:
66th AR
1st Bn: C(L), F and I
2d Bn: A(L), D and E
3d Bn: B(L), G and H

***EDIT*** Updated text attachment

buk2112 · Jan 12, 2014

Dear Earthican,

Let me first salute you on a most impressive thread you have going here, great work! I am trying to research a PFC John T. Bowman (ASN# 33122222) who was a member of the 17th Armored Engineer Battalion. Which company he belonged to I do not know. He was KIA on 12 October 1944 and I was curious if any of the AAR's you might have mention how and where this soldier met his fate? Thanks for all your efforts.

Earthican · Jan 13, 2014

I checked the documents and found no reference that would help you. After assisting with the Westwall break through in early October the 2d AD was mostly inactive though holding a section of the breach. From about 10 to 16 October the 3d Battalion of the 66th Armored Regiment supported the 30th ID in closing the ring around Aachen.

You can try to get the 17th AEB documents from NARA by email request. There is a per page copy fee. Requesting all the documents for October should get you what you need, if they exist, but might be expensive.

buk2112 · Jan 17, 2014

Thanks for checking for me. I believe I will request PFC Bowman's IDPF, that will probably tell me what I want to know.

TTH · Jan 17, 2014

Excellent work.

Earthican · Apr 7, 2014

I should have known the Dutch had mined this mountain (err... drained this marsh) before me...

I found this website while making an unrelated search. Nice research and side stories...
http://members.home.nl/mjbtje/003_contents.htm

And the missing overlay for the 66th Armored Regiment.
http://members.home.nl/mjbtje/100_brunssum.htm
And the composition of the CCA Task Forces.
http://members.home.nl/mjbtje/070_task_force_B.htm

With this new information I updated my previous post and attachments. I continue the story with the attached text and the map/overlay.
http://ww2talk.com/forums/topic/50645-us-2d-armored-division-september-1944/#entry603005

This concludes the advance of the 2d AD in September 1944. Though the 2d AD would move on, this line would remain static until January of 1945 when the British launch operation BLACKCOCK.

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US 2d Armored Division, September 1944

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taskForce66thARSept1944.jpg

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US 2d Armored Division, September 1944

Earthican Senior Member

Bernard85 WW2 Veteran WW2 Veteran

Earthican Senior Member

Slipdigit Old Hickory Recon

Earthican Senior Member

Earthican Senior Member

Earthican Senior Member

Earthican Senior Member

Earthican Senior Member

Attached Files:

overlayOnMapCCA2dADSept44marked.png

taskForce66thARSept1944.jpg

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