The Telemark sabotage: The battle for heavy water

I haven't been able to find a thorough description of this operation on the Forum and therefore decided to translate and post a piece I wrote some time ago.

There will be 4 or 5 instalments in all. There will also be pictures, but only after I have learned to fool the firewall system in this computer !
PART 1

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF HEAVY WATER

In 1938 the German physicists Hahn and Straussmann managed to split the nucleus of the Uran atom and thereby free atomic energy. The next step would be to create a chain reaction and here the heavy water became important. Heavy water (deuterium oxide) is an excellent braking medium for slowing chemical and biological processes. By sending the neutrons through heavy water the fission process can be controlled. The energy thus liberated may be channelised into an explosion a hundred times more powerful than a conventional bomb. At the works of Norsk Hydro at Vemork by the town of Rjukan in Telemark heavy water had been produced in small amounts as a spinoff during the production of fertiliser. By the outbreak of WW II this was the only significant stock of heavy water world wide.

In 1941 officials at Whitehall got very worried after intelligence reports revealed that the Germans had ordered the production of heavy water at Vemork to increase 30 – fold. An avalanche of “Most Secret” documents followed. Hitler was no doubt pressing his scientists to construct a nuclear weapon ahead of the Allies.

PROLOGUE

Professor Leif Tronstad at the Norsk Hydro works had led the development of the production of heavy water. He had intimate knowledge of the plant and was also a patriot all through. He silently hampered production as best he could. The Germans became suspicious and in the summer of 1941 he fled to the UK. He was immediately tasked to coordinate and lead intelligence and sabotage in Norway in cooperation with SOE.

In the summer of 1942 Churchill and Roosevelt met in New York. They agreed that the new “super bomb” had to be developed at all costs while the German attempts must be stopped.
To destroy the stock of heavy water got highest priority and Churchill involved himself in the planning. This was an excellent opportunity for SOE to demonstrate its relevance.

Einar Skinnarland was an engineer from the Rjukan area who had plenty of contacts inside the plant. With five others he hi-jacked the steamer ”Galtesund” and sailed it to Aberdeen. He was immediately enrolled into the Norwegian Independent Company 1, nick-named Linge Company. He was given intense training arranged by SOE. 28th March 1942, just eleven days after landing in Scotland he was inserted into Telemark by parachute. He went back to work as usual, as if he had been on an ordinary holiday, but had instructions to find out and forward to England as much a possible about the plant. His code name was ”Grouse”.

Jomar Brun took over the supervision of heavy water production after Tronstad. Even he was a loyal Norwegian and relayed through Skinnarland invaluable information on developments of the plant.

To plan an attack on the plant at Vemork was a strategic nightmare. Most proposals were immediately turned down. Amongst these were bombing the Moesvatn dam by the top of the valley as well as bombing the plant from the air. Both methods would have caused extensive civilian casualties. Sabotage by a small group of commandos also put the civilian population at risk of reprisals.

At the end of the summer in 1942 planners decided that the only possible raid would be the airborne insertion of a group of saboteurs.

GROUSE

While planners discussed the best way to attack the plant, SOE prepared a forward party to be inserted into the area and facilitate the raid. The operation was named GROUSE. The leader was Jens Anton Poulsson and he chose Knut Haukelid, Knut Haugland, Claus Helberg and Arne Kjelstrup for his team. All were trained by SOE. Knut Haukelid had to withdraw from the forward party after a shooting accident.

The group had a long period of waiting before they could go. At first there was a decision crisis in Combined Operations Command, then either the weather or technical difficulties made postponing of the mission necessary. They grew restless on the verge of desperation.

Area map

On 18th October a Halifax from the RAF dropped them and eight containers of equipment by parachute on to the Hardanger Plateau. Unfortunately they were just north of Songevatnet, far away from the planned drop point and a snowfall also started. After landing they spent two days to assemble their equipment and for a long time they couldn’t achieve radio contact with England. It took them six days of skiing with heavy loads to reach an abandoned farm, where they broke in; exhausted, cold, wet and hungry.

They spent another week to move the equipment to the cabin that had been chosen. They suffered from the cold and from lack of food. Three weeks after the parachute drop they managed to get through their first radio message to England:
Happy landing in spite of stones everywhere. Sorry to keep you waiting for message. Snow storm fog forced us to go down valleys. Four feet snow impossible with heavy equipment to cross mountains.

The group continued to send daily messages with updated information. On 12th November they reported they had found a suitable landing ground for receiving gliders.

