I've just found and started to wade through a very interesting doctoral thesis by Norman Kenneth Murphy on the aforementioned battle. It's an utter excoriation of Wavell's handling of - well, just about everything. His summing up is borderline vitriolic, but you can't say that he fails to produce evidence. I can only assume that it was well-received as my impression so far is that there's a solid weight of original research contained within. Link: https://hydra.hull.ac.uk/assets/hull:5595a/content [Slow-ish to load owing to size] You can - I think safely - skip the historiography and bibliographic sections and begin at page 82.
Charley, I've just skimmed the bits about the decision to deploy to Greece, but think I have spotted several factual errors amongst the otherwise refreshingly controversial analysis of Wavell's decisions. For example, he seems to have assumed that the 6th Division that was planned to be used for 'Mandible' was Australian, when in fact it was the British 6th Infantry Division. Nonetheless, thanks for the link. Regards Tom
Thanks for the note of caution - acknowleded. I only spotted grammatical and punctuation errors - perhaps indicative of the fact that I'm way outside my field of expertise. I must say, the accusation that Wavell was more concerned with his accomodation, transportation, sports, poetry and familial impedimenta than his job doesn't entirely ring true - my dip into his diary as Viceroy of India had my labeling him mentally as a workaholic with an ascetic temperament.
Charley, That Wavell made mistakes maybe true, but I'm more on the 'he had an incredibly difficult job, across a huge area and with inadequate resources' side of the fence. As always the mistakes in retrospect seem glaring but Wavell didn't get that luxury and just had to keep bashing on through all the ups and downs. At the very least, he had tried to do some thinking between the wars about how the army should fight in the future. Regards Tom
The paper is an interesting read for somebody who doesn't have any prior knowledge of the events and context. The Battle of Mersa el Brega - the battle that never was - and the the failure of 2nd Armoured Division and British generalship is not something that history has given much of an airing. Brits tend not to enjoy reading about how bad they were at BIG warfare..... So, a new subject dealt with in some detail. However, for a serious piece of academic study, I question its value and quality. A criticism directed more at the supervisor than the PhD student. If you have read up on the subject, especially working through the primary documentation, you will see it also comes up pretty short on historical facts and manages to offer up some rather questionnable arguments. But, as said, a good place to find a lot of data on a piece of military history that has been deliberately swept under the carpet for so long.
Posted the link as I found it an confessed that it wasn't my area. Happy to hear the specifics of your criticism if you fancy posting them.
There might be some useful info on this thread - Desert War Tobruk Documentary I have to admit I did not realise how much the Germans knew of British/Allied plans Another link here - Intercepted Communications for Field Marshal Erwin Rommel | HistoryNet TD
Here's some more reading for you to wade through.... Be wary of some of the claims by one of the posters who is an author who seems to be attempting to rewrite history. WO 32/9596 2 Armd Div withdrawal Pt 1 • Axis History Forum The "lost" battle of Mersa el Brega, Libyan desert, 31 March • Axis History Forum Mersa Brega 31st March 1941 • Axis History Forum M.G. Bataillon 8 31/3/41 - 14/5/41 • Axis History Forum Panzer-Regiment 5; Panzers Damaged/Destroyed • Axis History Forum 3rd Armourd Brigade Destroyed in the Desert • Axis History Forum
