Sword Beach.

Discussion in 'NW Europe' started by Trux, May 4, 2012.

  1. Trux

    Trux 21 AG

    SWORD BEACH.
    ODDS and ENDS.

    RASC.
    Few RASC units were landed in the first six hours. Partly this was because they were best carried in LSTs which would mainly land on the second tide. Partly of course there was no great need for supplies to be moved forward in the first few hours. Finally the 3ton lorries were likely to cause problems on the beach and were best landed onto prepared landing sites from Rhino ferries. Those vehicles that did land, especially bridging vehicles, did cause delays at the beach exits.

    106 Bridge Company.
    This company provided the following platoons for the initial landings:
    1621 Platoon (Bailey)
    1623 Platoon (Bailey)
    1624 Platoon (Pontoon)
    1626 Platoon (FBE)
    1629 Platoon (Assault)

    In addition the following landed by D+5
    1622 Platoon (Bailey)
    1641 Platoon (Bailey) from 147 Bridge Company.
    1649 Platoon (Assault) from 147 Bridge Company.


    The priority for 106 Company was to carry forward material to help 185 Brigade maintain its momentum if bridges were blown or otherwise unusable. 1626 Platoon carried Class 9 Folding Boat Equipment. 1629 Platoon carried assault equipment which included stormboats and anti tank gun ferries. Bailey Bridging for use on the Caen Canal and River Orne would land later.

    All the vehicles landed fully loaded with bridging equipment. Additional equipment was landed on Queen and Nan beaches by Landing Barge Vehicle. This was unloaded and stored in an RE Beach Dump, from which the bridging vehicles were replenished. Later a larger RE bridging dump was formed at Tailleville for 1 Corps.

    Some of the first vehicles to land were those of 1626 Platoon carrying FBE equipment for 8, 9 and 185 Brigades.

    Those for 8 Brigade landed by 0920 hours. The beaches were under fire and the sand was soft. Most of the vehicles had to be hauled off the beach by recovery vehicles. This and the congestion on the beach meant that clearing the beach was slow. Two vehicles had cleared the beach by 1010, three more by 1045 and two more by 1100. The eighth vehicle damaged its steering when being towed. The seven undamaged vehicles were despatched to their rendezvous at Benouville. The vehicles arrived by 1200 hours and parked along the road until 2230 when they were parked in an orchard. Rafting began at 2300.

    Five vehicles of 1626 Platoon carrying FBE material for 9 Brigade landed at 1430 and proceeded to Lion Sur Mer. They were forced to evacuate the area owing to enemy fire. One vehicle was disabled by mortar fire.

    1629 Platoon with assault equipment landed in three batches at 0920, 1130 and 1330. They went to Benouville and into the marshalling area without casualties.

    The first eight vehicles of 1621 Platoon with Bailey equipment landed at 1200 and arrived at the River Orne bridge site marshalling area at 1400. The vehicles were unloaded and returned to Queen Beach to reload at 2300 hours.

    1622 Platoon with Bailey equipment started to land at 1500 hours and continued to land throughout the day. It was to have moved to Ranville under 3 Canadian Division. It did not carry out any bridging programmes since all bridges were intact.

    1623 Platoon with Bailey Equipment landed on D+2 and moved to the Orne bridges.

    1624 Platoon with pontoon equipment was due to land on D day but remained off the beach from 1800 hours until the afternoon of D+1 when eight vehicles landed but remained on the beach for 6½ hours because of congestion. The remainder of the platoon landed on D+2 but were held up by the fire in the beach dump. All the vehicles eventually reached the bridge site on the River Orne.

    The company headquarters and the remaining platoons landed over Juno some time later.


    172 Infantry Brigade Company.
    For 185 Brigade.
    This company carried ammunition for 185 Brigade. This brigade was to advance as rapidly as possible to Caen and beyond. Being mobile it needed its Ammunition Point to keep up with it. The lorries of 172 Company transported the ammunition and then formed a reserve on wheels. As vehicles issued ammunition and became empty they returned to Sector Dumps to replenish.

    H+240. 7 3ton 4 X 4 GS, Austin land carrying ammunition for 185 Brigade Ammunition Point.
    H+360. 4 3ton 4 X 4 GS, Austin land carrying ammunition for 185 Brigade Ammunition Point.
     
  2. Trux

    Trux 21 AG

    SWORD BEACH.
    ODDS and ENDS.

    SIGNALS
    Signals on D Day can be divided into three main types:
    - The Divisional Signals which were much as for any operation although some modifications were made to the scales of wireless sets and vehicles. As far as possible the various divisional signals companies and sections kept to their normal duties.
    - The Beach Area Signals. The signals sections belonging to the army and navy beach organisations were responsible for providing signals in the beach areas and thus relieved divisional signals of these tasks.
    - Special Sections. To maintain signals on the headquarters ships and craft at sea and to provided communications for units and formations on the beach until their own were set up there were Ship Signal Sections and Beach Signals.


    Signals faced several unusual problems in the early hours of the landings.
    - There could be several headquarters in operation for each unit. Division and brigades had a headquarters on the designated headquarters ship, plus an alternative headquarters on a second ship or craft in case the main headquarters was lost or delayed. At some point the headquarters would land and for a time there could be headquarters on shore and at sea.
    - Water and electronics do not go well together so that before the vehicle mounted sets could come ashore communications depended on small waterproof sets.
    - Motorcycles could not be landed on the beach in the early stages, and when they could land it was by being carried on vehicles.
    - Wire communications were not practical in the early stages. Tracked vehicles damage wires and assault troops have other problems than avoiding wires.
    - In the early stages sets must be carried by personnel, which excludes heavy sets.
    - The great number of units in a restricted area places strains on the number of available frequencies. There are not only army units but RN and RAF units in the same area.
    - The most practical sets for amphibious assault units are those using crystals but this further limits the number of frequencies available since these sets are pre tuned.


    In part these problems were overcome by providing many extra sets and extra signals sections so that links were duplicated and there was a reserve of sets and personnel in case of losses. To insure against the failure of wireless sets 150% spares were landed in the early stages using handcarts.

    The first divisional signals parties landed with equipment in handcarts. These set up stations on or near the beach. When the first vehicles landed the handcart stations were replaced by stations in M14 halftracks and Humber 4 X 4 heavy utility cars. Larger signal vehicles including Lorry Command Vehicles landed on the second and third tides. The following sets and stations were deployed:
    - Jeeps fitted with wireless set No 19 and wireless set No 22. These also carried a handcart on the bonnet carrying wireless set No 19, wireless set No 22 and Reception set R107.
    - Four cable detachments equipped with jeeps and trailers carrying US hand cable laying equipment landed with the second flight and were in action by H + 10 hours. By midnight on D Day it was planned to have wire communications between Headquarters 3 Division, Main Headquarters I Corps, Headquarters 101 Beach Sub Area and Headquarters 3 Canadian Division.
    - Wireless set No 46 was widely used at battalion level and by supporting armour. These sets were waterproof, crystal controlled and could be carried by one man. Although invaluable in the early stages their range was short.
    - Wireless set No 68 was a longer range set also crystal controlled and capable of being carried by one man, but was not waterproof.
    - Wireless set No22 was used for longer ranges and was carried in handcarts, jeeps or by a three man team.

    The problem of multiple headquarters was solved by having them all on one net and ensuring that it was clear which headquarters was operational at any one time. Only that headquarters would answer calls or issue orders.