FRESHMAN

When Combined Operations Commandstarted detailed operation planning, the objective was approved in a few days. The objective was:

To destroy the stocks of Lurgan (code name for heavy water), the importance of which far ascends all other objectives, and only after their destruction has been assured to carry out such demolitions as will deny to the enemy the productive capacity of the Norsk Hydro Works.

The attack was to be performed by glider insertion of troops. It was the first time during WW II that this method was employed. The attack party was planned with 34 highly trained airborne engineers in two gliders. The Grouse advance party was to join them. They would if necessary fight their way to the target. Any casualties were to be given morphine and left behind. After the raid the Brits were to walk 250 miles to Sweden.

The operation was classified Top Secret and its initiation was signed by Churchill himself.

On the 19th November the uniformed and heavily eqiupped troops entered the two Horsa gliders towed Halifaxes. The weather over Telemark was well workable when they took off at 6 p.m. But as the aircraft crossed the Nort Sea the wind picked up. The Grouse party prepared landing lights and turned on the Eureka device which was to pick upp Rebecca signals from the aircraft. The system failed however and the aircrew never found the correct drop position.

One of the tugs managed to return to the UK, but the other tug and both gliders crashed in the south-western area of Norway.

Wreckage

Some were killed on impact, some were injured while others remained uninjured. The uninjured could have tried to flee to Sweden but decided to go for help. They were convinced they would be taken POWs and the injured would receive medical care, in accordance with the Geneva convention. When German troops arrived, none of the injured received any medical treatment. On the contrary they were tortured to death, while the uninjured were interrogated before they were executed.

Operation Freshman was a strategic disaster as well as a humanitarian tragedy. 34 top trained soldiers as well as the Halifax crew of six were all dead. After the objective of the operation was revealed,the Germans initiated massive fortifications works at Vemork.

 

SB,

Excellent report and looking forward to the next instalments.

Regards
Tom

 

SB
Excellent very concise and sets out the importance of the heavy water, looking forward to the next installment

 

Some great background Stormy, and I look forward to the rest of the instalments.

 

Strombird,

Small point in an otherwsie excellent article:

You said:

On the 19th November the uniformed and heavily eqiupped paratroopers entered the two Horsa gliders towed Halifaxes.

The men were not paratroopers but airlanding...they came from 9th Airborne Field Company RE and 261st Field Park Company RE......the operation was first offered to the 1st Parachute Squadron RE but as they were preapring for a move to North Africa the non-parachutre airborne troops were selected.....I covered this raid in my book Striking Back......

 

I will patiently wait for the rest of the series

I always wondered what other use heavy water might have, I had no idea.

 

Thats not quite correct is it? Excuse my o level nuclear physics. I though heavy water was for building reactors not bombs. Its a moderator, it actually achieves the opposite effect to a bomb, Its no use for Uranium weapons is it?


I guess a working reactor can be used to provide plutonium but the Germans where miles away from that...

Not sure Heavy water was a great deal of use, was it?

Kev

 

Thank you all-

....

On the 19th November the uniformed and heavily eqiupped paratroopers entered the two Horsa gliders towed Halifaxes.

The men were not paratroopers but airlanding.......

You are certainly right !

I almost can't wait to get back to my residence in the weekend to find which of my sources set me off on the wrong track. Or maybe I invented it all by myself..

I used the following sources available in English:
Churchill, Winston: The second World War (abridged, one-volume version)
Gallagher, Thomas: Assault in Norway
Haukelid, Knut: Skis Against the Atom
Mackenzie, William: The Secret History of SOE
Mears, Ray: The Real Heroes of telemark

I have also used two titles, available in Norwegian only: Poulsson, Jens-Anton: Aksjon Vemork and Tungtvannssabotasjen.

In addition I have used material from the Norwegian Resistance Museum and Army War Academy, both in Oslo.

 

Thats not quite correct is it? Excuse my o level nuclear physics. I though heavy water was for building reactors not bombs. Its a moderator, it actually achieves the opposite effect to a bomb, Its no use for Uranium weapons is it?


I guess a working reactor can be used to provide plutonium but the Germans where miles away from that...

Not sure Heavy water was a great deal of use, was it?

