How many large opposed landings were there in the ETO/MTO between a small Dieppe and a large Normandy? I would suspect that a lot more was learned on Sicily and the boot of Itally than on that raid. It was the lessons that they learned at Dieppe that convinced them not to try to take a port in the first stages of an invasion of France. I can't see this. It only influenced the degree of how badly an army was beaten. It was THE decisive battle of the Normandy campaign and pretty much ended all major German resistance in France. I think that's pretty cruical. But how greatly did they influence the war? The British Army would have never ended up on Japanese soil by that route and Japan didn't have the ability by then to extend into Eastern India, much less hold it. It was a turning point for the men on the ground. Much like Stalingrad. What about Alam el Halfa? The Eighth Army loses here and El Alamein does not happen. Yes, quite. I'd agree with that.
It also put them 200 - 300 miles away from their proper defensive positions making them much more vulnerable to attack. It is debatable which would have been more beneficial to the Soviets. I would say it moved their defensive positions. Stalin's objective wasn't to have a piece of Poland to make his boundaries bigger but mainly to keep Hitlers armies off of Russian dirt
Also I dont think it matters what Russias defences were to begin with. Hitler had stacked up 3 million men on the border of poland and russia. The initial blow when Hitler gave the "go ahead" for barbarossa would have been unstopable
I'd like to add my 2p worth if I may. As many have suggested, it is far too difficult to keep it down to 3 so I may go over this limit. A) Dieppe. Even though it was originally canned by the British as too dangerous, the lessons that were learned from it were very helpful indeed when it came to planning D-Day. B ) Falaise. Even though the Allies did miss a trick by not closing the pocket sooner, it almost totally reduced the Germans ability to wage a proper war in France. C) Imphal / Kohima. Pitched battles against the Japanese where the British army stood their ground and weren't afraid to face the Japanese and fight it out with them. D) Stalingrad. It's important. It just is. E) El Alemein. The first proper ground victory by the British Army against the Nazis. F) Kasserine Pass. It forced the Americans to listen to the British Army and take advice on how things should be done - not simply thinking they know best. I could go on. Hi Combover and welcome to the forums. I'm intrigued by your answers because with the exception of D it would appear that everything is centred around the British contribution. Having said that, would you not consider perhaps that the Battle of Britain was even more important than Dieppe? Why would you consider Stalingrad so important compared to, for example Operation Typhoon or Operation Bagration? What about the Battle of Midway where the Japanese lost the initiative in the Pacific for good when its main offensive weapon (its carriers) were destroyed in quick succession?
It was the lessons that they learned at Dieppe that convinced them not to try to take a port in the first stages of an invasion of France. It was THE decisive battle of the Normandy campaign and pretty much ended all major German resistance in France. I think that's pretty cruical. It was a turning point for the men on the ground. Much like Stalingrad. Yes, quite. I'd agree with that. I would respectfully suggest that after Stalingrad, the Germans still had offensive capabilities such as Mansteins Kharkov offensive (I know Za, it was overrated but was still a German Offensive!!!) after Bagration there was no more German offensives of note in the East. They lost more men in Bagration than at Stalingrad. Indeed they lost more men in the capitulation of Romania and the loss of the Ukraine in summer of 1944.
It was the lessons that they learned at Dieppe that convinced them not to try to take a port in the first stages of an invasion of France. I'm not sure that this lesson sunk in, as all 5 landings of Operation Torch, the landings for Operation Avalanche (Salerno) and the landings for Operation Dragoon (Southern France) were made at ports. Caen had harbor facilities and was intended to be taken on June 6, so I guess you could call it a port, also. It was THE decisive battle of the Normandy campaign and pretty much ended all major German resistance in France. I think that's pretty cruical. I would postulate that more decisive battle occured about 20 miles to southwest from Falaise, below Hill 314 outside of Mortain, where the German 7th Army's sword was broken. Lose that hill and the town, then it is 20 miles to the Channel and the southern wing of the Falaise trap is running on empty. It was a turning point for the men on the ground. Much like Stalingrad. I would agree if you were to say it was a turning point in the Burma Campaign, but I don't see how it could be a turning point in the defeat of the Japanese Empire. It did nothing to interdict shipping moving from the SW Pacific and there was no way for the SEAC forces to get to Japan. Without the bomb, that is the only way to defeat Japan.
