The following is from Operasjonene til Lands i Nord-Norge 1940, bind II pp. 98–105. The italics are in the original, endnotes in ( ). Words in [ ] were added by me to clarify points. I likely haven't cleaned up all the little grammar bits. Any errors in translation are mine. FURTHER EVENTS IN THE RANA AREA After the conference with the British on 14/5, lieutenant colonel Roscher Nielsen [Norwegian field commander] saw the situation in a somewhat brighter light; it was also expressed in his daily order on 17 May. They had now had some breathing room and used the time to reorganize the units etc. Lieutenant Colonel Nummedal [as the local area defense] ] commander in Mo and, in collaboration with the local police chief, was given responsibility for peace and order in Mo and its surroundings. He was also supposed to among others things implement the call-up of new personnel, muster horses and vehicles, including motor vehicles (the lack of such was very palpable) and obtain labor assistance for road workers (Umbukten and Saltfjellet) in collaboration with the pioneer commander, Captain Østeraas. As previously mentioned, Captain Østeraas made an excellent effort in road clearing, blocking and pioneer service. Due to incidents and abuses, the local defense chief emphasized that consideration was to be shown to the civilian population when accommodating and that all requisition requests were to go through the commandant, the regimental quartermaster or the local defense commander. As regards the condition of the troops, the local defense commander's impression of I/I.R.14 was that the battalion as such had no fighting value. The strength was reduced,(1) and the battalion was demoralized. Nor was the landvernsbataljonen in combat-ready condition. For both battalions, the lack of commanders and lack of training precluded other than purely stationary tasks. Due to the battalion commander's illness, Captain Finn Berg was ordered on 14/5 as commander of the landvernsbataljonen. The local defense commander telegraphed 16/5 to the division: «Our units greatly miss energetic, young commanders. Urgently requests the Division to provide commanders for replacement and supplementation as soon as possible.» (2) Another regrettable incident that shows the agitated mood of the troops should be mentioned here: The local defense commander had decided that the soldiers who had been under Captain Ellinger's command at Finneid should remain a separate force subject to I/I.R.14. About what happened at the formation on that occasion, the commander of the 3rd mitr. team, Corporal Næss, tells, among other things (3) that when the company was to be handed over, the soldiers refused this. They had no confidence in Ellinger, because he was a foreigner, and they suspected him of being in German pay. «This very undeserved suspicion of Ellinger - who was an excellent man of initiative and fighting spirit - has its explanation in the many rumors that circulated about treason ... The soldiers threatened to shoot Ellinger if they were to be transferred to him, and they made a charge [against him]. At the same time, we got ready to defend the captain. The situation was critical and very unpleasant. Violence was averted by Lieutenant Bangstad ordering his people to surrender their weapons. The order was followed...» After the messages received per 16/5 1940 (4) the Germans seemed to have approx. 3,000 men in the Mosjøen - Elsfjord - Korgen area, divided by approx. 600 men in Elsfjord, 3-400 men in Korgen and 1500-2000 men in the Mosjøen area. Close to one thousand men were equipped with bicycles. Of the artillery, 6 smaller and 2 slightly larger guns (respectively approx. 6 cm and 9-10 cm) were reported. Tanks were reported; this is considered uncertain. Some skiers were seen. At Hemnesberget, by boat and plane, approx. 400 men. Their ammunition stock was decreased with the sinking of "Nord-Norge", but the Germans seem to have received additional supplies by air. Two 37-40 mm cannons and mortars were found there. Håpnes vehicle bridge and Brekkvasselv railroad bridge (south of the county border) were under repair, the latter open to traffic within 48 hours. In this region during 15/5, approx. 