Kev


I'm a lousy physicist and my sources are unavailable at the moment. Wikipdeia however has this to say:


.....Relatively pure heavy water was produced in 1933, soon after the discovery of deuterium, the stable heavy isotope of hydrogen. With the discovery of nuclear fission in late 1938, and the need for a neutron moderator that captured few neutrons, heavy water became an important component of early nuclear energyWorld War II (1939–1945). Partly because of Nazi Germany's (1933–1945) technological reliance upon scarce heavy water for nuclear reactordesign of some nuclear reactors, either for generating electric power or for producing nuclear-weapons isotopes, such as plutonium-239.....
programs during research, they failed to produce a functioning nuclear reactor for the duration of the war. Since then, heavy water is an essential component in the
AND:

.....In 1934, Norsk Hydro built the first commercial heavy water plant at Vemork, Tinn, with a capacity of 12 tonnes per year.[17] From 1940 and throughout World War II, the plant was under German control and the allies decided to destroy the plant and its heavy water to inhibit German development of nuclear weapons. In late 1942, a planned raid by British airborne troops failed, both gliders crashing. The raiders were killed in the crash or subsequently executed by the Germans. In the night of 27 February 1943 Operation Gunnerside succeeded. Norwegian commandos and local resistance managed to demolish small but key parts of the electrolytic cells, dumping the accumulated heavy water down the factory drains. Had the German nuclear program followed similar lines of research as the U.S. Manhattan Project, such heavy water would have been crucial to obtaining plutonium from a nuclear reactor......

 

Part 2
(Still without pics, as firewalls keep outsmarting me. Grrr)

WINTER
Einar Skinnarland joined the Grouse party, who now had been forced to take cover far into the mountains of the Hardanger Plateau. Through the winter they had to move from one hiding to another and survived on reindeer moss. They grew weak and ill from malnutrition. Nonetheless they kept mentally healthy, crucial for the operation.

Keep up your hearts. We will do the job yet, they telegraphed to England.

Once in a while they managed to get some proper food, usually flour or oats. For Christmas there was a proper party when they had managed to shoot a reindeer. A branch of a juniper was made into a Christmas tree and they tuned in to some carols on the radio set.

GUNNERSIDE

Following the Freshman disaster SOE immediately started to plan alternatives. The plan was simple: Six Norwegians from Linge Company were to be parachuted onto the Hardanger Plateau as soon as possible. They were to join Grouse, who were now renamed Swallow. In a joint effort they were to destroy the target and then flee to Sweden.

Joachim Roenneberg was chosen as the leader. He picked out Knut Haukelid (now combat ready) , Hans Storhaug, Birger Stroemsheim, Fredrik Kayser and Kasper Idland.

The group were given a week on a training base which from security reasons had been evacuated for all other personnel. They got to study a model of the plant. They were also trained in placing explosives onto large cylinders and were given range training with new guns. They also had a minimum of parachute training.

The group were to wear British uniforms but were otherwise given free hands to choose their equipment. Items like special sleeping bags and high-tech boots turned up literally in the matter of hours.

PLAN

Gunnerside were to meet Swallow at the landing zone or if impossible, at another preplanned location. They should prepare hiding places to dispose of their equipment after mission accomplished. Then they were to man an advance observation post and perform final recce.

If Roenneberg’s assessment at this point was that the team had no chance to succeed they should withdraw and await orders.

The plan was to drop the team at full moon on 17th December and perform the raid in the night 24th to 25th December.

Before the group left the training base Tronstad held a final emotional speech:

You have no idea how important this mission is. You will live in the history of Norway for centuries to come.

WAITING

The team was ready to be flown to Norway. But extremely unfavourable weather made it necessary to postpone the flight, which could only be performed under a full moon. The group was therefore moved to Scotland to enable the members to maintain their physical strength, especially skiing skills.

In spite of the long wait as well as their physical condition, the Swallow group immediately started preparations to receive Gunnerside during the full moon period in January. It was to become one of the coldest winters on record in Telemark. For January and February it was only rarely milder than minus 30 deg C. Low temperatures contributed to problems with radio batteries and for extended periods of time contact with England was not achieved.

On the 23rd January it was reported that Gunnerside were on their way. However again the aircrew was unable to find the drop position and the aircraft had to return to the UK.

A new month of waiting followed. Swallow had now been on ground for over three months to prepare for the reception. How much longer could they endure cold, under-nourishment as well as the ongoing search for them? Two of them had been taken seriously ill.

The only advantage of the extended waiting was that they could spend more time in their sleeping-bags. They often slept 15 hours a day.

