The Battle of Arras - Rommel's bloody nose

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Rommel Papers, The - By Erwin Rommel - 1953

 

For those interested, here are the German files on the matter, available until 6 July:

http://www.yousendit.com/download/QlVoVWRzNnlubVVFSzhUQw

http://www.yousendit.com/download/QlVoVWRzNnlIcWRFQmRVag

Happy reading.

All the best

Andreas

 

Cheers Andreas

 

Anytime.

I should mention that these are the English translations of the war diary of 7. PD, carried out for the purpose of writing the official history in the 1950s. The detailed Lagekarten were a stroke of luck I had five years ago, where I was able to take the pictures while coming across them looking for something else.

All the best

Andreas

 

Nick (and others),

The Army branch "Fremde Heere West", by Oberst (Colonel) Ulrich Liss was in charge of army intelligence. They assessed all adversaries extensively. And quite accurate I believe, although only the assessement of the Dutch and French troops are known to me.

I am positive that an assessement on both the French and British army must have been made. It is often said that particularly the British army strength was overestimated. I have never seen paper proof of that.

It is certain that the French doctrine was well assessed and used against the Allies too. The effects of shock tactics were amplified by the French dogma of contineous lines (ligne continu). Local penetrations caused French units to withdraw in broad perspective, like that was so vividly demonstrated in the 10-13 May period ahead of the Meuse defences. In stead of rallying the German forces or developing hit and run tactics with the light cavalry against formations, local penetrations of even scout parties caused wide sectors to be evacuated. The most prominent proof of that was seen near Bouillon. It was a major aid to the German scheme. Working with vast avant gardes way ahead of the bulk of the most forward divisions, the avant gardes were able to push away the French back behind the main line. In such a way that one could argue if the French defeated themselves or if they were defeated as to the forward defences (ahead of the Meuse) that Gamelin had called so precious.

Beside the French reflex of maintaining bulge-less (sans saillant) defences, the good old directive order (that the Germans called Normaltaktik or Befehltaktik) was the enemy of French (and French orientated) forces. It left local Allied commanders paralyzed when raided and made them utterly predictable. As opposed to the German Auftragstaktik - that left local commanders much room to initiative within the paradigms of their tactical order. The Manstein/Guderian break through tactic at Sedan was designed against the awareness that French forces would rather move back and reorganize than counter on their own initiative. That was where the fast mechanized and motorized formations had to profit.

The only French units that would have been excellent for the job of countering a German penetration (in force), were the DLM's. These units were shaped along the Guderian mould. They had been formed to be used as most prominent manoeuvring units in (counter)offensive battle, much to the images that people like Prioux and De Gaulle had with the future French army. The three active DLM's were however abused by Gamelin as (more or less) static defence formations! The first being parked in the far northeastern corner near Turnhout (B.) and the two others in the Cavalry Corps of Prioux that had to defend the Gembloux void ahead of the main force of the French 1st Army. Notwithstanding a tactical victory gained by 2.DLM and 3.DLM in the battle for Hannuit and surroundings - they managed to contain the 3rd and 4th Panzer - they lost tremendeously material-wise. It would have been this Cavalery Corps that could have made the difference between a quick German victory and a gradual one. For if Prioux' CC would have been available as the strategic reserve in the back of the 2nd and 9th French, Guderian would have never been able to break out at Sedan like he did.

Like it was said in this thread, the French DCR (battle tank divisions) were totally inapt to gain on a win. Those were nut crackers, able to bash through heavy defences, but like all mastodonts, breathless within short. The light mechanized units were more than suitable to develop out of a DCR created breach and gain and maintain momentum. There had been four of those. Three employed in the forward defences in the north (as said hereabove) and the fourth in the GQG, where it was still in build-up.

