Cleaned up this old topic, as almost all pictures were lost due to the transfer to Invision. Unfortunately, it was damaged beyond repair. See now: http://ww2talk.com/forums/topic/50898-veritable-15th-scottish-43rd-wessex-divisions-in-the-reichswald-battle-feb-1945/
Still 1) Still viewer Western end of Kranenburg, where the main road to Cleve passes over a small bridge. Please note that the little church tower along the main street has changed after the war (see also next images on the film reel). Still 2) Still viewer A column of Kangaroos moving at full speed through the center of Kranenburg. They are followed by a Churchill Crocodile, a TD Achilles and other vehicles (see the next 12 or so images on the film reel). Still 3) Still viewer Near the western entrance of the town, just past the bridge is a little market-place to the left of the main road, where these film shots were taken. Still 4) Still viewer Same area with view to the west. Looks like a Recce unit is passing through Kranenburg. The area has changed a lot, making a comparison almost impossible. Still 5) http://www.britishpathe.com/thumbnail.php?img=91&media_urn=39817&record_id=13190&stills=225&time_offset=1&title=WEST+FRONT+WAR+REPORT Infantry of 15th Scottish Division move forward. Picture taken on the eastern fringe of Kranenburg. The war damage on the building is still visible on the gable. It is repaired with a light coloured stone. Hi Stolpi, On still viewer 2 if you click on "next image" about 7 or 8 times there is a Churchill with a Cullin hedgerow cutter. A very rare beast indeed. Cheers Kevin
Kevin - You mean the Churchill Crocodile, driving with the turret reversed. They are probably in a haste, because they're moving at quite some speed through the narrow street, nearly dangerous. Here is the link to the Pathe film: WEST FRONT WAR REPORT - British Pathe Attached another Kangaroo passing through Kranenburg. Is it of a different type? A few days later the rising river water reached Kranenburg and even covered part of the main street of the little town. Ah! In haste. Like me, I hadn't gone past that frame and seen the trailer or for that matter noticed the the flame thrower on the front! Perhaps an even rarer beast! Shame no name or numbers visible. Cheers Kevin
A shame the British Pathe Film does'nt realy give the scale of artillery fire involved for this operation, which was the 2nd largest artillery engagment of WW2 involving 5, Army Groups Royal Artillery, 7 Divisional Artillery's, HAA, LAA & Rocket Projectiles with the fire of over 1,050 guns. In the pre H Hour programme these guns fired over 2,666 tons of shells, with the Gnr's remaining deaf for days later. Rob
Being used as an OP/Command tank most likely . We had a thread on them being used in 1945. 43 Wessex's AT Regt used them. http://www.ww2talk.com/forum/weapons-technology-equipment/13723-who-used-valentines-1945-a.html
Hi Regarding the Moyland battle, here's a nice link. http://www.wlu.ca/lcmsds/cmh/back%20issues/CMH/volume%206/Issue%201/Brown%20-%20The%20Battle%20of%20moyland%20Wood%20-%20The%20Regina%20Rifle%20Regiment%2016-19%20February%201945.pdf .303
Stolpi - yes, I was doing the usual looking for something else when this popped up I thought put it on here and move on!