Svensbu

Only Haugland, the radio operator, had to get up every night to send a message to England. In the middle of the night it was often terribly cold, but he couldn’t use his gloves while sending, as even a minimal disturbance of the rhythm could evoke suspicions at the recipient that the sender had been compromised and the Germans taken over. All transmissions were performed in Morse code.

In the SOE fears grew that the last cancellation could affect their morale. This message was sent to encourage:
Deeply regret weather conditions have made it impossible to land party. Do hope you can manage to keep it going until next stand by period February 11th to 25th 2200 to 0200 GMT. We all send you our thanks and admiration.

Gunnerside continued perfecting their skills. At the beginning of the February full moon period, they were again at readiness for a new parachute drop.

DROP AT LAST

On the 16th of February the skies cleared after a heavy snowstorm and Gunnerside again borded the aircraft at the airfield in Scotland. The aircraft commander was Guy Gibson, who later in 1943 would lead Operation Chastise. The weather stayed clear as the six of them, with eleven equipment containers, were dropped just at a level of just 70 feet above the ground.

They all landed safely, however far away from the planned drop zone, and about 30 miles from Svensbu, where Swallow was based. When they had managed to gather the equipment from the containers, a new snowstorm arrived.



By a stroke of luck they bumped into the Jansbu cabin. Here they had to stay for six days. They had no radio and couldn’t contact neither England nor Swallow.

The members of Swallow feared the worst and couldn’t agree on what to do. On 22nd February the storm finally subsided, and Gunnerside loaded up their cargo and started the march on skis. In spite of their exhausted and starved state, they reached Svensbu after covering 30 miles in 16 hours.

The rejoin was celebrated in the evening with reindeer meat, chocolate and dried fruits. In the morning Haugland sent this message to London:
The party arrived yesterday evening. Everything in order. The spirits are excellent. On the air again after the operation. Heartiest greetings from all.

Haugland disassembled the sender and with Skinnarland he took up a communications post at the Skrykken depot. They stayed under cover, in readiness to send the post-attack message to England.

 

SB,

Excellent reading. Talk about disappointment with delays and bad weather not to mention lack of food.

Such hardships are hard to appreciate now.

Regards
Tom

 

Amazing the patience that must have been involved not to mention the mental fortitude, and I never knew that Guy Gibson was involved! keep it coming Stormy

 

Part 3


FINAL PREPARATIONS
The group took up a forward post at the Fjoesbudalen cabin.
Following the failed Operation Freshman the guarding of the plant had been improved, search lights and mines had been placed. From the direction of the group, the only point of entry was the 225 ft bridge over the 600 ft deep ravine. The ravine itself had not been considered, as the Germans didn’t imagine anybody would try to cross it.






The party decided to try to go down the ravine, cross the ice-covered river and climb the steep rock face to the other side. After the ascent they would attempt an entry to the plant as silently as possible. This way they were spared carrying a lot of equipment, easing their evasion after the assault. The danger of becoming engaged in a fire fight was also greatly reduced.


Early in the morning on the day they had picked out for the attack,
Claus Helberg was sent on a recon patrol to test if the plan was practically feasible. He returned five hours later, convinced that the attack could be carried out as planned. This was good news. They now knew they could enter the plant without alarming the guards. The group still didn’t agree whether fighting its way over the bridge or climbing the ravine was the better alternative. The issue was voted upon. The majority wanted to climb. Democracy won.


For the next few hours the team members were busy with their last preparations. The group was split in two: The cover force was led by Haukelid and had Helberg, Kjelstrup og Poulsson as members. The assault force consisted of Stroemsheim, Kayser, Idland and Storhaug, led by Roenneberg. Roenneberg now ordered them all to rest for two hours to gain as much energy as possible.


They were about to start one of the most important sabotage actions in history, but still none of them knew about the heavy water. They had no idea that in London Churchill and other important leaders were eagerly waiting for news on the outcome.


RAID

The evening of 27th February was mild and overcast with some wind as the cover force and the assault force in British uniforms and with British ID documents, left the Fjoesbudalen cabin. They brought various handguns, explosives and some food. The deep, wet snow made for a heavy walk, and they had to carry their skis as well.



Before they climbed down the ravine, they hid away their skis and backpacks. Due to the mild weather the steep surface was very slippery and when they reached the river the ice was covered with 4 inches of water. Climbing the rock face was easier than anticipated, but was physically demanding and unforgiving of mistakes.



They took cover by the railway line. There was a German guard change at midnight, but the saboteurs waited another 30 minutes. They used the time for resting and having some food. Roenneberg made sure that every single team member had understood his instructions to the detail.


