The Best 'Overall' Written Histories of WW2?

Ok, well there's two that jump out to me straight off. I'm sure there's better out there, but I found them particularly good reference points.

Martin Gilbert's History of the Second World War. The Second World War: Amazon.co.uk: Martin Gilbert: Books

It does what it say on the tin, in fact the first page is about the first day of the war and goes on to describe all the battles and there is a great final chapter dealing with the legacies of the war from 1945 up to the mid 70's. Really good writing and explains things clearly and without any judgement.

The Second is this one: World at War: Amazon.co.uk: Mark Arnold-Forster: Books
The book to accompany the series. Very general indeed but as a teenager it was a good book to dip into the war without getting bogged down in detail.


One of the problems is finding true "overall" histories - books that cover both Pacific and European theatres in equal measure. There are many that cover the European theater or the Pacific Theater exclusively and they are fine histories (Fall of the Third Reich by Shirer is an example of this) but can they be classed as "overall" or am I just nitpicking??

 

John Keegan said 'no history of the Second World War has been written'. Furthermore it'd be well into this century before someone did so.

I still feel that to a greater degree that stands.

 

John Keegan said 'no history of the Second World War has been written'. Furthermore it'd be well into this century before someone did so.

I still feel that to a greater degree that stands.
Thats a very valid point Swiper, the problem is that there is just so much information, how can it be satisfactorily told in one volume without getting too detached?

 

As Adam mentions aren't Winston Churchills Vols on WW2 pretty good? I haven't read them or seen them but they seem to get used a fair bit as sources in books.

 

Adam
Alanbrooke's diaries cover much of WW2 - I have had complete volumes of both Churchills and A.P. Taylors sagas still in the original shipping plastic -for some years now hoping that I can crack them open one day- but the days are getting shorter......

Cheers

 

Slightly off topic I keep thinking about buying Alanbrookes diaries for the BEF stuff

 

Max Hasting's 'All Hell Let Loose' is very good. I recommend it to my Advanced Higher pupils as a good general introduction before they specialise in say the Battle of the Atlantic or the role of the British army in WW2 for their dissertations.

Len

 

Max Hasting's 'All Hell Let Loose' is very good. I recommend it to my Advanced Higher pupils as a good general introduction before they specialise in say the Battle of the Atlantic or the role of the British army in WW2 for their dissertations.

Len

Please, please don't. His work, for the most part, is utter drivel whenever the British Army is involved.

But yes, I rather enjoyed Why the Allies Won by Richard Overy. It has some pretty glaring problems and isn't quite a narrative history, but is engaging and rather decent. I also read as a young teen 'The Second World War' by John Keegan which I will hold up there as a good read. But do agree with Keegan + Gerard that thus far no one has been able to condense it suitably. This is evident in histories of Overlord and North Africa, simply the amount of sources required soon becomes bewildering and direction is easily lost.

 

Please, please don't. His work, for the most part, is utter drivel whenever the British Army is involved.

Why so? (A serious question, not an accusation ...)

Best, Alan

 

Please, please don't. His work, for the most part, is utter drivel whenever the British Army is involved.


I find Hastings work to be ok, at least I couldnt find anything too wrong with him. His books Nemesis and Armageddon were, IMHO, good reads. Just my opinion though

 

Swiper,
the great strength of the Scottish Advanced Higher is that the pupils have to learn about Historiography ie. the fact that different Historians have differing strengths, weaknesses and biases. No one author or book should dominate the pupils thinking so mine will read inter alia, Churchill, Keegan, Hastings, Pitt (highly recommended on this forum for North Africa) ,Alanbrooke, Overy, Calder, Barnett, Charmley, Taylor etc. The reading list certainly keeps them busy and soon separates the sheep from the goats.

Len

 

Ah thats really good. I must say historiography is taught far too weakly, had a horrid feeling that you were just showing them Hastings (as originally had happened to me in my teens!)
Alan: PM incoming.

 

I cannot imagine that a single author could adequately cover the war in its entirety. The scope is just too broad. Plus, I think it depends on what you want to study.

There is a heavy concentration of discussion in this forum of ETO and Med, which is fine - we talk about what interests us most. I am certain that Alanbrooke's accounts are enlightening, but I stongly doubt that his discussion and analysis of the war in the Pacific is very involved at all, considering that the theater was mostly a US affair that consumed around 40% or more of the US war effort. I don't think that a book or series of books could equal S.E. Morison's opus, where the naval Pacific war is concerned. But then, he does not cover the ground war adequately, I guess mainly because he was a naval officer.

I think you would be better served by picking books or series of books by learned and well respected authors devoted to particular, broad aspects.