MOYLAND WOOD By Lieutenant-Colonel Norman R. Donogh On 16 February, the same day the Royal Winnipeg Rifles launched their attack on Louisendorf, the Regina Rifles tried to move southeast across the lateral road into the final 1,800-yard section of Moyland Wood. They were hit with heavy flanking fire from a wooded area on the west side of the lateral road on their left that reportedly had been cleared earlier. It took the entire day for the Reginas to secure the woods west of the lateral road. On the first day of battle, the “B” Company Commander came across a Cameronian officer and five men who had been held by the enemy for 24 hours, and incorporated them in his defensive position which he was establishing as a base for the next day’s operation. One Regina company, attacking eastward along the south side of the wood, sent one platoon into the wood. The enemy actually allowed it in, by simply moving to higher ground, then closed in behind it. Counter-attacks by the Reginas to free the entrapped platoon were driven off. When the Reginas renewed the attack on the 17th, they were stalled by heavy mortar and artillery fire. Their difficulties were compounded by deadly air-bursts as shells detonated in the treetops. Meanwhile the reserve battalion, 1st Canadian Scottish, advanced through open country on the Reginas’ right. Despite very heavy fire, the battalion took Heselerfeld and Rosskamp, and held them for three days despite repeated counter-attacks and constant fire. In that three-day action, Can Scott Acting Corporal P.P. Katchonoski, who took charge when both the commander and sergeant became casualties, won the DCM for boldly directing his platoon’s defense. On the 18th, the third day of the battle, the Regina Rifles again attacked, this time from the southwest side of Moyland Wood. The enemy, to this point, had been from the 346 Fusilier Battalion, 60 Panzer Grenadier Regiment, and 116 Panzer Division. They were relieved first by a battalion from the 6th Parachute Division, newly arrived from North Holland, and soon by the strong 19th and 21st Parachute Regiments and, later, the 18th Parachute Regiment, all from the 7th Parachute Division. Again, despite strong, determined advances, the Regina Rifles were counter-attacked and repulsed. Heavy machine gun fire from the woods, and continuous heavy artillery fire from across the Rhine River, stalled the advance of the exhausted battalion and supporting infantry from the Canadian Scottish. The Canadian Scottish did manage to push a weakened, 64-man company into the southeastern tip of the wood to cut off the enemy between them and the Reginas, but it was surrounded during consolidation and in the counter-attack only nine men managed to get back to their original position. The Canadian Scottish northern flank, left open by this disaster to “C” Company, was quickly sealed off by the regimental carriers and a troop of tanks from the Fort Garry Horse. The remaining companies made little headway towards Calcar and during the evening had to beat off six counter-attacks by German paratroopers, while a Canadian Scottish outpost at Heselerfeld was overrun. The crust of the German defences showed no signs of cracking and it was apparent the strength of the German defenders had been severely underestimated. The time had come for a new tack. Failure to drive the stubborn enemy from the Moyland Wood salient was seriously delaying the planned advance of 2nd Canadian Corps. The Royal Winnipeg Rifles, still holding the Louisendorf sector after their successful attack, were withdrawn on 20 February and shifted to Moyland Wood for the final attack the next day. Rifles Action at Moyland In switching from Louisendorf to Moyland Wood the Royal Winnipeg Rifles took advantage of every hour at their disposal. The Brigade “O” Group, at which Colonel Fulton was to receive his orders for the February 21st attack, was set for 1330 hours on 20 February, but he knew the outline of the plan and early that morning he pre-briefed the company and platoon commanders and supporting arms, enabling them to study the ground from concealed observation points. He then gave his own full orders at 1830 hours that evening for the attack, which would begin the next morning at 1000 hours. Before dealing with the detailed operations, I would like to make two general comments: 1. The significance of the whole Moyland battle was how a very determined body of enemy infantry who, regardless of cost in lives, could so strongly delay our advance with fire and constant counter-attack, forcing us to mount a set-piece attack. 2. The strength and quality of the enemy was seriously underestimated. At the beginning of OPERATION VERITABLE the Canadian Army faced one reinforced infantry division, the 84th. During the Rhineland Battle this increased to a peak of ten divisions: three infantry, 84th, 180th and 190th; three panzer, 15th Panzer Grenadiers, 116th Panzer (which finally absorbed the greatly weakened 84th) and the Panzer Lehr, and, from the First Parachute Army, the 2nd, 6th, 7th and 8th Parachute divisions. The history stated that “the German opposition had been formidable in both quantity and quality”, and singled out what it described as “the skilful and hard bitten paratroopers as the ones who continued to offer the fiercest resistance.” It was on February 16th, the opening day of the Regina rifles/Canadian Scottish attack on the southeastern peninsula of Moyland Wood that Lt.