At 0030 precisely they started their advance to the target. All nine of them quietly crept up to the warehouse 100 yards from the iron gates. The cover force took their posts with their sub-machine guns while one man ran up to the gates and cut the padlock with a heavy pair of bolt cutters. The cover force immediately entered and took up new posts while the sabotage force opened the next gate, which led to the heavy water storage in the cellar. Everything was quiet, only normal noises from the plant were heard. Only cause for worry was the clear sky with its bright moon.



The cover force took up new posts at the German guard hut. As briefed, the sabotage force left one man to cover the rear and the rest divided into two pairs, each with a complete set of explosives.



They found both possible access doors to the cellar locked. This was unexpected. It was later revealed that Skinnarland’s contact at the plant, who should have unlocked the doors, had been taken sick and was not at work. The solution was to crawl through a narrow cable canal, which Tronstad had pointed out to them. Kayser and Roenneberg crawled through, pushing their explosives packs in front of them.



In the storage room Kayser kept the Norwegian watchman at gunpoint while Roenneberg started to fit charges to every heavy water cylinder. He was half way through when a window was broken and Stroemsheim entered the room from the back of the plant. Unable to find the cable canal and unaware that the two other team members had already entered, Stroemsheim and Idland had decided to go through the window as a last resort. Idland took up post outside the broken window, while Stroemsheim helped Roenneberg to fit and check the rest of the charges.



At impulse they decided to use 30 sec fuses instead of 2 minutes, as planned. This reduced the chances for anyone to have time to disarm the charges. It was also a very brave decision, since it meant that the alarm would be set off before the group had time to get out of the plant.



Just as they were about to light the fuses, the watchman asked them to find his spectacles first. In wartime Norway, spectacles were almost irreplaceable. This task was calmly undertaken, but right after approaching steps were heard and the situation became very tense. Fortunately it was just the other Norwegian watchman. While Roenneberg lit the fuses, Kayser counted to ten before he asked the two civilians to run up the stairs as fast as they could. Then the saboteurs ran out into the night through the cellar door.



They were less than 60 ft away when they heard the soft noise of an explosion. The noise was muffled by the thick concrete walls and masked by the normal noises from the plant. It was so faint that the sabotage force wondered whether the charges had been set correctly.
Unaware that the noise from small explosion was commonplace in the plant, the saboteurs immediately took cover, waiting for a response from the German guard hut. After a while a German soldier, only half-dressed, came out and had a look, swinging a torch around, just inches above the head of Haukelid, who was hiding behind some empty barrels. He then returned to the hut. When the door was closed, the saboteurs quickly started their withdrawal. Their ability to hold back fire in this tense situation was a demonstration of calm and professionalism.



Up to this point, the operation had gone far more smoothly than expected. The only persons who had seen the saboteurs, believed they were British commandos. Care had also been taken to leave some papers in English, tools and even a Tommy Gun.

 

Thank you for this Stormbird, your "bare bones" telling is far more interesting than a 300 page book !

 

Part 4 (final)


WITHDRAWAL
It was now crucial that they could get as far from the plant as possible before the alarm was raised. They forced the ravine in the same manner as they had done in the other direction. As they crossed the river, they heard the sirens at the plant. When finalising the ascent, they saw the first car come up the valley from Rjukan. It had to travel very slowly on the slippery surface of the road. The hunt for them had started.

For three hours they climbed the steep mountain side to the Hardanger Plateau. The Germans remained convinced they still had to be within the plant. They had not gone over the bridge and forcing the ravine was unthinkable!

At five in the morning the group reached the plateau, which met them with a westerly gale force wind. They had a short break to rest and eat, and then pressed on to get as much distance as possible to their pursuers. When they reached the cabin at Langsjaa they hadn’t slept for 36 hours and had most of the time pushed on in maximum tempo. Everybody was absolutely exhausted.

The operation had been a complete success. They had entered the plant unnoticed, destroyed all the heavy water cylinders and escaped before the alarm was raised. Not a shot had been fired, nobody was lost or injured and the only observers believed they were British Commandos. They had even fulfilled their task without damaging any part of the production plant, which at the time was evaluated to be of vital economic interest.

For a complex set of reasons no message was sent to London until ten days after the attack. The message sent was:
Operation carried out with 100 per cent success. High Concentration plant completely destroyed. Shots not changed since the Germans did not realise anything. The Germans do not appear to know whence we came or whither the party disappeared.

