The Importance of the North African/Western Desert Campaign

I propose that the Western Desert campaign was far more important than generally accepted. I have often read that it was chosen as a theater of war by the Allies (in actuality the UK at the time) because it was the only place available to fight Germany and Italy following the close of the Norwegian and French/Low Countries campaigns of June, 1940.

Herr Schnicklgruber apparently viewed North Africa as a sideshow in light the parsimonious manner in which men and equipment were dispatched there in 1940, 41 & 42. Initially, OKW only sent the 15th Panzer and the 5th Light (later the 21st Panzer) Divisions, plus a smattering of smaller units. Despite the repeated requests of Deutsch Africa Corps and later Panzer Army Africa, insufficient troops and equipment were transferred to the local command until it was too late. By early 1943, large numbers of troops were finally placed under the command of Panzer Army Africa, just in time for von Armin to surrender them to British, US and French forces at Tunis in May. This came just after the German 6th Army surrendered at Stalingrad the previous February and was almost as great of a debacle in terms of men lost (in excess of 250,000 men) as Paulus’ siege and surrender.

Hitler apparently did not feel that the Wehrmacht could spare the necessary men and material from Barbarossa and expected the DAK to accomplish its mission with inadequate forces. His narrow-sighted decision would have adverse effects in following years (as did many of his other directives).

I propose that had the Axis command supplied the commanders (Rommel and von Arnim) of the North African forces the necessary troops to expand control from the Pillars of Hercules to the Sinai (yes, taking control of French-controlled areas), that ultimately more troops would have been available for operations against the Soviet Union in 1943 and 44. There would have been no Operation Torch and Tunisian Campaign as we know it because the Allied North African landings would have been far more difficult. The lack of large, usuable harbors on the Atlantic side of Morocco would have made supplying forces difficult.

It is likely that both ends of the Med Sea could be have held by 10-15 divisions and other supporting forces. As it was, the northern coast of Africa was lost and the Axis, fearing landings almost anywhere on southern coast of Europe was forced to garrison almost the entire length of the northern Mediterranean Sea to the tune of 40+ divisions. Can you imagine what a difference in 1944 to OKH 25-30 divisions plus the 250,000 lost in Tunis would have been?

I am not proposing that the war in the East would have been won by the Axis powers, but I suspect that the precipitous defeats such as what happened to Army Group Center would not have occurred, at least not in the summer of 1944. Also, it is possible that the extra troops would have given the Germans the additional forces to continue the Kharkov counter-offensive (Third Battle of Kharkov) to include the reduction of the Kursk salient in Feb-Mar 1943, thus removing the obvious bulls-eye so evident to Russian planners in the Summer of 1943.

Germany would not have been so hamstrung by the lack of forces that so limited its freedom of action in late 1943 and 1944 and onto 1945 or possibly 46...

 

I propose that the Western Desert campaign was far more important than generally accepted.

I agree with your proposition that it was more important than generally accepted.

Rommel's loss of North Africa IMHO was his inability to take Tobruk in April 1941 and the subsequent attempts to oust the Australian troops and British artillerymen. Rommel was beaten consistently by a better Australian general, Sir Leslie Morshead who out thought Rommel at every turn.

Under Morshead, the Tobruk garrison repulsed Rommel and the AK not just by defence but purposeful offence outside the wire which demoralised the AK.

This eight months that they held Tobruk, denied Rommel Cairo and the Suez whilst allowing the Allies to build up and put all the errors right in men and equipment.

Even when the Australians were pulled out in November and Rommel was eventually successful in taking Tobruk in 1942, he failed to use that port effectively to improve his logistical situation.

"If" Hitler had supplied Rommel better, things may have been different.

"If" Churchill had not taken the British, Australian & NZ divisions out of North Africa (60-70% of the entire allied force) and sent them to Greece, which subsequently halted the overpowering route of the Axis by General O'Connor, Rommel may have not even landed in Tripoli.

 

Hi Jeff,
Welcome to the Forum and for your interesting post.

