The failure to re-employ Cunningham and Godwin-Austen in front line commands

Hi all, I'd like a discussion on the failure to re-employ generals Alan Cunningham and Reede Godwin-Austen to front line commands after the Crusader campaign.

The reason I ask is, if my understanding of it is correct, that Alan Brooke continued to lament throughout the war on a lack of good commanders. Just because a general had a bad battle/campaign, Brooke understood it didn't always mean the generalship (is that a word?) was bad, other circumstances could be at play.

Both O'Conner and Ritchie were later given Corps commands. O'Conner is very understandable, being re-employed after his release from captivity with the Italians, having been captured in North Africa. But Richie failed, as commander of the Eighth Army. Nevertheless, Brooke had faith in him, concluding he'd been promoted into too higher a command too quickly, and later gave him a Corps Command.

Alan Cunningham had been very successful in East Africa, and on the formation of the Eighth Army, was given command. Unfortunalty, few generals seemed to have done well against Rommel, and Cunningham was one of them, being relieved of command by Auchinleck, seven months earlier than Ritchie, who suffered the same fate. However, as I understand it, an argument can be made that everything wasn't all Cunningham's fault, he was a capable officer, and could have been successful in a future command. But Churchill, placing so much faith on Operation Crusader, wanted scapegoats and Cunningham became one of them, Brooke not being able to persuade Churchill otherwise.

Another to fall to the same fate was Reede Godwin-Austen, who resigned when Richie went behind his back and countermand an order that he had previously agreed with Godwin-Austen. However, Godwin-Austen had previous with Churchill, having conducted a successful retreat and evacuation of British forces in British Somaliland back in August 1940. For Churchill, one measurement of success was a butchers bill, and he held the belief that the colony was lost far too cheaply.

Could either or both of these officers have continued onto successful front line command careers, if given the chance?

 

Hi,

Have you got a reference for that sentence?

Regards

Tom

 

Not really into Top Brass but the question in my mind is: was Monty involved?
He "did" for Anderson after 1st Army was disbanded in 1943.
I can see why but once he made his mind up Monty stuck to his guns.
The Plain Cook and the Great Showman.

Operation Crusader - Wikipedia

Kenneth Anderson (British Army officer) - Wikipedia

Alan Cunningham - Wikipedia

Reade Godwin-Austen - Wikipedia

Might make interesting reading if anyone has the time.
Particularly Reade Godwin-Austen who seems to have prior history with Monty.

 

Hi Tom, no reference, its just my take on how things played out. I'm hard pushed as to understanding why Churchill was so against Cunningham having any further post, after Crusader. Was Churchill expecting a greater victory, was Cunningham used as the excuse why that wasn't so by Auchinleck or others?.

In the notes section of Reede Godwin-Austen's Wikipedia entry it quotes
Alanbrooke in his diary entry of 11 May 1942 wrote: "... Grigg and I tackled PM again about Cunningham and Godwin-Austen, but without any luck! ... the moment their names are mentioned one might imagine they are criminals of the worst order". A further attempt and refusal is mentioned in the entry of 18 May.
Reade Godwin-Austen - Wikipedia

 

Is it not true that Cunningham had to be relieved in the middle of Crusader because of stress, or similar?

 

Mental breakdown or 'exhaustion' are what it has been called in some sources (not to hand).

He was later appointed High Commissioner for Palestine and Transjordan, a position not without its challenges, but one wonders whether there might have been the suspicion of a potential relapse that could be costly on the battlefield.

 

Its in Alanbrooke's diary

 

That is reference!! Thanks.

There are also more details in the Army Records Society volume of Auchinleck's papers:

I think it fair to say that Auchinleck's report was sufficiently damning of Cunningham to cause Churchill not to want him employed again in an active Army command.

Regards

Tom

 

Uncle T.,

Why would you consider that Montgomery had any input on the decisions being made in the spring of 1942 by Churchill or Brooke?

It's not like his career suffered too much by no longer being employed in front-line command either!