-Gen. Herman Plochers 6th Parachute Division had relieved the 84th Division between the Cleve-Calcar road and the Rhine River. That is the background for the final February 21st attack on Moyland Wood by the Royal Winnipeg Rifles. The Battalion “O” Group, conducted by Col. Fulton at 1830 hours 20 February involved a plan that was both doctrinal and novel, in that it was based on proven tactical principles with some innovative tactics. The southeast portion of Moyland Wood was a natural peninsula. It extended for 1800 yards – one mile – from the north-south lateral road, and tapered to a point. In the plan, this portion of the enemy-held wood was divided into six 300-yard-wide sectors, lettered A to F, each in turn to be systematically cleared, using all available support. The Plan This included a continuous fire plan designed to saturate the wood, beginning 30 minutes before H hour. It would employ medium and field artillery, 4.2 inch mortars from the support battalion, the Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa, 3 inch mortars from the infantry battalions in the brigade, and with unit anti-tank guns and machine-guns firing enfilade over open sights from the south flank. The artillery would then be directed ahead of the advancing infantry at known or likely enemy positions north and east of the wood. The lighter-calibre weapons – anti-tank guns and Vickers medium machine-guns from the CH of O – would continue to fire over open sights on the wood for a further 45 minutes in B Sector, 75 minutes in C, 120 minutes in D and 150 minutes in E Sector – a continuous fire coverage. Four tanks from the Sherbrooke Fusiliers were to support the leading troops, two per company. A major feature of the plan was to have twelve Wasps (carrier-borne flamethrowers); six each from the Winnipeg Rifles and Canadian Scottish, so employed that at all times three Wasps would be with each forward company. These were rotated on a planned refuelling system. This was to be the first use of flame by the battalion in forest fighting. The attack was to begin on a two-company front: “B” left, “D” right, with three Wasps each, striking northeast through A Sector over the central wooded ridge up to the forest’s edge facing the village of Moyland. “A” and “C” companies, with rotating Wasps transferred to their front, would then enter the wood and strike southeastward to destroy the enemy systematically in B, C and D Sectors. As a final move, “B” and “D” Companies would hand over their captured positions in A Sector to the Reginas. “B” Company would then consolidate behind “A” and “C” Companies, while “D” Company would skirt the forest on the southwest side to attack and clear the southeastern tip of the wood in E Sector. H hour was set for 1000 hours 21 February.
Part 2 - The Costly Battle Prior to the assault, the two leading companies – “B” and “D” – moved into the Regina Rifles area to form up. They dug in, anticipating, quite correctly, heavy defensive fire. The start line was a road running eastward from the lateral road along the southern edge of A Sector. Even before H hour, enemy machine gun fire from a flanking position required “D” Company to clean them out. This was accomplished by H minus 5 minutes. Both “B” and “D” Companies were on the start line by H plus 10 minutes; the Sherbrooke Fusiliers were forward to give supporting fire. The attack was accompanied by ear-splitting explosions as bursting shells and mortars combined with the crack of anti-tank guns and constant whine of ricocheting machine-gun bullets. The advancing infantry moved through the woods under heavy fire from enemy machine guns and an artillery concentration. A particular problem was enemy machine gun fire from the left flank, until that post was neutralized, and from machine gun fire in the centre. The enemy paratroopers finally began to withdraw; most were killed by return fire before they could escape to a defended house just northeast of the wood on the edge of the village of Moyland. Enemy paratroopers who managed to reach the house were hit by rocket fire from supporting typhoons of 84 Group RAF. In the advance to the northeast side of the wood overlooking Moyland and its famous castle, the clearing of A Sector took 40 minutes. (Lt. Bob Gannon of “D” Company was killed; Lt. J.M. Millespie and Lt. F. Marlyn of “B” Company were wounded.) The next phase of the attack was a two-company assault – “A” right and “C” left – from B Sector southeastward. B Sector was cleared without opposition and on schedule. But the clearing of C Sector was hotly contested. Subjected to heavy machine gun and mortar fire and determined resistance, the attacking riflemen took mounting casualties, much from enemy air-burst artillery, and some from our own guns. The enemy, being dug in, did not suffer as much. The same opposition continued throughout