    Beach Signals provided communications on the beach. The first personnel landed with the first wave and as soon as possible a Main Beach Signal Office was established on each beach to receive and transmit messages for units and headquarters until their own signals were available.

    The divisional reconnaissance regiment provided Contact Detachments. These provided an additional wireless net which passes information regarding the progress of the battle to the divisional commander. It was recognised that battalion and brigade commanders were often too involved in conducting operations to keep division headquarters informed. Initially there were twelve detachments deployed as follows
    - 8 Brigade (Assault brigade) and 185 Brigade (Follow up Brigade) had three detachments which gave one per battalion and one for brigade headquarters.
    - Divisional Headquarters had two detachments.
    - 9 Brigade (Reserve brigade) had two detachments.
    When 185 Brigade passed through 8 Brigade two of 8 Brigades detachments would transfer to 9 Brigade.

    The detachments landing with the first waves landed on foot. Jeeps landed later.

    One patrol of ‘A’ Squadron, GHQ Liaison Squadron (Phantom) would land with Divisional Headquarters in order to pass reports back to Headquarters, 2 Army which was still in the UK.

    Each Division Headquarters Ship had a transmitter which could broadcast messages. Broadcast means simply transmitting information to anyone and not to a particular unit. The Headquarters ship could broadcast for up to 10 minutes twice an hour. 3 Divisions times were 20 minutes and 50 minutes past the hour. Each unit down to battalion and regiment had a receiver on this wavelength. The following information could be broadcast
    - Special Naval Information.
    - Special Army information from corps or division
    - General Situation Reports.
    - Time Signals
    - Air Raid Warnings
    - Movements of friendly aircraft in the immediate area
    - Instructions to a formation if all other means failed.

    All troops were issued with code signs which were to be changed at 0200 hours daily.


    3 Division Signals.
    A normal divisional signals organisation with the addition of the following sections for the landings only. They would come under the Beach Sub Area when it took over responsibility for the beach area.
    10 Beach Signals Section.
    13 Beach Signals Section.
    115 Medium Wireless Section.

    Standard Divisional Organisation.
    Headquarters.
    Headquarters Company.
    M Section. Maintenance.
    No1 Company.
    A Section. Wireless.
    B Section. Wireless.
    C Section. Cable.
    D section. Operating.
    No 2 Company. RA.
    E Section. 7 Field Regiment.
    F Section. 76 Field Regiment.
    G Section. 33 Field Regiment.
    H Section. CRA.
    No 3 Company.
    J Section. 8 Brigade.
    K Section. 9 Brigade.
    L Section. 185 Brigade.
    N Section. RE
    P Section. MG.



    While still at sea headquarters and their signals were on Headquarters ships offshore.
    Divisional Headquarters was on HMS Largs. The signals personnel on board provided the following wireless links. There were also RN and RAF signals aboard.
    - Divisional ‘A’ Wave. This was the command wave and had links to the three infantry brigade headquarter ships, the armoured brigade headquarters craft, and division tactical headquarters. The link was duplicated on the standby headquarters craft HMS Dacres.
    - Commander Royal Artillery Wave. This had links to the headquarters craft of the three self propelled field regiments and division tactical headquarters.
    - Corps ‘A’ Wave. For communications to I Corps Headquarters.
    - Army ‘A’ Wave. For communications to 2 Army headquarters.
    - Air Support Signals Unit. For requesting air support.
    - Contact Patrols. For receiving progress reports.

    Each brigade headquarters ship the following links.
    - Divisional ‘A’ wave.
    - CRA Wave.
    - To supporting RA field regiment.
    - Brigade ‘A’ Wave.
    - Brigade ‘B’ Wave using 46 sets.

    HMS Dacres had in addition
    - Corps ‘A’ Wave.



    Wireless Channels used by 3 Division.

    Army W/T net.
    Afloat.
    2 Army Main Headquarters
    Tactical Headquarters 1 Corps on LSH Hilary.
    3 Division Headquarters on LSH Largs.

    Corps A net (R/T)
    When afloat:
    Tactical Headquarters 1 Corps on LSH Hilary.
    3 Canadian Division Headquarters on LSH Hilary.
    3 Canadian Division Standby Headquarters on LSH Royal Ulsterman.
    3 Division Headquarters on LSH Largs.
    3 Division Standby Headquarters on LSH(S) Goathland.
    6 Airborne Division Headquarters.
    When ashore:
    Main Headquarters 1 Corps.
    3 Division Headquarters.
    3 Canadian Division Headquarters.
    51 Division Headquarters (Listening).

    Corps B net (W/T)
    Ashore.
    Main Headquarters 1 Corps.
    3 Division Headquarters.
    3 Canadian Division Headquarters.
    51 Division Headquarters (Listening)

    Corps Q net.
    Ashore:
    Main Headquarters 1 Corps.
    A/Q 3 Division
    101 Beach Sub Area.

    Division A net.
    Afloat:
    3 Division Headquarters on LSH Largs.
    8 Brigade Headquarters on LSH(S) Dacres.
    8 Brigade Standby Headquarters on LCT. (listens only)
    185 Brigade Headquarters on LSH(S) Goathland.
    185 Brigade Standby Headquarters on LCT. (listens only)
    9 Brigade Headquarters on LSH(S) Locust.
    9 Brigade Stand By Headquarters on LCT. (listens only)
    1 Special Service Brigade Headquarters.
    5 Beach Group. (emergency only).
    Ashore
    3 Division Headquarters.
    8 Brigade Headquarters.
    185 Brigade Headquarters.
    9 Brigade Headquarters.
    27 Brigade Headquarters.
    1 Special Service Brigade Headquarters.
    5 Beach Group. (emergency only)

    Division B net.
    Afloat.
    3 Division Headquarters on LSH Largs.
    8 Brigade Headquarters on LSH(S) Dacres.
    8 Brigade Standby Headquarters on LCT. (listens only)
    185 Brigade Headquarters on LSH(S) Goathland.
    185 Brigade Standby Headquarters on LCT. (listens only)
    9 Brigade Headquarters on LSH(S) Locust.
    9 Brigade Stand By Headquarters on LCT. (listens only)
    5 Beach Group. (emergency only)
    Division Q on 46 set.
    Ashore
    3 Division Headquarters.
    8 Brigade Headquarters.
    185 Brigade Headquarters.
    9 Brigade Headquarters.
    5 Beach Group. (emergency only).

    Division Q net. (46 set)
    Division Q
    Sector Store Dump
    Report Centre 1
    Report Centre 2

    Flank net.
    1
    3 Division. Control.
    1 Corps Main Headquarters
    6 Airborne Division Headquarters
    2
    3 Canadian Division Headquarters. Control.
    Main Headquarters 50 Division
    Main Headquarters 7 Armoured Division.

    3 Division Liaison Officer at Headquarters 3 Canadian Division Headquarters listens on Divisional A net.

    Naval Beach Wave.
    LSH Largs.
    LSH(S) Goathland.
    LSH(S) Dacres.
    Principal Beach Master. Ashore.

    Contact Detachment Net.
    All contact detachments ashore are on the same net and messages passed by contact detachments at any battalion can be picked up by all Brigade and Divisional Headquarters.