The Battle for North and East Africa, additional to what you have stated, is that it was it was the forerunner of what became the strategically important, but often down-played Mediterranean Theatre. Field-Marshall Alexander’s post-war summation is relevant:

"Any estimate of the value of the campaign must he expressed, not in terms of the ground gained, for the ground was not vital, in the strict sense, either to us or to the enemy, but in terms of its effect on the war as a whole. The Allied Armies in Italy were not engaged with the enemy's main armies and their attacks were not directed, as were those of the Allies in the west or the Russians in the east, against the heart of the German Fatherland and the nerve-centres of Germany's national existence. Our role was subordinate and preparatory. Ten months before the great assault in the west our invasion of Italy, at first in very moderate strength, drew off to that remote quarter forces that might have turned the scale in France. As the campaign progressed more and more German troops were drawn in to oppose us. The supreme directors of Allied strategy were always careful to see that our strength was never allowed to grow above the minimum necessary for our tasks; at one time and another during those 20 months no less than 21 divisions in all were removed from my command for the benefit of other theatres. The Germans made no comparable detachments. Except for a short period in the spring of 1944 they had always more formations in Italy than we had, and we made such good use of that brief exceptional period that in the summer of 1944, the crisis of the war, they found themselves forced to divert eight divisions to this secondary theatre. At that time, when the value of our strategic contribution was at its greatest, 55 German divisions were tied down in the Mediterranean by the threat, actual or potential, presented by our armies in Italy. The record of the comparative casualties tells us the same story. On the German side they amounted to 536,000. Allied casualties were 312,000. The difference is the more remarkable in that we were always the attackers. Four times we carried out that most difficult operation of war, an amphib­ious landing. Three times we launched a prepared offensive with the full strength of an army group. Nowhere in Europe did soldiers face more difficult terrain or more determined adversaries.
The conclusion is that the campaign in Italy fulfilled its strategic mission.”

Despite what you (and also I have read) North Africa was not a theatre chosen by the British to do battle with the Axis – the Italian invasion of Egypt made it so.

Cheers, Gerry

 

Gerry,

Thanks for your kind reply.

As you may have noticed, I am a Southern-American (I'm keeping up with some in our country who think it is important to add a prefix to our national origin). I read a great deal, but living here in the colonies, I don't have much access to information regarding the British Army. I found this forum and it has been interesting to read.

It's almost as if our version of WWII history is "oh yeah, the Brits were holding our left flank as we landed at Normandy, charged across Europe and fought the only real battle-the Battle of the Bulge, all the while cutting wide swaths throught the Nazis." Well, maybe it's not that bad, but you get the picture as Hollywood sees it. But they have gotten somewhat better lately.

I agree with you that North Africa was more or less thrust upon the British Army. Italy and Sicily were a bit more problematic. While it seems obvious that both had to be taken, and for several valid reasons (securing the sea-lanes being one) it is still more or less was a matter of fighting the enemy where you are able to and in July 1943, Italy was about all that was realistically available to the Commonwealth and US forces.

The Balkans were good opportunity for political reasons, as the Prime Minister pleaded, but would it have been successful militarily? With terrain at least equally vicious as the Appennines, I don't feel that we could have had success even on par with the Italian campaign and with larger expanse of territory to cover, more divisions would have been neccessary there than were required by the 15th AG in Italy. We could have possibly cut the Russians off at the pass as they moved toward the west and ultimately saved parts of Eastern Europe from about 40 years of the Warsaw Pact, but would we been able to prevent a Russian push that stopped at the North Sea or the Channel? As it was, Dempsey had to hoof it to beat Simonyak to Lubeck and seal off Schleswig-Holstein and that was with our main effort in Northwest Europe.

Possibly Winston would not have been "dragooned" into Operation Anvil, if for no other reason than the lack of available troops. I know that the story about the name of Operation Dragoon is probably not true, but it does sound like something you'd hear from him.

Anyway, the North African, Sicilian and Italian campaigns served their purposes, even if they seem to be analogous to sticking your hand into a tar baby. One just seemed to follow the other and when you put your hand in, you can't get it out. It was not always the best place to fight militarily or politically, but it's what we had.

 

A belated welcome Jeff,

I also agree this was a very interesting post.