1500 Germans had gathered. Altogether, it seemed that in Mosjøen - Elsfjord - Korgen that approx. a German regiment was against him. The message from Namdalen indicated that another regiment was being drawn north. By agreement with the British commander, the defense of the Mo area was arranged as follows (5) (see sketch no. 27): The British were to defend the road along the fjord from Finneid towards Mo. Of the Norwegian units, the landvernsbataljonen which previously defended the north side of the Mo and Rana rivers, while I/I.R.14, together with a British company that had the landvernsbataljonen's machine gun company subordinated, was to secure Rana's north side with a main position at Ytteren and with a company (Kp.2) advanced to Sletten with guard duty at Bustneset and reconnaissance towards Strømmen - Strømsbotten. Langvatnet was to be secured by patrols. The battalion would, it was said in the order, probably be reinforced on 17/5 with a landvernskompani company from I.R.16 and a communications troop and a mortar troop from I.R.15. The company that had previously been under Danish captain Ellinger was to be placed under the command of the battalion. Captain Ellinger was to be company commander and have largely the same people as before. The battalion's positions were to be developed as strongly as possible with a view to stubborn defence. The British position at Dalselven was strong and had to be held. However, it was necessary to secure the mountain between this position and Umbukta. Of I/I.R.14, it was only believed to be able to set up two skier squads, each of approx. 60 men. A troop from the area around Bjerkmoen was to clear through Bjerkadalen and prevent enemy advance that way. The other squad was to be from Lille Akers Vn. to clear-up and prevent enemy advance over Store Mål Vn. The squad was to seek contact with Sergeant Riksen's squad (of Lv.kp.2) which previously patrolled the area Store Akers Lake. - Kjennn Lake - Gressvannet. The Swedish captain Björkman with approx. 40 volunteers were to secure the area around Umbukta [These were Swedish volunteers from the Winter War]. (6) He [Björkman] came on 12/5 with 3 commanders across Umbukta to Mo i Rana. On 14/5, 36 men of his people followed. The squad was set up and in order on 16/5. Captain Björkman was difficult to deal with on the authority of K.G. sent back over the border 18/5 by the local defense chief along with his men. In the local defense commander's order, it was stated that the task the skier troops were given required boldness and the ability to use the loins. German patrols were to be attacked wherever they appeared. Information about the enemy had to be obtained. The supply service was built up under the condition given by the leadership that the Mo area should be held. The quartermaster had supplies for approx. 14 days. Out of consideration for the danger to the air, rations, material and ammunition were stored scattered. (7) The supply service also went smoothly in the Rana area, and the troops lacked nothing for their sustenance. (See sketch no. 27) On the afternoon of 17/5, the Germans attacked Dalselvstillingen. This strong position was occupied by the I. Battalion Scots Guards with two companies. Ind. Coy. No. 1 and the battery which were subordinate to the battalion stood a little further back along the highway. The force's B-echelon (8) and later the battalion's "B-company" from Ytteren stood in a rear position at Lundenget. The battalion's "C-company" was moving from Bodø to Røsvoll. By 1830, there was a full battle at Dalselven. The four British 25-pounder guns had little effect as the battery's wire connection was shot to pieces. The British succeeded in stopping the attack along the highway. The Germans suffered several losses as they tried to cross the blown bridge with planks. Despite Norwegian warnings, the British had not occupied the heights. The Germans with parts of their main force at the national road succeeded in making an immediate movement and in attacking the British at Dalselven in the flank. After stubborn resistance, the two British companies had to fall back through the reserve position at Lundenget at 0200 on 18/5. (9) The afternoon of 17/5 approx. 150 Germans had been reported southeast of Bjerkmoen during the advance north. The two Norwegian ski squads were driven away, the western one without putting up any resistance, while the squad at Lille Akersvann held on well. (10) The message about the enemy at Lille Akersvann, which the British companies at Dalselven received around 1800, was that these were parachute troops, and when an hour later a 12-year- old boy came running and announced that the Germans were close by, the British assumed it was the same force. (11) At 2100 hours, the local defense commander called and asked the Finnish volunteers, who were now standing at Meyergårdeni Mo, to take care of a force of approx. 60 men who had skied over Mofjellet and were about to fall behind the British. In a report of 22/5 1940, Ensign Stavheim tells about this: «Our boys, 38 men, immediately left by car, and had not gone more than 20 m from the car before the first shots from the machine guns of the Germans rang out. Our force had previously split into two and one half attacked the Germans in the flank. The German section was completely split up and beaten back by our boys. Then English soldiers arrived and took over the security of this front, but we did not hear gunfire from there later.» Sergeant Thore Jacobson, Borlånge, Sweden, fell during the skirmish, which took place at a small cage-raising mill southeast of Smelteverket. 