    Each Brigade Headquarters Net.
    Afloat.
    A Net on 22 set. B Wave on 46 set.
    Brigade Headquarters
    Three Battalion Headquarters
    Stand By Headquarters Ship.
    Ashore.
    A net on 22 set.
    Brigade Headquarters
    Three Battalion Headquarters
    Battalion Unit Landing Officer
    Liaison Officer with 1 SS Brigade
    LSH(S) Dacres
    ABSS Red
    ABSS White
    5 Beach Group

    8 Brigade Commando Net on 46 sets.
    Brigade Headquarters
    4 Commando
    41 Commando

    6 Commando will be on 2 East Yorkshire Regiment, Battalion Command Net on 46 set.

    Flank Communications Net on land.
    185 Brigade Headquarters. Control.
    9 Canadian Brigade.
    8 Canadian Brigade.
    9 Brigade
    5 Parachute Brigade.

    In addition Brigade Liaison Officers attached to Division Headquarters will have sets on their own brigade net.

    Force Broadcast from Largs.
    Receivers BP 412 issued down to Battalion and Regiment Headquarters. Manned by staff and not signals.



    Special signals personnel.
    Headquarters Ship Signal Section.
    2 officers and 55 other ranks.
    To work the army communications in the Headquarters Ship thus releasing divisional signals to concentrate on their role ashore.

    Headquarters Ship Signal Section, Modified.
    1 serjeant and 15 other ranks.
    To work the army communications on the Brigade Headquarters Ship or Stand By Division Headquarters Ship.

    Beach Signal Section.
    With Beach Signal Section RN forms Beach Signal Unit.
    1 Officer and 28 other ranks.
    - To provide a signals centre at the beaches for the use of the assaulting brigade headquarters on landing and such other formation headquarters as may wish to use it.
    - To provide an immediate reserve of equipment and personnel at the disposal of Officer Commanding Division Signals.
    - To provide the early communications between the Beach Group Commander and his Beach Company Commanders.
    - To provide a link between army units and authorities ashore with naval authorities afloat in the early stages.

    Advanced parties land with assaulting battalion headquarters and provide army communications from the Advanced Beach Signal Station to Battalion Headquarters ashore and Brigade Headquarters afloat, and naval communications to Senior Officer Assault Group and Deputy/Senior Officer Assault Group.

    The Main party lands on the selected main beach half an hour before the Brigade Commander. It provides army operational channels from Main Beach Signal Station to battalions and to division. Also Naval channel to Assault Force Commander.

    Signals nets in operation on landing.
    The assault battalion will not normally operate its sets until after landing to avoid the failure of waterproofing.
    - Once ashore communications are established from Battalion Headquarters to Company Headquarters on the battalion waves No18 sets. Brigade will intercept these communications.
    - Brigade Headquarters will establish communication to Battalion Headquarters on Brigade A and B waves 22 and 46 sets at Battalion Headquarters. Brigade Headquarters Ship and Division Headquarters Ship will intercept.
    - From Division Headquarters to Brigade Headquarters on Division A wave.
    - From Contact Detachments at Battalion Headquarters to Division Headquarters on reconnaissance wave 68R set. Brigade listens.
    - Advanced Beach Signal Station in communication with Battalions on Brigade B wave and SOAG on landing wave.

    H+90 minutes.
    - The Brigade Commander commits the Main Party of the Beach Signal Unit to the beach selected for landing Brigade Headquarters.
    - Main Beach Signal Station is set up near the main exit to the selected beach.
    - The Main Beach Signal Station becomes the Signal Centre for the Brigade Commander. Communications are established to Battalions on Brigade A and B waves, to Division on Divisional A and B waves and to Naval Force Commander and Senior Officer Assault Group on Naval Beach Wave.
    - The Brigade Commander leaves the Brigade Headquarters Ship and goes to Main Beach Signal Station. He should be accompanied by 22 and 46 sets for communication on Brigade A and B waves.

    H+120 to H+360 minutes.
    - Vehicles and sets of Brigade Headquarters proceed to the first selected site of Brigade Headquarters and establish communications.
    - Brigade Commander and party leave the Main Beach Signal Station for the first site.

    Some time in the first 24 hours Divisional Headquarters will land.
    - Vehicles and sets of Tactical Division Headquarters will be carried dispersed on two LSTs or LCTs and committed to the selected beach before Division Headquarters lands.
    - Tactical Headquarters lands from the Headquarters Ship.
    - Division Headquarters can use the Main Beach Signal Station in an emergency until all its sets are ashore.


    Wireless Silence.
    Wireless silence should be maintained up to H Hour on all army nets, including rear links except for:
    - 6 Airborne Division. May use internal nets but should not relax wireless silence before H-90. Silence may be broken to pass urgent information to 3 Division or to call for fire from bombarding ships. Silence will then be resumed.
    - DD Squadrons may relax wireless silence on the minimum number of sets necessary to control launching and the run in. Not before H-120.
    - 5 Assault Regiment and Assault Brigade Command nets may relax wireless silence to check nets. Not before H-15 and only minimum signals to be sent before H Hour.
    - RA Command net may relax wireless silence on the minimum number of sets necessary to control supporting fire during the run in. Not before H-90.

    After H Hour wireless silence may be relaxed by units and formations of the Assault Division and Brigade Headquarter Ships. Other ships and craft relax only within six miles of the coast.

    Except as detailed above wireless silence may be broken only on the orders of the Naval Force Commander. The minimum number of signals will be made and wireless silence resumed as soon as possible.

    The following Code Words will be used as the first word in any message purporting to break or relax wireless silence.

    Corps RT breaking on 1st occasion: Dingdong 2nd occasion or relaxing: Foglamp
    Army WT breaking on 1st occasion: Legbreak
    Division A breaking on 1st occasion: Sprat 2nd occasion or relaxing: Tunny
    Division B breaking on 1st occasion: Mussel 2nd occasion or relaxing: Prawn
    Contact breaking on 1st occasion: Lobster 2nd occasion or relaxing: Whiting


    Codes.
    Apart from the ciphers used in sending messages in Morse there were several lists of codewords to be used in speech transmissions.

    There was a list of 15 code words to be used for the place names of towns and villages.

    There was a list of 15 code words which could be used to report when units had captured (or not) objectives and completed phases.

    There were 5 code words which could be used to report the state of bridges over the Orne and the Caen Canal.

    There were code words which were sent out to inform units when command was transferred to a different headquarters. The transfer itself was pre planned but the timing depended on events.


    COMMENT.
    Add naval signals, and the large number of radar sets in use, and the air must have been so thick with electronic signals that you could hardly walk through them. (My understanding of these things is limited.)
     
  3. Trux

    Trux 21 AG

    SWORD BEACH,
    ODDS and ENDS.

    MORE SIGNALS.

    Air Support Signals Unit
    The Air Support Signals Unit provided communications with 2nd Tactical Air Force in order to obtain immediate air support and tactical reconnaissance reports.

    On shore there were Assault Tentacles, each with a jeep and 2 men with a No22 set, as follows.
    Main Headquarters 3 Division.
    Headquarters 8 Infantry Brigade.
    Headquarters 185 Infantry Brigade.
    Headquarters 1 Special Service Brigade.

    There were also normal tentacles as follows.
    Headquarters Ship HMS Largs.
    Combined Headquarters, Portsmouth.
    Main Headquarters 6 Airborne Division. Still in UK.
    Headquarters 2 Tactical Air Force, Uxbridge.

    The Assault Tentacle with Headquarters 8 Brigade was to join Headquarters 9 Brigade on the orders of Headquarters 3 Division. This would be when 8 Brigade went into defensive positions.