Hi Combover and welcome to the forums. I'm intrigued by your answers because with the exception of D it would appear that everything is centred around the British contribution. Having said that, would you not consider perhaps that the Battle of Britain was even more important than Dieppe? Why would you consider Stalingrad so important compared to, for example Operation Typhoon or Operation Bagration? What about the Battle of Midway where the Japanese lost the initiative in the Pacific for good when its main offensive weapon (its carriers) were destroyed in quick succession? I would agree, but no matter which way you look at it, there are far too many decisive battles to limit it to just 3. I can add the fall or Crete for the Germans, Kursk for the Russians, Warsaw (44) uprising for the Poles, Battle of the Bulge for all concerned.... I would also wish to mention the Hurtgen Forest, but it didn't accomplish anything other than the needless waste of U.S lives. I have centred on the British because I am British.
It also put them 200 - 300 miles away from their proper defensive positions making them much more vulnerable to attack. It is debatable which would have been more beneficial to the Soviets. Which "them" and "their" are you talking about? I will assume the Germans. The Soviets were in no position to attack, since they were in the middle of Army restructuring, changing sizes and compositions of their units.
Which "them" and "their" are you talking about? I will assume the Germans. The Soviets were in no position to attack, since they were in the middle of Army restructuring, changing sizes and compositions of their units. No I meant the Soviets.
I would respectfully suggest that after Stalingrad, the Germans still had offensive capabilities such as Mansteins Kharkov offensive (I know Za, it was overrated but was still a German Offensive!!!) after Bagration since Zitadelle there was no more German offensives of note in the East. They lost more men in Bagration than at Stalingrad. Indeed they lost more men in the capitulation of Romania and the loss of the Ukraine in summer of 1944. There, fixed it for you! :p
It also put them 200 - 300 miles away from their proper defensive positions making them much more vulnerable to attack. It is debatable which would have been more beneficial to the Soviets. Which "them" and "their" are you talking about? I will assume the Germans. No I meant the Soviets. I'm just a poor ol' ignernt country boy, but I don't see how mostly abandoning a prewar defensive line and partially moving it 200 miles would hinder an army on the attack more than one that was not hobbled by such limitations.
I would also wish to mention the Hurtgen Forest, but it didn't accomplish anything other than the needless waste of U.S lives. I have centred on the British because I am British. If it didn't accomplish anything other than disproportionatre losses why is it so important to list it? Dieppev was only a raid, a live test on landing technique that didn't work out so well after all. How is this more important than say Midway where Japanese expansion got a major check at great loss but you do not list? Might as well cite the Bruneval raid, which provided a lot of useful information but was this a battle? It's all right being Brit centred, but you have to be a bit more coherent. Why Dieppe and not, say, Goodwood
I'm just a poor ol' ignernt country boy, but I don't see how mostly abandoning a prewar defensive line and partially moving it 200 miles would hinder an army on the attack more than one that was not hobbled by such limitations. No, what i'm suggesting is that the Soviets response to a German attack (which was parctised in their war games) was to have an effective defensive line to snag a German attack giving the offensive forces time to assemble and launch a massive counter-attack on the German forces. Zhukov's pre-war 'defensive-offensive' plans centred on there being an effective first line of defence. By moving the troops 200-300 miles from their defensive lines which they had had time to fortify satisfactorily to an area where they had to start afresh had a large impact on their inability to hold the Germans for any useful amount of time. This, coupled with the bewildering directives issued from the Kremlin effectively wiped out any proper Soviet resistance. One really has to wonder what difference this 200-300 miles made. Unfortunately this is getting into the great 'what if' history, which I don't like.