In my opinion however, neither side initialy had a strategic interest in North Africa. Hitler was only interested in Barbarosa and Britain was only interested in rebuilding it's forces and defending the homeland.

At the begining, North Africa was only the preocupation of Musollini with his "empire" in Libya and Abbysinia. In fact I doubt they took the Italian forces seriously at the begining as they were mainly Black Shirt militia divisions (who mostly surrendered during Compass). That is why they onlt earmarked the 7th Armoured Division (and its precursors) to defend the western frontier. Their main concern was with the large Italian forces in Abbysinia under the Duke of Acosta.

The Australian Division was originaly intended for Britain but was sent to Egypt only because there was concern about feeding another division in the homeland.

The original intention of Operation Compass was only to take the Italian forts at the frontier. Even after Cunningham took over most of Libya, his forces were taken from here to go to Greece and in the case of the 4th Indian Division, to Abbysinia.

As for the Germans, Rommell was only sent with a token force to prevent Mussolini from being disgraced with a defeat (the same reason he postponed Barbarosa to conquer Greece).

Not being strategicaly importan was also the reason for the lack of supplies and strong reinforcements on both sides.

The reason that the Comonwealth was driven from El-Aghelia both times was due in a large part to the long supply route back to the delta. And the same can be said to Rommels defeats during Crusader as well as Alemein.

I would say that Churchill probably first realized the strategic importance of North Africa after Rommels breakthrough to Alemein, when most non military people thought that he would take the oil fields of the Middle East in no time. Hitler realized it even latter when the allies were driving towards Tunisia.

 

HI All
I'm very interested to find out what happened at Tunisia in May 1943 as I recently received the military records of my fathers and have been able to work out that he was there at that time.
Were the Americans involved as well?
Jackie

 

I'm very interested to find out what happened at Tunisia in May 1943 as I recently received the military records of my fathers and have been able to work out that he was there at that time.
Were the Americans involved as well?
Hi Jackie,

Simultaneouly, on 6th May, the British launched their attack down the Medjerda Valley to liberate Tunis, and in the north US forces started their drive to capture Bizerta. Exactly one wek later the German and Italian forces officially surrended - the war in Africa was over.
For the story of th British assault see page two: Churchill/Sherman Deployment

Two definitive books: David Rolf's "The Bloody Road to Tunis" and Rick Atkinson's "An Army at Dawn.

In which unit did your father serve?

Cheers, Gerry

 

HI Gerry
Thanks for your information-I will definitly look up the links which you sent me. As to the unit he was in-not sure of that, but I do know he was in the UK by 15th June 1943.
My father was Polish hence my confusion over exactly what he did etc. because many of the records are in Polish and my understanding of it is very limited.
Jackie

 

Hi Jeff,
Sufficient supplies for Rommel to break through to the Nile Delta were sent, but most never reached him due to losses at Sea.Thanks to the R.N. , R.A.F. and Ultra Intelligence.On more than one occasion all re-supply was stopped because the shipping routes were insecure. When Rommel desperately reqired fuel in October 1942 the four ships carrying it were sunk en-route.
Brian

 

Hi Jeff,
Sufficient supplies for Rommel to break through to the Nile Delta were sent, but most never reached him due to losses at Sea.Thanks to the R.N. , R.A.F. and Ultra Intelligence.On more than one occasion all re-supply was stopped because the shipping routes were insecure. When Rommel desperately reqired fuel in October 1942 the four ships carrying it were sunk en-route.
Brian


What has to be remembered though is that despite his constant supply problems, Rommel was extremely successful in what little logistics and man power he had. He defeated numerous British forces much larger than his own! General O'Conner I think was the same, would have been an interesting show down if he hadn't been caught.

 

What has to be remembered though is that despite his constant supply problems, Rommel was extremely successful in what little logistics and man power he had. He defeated numerous British forces much larger than his own! General O'Conner I think was the same, would have been an interesting show down if he hadn't been caught.

This was one of Churchills greatest errors. Halting the push at El Agheila and splitting his forces to contest Greece cost a huge amount of allied lives for a negative result. (Having to fight for the same real estate time and time again)

The one saving grace was the Tobruk garrison continually denying Rommel the use of its port facilities and subsequently Egypt and the Suez. This allowed the build up of forces from Egypt to take place which eventually proved the downfall for the Axis.