    Headquarters 3 Division had a reception set to receive VHF reports from Tactical Reconnaissance aircraft. Tactical Reconnaissance information was also to be broadcast from Uxbridge and might also be sent to ASSU tentacles.

    If ASSU tentacles became casualties Contact Detachments could be used in the role.

    All the above operated on the same wireless net, A 30.

    H+45.
    1 Jeep with 2 crew. Assault Tentacle for Headquarters 8 Brigade (Assault Brigade). To join to 9 Brigade on the orders of 3 Division.
    H+75.
    1 man. Assault Tentacle for Headquarters 1 Special Service Brigade.
    H+240
    1 Jeep with 2 crew. Assault Tentacle for Headquarters 1 Special Service Brigade.
    1 Jeep with 2 crew. Assault Tentacle for Headquarters 185 Brigade.
    H+360
    1 Jeep with 2 crew. Assault Tentacle for Main Headquarters 3 Division.

    D+1
    1 15cwt 4 X 4 Wireless House or 15cwt RAF Wireless with 4 crew. Tentacle for Headquarters 3 Division.
    1 15cwt 4 X 4 Wireless House or 15cwt RAF Wireless with 4 crew. Tentacle for Headquarters 8 Brigade.
    1 15cwt 4 X 4 Wireless House or 15cwt RAF Wireless with 4 crew. Tentacle for Headquarters 9 Brigade.
    1 15cwt 4 X 4 Wireless House or 15cwt RAF Wireless with 4 crew. Tentacle for Headquarters 185 Brigade.



    ‘A’ Squadron, GHQ Liaison Regiment.
    One patrol would land with 3 Division Headquarters with the task of passing situation reports direct to Main Headquarters 2nd Army.

    H+285
    1 Jeep towing a 10cwt trailer with 3 crew.
    2 Motorcycles. Carried in trailer for landing.
    1 M3A1 White 4 X 4 with 4 crew.

    The patrol landed on time and made its way to Hermanville where it positioned itself close to 3 Division headquarters. The two R 107 receivers had been used afloat from about H – 2½ hours to listen to signals traffic. In particular it monitored the contact detachment net and the command net for 6 Airborne Division. There was a gap in operation while the patrol landed and then monitoring resumed. The Intelligence Officer obtained information direct from Headquarters 3 Division. Information was transmitted back to Phantom in the UK and thence to Headquarters 2 Army. Headquarters I Corps was able to listen in and share the information.
     
  4. gpo son

    gpo son Senior Member

    Quick question did the Brits doulbe up on arty on Sword and Gold as the Canucks did on Juno. Seems the 3rd CID had 1 field regiment of SP's either preists, or sextons 25lb (mostly m7s) per Battalion of infantry. more to follow on its own...arty on Juno thread.
     
  5. Trux

    Trux 21 AG

    GPO's son,

    For the assault both Sword and Gold had three Field Regiments, all Self Propelled. Juno of course had four Field Regiments, also all Self Propelled.

    The usual allocation was one regiment per brigade but Gold had four brigades.

    Mike
     
  6. Trux

    Trux 21 AG

    I am attempting to move my earlier posts on the operation of Sword Beach. The reasons are,
    They will be in a more accessible and readable format.
    The order of posts will be more logical.
    More information will be included.

    Mike.
     
  7. Trux

    Trux 21 AG

    SWORD BEACH.
    OPERATING THE BEACHES.

    After the Assault and Follow Up phases there was no relaxing on the beaches. It was now essential that the forces ashore should be reinforced faster than the enemy could reinforce theirs. If the enemy could move reinforcements more rapidly than the Allies then the whole invasion force would be in trouble. Part of the equation was to prevent the enemy from moving reinforcements but the rapid landing of Allied troops was vital.

    It was also essential that maintenance stores be brought in at a steady rate to supply the forces ashore. It was further seen to be essential that there should be a rapid build up of reserve stocks for the following reasons:
    - Cross Channel supplies could be interrupted by the weather.
    - Cross Channel supplies could be interrupted by enemy sea and air action.
    - If the enemy defence should suddenly crack then the forces ashore must be in a position to exploit the rapid advance. This would need extra supplies, particularly of petrol.
    - If the enemy launched fierce or lengthy counter attacks extra supplies, particularly of ammunition, would be needed.

    It was planned that the following would be landed in addition to normal maintenance.

    By D+3.
    - Ammunition. There should be four days expenditure of ammunition at 21 Army Group rates for all forces due to be ashore by D+5.
    - Fuel. There should be fuel for 50 miles per vehicle due to be ashore by D+5.
    - Supplies. There should be two days supplies for all the forces due to be ashore by D+5.
    - Ordnance. Pre planned and pre packed Landing Reserve Sets would be landed and used until D+9. From D+10 Beach Maintenance Packs would be used. These contained spares and equipment for 30 days.
    By D+41.
    There should be 14 days initial stock of all commodities held in the Rear Maintenance Area.


    The beaches were steadily developed and it was necessary to use considerable initiative and ingenuity to maintain the flow of personnel, vehicles and stores across the beaches. Three elements were involved:
    - The Cross Channel Shuttle Service which kept shipping moving to and fro.
    - The ship to shore service. Some craft of course could cross the Channel and then unload themselves by beaching but the majority depended on the Ferry Service. This was under Navy control.
    - The transport of stores from the beach to the dumps. DUKWs were able to merge this with the ship to shore Ferry Service but General Service lorries played a great part also.

    For the time being we are concerned with the activities of the above from two miles off shore to two miles inland. The organisations involved include:
    The RN Ferry Service.
    RE Transportation Units. Port Operating and Inland Water Transport Operating Companies.
    RASC DUKW and GT companies.
     
  8. Trux

    Trux 21 AG

    SWORD BEACH.
    OPERATING THE BEACH.

    SHIP TO SHORE.
    LSTs, LCTs and Coasters could cross the Channel and then beach themselves for unloading. LSTs and Coasters could also remain offshore and unload into various ferry craft, rhinos and DUKWs.

    9 Port Operating Group
    Headquarters 9 Port Operating Group controlled all Transportation units on Sword. These included:
    Headquarters 9 Port Operating Group
    999 Port Operating Company
    1028 Port Operating Company
    1032 Port Operating Company
    1055 Port Operating Company (less detachment with 11 Port Operating Company)
    1056 Port Operating Company
    1050 Port Maintenance Company

    Plus units of 3 Inland Water Transport Group placed under command for operation and maintenance of Rhino Ferries.
    240 Inland Water Transport Company
    Detachment 927 Inland Water Transport LAW Company.
    Detachment 267 Pioneer Company

    Plus units placed under administrative command until control assumed by Headquarters 11 Line of Communication. These were mainly intended to operate the docks at Ouistreham and Caen.
    Detachment 2 Port Construction and Repair Group
    937 Port Construction and Repair Company
    Detachment 2 Mechanical Equipment (Transportation) Section
    Detachment 965 Inland Water Transport Operating Company.
    Detachment 972 Inland Water Transport LAW Company
    238 Pioneer Company
    42 Mechanical Equipment (Transportation) Section.


    Coasters
    Large numbers of coasters were used. They were of two categories, Motor Transport Coasters and Stores Coasters. All MT Coasters were discharged over the side into craft but some Stores Coasters were beached and dried out.