oddly the greatest slaughter of enemy troops. Where their bodies went on for miles was Falaise. I don't think that anyone really realises the significance of that monstrous slaughterhouse....Miles of dead. armies in the cauldron. Sapper
No, what i'm suggesting is that the Soviets response to a German attack (which was parctised in their war games) was to have an effective defensive line to snag a German attack giving the offensive forces time to assemble and launch a massive counter-attack on the German forces. Zhukov's pre-war 'defensive-offensive' plans centred on there being an effective first line of defence. By moving the troops 200-300 miles from their defensive lines which they had had time to fortify satisfactorily to an area where they had to start afresh had a large impact on their inability to hold the Germans for any useful amount of time. This, coupled with the bewildering directives issued from the Kremlin effectively wiped out any proper Soviet resistance. One really has to wonder what difference this 200-300 miles made. Unfortunately this is getting into the great 'what if' history, which I don't like. Aye 'tis. I'll just leave it that I disagree with the above assessment and move on. I don't want to incure the wrath of the Forum Sergeant Major by delving too close to What-if territory.
Battle of Britain to me is the first decisive battle of the war as it kept Britain as the main allied base in Europe and forced Hitler to commit huge amounts of funding and troops to secure his western defences and fight on two fronts. I still hear the reason for saying so, was because Britain "stood alone" which is utter nonsense. Take away the Commonwealth pilots, Poles, Czechs et al and Dowding's biggest fear of not enough pilots would have been realised very early. Pearl Harbor: In terms of a "battle" it was minuscule compared to very many others and I mean that with the most reverence to those who died. This brought America into the war against Japan which would eventually "sink" their dream of a "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" however this did not do much for the war in Europe against Germany. Roosevelt was still shackled with the constitution and unable to send forces to fight there. Hitler in his stupidity four days later made his one and only declaration of war on another country and picked the US for his debut. This was as "decisive" as it gets, as Roosevelt, under great opposition, declared the war in Europe to be a priority over the Pacific theatre and the Japanese. The sleeping giant with the largest economy and the greatest manufacturing capabilities, turned the tide for nearly every theatre of war from then on. Number three is difficult for me so I must go for the Eastern European theatre as a whole because you could name any number of battles there that dwarf any other in scales of loss. I must also mention El Alamein by saying that the only reason it was able to occur in that form was because of (4) Brigades of Australian troops and British composite units of Armour, Artillery etc that fell back to Tobruk and held it for 240 days against Rommel at his best. This denial of Tobruk allowed the British Forces to rebuild through Egypt and eventually defeat Rommel at El Alamein and together with US forces, capture over 250,000 axis troops. This did stop Rommel from getting to Cairo/Alexandria and the Suez Canal.
Aye 'tis. I'll just leave it that I disagree with the above assessment and move on. I don't want to incure the wrath of the Forum Sergeant Major by delving too close to What-if territory. By all means PM me, i'm happy to have a discussion with someone who clearly knows more than I.
oddly the greatest slaughter of enemy troops. Where their bodies went on for miles was Falaise. I don't think that anyone really realises the significance of that monstrous slaughterhouse....Miles of dead. armies in the cauldron. Sapper Agree, no matter how much I read about it. You'd have to be there to fully understand how that battle was. Fancy trampling over dead bodies, animals without touching the earth.
No, what i'm suggesting is that the Soviets response to a German attack (which was parctised in their war games) was to have an effective defensive line to snag a German attack giving the offensive forces time to assemble and launch a massive counter-attack on the German forces. Zhukov's pre-war 'defensive-offensive' plans centred on there being an effective first line of defence. By moving the troops 200-300 miles from their defensive lines which they had had time to fortify satisfactorily to an area where they had to start afresh had a large impact on their inability to hold the Germans for any useful amount of time. This, coupled with the bewildering directives issued from the Kremlin effectively wiped out any proper Soviet resistance. One really has to wonder what difference this 200-300 miles made. Unfortunately this is getting into the great 'what if' history, which I don't like. the disposition of the Red army was caused by a political decision :a concentration in saillants,to be able to counterattack and wage war on the territory of the enemy .IIRC,NATO had the same policy in the eighties:the Forward Defense.
the disposition of the Red army was caused by a political decision :a concentration in saillants,to be able to counterattack and wage war on the territory of the enemy .IIRC,NATO had the same policy in the eighties:the Forward Defense. The disposition of the Red Army prior to the GP War was in military districts, which would transform into army groups at the first sign of war.