 

I would agree with Jeff.
Each historian has a certain bias based on theatre of operation and country of origin.
I knew zippydooda about the Italian Campaign. That changed when I purchased 'The D-Day Dodgers, The Canadians in Italy, 1943-1945 by Dancocks. It was recommended by Tom Canning, a Veteran of the Italian Campaign.

 

I have nine general histories of the war, and I am not fully satisfied with any of them.
Sulzberger and Snyder are popular and superficial. Liddell-Hart is too partial towards his own theories of war. Have only read a little of Calvocoressi and Wint, wasn't overly impressed. Collier blames the Americans for every Allied disappointment. Murray and Millett is opinionated, overestimates the Germans, and misunderstands the British. Weinberg is often good but long-winded and so huge that you get lost in it. Keegan's history is far from his best job. I like much of Willmott's Great Crusade, but at times his treatment of operations is too skimpy. He gives the home fronts scant attention and he manages the difficult feat of overestimating the Red Army's contribution to Allied victory. I consider Alanbrooke a source, not a history, and Churchill is best thought of in the same way.

I haven't read Hastings' general history and I don't want to. He writes well, but he does too much back-seat driving. He also overestimates the German army and underestimates the Allied armies, a common fault in his generation of historians.

 

Ah thats really good. I must say historiography is taught far too weakly, had a horrid feeling that you were just showing them Hastings (as originally had happened to me in my teens!)
Alan: PM incoming.

Awww don't PM share your thoughts with us all ...I for one am also interested in your thoughts on the book

 

History was certainly taught in Guards regiments during the evening 'shiny parade' tales of Hougoumont Farm Waterloo and the Saving of the Colours at Alma. Done for a reason and rightly so. At higher levels the overall picture like Cromwell's portrait came warts and all. It is a risky business talking history, the risk is always there that some will mistake the message and wish to shoot the messenger. Post world war two the general staff held 'wash ups'. The question posed? 'Why did the British Army perform poorly during the war'. Some will I have no doubt be bristling already. Fact is there was much that went wrong and cost lives. The bravery and tenacity was not in question, ability was. Why? In short and it would be wise to research yourselves. Some conclusions I will cover again in short. Lack of a firm doctrine, the constant changing of infantry and tank cooperation. War department had ideas but made no attempt to enforce them, leave it to commanders to work out - if they felt like it! The post war conclusion which is hard for any of us to stomach was to move away from the regimental system which was considered too rigid and cumbersome. The German system of organic command where the commander had his support,guns and armour under direct command, he could order and not request a gun shoot etc. Training was considered as inadequate and often poor with no attempt at realism, armoured regiments training in open areas - Salisbury plain and Norfolk where they knew that the fighting would often be in close country. The use of 'experienced' units on D day was criticized, the soldiers held a not unreasonable view that they had done their bit, this along with officers openly displaying hostility to the idea they would be the first in. AWOL rates went up with sickness rates. Commanders openly defied orders to train for the invasion, the 'we know how to fight attitude' and the refusal to be trained by those who had not been in the thick of it. That the training teams had worked out the problems was not accepted, subsequently units went into action without experience of close country fighting with armour and paid dearly for it. It may astonish some that in 1944 infantry battalions were being shot up badly because of failure to train. Whilst other battalions knew what they were confronting and dealt with it. Infantrymen at Waterloo were aware of the reverse slope defence as were many German commanders and some British battalion commanders. The principle of using high ground is a sound one the defence of that high ground when likely to be attacked is one that requires training because it does not when described seem logical, training overcomes that. If asked to defend high ground you hold. The approach might be to line the top line or ridge with dug in positions and that is fine, the next step? Maybe digging in staggered fire trenches to your frontage and defend in depth. Reverse slope defence does not do this, digging in on the frontage exposes your trenches to direct fire from guns, tanks MG and section weapons, so we dig in in depth down the reverse slope out of line of sight weapons the positions are then only able to be engaged by unsighted mortar and possibly guns. The question then is how on earth do you see your enemy? Well the top line defences may succeed in keeping the attacker off the high ground, if the attacker does break onto the top line he is in the killing zone on the horizon as the defence engages the attacker from the in depth positions on the reverse slope. It worked and worked for centuries yet we had battalion commanders stymied by these tactics. The question became why? However unpalatable these questions needed to be asked then to change attitudes and training methods as indeed the time is right for historians to discuss now the failures and successes. Many histories gloss over the failures. The armour came out of it with a much better report than the poor old infantry.


Over the years I have noticed that those who take one view will describe historians who give a counter argument as not a good historian.


On checking: Tunisia led the British to implement tactical exercises in England to deal with German reverse slope defences. These were not especially popular, or apparently very widespread. I assume this is recorded in histories?