    Coasters were preloaded some time before D Day and arrived in follow up convoys. At first they carried a single commodity, stores, ammunition or cased petrol. However they were tactically loaded and stores ships had a mixture of stores made up according to pre determined tables. Ammunition was also carried in mixed loads according to staff forecasts of expenditure.


    9 Port Operating Group
    Port Operating Companies were responsible for unloading coasters, whether beached or unloading into craft. In the early stages of the landings personnel arrived by coaster, 28 men on each. After discharging their ship they remained on shore with the Beach Group and were available to discharge the next ships to come in. For the first three days the tasks were carefully pre planned as follows.

    999 Port Operating Company.
    Eight gangs arrived on coasters on the second tide on D Day and worked the first shift discharging as follows, Marcel, 3 gangs, Northgate, 2 gangs, and Glengarrif (900 tons built 1936), 3 gangs. Three gangs were carried on the coasters as reliefs. They, plus five gangs landed from LCI(L)s, took over the discharge of the coasters for a second shift. The original eight gangs completed the discharge of the coasters by the end of the third shift.

    A further eight gangs arrived on following coasters on D+2 and commenced discharging them for he first working shift. Antiquity (300 tons, built 1933), 2 gangs, ???mount (Undecipherable on the source document), 2 gangs, Gateshead (700 tons, built 1917), 2 gangs and West Town (700 tons, built 1921), 2 gangs.

    A detachment of 2 RB19 cranes and 3 RB10 cranes from 1050 Port Maintenance Company worked with 999 Port Operating Company.


    1028 Port Operating Company.
    Three gangs arrived on the coaster Monkstone on the second tide of D Day and discharged it for the first shift. Three relief gangs landed by LCI(L) took over discharging Monkstone for the second shift. A further five gangs arrived on the first tide of D+1 on the following coasters and discharged them for the first working shift. Gladonia (400 tons, built 1939), 2 gangs and Avonville, 3 gangs. Five relief gangs landed by LCI(L) will take over unloading for the second shift.

    A detachment of 2 RB19 cranes and 3 RB10 cranes from 1050 Port Maintenance Company worked with 1028 Port Operating Company.


    1056 Port Operating Company.
    Eight gangs arrived on the following coasters on D+1 and commenced discharging for the first shift. Dunvegan Head (600 tons built 1920), 2 gangs. Dunvegan Head would return later and be hit by shellfire and burned out. Plasma, 2 gangs, Kyle Gorm, 2 gangs and Holborn Head (500 tons built 1925), 2 gangs. Two spare gangs landed by the above plus six relief gangs landed by LCI(L) took over for the second shift.


    1055 Port Operating Company.
    Eight gangs arrived on four coasters D+2. They worked the first shift. The remainder of 1055 Port Operating Company was with 11 Port Operating Group.


    1032 Port Operating Company.
    Sixteen gangs arrived on eight MT coasters on D+1. Eight gangs discharged two MT coasters arriving on D+2.

    On completion of this phase the company organisation reverted to 4 sections of 4 sub sections, 16 working gangs, for further employment. From the PM shift D+2 onwards deployment of units was carried out under the detailed instructions of the Docks Superintendent (Operations) at the Beach Group Control Post to conform to the general policy agreed on at the Ferry Control Conference.

    Officers in charge of the coasters were responsible for ensuring that DUKW drivers displayed appropriate destination signs for their loads.

    In line with civilian practice they were organised in gangs to work each hold. Each gang consisted of 14 men and could work a hatch. It consisted of:
    NCO, hatchman
    checker
    two winch drivers
    six men in the hold
    four men on the craft or shore

    Army stevedores were trained to unload vessels by manhandling cargo into cargo nets or onto pallets in the ships holds. The nets were then hoisted using the ships own derricks, booms and winches. In some cases, especially when unloading into DUKWs, the cargo net was placed directly into an RASC vehicle. More usually cargo was loaded into vehicles by hand.

    Vehicles going into Europe were mostly fitted with flanged hubs. These made the unloading of vehicles simpler and quicker. A rope loop was placed round each hub flange (6 X 4 vehicles only used four) and the vehicle was then lifted by ships winch. When the vehicle was safely lowered into or onto the craft the loops were easily removed. The alternative was to use nets which were fitted under the wheels. This meant pushing the vehicle onto the nets while in the ships hold and then pushing it off them again when it was on the craft. Motor Transport Coasters were only used in the initial stages.

    Some Stores Coasters were beached on Peter Red. It was not originally planned to use this beach as there were dangerous rocks at the low water mark. However Peter beach had good firm, level sand but and Coasters were brought in when the tide was sufficiently high to give a safe clearance over the rocks. They were then beached as the tide went out and could be unloaded directly into lorries. This proved an extremely valuable means of rapid discharge. Peter had two tracked exits and one wheeled exit. Owing to enemy action it was decided not to beach further coasters after D+16.

    Port Operating Companies worked well and often were able to discharge stores much more quickly than craft could be provided. By having an advanced headquarters afloat they were able to monitor the discharge of ships and coasters very carefully and transfer gangs from one ship to another with minimum delay.

    A considerable amount of time was saved by arranging for gangs to be sent to the various ships and coasters in the Anchorage by DUKW. Whilst this entailed some 20 DUKWs being temporarily lost for the discharge of cargo it was found to be much quicker to get gangs to their ship in this manner rather than by using one or two craft operating on a ‘milk round’ principle. Gangs were also provided with No 46 wireless sets so that progress could be reported and efficient use of craft organised.

    Note.
    Beaching ships, allowing them to dry out and then unload over the side into vehicles was by no means unusual. In earlier times this was the normal method. It was still common in the late C19th, especially with smaller wooden sailing ships. Large steel steam powered ships could not do this safely and port authorities insisted on them using either wharves or lighters. Coasters designed for the more remote Baltic still beached and unloaded using their own derricks. It was also known for merchant ships to be scuttled as breakwaters in earlier wars. Wooden ships did not usually suffer and could be raised again when no longer needed. Indeed wooden ships were sometimes sunk to clean them or get rid of disease.

    Continued shelling of the beaches led to further changes. On D+20 it was decided that POL and ammunition would no longer be landed. Only coasters carrying general stores, mainly engineer and transportation, would be unloaded and these would be by DUKW. All ferry craft were moved to other sectors.


    1050 Port Maintenance Company.
    Port Maintenance Companies consisted of a headquarters and four sections. Normally they were responsible for the maintenance and repair of port facilities and equipment and for the repair of port craft. For the D Day landings their initial role was to operate RB10 and RB19 crawler cranes which landed with the Port Operating Companies. These were for general use in unloading crafts, and for the recovery of army craft. Both RB10 and RB19 were found to operate satisfactorily on the beaches but the larger RB19 was more effective.

    1050 Port Maintenance and Repair Company was in support of the Port Operating and Inland Water Transport Companies of 9 Port Operating Group. It was to operate cranes and keep the Port Operating Companies and Inland Water Transport Companies supplied with all the gear they required

    A Captain with a WO1 was to command ‘A’ Section and ‘B’ Section less chippie and shop sub section. He was responsible for work on the Stores Beach. He established No2 Beach Gear Stores on Queen Sector, in Sector Stores Dumps 1 and 3, and maintained working gear. He was also responsible for the cranes in accordance with the general directions of the Port Superintendent at 5 Beach Group Command Post.