This historic message caused celebrations in Downing Street as well as in Whitehall and in the HQ of the SOE.

HUNT AND EVASION

The head of Gestapo in Norway, general Rediess, arrived at the plant to inspect the damage. Convinced the saboteurs must have had inside helpers, he was hungry for revenge. He immediately had engineers and laboratory personnel arrested and interrogated and threatened to shoot them all if the guilty did not give themselves up. Rediess would have had his way, had not general von Falkenhorst arrived. He declared the sabotage to be the most perfect coup he had seen during the whole war and admired ”die Britischer Gangsteren”. When von Falkenhorst had classed the action as a pure military operation without any involvement of civilians, Gestapo had to free the prisoners. A large scale manhunt for Die Britischer was launched.

The plan was that Haugland and Skinnarland should stay in the Rjukan area, Haukelid and Kjelstrup should stay on the Hardanger plateau , Poulsson and Helberg should travel to Oslo and the other five should ski the 250 miles to Sweden.

The Germans immediately declared a curfew in the entire area and started a massive search involving over 2000 soldiers. They searched and scorched every uninhabited cabin they could fin don the map over the plateau. The entire plateau quickly became a criss-cross of skiing tracks, where it was impossible to find anything. German patrols engaged each other in fire-fights believing the other patrol were partisans. Several soldiers were wounded. The saboteurs remaining on the plateau had dug themselves snow caves close to the mountain tops. They had an excellent view of the commotion and felt very safe.

The five who skied eastwards reached Sweden in 15 days and were soon on a flight to England.

How Helberg escaped his pursuers is a story of its own. He went to Oslo as planned and spent some weeks there.

He received some erratic information from local resistance fighter that the Hardanger plateau was safe and returned to the plateau to move Swallow/Freshman’-s equipment to a safer hiding. In reality the place was overflowing with German troops. When he approached the cabin at Jansbu, he walked straight into a trap. Shots on him missed and a race lasting several hours, followed. It ended by Helberg shooting the remaining German soldier. Helberg raced on and in the dark he skied down a cliff and broke a bone in his shoulder. He none the less carried on but was after a short while stopped by a German patrol. His forged identity papers were professional enough to convince the Germans.

They took him to a nearby house full of German soldiers, after a while including Terboven. Among the guests was a young girl who declined dining with Terboven. She openly bragged about her father, who was a colonel in the Norwegian Army in Great Britain. Terboven was furious and ordered all the Norwegian guests deported to the prison camp at Grini. They were all put on to a bus escorted by motor bikes, and told they would be shot if they tied to escape.

When the bus was slowing, climbing a hill, Helberg threw himself off and ran into the forest, followed by small arms fire and hand grenades. He managed to get away, even though he when jumping from the bus had broken a new bone in his shoulder. After three months escaping he reached Great Britain via Sweden.

AFTERMATH

The whole stock of heavy water had been demolished in the sabotage, but the production was quickly resumed. The Allied High Command decided that the plant had to be air bombed.

On 16th November 1943 over 1000 bombs were released over the area. Only 18 of them hit the plant itself and the stocks of heavy water were not damaged. 22 Norwegian civilians were killed. Norwegian authorities had not been informed before the bombing and their reactions were harsh. For a while relations between Norwegian authorities and the Allied High Command remained strained.



But the bomb attack made the Germans decide to give up producing heavy water at Vemork and move the stocks to Germany. As soon as Einar Skinnarland heard this, he relayed the information to England. It was decided that this remaining stock of heavy water had to be destroyed, almost at any cost. It quickly became clear that the weakest spot would be as the cargo was on board the railway ferry D/S Hydro, as this was crossing Lake Tinnsjoen.



The raid was performed on 19th February 1944, when a team, led by Knut Haukelid, placed a timed bomb underneath the ferry. It was impossible to warn the civilians, as this would risk revealing the attack. Fourteen civilian Norwegians and four German troops were killed when the bomb detonated and the ferry sunk to a deep of 1440 feet.

This marked the end of the battle for heavy water in Norway.

 

You are certainly right !

I almost can't wait to get back to my residence in the weekend to find which of my sources set me off on the wrong track...

Unable to find this error anywhere, I put all the blame on myself.:sorry:
And thank you for the heads-up, airborne medic !