Regards

Tom

 

No that is not fully true. He was sacked on the spot as he wasn't up to fighting the battle in the view of Auchinleck. He was then sent to hospital to find a way to make that decision, where Auchinleck probably overreached himself, palatable in London. Cunningham absolutely resented this.

His personal files show IMO and from a quick glance a man who was very much aggrieved by what had happened to him, and who spent his time fighting to control the narrative of the operation that destroyed his career. Reading the letters I am not surprised he was not re-employed.

All the best

Andreas

 

Monty had nothing to do with the decision to relieve Godwin Austen, and I seriously doubt he was asked his opinion about future employement of a man a few ranks above him at the time when Auchinleck was sacked.

All the best

Andreas

 

As noted above, I also think Cunningham engaged in a bit of self-sabotage, by not playing along with the fiction of his hospitalisation very well. Similarly, Godwin Austen resigned his command (he wasn't relieved), which made him 'not a team player', and thus probably unemployable, despite his qualifications.

A lost opportunity in my view. Making him Eighth Army commander instead of Ritchie might well have changed the course of things, as he was undoubtedly able. But he wasn't part of Auchinleck's clique, and had come up with Cunningham.

To quote myself:

#WavellReviews “Eighth Army versus Rommel” by James Colvin » Wavell Room

All the best

Andreas

 

Wow, that's fascinating.

 

The money quotes are below. The first is the official letter from Auchinleck to Cunningham, telling him he is sacked. The second the unofficial letter accompanying the official letter.

These are from Cunningham's personal papers.



All the best

Andreas

 

I was wondering when our Crusader expert would chime in.

Here is an interesting thesis about Cunningham. https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/ws/portalfiles/portal/159062467/2021_Vincent_Dennis_1072010_ethesis.pdf

The author sees Cunningham as a scapegoat and offers many extenuations for him: unfamiliarity with his new command, insufficient time to prepare, inadequate training of 1st SA Division, the inadequacies of Norrie and Gott, etc. I am not familiar enough with Crusader to say how valid these extenuations are. But Crusader was a vital operation in the only place in the world where Britain was confronting the enemy's land forces. For Cunningham to give up on such an offensive after only a few days was a command error of such major proportions that I am not at all surprised that Auchinleck sacked him. I would not have re-employed a general like that in independent command, and I don't blame Churchill. I should add that I am at times bemused by a tendency in modern scholarship to find extenuations for many failed commanders, all of whom are depicted as scapegoats who would have done great things but for, etc. etc. Churchill must at times have gotten heartily tired of senior generals not only offering excuses for themselves but going to bat for their mates who had been sacked for one reason or another. Churchill is a favorite butt of military historians for his impatience and ignorance of modern war. God knows he was wrong often enough. But you have to push in war, and Churchill--with Brooke, too--provided a necessary push.

 

In fairness to Cunningham, Norrie had gotten cold feet at that point too. But otherwise, yes.

He wasn't up to the job. Neither was Ritchie, but Ritchie was on Auchinleck's team, so could get away with murder.

All the best

Andreas

 

Aren't academics judged on the quality and structure of their arguments, rather than the 'truth' of their conclusions? Is there much point in a thesis that supports the consensus?

Nudging it back on topic, it can't hurt to look at the other side of the story. That said, I don't know enough about the Desert War to know whether CRUSADER was a potential victory that was thrown away, or unwinnable from the start.

 

I feel that the British and allied forces could have scored a more decisive victory in Crusader, but - should that be the topic for another thread?

 

Well, despite awkward execution the offensive finally succeeded in most of its objectives. I suppose you could call it a stumble to victory.

 

Thanks for posting that. I've never see it.

I can't find the source (I'm overseas and away from my books and will look when I get back), but one author I read opined that Cunningham had indeed had a nervous breakdown, but he did not accept that this was the case and the 'hospital stay for propaganda' story was supplied by the Auk to sweeten the pill.

Those letters are most interesting, but I don't think they preclude a breakdown actually having happened.

It proves nothing whatsoever, but I'd suggest the possibility of Auchinleck going to lengths to save Cunningham's blushes is certainly 'in character' with all I've read of him.