    A Captain with a WO1 was to command ‘C’ Section less chippie and shop sub section.
    He was responsible for the MT Beach. He established No1 Beach Gear Stores on Roger Sector to maintain MT handling gear. He was to carry out a reconnaissance with the Naval Beach Commando, site the MT Beach Gear Stores, and report to Group Headquarters by midnight D+1/D+2.

    Company Headquarters was established near 3 Sector Stores Dump.

    Five cranes landed in advance of the main party unloaded LBVs loaded with urgently required bridging material. De waterproofing was carried out as soon as possible but the unloading bridging had priority. Five cranes landed with the main party. Further cranes land on D+2.

    Initially Beach Stores were limited to 100 cargo nets. No2 Beach Gear Stores established a small cargo net store at the DUKW Control Post so that DUKWs going to sea could be made up to three nets each. All DUKWs carried three nets and generally the parties unloading the DUKWs should put three nets on before the DUKW left the BMA. Further Beach Gear Stores equipment were landed from coasters on D+1 and D+2. These were labelled ‘F’ and ‘G’ with ‘F’ going to ‘A’ Section and ‘G’ going to ‘B’ Section. These had high priority and as soon as they were identified the unloading gang informed company headquarters and guides were sent to us to meet DUKWs.

    Headquarters, ‘A’, ‘B’ and ‘C’ Sections landed at H+22 hours. Vehicles landed on D+1. D Section landed on D+2.


    Headquarters 9 Port Operating Group.
    Headquarters 9 Port Operating Group was to land and maintain 3 Division Assault Group on D Day and D+1 and subsequently to implement 1 Corps and 2 Army stores and MT programmes.

    For the first few days pre loaded coasters would arrive on a predetermined timetable and be unloaded according to a pre prepared plan.

    Stores Unloading Plan.
    - On D Day Priority Stores were loaded on coasters Marcel, North Gate, Glen Garrif and Monkstone. 420 tons of stores were be unloaded on D Day.
    - On D+1 959 tons of stores, the balance from D Day arrivals, were to be unloaded. Coasters Gladinia, Dunvegan Head, Plasma, Avonville, Kyle Gorm and Holborn Head should arrive and unload 1840 tons of stores.
    - On D+2 1048 tons of stores, the balance from D+1 arrivals, were to be unloaded. 1880 tons of stores were to be unloaded from new arrivals.
    - On D+3 918 tons of stores, the balance from D+2 arrivals, were to be unloaded. 2038 tons of stores were to be unloaded from new arrivals.
    - On D+4 1270 tons of stores, the balance from D+3 arrivals, were to be unloaded. 1492 tons of stores were to be unloaded from new arrivals.
    - On D+5 1368 tons of stores, the balance from D+3 and D+4, were to be unloaded. 1280 tons of stores were to be unloaded from new arrivals.
    After D+5 it was not possible to plan precisely.

    Motor Transport Unloading Plan.
    - On Tide 1 110 LCT were to land 1210 vehicles and 5 LST(2) were to land 360 vehicles using 4 Rhino Ferries.
    - On Tide 2 12 LST(2) were to land 720 vehicles using 8 Rhino Ferries.
    - On Tide 3 5 LST(2) were to land 300 vehicles using 4 Rhino Ferries and 8 MT Coasters were to land 232 vehicles using 2 Rhino Ferries, 10 LCT and 48 LCM.
    - On Tide 4 2 MT Coasters were to land 188 vehicles. The balance from previous tide was also to be landed. 6 Rhino Ferries, 10 LCT and 48 LCM were available.
    After this time a ferry service would be operated using craft of the RN ferry service and Rhino Ferries. In the event the landing of MT was badly behind schedule.

    The following RN ferry craft were planned to be available for the third tide.
    32 LCM, 10 LCT and 19 LBV arrive empty to discharge priority vehicles.
    23 LBV and 16 LCM arrive preloaded and will discharge early on D+1.

    To assist in identification all coasters carried a code number board four foot high and six foot long. This carried the following markings.
    - On the top half the ships code number.
    - On the bottom half
    A letter for the port of loading
    A letter for he destination. G, J or S.
    The date of arrival. D+?
    A code for the nature of the cargo.
    A= ammunition
    C= coal
    CA= civil affairs
    D= ordnance votes 7 and 8 (clothing and special stores)
    E= engineer
    G= 1098 (unit stores)
    N= navy
    NF= NAAFI
    M= medical
    P=POL
    R= RAF
    S= supplies
    Tn= transportation
    V= vehicle
    W= ordnance vote 19






    HQ Deployment
    - Commanding Officer. Lieutenant Colonel. Located at Beach Sub Area Command Post on D and D+1. Then at Main Headquarters 101 Beach Sub Area. Commands all Transportation troops within the Sub Area. Acts as Transportation Adviser to Sub Area Commander.
    - Adjutant. Captain. Located at Beach Sub Area Command Post on D and D+1. Then at Main Headquarters 101 Beach Sub Area. Responsible for Transportation Intelligence for the Commanding Officer.
    - Ordnance Officer Docks. Major. Located at Beach Sub Area Command Post on D and D+1. Then at Main Headquarters 101 Beach Sub Area. Ordnance Adviser to the Group.
    - Docks Superintendent (Operations). Major. Located at 5 Beach Group Command Post. Responsible for Transportation planning for future work in accordance with Ferry Control Conference. Transportation Adviser to Beach Group Commander.
    - Assistant Docks Superintendent (Operations). Captain. Located at 5 Beach Group Command Post. Responsible for Transportation planning for future work in accordance with Ferry Control Conference. Transportation Adviser to Beach Group Commander.
    - Docks Superintendent (Statistics). Major. Located at 5 Beach Group Command Post. Responsible for Statistics, past and present.
    - Docks Superintendent (Ship). Major. Located afloat. Responsible for liaison with Senior Officer Ferry Control regarding Ferry Craft, and with DUKW Control Afloat. Deals with problems afloat. Advises the Port Operating Companies. Assumes command of any coaster gangs engaged on awkward lifts if necessary.
    - Assistant Docks Superintendent (Ship). Captain. Located afloat. Responsible for liaison with Senior Officer Ferry Control regarding Ferry Craft, and with DUKW Control Afloat. Deals with problems afloat. Advises the Port Operating Companies. Assumes command of any coaster gangs engaged on awkward lifts if necessary.
    - Lieutenant. Administration. Transportation Bivouac Area. Coordinates administration of transportation troops and of the Transportation Bivouac Area.
     
  9. Trux

    Trux 21 AG

    SWORD BEACH.
    OPERATING THE BEACH

    SHIP TO SHORE.

    3 Inland Water Transport Group.
    Rhino Ferry.

    3 Inland Water Transport Group consisting of 940 Inland Water Transport Operating Company, 927 Light Aid Workshop and 267 Pioneer Company, was responsible for the operation and maintenance of Rhino Ferries from D Day. The senior Inland Water Transport officer was based aboard the Senior Officer Ferry Control’s Headquarters ship. The priority task was to ferry LST deckloads to the beach and when available to ferry MT from ships and coasters.

    The slope of the Normandy beaches was too shallow for normal beaching and it was intended that LSTs would unload using Rhino Ferries. These were 175 foot long, 43 foot wide and 5 foot deep, with a ramp at the bow. They were powered by two 160 horse power outboard motors and there was a separate tug of similar construction with a further two 160 horse power outboard motors. There was sufficient deck space to allow an LST to unload in two trips. The ferry could unload and retract itself on a falling tide.