4 men were injured. The liaison officer at Ind. Coy. No. 1, lieutenant Nils Ebbesen, in report 15/12-41, tells of a battle with a German "parachute squad", which must be of the same strength. In the report it is stated, among other things that the company stood in battle in collection position at Dalselv until 18/5 at 0100 «... And when we received word that enemy parachute troops had landed on our left flank, the company was ordered to withdraw with an assembly point 3 kilometers south of Mo at the smelter. From here a patrol led by Major May was sent up the valley and came into contact with an enemy parachute troop which was destroyed. In the meantime, the company withdrew to Mo where new positions were established in the cemetery. The patrol under Major May went over the mountain, and on the crest of the hill was fired upon by his own troops, fortunately without any casualties. At 1100 the company was ordered to withdraw and marched over the bridge at Dunderlandsdalen to a farm 6 english miles south of Storfosshei where engineering troops blew up both the road bridge and the railway bridge over the river...» On 18/5 at 0230 Lieutenant-Colonel Roscher Nielsen was woken up by Lieutenant-Colonel Trappes-Lomax who announced that his position at Dalselvenvar had been bypassed by superior German forces and that, as no reinforcements had arrived, he was forced to abandon the Rana area. The question of whether the Norwegians alone should continue the defense of Rana was submitted to the division, which decided that they should retreat. (See sketch no. 28 at the back of the book.) The plan for the retreat put together by two local commanders was that the two Norwegian battalions were to be withdrawn immediately to the area around Storforshei, covered by the British. From there, the land defense battalion was to be taken further north on the night of 19/5, I/I.R.14 on the night of 20/5. On 19/5 the British Brigadier Gubbins, who was now in command of the British forces due to Brigadier Fraser's illness, came to Nævernes, where Lieutenant-Colonel Trappes-Lomax then had his headquarters, and without conference and without informing Lieutenant-Colonel Roscher Nielsen, ordered a faster retreat than originally established. (12) It was, says Roscher Nielsen, almost a coincidence that he kept up to date with the events. The consequence was that a large part of the Norwegians' material at Storforshei stood [unprotected] between the last British and the Germans for approx. 5 hours. (13) Norwegian troops, Kp.1/I/I.R.14 was advanced at night to Nævernes. Volunteer unit Ellinger was ordered by Major Sundlo to take a position in Grønfjelldalen to prevent a German advance through this to cut off our troops' retreat through Dunderlandsdalen. The detachment remained here until all Norwegian and British detachments had passed Nævernes. The order to go back did not reach the company - "B-Coy" - which was in the reserve position at Lundenget. The company was cut off by the enemy and considered lost. However, it managed to break free and, after a tiring march in deep snow over two mountain ridges and a large, raging river, the national road reached a few english miles north of Mo and was notified of his presence. (14) Major General Ø. R. Dahl also tells about this later, among others: "Two Swedish "captains" who had both belonged to Björkman's group, Levenhaupt and Sjöberg, had been detached to the British at Dalselven, Levenhaupt to the company in question here. At Krokstrand, Dahl was woken up by the phone during the night. It was Levenhaupt who told about the "lost" company that there was hope of saving if transport could be obtained. Transport was arranged, according to Erskine from Storforshei - which the company had reached after a forced march - arriving at Krokstrand on the morning of 20/5. Dahl states that Levenhaupt later came to England and received the "Military Cross" for his help to the British company. On the night of 20/5, Roscher Nielsen had another conference with Trappes-Lomax at Krokstrand. According to Roscher Nielsen, they agreed to hold a new reserve position at Messingsletten, while the main force should be led over Saltfjellet [the mountain north of Mo] as soon as possible so that they could have time to organize an effective defense in the Storjord - Pothus area. At this point, Trappes-Lomax received orders from General Auchinleck stating that they had now reached a good defensive position and that it was of crucial importance to stand and fight. The general trusted that the Scots Guards would stop the enemy. However, the lieutenant colonel argued that to engage in a decisive battle in a vulnerable position with the high mountain area at his