the clearing of D Sector. But the attack prevailed, with support from Wasps and covering fire from tanks at the south side of the wood. “The flamethrowers terrified the enemy”, the after-action report stated. “The method of working the Wasps was to have three with each forward company at all times: when their fuel was expended they withdrew, and the six in reserve replaced them. This leapfrogging and relieving kept Wasps continually with the infantry. It proved of double value, first to bolster the morale of our troops, while undermining that of the enemy.” Let me deal specifically with each company during the clearing of Sectors B to D. In “A” Company, all four officers were put out of action, two killed and two wounded. (Lt. P.E. Walsh and Lt. K.P. Pritchard were killed, and the two wounded were Capt. J.R. Morgan, the company commander, who was hit by a sniper, and Lt. Harry Badger.) The advance was painful and step-by-step, with close-quarter fighting controlled by the remaining NCOs. The enemy positions were revealed only when they opened fire at close range. The German paratroopers were well dug in and camouflaged, and the advancing troops had to crawl forward determinedly to reach cover and fire back. At that stage the decimated company regrouped under the leadership of Sgt. Alf Richardson, MM. Wasps and the remaining riflemen and NCOs, supported by tank fire from the road southeast of the wood, made a co-ordinated assault up the ridge – the final objective of the company – and dug in. The high ground in front of Sgt. Fred Bragnalo’s point platoon provided an excellent view of the open ground below and a small wooded area 200 yards further east. Three enemy counter-attacks of 30 to 40 paratroopers each were launched from the wooded area, but were caught in the open by artillery fire directed by a forward observation officer in the “A” Company position. A heavy toll was inflicted. Indeed, throughout the entire day’s operation, casualties were heavy on both sides because of the determined resistance by enemy paratroopers and the equally determined assault by “A” Company. At the end of the day only 29 men were left in the company. In “C” Company’s sector-by-sector advance, its total casualties equalled those of “A” Company. Two of its platoon commanders were wounded (Lt. E.E. Gridley, wounded for the third time in action, and Lt. Bruce MacDonald who won the Military Cross). The depleted company, (commanded by Major C.S. Platts), aided by flamethrowers, attacked an enemy position containing a pocket of paratroopers reportedly numbering 250, on high ground in the wood. The enemy was dug in and supported by mortar fire and air-burst artillery, its position ringed with mines and trip-wire. But with flame, heavy machine gun fire and assaulting infantry, the position was stormed and overrun. Some were killed, a number escaped, and only five were taken out alive. By the time “A” and “C” companies had consolidated their positions at 1330 hours – three and a half hours after the beginning of the battle – Sectors B, C and D had been taken despite determined opposition. The Carrier Platoon Commander who had directed the leapfrogging and refueling of the Wasps took his platoon to reinforce “A” Company and to take over the composite group. “C” Company was left with two officers and 40 men. “B” Company, which had moved forward to consolidate with them, had two officers and 50 men left. The final stage of the battle – the clearing of E Sector to the eastern tip of the forest – was assigned to “D” Company. On turning over its northern position opposite Moyland to the Reginas, “D” Company withdrew, skirted the south edge of the wood, and moved in to link up with the heavily-depleted “C” Company. From here it attacked, beginning at 1400 hours. One of the Sherbrooke Fusiliers’ tanks had been knocked out, but another helped shoot in the assault. The artillery fire plan for F Sector – beyond the wood – had to be repeated to prevent enemy reinforcements from entering E Sector, and to cut down enemy trying to retreat. E Sector was defended by machine-gun fire and paratroopers in pits, surrounded by anti-tank and anti-personnel mines hastily strewn through the area. But “D” Company, with three tanks up with the leading troops, pressed forward, despite heavy casualties. When E Sector was cleared to the southeast tip of the woods, “D” Company attempted to push forward to capture some houses in F Sector, full of enemy with machine guns. Tanks could not support the attack because of mines. The enemy paratroopers then launched a wild counter-attack. Throwing grenades and firing Schmeisers from the hip, they charged “D” Company positions but were driven back. The still-determined enemy continued to harass the positions with machine gun and mortar fire. (At this point Lt. George Aldous, commanding the leading platoon, was temporarily blinded by grenade fragments, but after medical attention returned to direct his platoon throughout the night. He was awarded the Military Cross.) Casualties continued to mount, and “D” Company stretcher-bearers, with visible Red Cross armbands, were targets. One, Rfn. Mervin