    A Rhino Ferry was towed behind the LST. On arrival at the unloading point the ferry moved to the bows of the LST. A centre line was passed to the LST and the ferry reversed towards the LST ramp. The LST doors were opened and the ramp lowered to 6 foot above the water. The ferry was then winched up to the LST ramp using the centre line. Side lines then secured the ferry to the LST and the ramp was lowered to the ferry deck. Vehicles could then drive directly on to the ferry, which headed to the shore under its own power when loaded. On arrival at the beach the vehicles could drive straight down the fixed centre ramp into 1½ foot of water. While the ferry was away the vehicles on the Upper Deck could be lowered to the Tank Deck so as to be ready to board the ferry on its return.

    Inland Waterway Operating Companies had been operating tugs and barges, mainly in military ports. For D day several were to be re equipped and retrained in the operation of Rhino Ferries. In April and May the companies were trained, a section at a time, on the operation of the Rhino and the special tugs that accompanied them. Production of the actual ferries and tugs was slow and most companies did not receive their full complement until the end of May. Even then companies were short of tugs.

    940 Inland Water Transport Operating Company provided a headquarters and nine crews, each operating a Rhino Ferry and a tug . In theory each Rhino would be towed across the Channel behind the LST which it was to unload on arrival. Each of the tugs was to be towed by an LST which did not tow a Rhino. However on Sword the first group of LSTs towed both a Rhino and a tug which in the event was not a good idea since the tugs came adrift in the rough crossing and were lost. Nine spare crews followed in order to work a shift system allowing 24 hour working.

    Each Rhino going to Sword was also accompanied by a Caterpillar D8 Angledozer, carried on the LST. On Gold they were carried on the Rhino and suffered in the heavy weather. The units going to Sword did however store some administrative equipment and stores on the Rhino and much was lost on the crossing. The angledozer was to make a level sand ramp for the vehicles to use after leaving the Rhino. They could also be used to help in manoeuvring and anchoring the Rhino since they were equipped with a heavy duty winch. It is thought that the D8s were operated by 42 Mechanical Equipment (Transportation) Section.

    The first flight of five LSTs arrived on time, at around H+7 hours, with five Rhino Ferries in tow. The discharge of LSTs by Rhino was delayed and the first Rhinos did not beach until H+9½ hours. On the second tide a further twelve LSTs arrives towing a further four Rhinos. The Ferries continued to be very slow to discharge on D Day and D+1 mainly because of the heavy swell, making coupling the Rhino to the LST and making beaching difficult. The breakdown of power units also caused delay. From an early stage it was necessary to arrange for an LCT or LCM to tow them into shore. This worked quite well.

    From D+2 until D+8 when the last LST arrived on Sword, the Rhinos were used to discharge Motor Transport. In calm seas and with their own power it was possible it to make a round trip to LSTs a mile off shore in 3 hours. However in practice an average of 6 hours was needed. When discharging vehicles from MT coasters it was usual to make only one trip per shift since the discharge over the side onto the Rhino was slow. Roger Green Beach was used for Rhinos carrying motor transport. This was the beach most exposed to enemy shell fire as it was the most easterly and therefor nearest to enemy batteries, and under direct observation. However it was nearest to the vehicle transit areas and to the route that was intended to be the main forward route to Caen and beyond. Roger Green eventually had one tracked exit and one wheeled exit, plus a concrete exit for the use of DUKWs.

    Later Rhinos suffered from loss of power units and ramps which made it difficult for them to discharge vehicles. It was decided to find other means of landing vehicles. This included from D+4 beaching and drying out LSTs so they could unload direct onto the beach. LCTs had always beached anyway and continued to do so. The Rhino ferries were then used mainly to assist with the discharging of stores. In this role they could carry 330 tons of stores. They were beached and allowed to dry out. They could then discharge into three 3 ton lorries each side.

    All the Rhino equipment proved unreliable. The tug units were generally out of action and the Rhino Ferries themselves were often unserviceable. Even the apparently robust Caterpillar D8s were often unserviceable, presumably due to a combination of sand, salt water and continuous hard work. The dozers and crews were from an as yet unidentified Mechanical Equipment Section so the crews would be trained and experienced in the operation of the machines but not necessarily in beach work. The dozers were to be returned to the Mechanical Equipment Unit for maintenance and repair but they could not be accepted due to a lack of spare parts.

    As early as D+4 there were only six Rhinos working. One was lost when it came adrift from LST 614, one was beached under enemy fire and one damaged its ramp when it was lowered onto a mine. On D+8 Rhinos 73 and 13 were hit by bombs during the night. No13 was burned out and totally lost. On D+9 Rhino 85 was hit by shellfire when moored at a buoy. It broke adrift and was lost.

    Further damage was caused by the gales of June 19th to 22nd. This caused the Rhinos to be beached but they were very vulnerable. No work was done for more than two days, but at least time was made for maintenance and even recreation, except for some crews who were stranded at the Gooseberry when the DUKWs could not return them to shore. Three Rhinos and a PBR needed salvaging after the gales. Nos 94 was salvaged on Queen White on the 22nd and No25 was prepared for salvaging. On the 23rd PBR No7 was unloaded and refloated at Luc sur Mer, where it had beached after going adrift, and Rhino 31 was salvaged from Queen Red.

    On the 27th the company gave up using Rhinos as self propelled ferries and towed them using LCT and LCM.
    Some TID tugs were also used to tow the Rhino ferries. These tugs were initially used to tow Mulberry and Gooseberry components across the Channel. When they could be spared from other duties they reverted to their primary role of towing ferries and barges. It seems that the personnel and tugs remained on the strength of the IWT Companies even when detached for other duty.

    Personnel was also overworked. There were spare personnel from the ferries and tugs which were unserviceable but at the same time the unserviceable units had to be guarded and all equipment maintained. Two crews were borrowed from 966 IWT Company on Juno on D +3. They remained with 940 Company until June 23rd. One Rhino ferry was hit by shellfire and several of the 966 Company personnel were injured.

    Personnel lived on shore. The first sections to land set up a bivouac area on Queen Red but on D+2 they had to move to a new bivouac area near 101 GT Company Transport Park because the original area was needed for an ammunition dump following a fire. From D+3 a working pattern was established with shifts each working twelve hours. Since this did not match the tides or the time taken to complete a round trip it was necessary to transfer personnel to the Rhinos by DUKW. A technical office was opened on the beach and the workshop was based on the LST Bachaquero. After the first few days it was found desirable to moor the Rhinos at buoys at the Gooseberry when not in operation. From D+7 the company was allotted a DUKW and a LCP(L) to ferry personnel and act as despatch boat. As the bivouac remained next to the DUKW Park no other transport was needed on land.

    Rhino Ferries were only a temporary measure introduced in order to unload LSTs on the shallow sloping Normandy beaches. On other beaches the continued to unload vehicles from MT ships and coasters but all the Inland Water Transport Companies reverted to the operation of TID tugs and barges. 940 Company moved to Juno beach when Sword closed at the end of June.

    As the Rhino Ferries became unserviceable to the point where they were not worth repairing they were handed over to Port Maintenance and Port Construction and Repair units who used the components, minus the bow and stern sections with motors and ramps, to construct jetties. On D+19 it was decided that a sunken causeway made from four lengths of pontoon would be provided. These were sunk on Roger Green for the reception of LCT and LCI(L). The pontoon was sunk by filling the sections with water and then sand was bulldozed against it. It was then stable and craft could dock at the seaward end, or at a point where they could lower their ramp to allow vehicles and personnel to unload. Due to constant shellfire it was agreed on D+21 that no further LCT would come into Sword and they were in future diverted to Juno.