 

Hello Spidge.

I have to agree on the point about breaking up the formations. But there was a shortage of men and equipments in the vicinity of Greece, so I really can't see any other option if he was to aid the Greeks.

The political cost of not aiding Greece would have been enormous.

 

firstly,this campaign taught the western allies how to fight as an effective team.secondley,the tactical use of aircraft was honed in this campaign eg.montys insistance upon having r.a.f hq next to army h.q.very important.yours,4th wilts.

 

I'd like to add the battle schools in Egypt where procedures were standarised. Education of Sappers etc.

The perfection of the Royal Artillery was done in the desert campaign too.

Monty's insistence on fighting with divisions as divisions helped aswell.

Basically the Desert campaign helped closing the gap between the Germans who had worked hard during the 30ies, and the Allies.

 

There has been much written about the "unusual" cohesion between the Australian troops and British RA et al during the siege of Tobruk. Australian, Lt.Gen Morshead, while known as Ming The Merciless to his troops proved his ability and gained their respect by defeating Rommels' Blitzkrieg and the German machine for the first time on land.

He learnt his trade under Australian General Sir John Monash in WW1.

 

Great Post,
The point about Churchill's not choosing the North African theatre is excellent. A case of serendipity. Mussolini provided the Brits with the opportunity to engage the axis on "their" ground, more-or-less. Since the Brits had far more experience in North Africa. "The Path to Victory" and an "Army at Dawn" are great reads on this critical western theatre and show the wisdom of Churchill's reluctance for an early landing in France even had it been logistically possible. The initial spanking Ameican troops received at the hands of the Afrika Corps was critical to the development of Eisenhowers Leadership and that of his Lieutennts as well as te troops themselves.
Much is made of Rommel's early successes against the British, but it is important to know that he benefited from extrodinary inteligence that quite literally told him what the British were planning and where and when. If the the allies are criticized for not being up against the first team, it shoud be noted that Rommel also took full advantage of his opponents lack of experience, arguable leadership and blunders in the early going. Which is the mark of good generals. Both the African campaign and Barbarossa do reveal Hitler's marked tendency to underestimate his enemies and overestimate Germany's capacity for military operations. It has been postulated that the German's simply did not have their economy or war machine set up to accomplish the goals Hitler insisted on. Von Bock pointed this out before Barbossa. So whether more troops and equipment would have made a difference can always be argued.
The experience of Russia in Afghanistan and the US in Vietnam and Iraq against determined opponents would seem to argue against it.

 

Lt.Gen Morshead, while known as Ming The Merciless to his troops proved his ability and gained their respect by defeating Rommels' Blitzkrieg and the German machine for the first time on land.

He learnt his trade under Australian General Sir John Monash in WW1.


This is so true. It was evident that Morshead was a 'clear thinker'. The best kit the Germans could use against the Allies was the MG's, the long range 88's, and superiour tank guns.(shelling allied positions whilst maintaining a safe distance from the 2pdr.) Morshead negated those weapons by fighting a lot in the dark. So easy, so brilliant.

IIRC Monash had read about this (night operations) from the Japanese victories against superiour Russian forces in 1905.

At any rate the hard fought lessons that the Tobruk Rats made was implemented in the second battle of El Alamein. And that was an important factor for the victory there.

 

Morshead negated those weapons by fighting a lot in the dark. So easy, so brilliant.

After the initial defeat of Rommel at Tobruk, Morshead said that defence was "A state of mind" and a dangerous comfort for the troops to fall into.

So, every night, he ordered that a different company of "commandos" from different positions right across the perimeter, left Tobruk to cause havoc throughout the German perimeter. Killing, destroying supplies and taking prisoners for interrogation.

 

after the battle of alamain,the 7th armd div chased rommel for 1200 miles,they were generally in the lead.this showed perhaps the durability and reliablity of the sherman over similar crusader tanks.yours,4th wilts.

 

A must read is "The End of the Beginnin" by Tim Clayton and Phil Craig. It deals with the Comonwealth retreat to Alamein in the Summer of 42 and briefly covers the battle itself.