The Bombing of Bari Harbour 2 December 1943 - a white-wash?

HAARA. I had no intention of refuting or defending any actions on the Day but rather have Stan's view of the going's on as he saw it.
I also thought it was a great opportunity to bump this thread. describing the result of this little known action. I expect Stan's views were as much as anything typical of the rumours and part truths the permeated the area at the time.
Thanks for your report which sets the record straight on the defensive action. there is little doubt that with the habour packed that tight it would be impossible for devistation not to occur. with even a minor raid.
If you recall Halifax was devisted in 1917 as a result of 2 muntion ships colliding.
Matt

 

I did not know of this raid until reading about it now.

Despite the allied casualties, you must give the germans a thumbs up for having staged this perfect strike. Along the lines of the Ruhr dam buster, and Taranto (in which nobody here mourns the losses of civilians and pows in the area).
with 100 (old obsolete type) bombers, 30 ships sunk, 10 more damaged and a wrecked harbour, at a time in which germans had lost air supremacy for quite some time....

interesting: "They(germanfirstplanes) also dropped flares, which were not needed due to the harbour being well illuminated."
" Bari had inadequate air defences; no RAF fighter squadrons were based there, and fighters within range were assigned to escort or offensive duties, not port defence. Ground defences were ineffective.[2]
Little thought was given to the possibility of a German air raid on Bari, as it was believed that the Luftwaffe in Italy was stretched too thin to mount a major attack."

and again, thank you to the inadequate commanders.

My question is; were there any reprisals to the incompetent allied commanders responsible for this disaster ?


edit: I guess not:
In 1986 the British government finally admitted to survivors of the Bari raid that they had been exposed to poison gas and amended their pension payments accordingly

 

To correct another one of the Bari ‘myths’, the R.A.F. was present at Bari, and had night fighters available. On the night of the raid the dusk patrol had recently landed, leaving a window of opportunity for the raiders. Were the Germans aware of this operationally? Three Beaufighters were sent up immediately after the raid began, but were limited by the GCI (Gun Controlled Intervention) available. Fundamentally they risked being shot down by their own side. One did pursue the retreating German aircraft, but lost contact. Allied patrol procedures were amended after the raid to prevent similar ‘windows of opportunity’ occurring.

The planning and execution of the German raid should not be underestimated. Aircraft forming the raiding party were assembled from six different bases in northern Italy, with the raid appearing to have been based on good intelligence from regular reconnaissance missions over Bari, despite many of these being successfully intercepted by both Allied aircraft and H.A.A. fire

The Luftwaffe had previously probed the defences at Bari in November, using Duppelstreifen (Window), this being ‘tuned’ to confuse Range and Direction Finding (RDF) equipment, causing concern amongst the Allies, with a committee being set up to review this, but the raid came before it had reached a conclusion, and new standing orders issued. GL radar was not affected in the same way, working on a different frequency.

In simple terms, the raiders flew under the radar cover, and ‘hid’ behind radar countermeasures, approaching the target from the east, which had not been anticipated, giving them complete surprise. The breakdown of telephone communications between the radar station north of Bari and the Gun Operations Room at Bari contributed significantly to a ‘perfect storm’, exacerbated by the fact that the regular Anti Air Defence Commander was off duty sick on the night of the raid, those present in his place having limited experience to properly interpret radar data interference caused by the Duppelstreifen, leading to a delay in any warnings being issued, and hampered by the breakdown in telephone communications, which lacked any planned resilient backup. The report of the incident included the following in their conclusions:

“… the Anti Aircraft Liaison Officer at S.O.R. showed negligence in not having his telephone rectified before dark on that night”, and recommended that “… in an occupied country where there is a risk of sabotage there should always be an alternative wireless link from S.O.R. to G.O.R. in the same defence area.”

The lighting of the port at night was due to the pressures to bring forward ammunition and supplies for the advancing Allied forces, in particular the US Airforce, the docks working continuously, and, tellingly, in the belief that the Luftwaffe was no longer a significant threat. The lights were immediately switched off after the raid began, but one dock crane remained lit, and was subsequently ‘shot out’. Inexcusable? Without doubt, but it’s easy to be critical in hindsight. The official report “condemned” working in the port under lights at night.

The number of ships sunk or destroyed was seventeen, being 5 American, 5 British, 2 Italian, 3 Norwegian, and 2 Polish, totalling 75,936 tons, whilst the tonnage of ships damaged was 27,289 tons. The port was closed for three weeks with resultant delays and loss of supplies, in particular to the U.S. Airforce.