 

The failed 'OPERATION FRESHMAN'


One of the first attacks made by British airborne forces was the attempt to disrupt the heavy water research and production facility at Rjukan near Vermork, Norway. This attack, carried out on 19 November 1942, involved two parties of Royal Engineers being flown by Horsa glider to Norway in order to sabotage the plant. Two Halifax Horsa combinations were used. The weather was poor and the intercommunications between aircaft and gliders failed, the radio navigation aids also failed. Both gliders were lost as was one of the Halifax's.

19 November 1942.

38 Wing
Halifax II W7801
Helleland, Norway

The Halifax crashed shortly after casting off its glider.

Casualties.....

F/L. Arthur Roland Parkinson RCAF. 26 Pilot
P/O. Gerard Walter Sewell De Gency. 20 Co-Pilot
F/L. Arthur Edwin Thomas. 32 Navigator
F/S. Albert Buckton. 23 Wireless Operator
Sgt. James Falconer. 20 Flight Engineer
F/S. George Mercier Edwards. 24 Air Gunner
F/O. Arnold Thomas Hayward Hayward 28 Observer


…....................................


38 Wing
Horsa HS114
North of Helleland

This glider crashed about 3 miles away from the tug aircraft and the two pilots and driver Pendlebury were killed on impact. The remaining soldiers, several of whom were injured, were taken to an army barracks at Slettebo near Egersund where they were murdered, their bodies were buried on the sea shore.


Casualties....


P/O. Norman Arthur Davies RAAF. 26 RAAF
P/O. Herbert John Fraser. 28 RAAF
Lt. Alex Charles Allen. 24 RE
L/Sgt. George Knowles. 28
Cpl. John George Llewellyn Thomas. 23
L/Cpl. Frederick William Bray. 29
L/Cpl. Alexander Campbell. 24
Sapper. Ernest William Bailey. 31
Sapper. Howell Bevan. 22
Sapper. Thomas William Falkner. 22
Sapper. Charles Henry Grundy. 22
Sapper. Herbert J. Legate. 24
Sapper. Leslie Smallman. 22
Sapper. James May Stephen. 25
Sapper. Gerald Stanley Williams. 18
Driver. John Thomas Vernon Belfield. 26
Driver. Ernest Pendlebury. 25

..................................

38 Wing
Horsa DP349
Fylgjdal


This glider crashed into the mountains killing the crew and several soldiers. The enemy forces rounded up the others and four seriously wounded men were immediately killed by their captors, whilst the others were subsequently murdered about two months later.

Casualties....

Staff Sgt. Malcolm Frederick Strathdee. Pilot. GPR
Sgt. Peter Doig. Co-Pilot
Lt. David Alexander Methven. 20 GM RE
L/Sgt. Frederick Healey. 29
Cpl. James Dobson Cairncross. 22. Murdered 20 November 1942
L/Cpl. Trevor Lewis Masters. 25. Murdered 20 November 1942
L/Cpl. Wallace Mahlon Jackson. 21. Murdered 18 January 1943
Sapper. James Frank Blackburn. 25. Murdered 18 January 1943
Sapper. Frank Bonner. 25. Murdered 18 January 1943
Sapper. William Jacques. 30
Sapper. Robert Norman. 22
Sapper Eric John Smith. 24. Murdered 20 November 1942
Sapper. John Wilfred Walsh. 21. Murdered 18 January 1943
Sapper. Thomas William White. 23. Murdered 18 January 1943
Driver. Peter Paul Farrell. 26. Murdered 20 November 1942
Driver. John Glen Vernon Hunter. 22
Driver. George Simkins. 30


Extract from 'Though Without Anger' – Colin Cummings.


….............................

Operation Freshman - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Operation Freshman

 

To All

Thankx 4 this excellent thread


Erik

 

Can anyone point me in the direction of the location of the planning centre for operation Gunnerside please? I understand that there is a connection with Chiltern Court in Baker Street but how would I support this? I am looking for documentation that may be able to support the Chiltern Court connection where SOE's Scandinavian sections were based.

Many thanks.

Daniel.

 

A little about the first consignment of heavy water that was moved out from Norsk Hydro.

In March 1940 agents of the French Deuxième Bureau, led by a Lieutenant Allier, succeeded in smuggling 187 kg of heavy water (deuterium oxide – see Appendix One for a description of its use) out of Norway. The consignment was all that was stockpiled in Ryukan. In an agreement concluded on 9 March 1940 the stock was loaned to the French, free of charge. After the war they were to have the choice of purchasing the consignment, or replacing it.