Milson, although wounded when a bullet penetrated his helmet, continued helping casualties. For this he was awarded the first of two Military Medals he won during the final months of the war. “The company’s success,” wrote Canadian Army historian Col. C.P. Stacey, “owed much to the skill and inspiration of its commander, Major L.H. Denison, who went from platoon to platoon keeping his men moving forward despite increasing casualties, and led the assault on the final enemy position.” Major Denison, who won the Distinguished Service Order for his actions, went on to organize the company’s defenses at the edge of the trees. They repelled two sharp counter-attacks during the night. “D” Company was to end the day with three officers and 50 men. (The fatal casualties included company 2/ic Capt. Bill Ormiston and Cpl. George Quovadis when a mine blew up their carrier.) As part of the night defence, tanks were brought forward to cover enemy-held houses in F Sector, and the Scout Platoon was dispatched to patrol nearby crossroads, where they repelled another enemy counter-attack. The Battle of Moyland Wood was over. But the cost was high. Of the 183 casualties sustained by the Regiment in the Louisendorf-Moyland action, 105 – 26 of them fatal – occurred on the final day among the conifers of Moyland Wood. Of the 105, 92 were from the four greatly-under strength rifle companies: they entered the battle with a combined strength of 207, and suffered 44% casualties in a single day. (One surviving example of the fierce Moyland Wood battle is Harold Prout, a bren-gunner on a Wasp Carrier who had his jaw and most of his tongue shot away by a German 88-millimetre shell. He has constantly worn a thick bandage over his lower face for 65 years. He was later enrolled in the French Legion of Honour.) An Assessment This bitterly-fought, one-day operation, while costly, did overcome fanatical resistance from fire-supported dug-in paratroopers. Casualties would have been higher, save for the use of tanks, the aggressive employment of flame-throwers and a well-coordinated fire plan. The following comments are repetitious, but worth emphasizing: “The fire plan”, stated the after-action report, “employed all the available weapons of neighbouring units, including divisional artillery and the 4.2 inch mortars and machine guns of the CH of O. The field and medium artillery were most effective once our infantry were in the wood, firing at known enemy positions outside the wood, and sealing off approaches and escape routes. Anti-tank guns and light machine guns of units in the area, and the machine guns of CH of O fired across the wood on flat trajectory – preventing the reinforcement of the assault sector. “84 Group RAF gave great assistance on 21 Feb. They flew approximately 100 sorties against the enemy machine gun and mortar posts. They too helped seal off approaches and escape routes.” With this support, the infantrymen and highly effective flamethrowers fought a ferocious step-by-step battle, suffering mounting casualties against a determined enemy. But the attacking Rifles were equally determined and fully committed. And they prevailed. The German 6th Parachute Division pulled its front back beyond Calcar. The road to Calcar was open.
Ramacal - interesting info. Do you also have the Intelligence reports of the following days? It is the only one I can recall seeing. Looked at the file over a year ago, so can't recall what else was in there. Next time I go to Kew, I'll have another look. I posted it because I thought you might find it interesting.
The Unit was 1 Canadian Rocket Battery. They had a small cadre of Canadians for training purposes at a camp outside of Tilburg, but took 337 Battery (2 Troops) and 338 Battery (1 Troop) of 102 LAA Regiment under command for Operation Veritable (337 & 338 Batteries alternated from November 1944 to the end of the war). Thanks for posting the British Pathe link. I first saw that film at the Imperial Museum's Film & Photographic archives several years ago (bought a copy) and they said they owned the copyright. Did not realise that British Pathe could own the copyright to the same piece of film footage. They operated from 8 February to 8 March (Operation Plunder as well) using 13,300 of those rockets, the entire stock in theatre. There were 12 launchers in total for the op. 4 launchers per troop. 32 rockets per launcher. Some firepower in total, but the loading operation took time. War Diary of 1 Canadian Rocket War diary of 102 LAA Regiment. The entire fire plan is in the 102 LAA War Diary, but no plans to show what and where they fired. The maps I posted earlier in this thread also included a map and the trace overlay for the Rocket Projector Fire plan for the entire operation. I am in the process of getting an A1 size print made and a trace as well.
This is the front cover of a booklet with a photo of the only surviving example of the 30 barrel launcher. There was a 36 barrel launcher as well. 337 and 338 Batteries of 102 LAA Regt took part in the use of all 24 in Operation Quick Anger in the operation to capture Arnhem in April 1945. The only time this happened.