back - would be to waste the only battalion available for immediate defence. After telephonic conference with headquarters, Brigadier Gubbins issued modified instructions which were to "hit hard" and only withdraw when there was serious danger to the safety of the force. (15) According to Lieutenant Colonel Roscher Nielsen's report, Brigadier Gubbin's order was that Trappes-Lomax should remain as long as possible at Krokstrand. From there he was to return to the height of Viskiskoia where he was to hold for at least three days, so that the Irish Guards together with two independent companies would have time to set up the position at Pothus. In reality, three positions were eventually occupied in the Krokstrand area for permanent defence, where the British took up positions behind the blown-up bridges. The Germans were slowed by these blasts and slowly followed. But the battle for the individual positions did not last long, as the enemy forced the defender back by immediate movements and flanking fire from the ridges. The volunteer unit Ellinger always formed the last line of defense for the British and saved them, says Roscher Nielsen in his report, actually three times out of a very difficult situation. Lieutenant Arne Pedersen with his machine gun squad (see below) also played, says the local defense chief, a big role, and Pedersen's machine guns were constantly in action. On 20/5, the Norwegian units, as mentioned before, were located in the area of Pothus- Vensmoen-Drageid. From I/I.R.14’s reduced strength, two skier troops were taken out, each of approx. 40 men volunteers. During bombing raids by German planes against Drageid on 20/5, the following fell: Private 8044/37 Vidar Breirem, Tilrem in Breirem, born 5/7-16. Private 6235/36 Klifford Johansen, Lovund in Lurøy, b. 4/T-14. Gunnar M. Pedersen, Slåttøy in Brønnøy, born 10/11-16. 5051/34 Torleif J. Pedersen, Slåttøy in Brønnøy, born 17/7-13. A Finnish worker volunteer (not named) was fatally wounded. Several men were wounded. In the evening of 22/5 and the night of 23/5, the Scots Guards went back over Saltfjellet and in the morning took up a position at Viskiskoia behind the blown-up bridge, and secured in the flanks by advanced units - Ind. Coy. No. 3 (sent up from Rognan) and two Norwegian ski squads (set up on 20/5 under lieutenants Gruben and Pedersen) starting respectively from Midtistuen - Krukkistuen and Dypenkoia. The enemy attacked on 23/5 em. By 1600 the independent company had been driven back so that the enemy could take the main position under flanking fire. At 1800, Brigadier Gubbins gave the order to retreat to a planned position behind the bridge at Storjord. The enemy did not make contact until 24/5 in the evening. Orders were then given to go back without sustained fighting as fresh troops had now gone into position approx. 20 km further back (at Pothus). Accordingly the Scots Guards with attached detachments proceeded down the valley. The battalion arrived the next morning by boat to Bodø.(16) The Norwegian units that had cooperated with the Scots Guards were placed in Saltdal under the direct command of the local defense commander. For the further events in the Salten area see chapter 17. FNs 1 Kp.1 and Kp.3 were therefore merged, and numbered 100 privates, Kp.2, Kp.4 and the staff company, respectively 70, 60 and 70 men. strong, a total of 300 men. str. (Diary I for I/I.R.14.) 2 1 ensign, 1 sergeant and 18 newly graduated sergeants were distributed on 25/5 to the battalions Omdal and Berg. 3 Report 7/11 1948, p. 7. Captain Ellinger has described the episode as he perceived it - the behavior of soldiers who did not want to fight - in his book «Den forunderlige krig», pp. 78-79. The episode must be seen in connection with what happened at Finneid on 13/5, described on p. 65 et seq. in his book (see above). 4 Local Defense Commander's Intelligence No. 1 per 16/5 1940 (draft in the local defense chief's archive). 5 The Local Defense Commander's directive and orders of 16/5. 6 Swedish Finland-volunteer Björkman had previously participated in the battles in Trysil and N. Osen (see, "Glåmadalføret, Trysil og Rendalen", p.292 ff.). 7 The Chief of Supply, Captain Hilstad's report 14/3-41, pp. 15-17. 8 Corresponds to our combat trains group II. 9 Derry, p. 185. 10 Diary I for I/I.R.15, Major Sundlos report 23/6-41 to the Civil Administration for the Army and Navy. 11 Erskine: "The Scots Guards", page 38. However, as mentioned before, the force the boy warned about was sent out from the main force at the highway. Pref. note 12 To Krokstrand and from there on to Rusånes in Salten. On 20/5 they were misplaced in the area of Pothus-Vensmoen-Drageid. 13 The local defense commander, lieutenant colonel Roscher Nielsen's report 3/6 1940. 14 Erskine: "The Scots Guards -", page 41. 15 Derry, p. 188. 16 Derry, p. 189.