The Ardennes Offensive

Stolpi
Have it your way then..but I still chuckle at the use of your "Allied " team - as again in my view - that seldom happened from Kasserine - Gabes gap - Salerno - Cassino - Anzio - Falaise - Ahrnem -and the Bulge.....

Cheers

 

To Slipdigit

Jeff,
Your line about pissing out of the boot, even with instructions from the heel brought a belly laugh.
A light hearted thanks from your neighbour north of the 49th parallel.

 

The winning team in the North, only Gerow of US Vth Corps is missing.

 

Steve,

Apologies for the delay in responding, I have had someone in my immediate family who has been in the hospital and that has required my attention moreso than this good forum.

I was not clear in my response to the accusation of unpreparedness as to what I actually I took exception. Again, I offer apologies for that error. While I detailed a laundry list of responses enacted at the army level of command (as opposed to army group), my disagreement actually is not with what the Commander, 21st AG did or did not do vs what the Commander, US First Army did or did not do to resolve the impending possible disaster.

My disagreement is with the accusation made previously by a member here in another thread and then alluded to by that same member in this thread, that the commanders of SHAEF and 12th Army Group were derelict in their duty during the crucial days after 15 December 1944, by spending their time during this important time banging their mistresses outside Paris instead of tending to the crisis they knew that they were facing in the Ardennes.

We can argue the merits of the decisions made at nauseum, but I find it greatly disengenuous for a member to make unproven, jingoistic accusations, veiled or otherwise, and promote them as fact.

 

Jeff

I am the member who made the TRUE statements that both Eisenhauer and Bradley were with Ikes Driver - the Irish woman who became an American member of your women's Army the name and nationality of Bradley's companion is not known - Ike's Diarist was in Paris dining with Ernest Hemingway- Bedel Smith did fire the British Intelligence members Strong and Whitely for even suggesting that command of the Northern sector should be given to Monty - on the FOURTH
day of the attack Ike finally emerged to make Monty commander of the Northern sector....

Now I do take exception to your term "banging their mistresses" as I do not KNOW what they were doing - BUT I do know that I do not use such terms - but I do know that Nigel Hamilton is an honest man and if he writes that Ike and Bradley spent time in Paris with two females - I tend to believe him

However I have no doubt you will still feel angry at many of my comments when it concerns your leaders in Europe as I happened to be there at the time and have studied that area very well and I haven't studied the Pacific areas but accept
the statement by Field Marshal Alanbrooke as he was the ONLY member of the Joint Chiefs to visit MacArthur as being the ONLY American General with ANY strategic vision.....so go and chew on that for a while

Cheers

 

No chewing on my part is necessary, Tom. I would have to accept it as fact, first.

Glad you were there and appreciate your service and dedication. Since you mentioned that you were "there," how were the views of 21st AG and SHAEF from Italy?

I'm not sure what you are trying to say about Hemingway and how it relates to Paris, as he was on his way to Luxembourg on December 17, where he was hospitalized with pneumonia for a week.

Yes, MacArthur, I know him. If I remember correctly, he was relieved of command in 1951 because of his strategic vision.

 

Thanks. I'll be here all week. Don't forget to tip the waiters and waitresses.

 

Jeff

I only threw in the fact that Ike's diarist was dining in Paris with Hemingway on 16th December to show a time line of the Paris visitor who was never too faraway from his boss

How did we look upon 21st Ag and Sheaf from Italy - good one .... you must appreciate that MANY serving in Italy after the campaigns in Africa and Sicily with both British 1st and 8th Armies had been actually fighting

since July in 1940 - if you study the history of 11th Hussars in 7th Armoured Div ( who went on to D Day etc ) WITHOUT any leave at home.....then British 2nd Army comes along - in 1944 entitled BLA - which meant British Liberation Army

but to us simple minded squaddies - years without leave at home - this became the British Leave Army..as they seemed to be on leave to the Uk every six weeks or so....just perception really...Sheaf - overblown club for the useless

Mac Arthur was NOT fired for his Strategic Vision but rather the US had changed whatever Strategic vision they had to that of NOT actually winning wars but rather keeping the Military/Industrial complex in full employment - see the defeats

of Korea - Viet-Nam - Panama - Iraq 1 and 11 - Afghanistan and show me your strategic vision to-day in rattling their sabres at Iran...?

Cheers

 

I am certain Nevil appreciates your opinion of his service.

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Regardless, thanks for supporting my contention made in post 124 in regards to your motivation.

 

I've just noticed this question, and it occurs to me that the distance is a little further than that between the French high command and their troops at Sedan facing the 1940 breakthrough in the Ardennes and those French generals have been widely criticised for their failure to be close to the situation.

This thread sums up for me many of the reasons that I focus on 1940....

 

Where should SHAEF need to be? Brussels in the north, Rheims in the center or Nancy in the South? Or somewhere else? The front was quite long. If SHAEF moves closer to any one of the three army groups, it is still going to be a pretty good trot to the other AGs.

If memory serves me, the Gamelin had no radio at his location and all his communications had to carried by a motorcycle courier.

 

Re HQ locations: Bradley's Army Group Headquarters at Luxemburg was too close to the front. His refusal to move it further back, did cost him the command of the troops north of the breakthrough: the U.S. First and U.S.Ninth Armies.

 

Bradley's command problem was also a communications problem. 12 AG deployed either side of the Ardennes. Once the Germans broke through it was not easy to maintain contact across the bulge, by radio or dispatch rider. The logical solution was the one adopted - shifting the Army group boundary South to put the allies North of the Bulge under one commander.

Montgomery argued that Eisenhower's problem was that he did not have a land commander. I am not sure that is necessarily so. Kesselring combined theatre command with land force command in Italy and controlled the German land battle with more grip than SHAEF appeared to impose. This may be more a reflection of Eisenhower's leadership style - and the strategic situation.