Ryukan was later to be the scene of the film The Heroes of Telemark. Some sources say that the Bureau booked two or three flights to confuse the Germans; and that one of these, destined for Amsterdam, was intercepted and made to land at Hamburg. Allier and one other secret agent accompanied the first ten cans of the material on a flight to Scotland; the other sixteen cans followed two days later, accompanied by two more agents.

Another account says that the unpressurized aircraft flew so high that Allier passed out while stretched out across the cans of the precious liquid; when the pilot realised what had happened he hastily lost altitude and Allier regained consciousness.

The twenty six cans were passed to the Collège de France laboratory of the French physicist Jean Frédéric Joliot-Curie. Joliot-Curie and his wife Irène (Marie Skłodowska Curie's daughter) had shared the 1935 Nobel Prize for Chemistry. At the outbreak of World War II, Joliot-Curie was a professor at the Collège and it was there that the cans were stored in an air raid shelter.

When France was invaded Dautry, the French Armaments Minister, ordered that the consignment should be saved from the enemy. On 16 May a team from the Ministry, led by Allier, arrived at the laboratory. After a brief meeting it was decided that the heavy water should be moved away from Paris, together with a vast amount of other heavy material, including lead bars. Later in May Hans von Halban and a colleague moved south to Clermont-Ferrand, where they established a temporary laboratory.

On 6 June another colleague, Lew Kowarski, set off south with a convoy of trucks loaded with the bulk of the consignment, including the deuterium oxide. At Clermont-Ferrand they were met by Halban. The heavy water was put in a women’s prison in the city of Riom. Lew Kowarski sent his wife and four year old daughter south by train. His daughter had been scalded some days before and her arm was in bandages. They were reunited at Clermont-Ferrand.

Allier arrived at the villa/laboratory on 16 June, in uniform. He, Joliot-Curie and Halban decided that Halban and Kowarski should leave for Bordeaux early next morning, with the heavy water. Joliot-Curie seems to have told Halban that he, Halban, would be responsible for the heavy water. This rankled with Kowarski, who considered that he was ‘the heavy water man.’ They set out in two cars. Halban had his wife and young daughter in one; Kowarski, who could not drive, was driven, again with wife and daughter. The journey must have been particularly uncomfortable for the burly Kowarski, who was lying on a few blankets laid across some twenty cans.

They drove throughout the day and did not reach Bordeaux until an hour before midnight 17 June. Once there they sought the temporary office of the Ministry of Armaments to receive their instructions.

Their orders were brief: they were to go to England in a ship that had been allocated to a Lord Suffolk, who had the use of it to evacuate scientists and material destined for Britain. There they were to put themselves, and the heavy water, at the disposal of the British authorities. They were to observe absolute secrecy. When in the UK, they refused to take orders coming from Colonel, later General, De Gaulle, as he was not a member of ‘the British authorities’. This greatly annoyed the Free French leader.

Just after midnight 18 June the two nuclear scientists arrived at the ship with their families and the 'heavy water.' .....

From a later chapter:

At first no one knew what to do with the heavy water. Until, on the 4 July, General Sir Maurice Taylor, a Senior Military Advisor (to the Ministry of Supply?) wrote to Lord Wigram at Windsor Castle telling him:

We have rescued from France a small stock of what is probably the most valuable and rare material in the world and one which is most urgently needed, in very small quantities, for what we hope may prove to be without exaggeration the most important scientific contribution to our war effort.

He went on to ask ‘if he could arrange safe storage ‘in some small chamber in the depths below Windsor Castle’.

On 9 July Lord Suffolk collected twenty of the cans and delivered them to the Castle library, where the librarian O F Morshead took charge and arranged for the consignment to be stored in the same place as the Crown Jewels. No one could say that the British did not appreciate the value of the material that had been saved.

On 11 July Morshead wrote a note to Gough confirming arrangements for the release of the material and saying ‘the King knows that it is here.’ Morshead was much more than a librarian; his decorations were C.V.O. D.S.O. M.C. Croix de Guerre. By 1952 he was Sir Owen Frederick Morshead KC.V.O etc. and in 1958 K.C.B. Even in 1936 Lord Wigram’s full style was Colonel the Right Honourable Clive, Baron Wigram G.C.B. G.C.V.O. C.S.I.

Twelve square tins of more concentrated material and eight round tins of less concentrated material were taken to Windsor. Three square tins and three round tins, with the same contents as the Windsor consignment, remained at Wormwood Scrubs prison – at that time the temporary headquarters of MI5.