 

IMO the DLM, while more balanced tham the DCR, was far from an ideal unit. Being designed for recon it didn't have much staying power though at least it could be counted on to go into combat after a road march without a long gap to refuel and regroup. Hannuit was a Pirric victory, 3rd and 4th Panzer fought on and eventually joined the Panzer corridor while Prioux's Corps was never a threat again. The problem with most allied tank forces is that they were designed as infantry support units in set piece battles and not able to hold ground by themselves, far less exploit an initial success, command paralisys prevented the rapid creation of combined arms groups. The Arras episode shows German infantry cought unprepared was just as prone to tank panic as the allies but to take advantage of that you need to keep pushing not retreat and give them time to regroup.

The most balanced allied unit was probably the British first armoured but it was a sad case of too little too late coupled with tactical blunders, at Abbeville the allies had a crushing armour superiority but achieved little, Stonne saw 3DCR and 3DIM, on paper a strong combined arms force, fail to pin the Germans and prevent the reinforcement of the corridor (they faced 3 different Germans corps during the battle as each disengaged and moved west).
Arras was better but what was needed was to punch through the corridor not to just make a raid, the forces theoretically available were substantial and the final result disappointing.

AFAIK the reserve include the 3 DCR and a bunch of other divisions, so it's not like there was nothing, the real problem was the lack of preparation for a fluid situation that left the initiative entirely in German hands..

 

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IMO the DLM, while more balanced tham the DCR, was far from an ideal unit. Being designed for recon it didn't have much staying power ...

Where do you get that these divisions were designed for recon??? The DLM, the light mechanized divisions, were cavalry battle divisions, designed to be used as the most formidable tactical manoeuvre units in the French army. Apart from that, one does not design a division to recce duties.

Hannuit was a Pirric victory, 3rd and 4th Panzer fought on and eventually joined the Panzer corridor while Prioux's Corps was never a threat again.

I called Hannuit a tactical victory, which it was. The Cav Corps was intended to delay the German avant garde ahead of the main forces of the 1st French to move into the Wavre-Namur defences. Cav Corps succeeded in that. There is no argument that this tactical victory didn't pay off in the long run. BTW, as I said earlier, the DLM's were abused as defensive avant garde divisions in the Gembloux void. That was exactly why they were not available in a later stage when their dynamic and powerful tank forces were much needed.

The problem with most allied tank forces is that they were designed as infantry support units in set piece battles and not able to hold ground by themselves, far less exploit an initial success, command paralisys prevented the rapid creation of combined arms groups.

That was not the case for the DLM's. DLM's were cavalry battle divisions with their own infantry support and particularly designed to gain momentum and render substantial battlefield successes. These French divisions were as potent as the German tank divisions, better in many cases.

The most balanced allied unit was probably the British first armoured but it was a sad case of too little too late coupled with tactical blunders

I disagree. The British had no balanced units and it took at least well into the desert war before they managed to form and shape some. The French DLM's were balanced divisions, although perhaps too large. Like the Germans decreased the volume of their tank divisions to more practical shape and size after the Westfeldzug. Besides, the Allied units particularly failed adequate wireless com sets on every tank (like the Germans had) and adequate tank tactics.

Stonne saw 3DCR and 3DIM, on paper a strong combined arms force, fail to pin the Germans and prevent the reinforcement of the corridor

Did you study that one?

Arras was better but what was needed was to punch through the corridor not to just make a raid, the forces theoretically available were substantial and the final result disappointing.


Really? Don't you think the Allied high command didn't know? The utterly brave British effort at Arras was undertaken knowning the French could most likely not assist and in the conviction that a modest local success was all there could be hoped for. Better to try create some shock perhaps tempting the Germans to halt or even withdraw a bit, than to avoid battle any further. The forces theoretically available were not substantial at all. Because all knew it would take days to get the desired formations into place.

AFAIK the reserve include the 3 DCR and a bunch of other divisions, so it's not like there was nothing, the real problem was the lack of preparation for a fluid situation that left the initiative entirely in German hands..

Agreed. That is what I said before. Good to read that you concur ...