    LSTs and LCTs landed vehicles and LCIs landed personnel on Roger Beach from where they could proceed direct to the Assembly Areas inland of Ouistreham. Coasters beached on Peter which was close to the dumps of the Beach Maintenance Area. The main beach however remained Queen. This was where the assault landings had taken place and was where the initial eight exits were made. All the Queen beaches handles beached LCM, LCT, LBV and DUKWs as available. These belonged to the Ferry Organisation with the DUKWs being operated by the RASC and the remainder by RN. Exits were developed as follows.
    Queen Green two wheeled exits.
    Queen White one concrete exit, three tracked exits, one DUKW exit and three wheeled exits.
    Queen Red one tracked exit, one concrete DUKW exit, one wheeled and personnel exit and one wheeled exit


    21 Transport Column RASC.
    21 Transport Column controlled the following General Transport Companies.
    101 General Transport Company operating DUKWs.
    299 General Transport Company operating DUKWs.
    ‘A’ Platoon of 633 General Transport Company operating DUKWs and trained in casualty evacuation.
    39 General Transport Company operating CMP Chevrolet 3ton 4 X 4 lorries.

    101 and 299 General Transport Companies were each to land two platoons on D Day and a third platoon on D+1. All DUKWs were pre loaded with ammunition which had been loaded by personnel of the Beach Groups which should offload them on landing. 5 Beach Group for 101 Company and 6 Beach Group for 299 Company. A General Transport Park was established near Queen Beach, just north of Colleville.

    As the DUKWs were launched they were met by RASC motor boats which assembled them and led them to shore. Guides on shore led them to one of the Sector Stores Dumps where the ammunition was of loaded and then the DUKWs were led to the Transport Park where they established a bivouac area and an area for the maintenance of the vehicles. DUKWs were then available for work off loading coasters as they arrived.



    101 General Transport Company (DUKWs)
    20 men landed at H+195 minutes as a reconnaissance party for General Transport Park. They checked that the assigned area was indeed suitable and made a plan of the layout. At H+5½ hours the Officer Commanding, 66 DUKWs and 262 men landed, having been launched from LSTs. A 3ton 4 X 4 GS, with 2 crew, landed at H+7 hours and the remaining 33 DUKWs landed from LSTs at H+22 hours.


    299 General Transport Company (DUKW).
    At H+240 ten men with five bicycles landed with the Reconnaissance Party for 6 Beach Group. It was intended that they should reconnoitre the sites for the Beach Maintenance Area but this was not possible since the enemy had not yet been cleared. At H+12 hours 66 DUKWs landed together with administrative vehicles. The remaining 33 DUKWs landed at H+22 hours.


    633 General Transport Company.
    ‘A’ Platoon. (Medical Detachment).
    This landed with 22 DUKWs ten of which were carried on LSTs davits in place of LCVPs and 12 were carried on the Tank Deck.

    Loaded onto LSTs at Gosport on 2 June and moored at Ryde Pier. They sailed at 18.30 on 5 June and arrived off the French coast at 13.00 on D Day. The LSTs anchored 3½ miles offshore and the DUKWs were unloaded almost immediately. They swam to shore guided by the RASC motor launch ‘Grouse’. The pre loaded stores were landed, the ammunition at Sector Stores Dumps and the stretchers at the Field Dressing Station. Medical evacuation started immediately. Casualties were loaded onto DUKWs at the Casualty Evacuation Post and carried out to LSTs fitted to carry casualties. The LSTs had offloaded vehicles and then rigged stretcher racks in the Tank Deck. Ducks could drive straight into the LST to unload. The platoon headquarters was established at the General Transport Park and line communication established to the RAMC Casualty Evacuation Post.

    Casualty evacuation continued all night and through D+1. Conditions were difficult with the sea still being rough and the beach was being shelled, bombed and machine gunned. From D+2 to D+7 the casualty evacuation started at 04.45 and continued until midnight. Maintenance on the DUKWs was carried out after each round trip. On D+8 there were no casualties to be evacuated by DUKW so ammunition was landed. Some casualty evacuation was carried out on D+9. On D+10 RE Stores were unloaded and on D+11 the RASC reported that the platoon would no longer be required for casualty evacuation.

    At midday on D+13 work had to stop because of bad weather and no further trips were made until the afternoon of D+16. Time was spent on painting and maintenance.

    On D+18 the Company Headquarters, workshop section and ‘Q’ Platoon moved to Sword from Gold and the whole company established a park at Hermanville and worked Peter Red Beach at Luc sur Mer. The DUKW Control Post opened at 09.00 and the company worked a steady routine for the remainder of June.



    624 Motor Boat Company.
    624 Company was not a part of 21 Transport Column but each beach had a section assigned for DUKW control. It operated 48 foot fast launches which were used for intercommunication work and for controlling the movement of DUKWs. Sword had a section of seven launches, plus a Motor Fishing Boat to act as headquarters and depot craft.

    On D Day the launches acted as control craft, meeting and assembling DUKWs as they were launched from LSTs and guiding them to shore.



    DUKWs proved a most effective means of landing stores since they eliminated the need for transfer of loads from craft to vehicle. They needed considerable maintenance but companies had a reserve of vehicles and an enhanced maintenance section.

    DUKWs were in almost continuous operation discharging stores from coasters and carrying them direct to Sector Dumps. Two Platoons of DUKWs were landed on each of the first three tides giving a total of 198 DUKWs in two RASC Companies. Usually personnel from Port Operating Companies unloaded stores from coasters using the ships winches and derricks. Three tons of cargo were loaded in cargo nets and lowered into the DUKW. On arrival at dumps the nets were hoisted out by A frames attached to certain DUKWs or by mobile cranes. Some dumps had lorry mounted cranes on strength and the RASC later landed self propelled cranes.

    All DUKWs carried three cargo nets. They started out with three and when they were unloaded either the original three nets or a replacement three should be placed in the vehicle at the dump. In case this was not done a reserve of nets was stocked at the DUKW Control Post. Some heavy, bulky or awkward loads did not use nets and in that case care had to be taken not to overload the DUKW. The cargo handling teams tended to fill any empty space and overload the vehicle.

    Since responsibility for the beaches was divided between army and navy at the high water mark DUKWs had divided control. At sea they were controlled by the navy in the form of Beachmasters but guided to their coasters by RASC launches. On the beach was a DUKW Control Point where DUKWs were met and guided by RASC motor cyclists. The Control Point was operated by RASC but needed permission from the RN Beachmaster before releasing DUKWs to sea. Before leaving the coaster which they were discharging the DUKW crew marked their destination on a board, or a black painted panel on the hull. This enabled Provost and Beach group personnel to direct them efficiently.


    After the first three days it was decided that the amount of stores discharged into DUKWs during the hours of darkness was a very small return for the effort, and drivers were becoming tired. It was arranged that DUKWs would only operate between the hours of 0430 and 2300.

    With coasters anchored a mile off shore and a total turn round distance to the inland depots being some seven miles the DUKWs were making an average of 3½ to 4 round trips per day. On D+15 it was decided to open up a Transhipment Area where stores were transferred from DUKW to lorry. This saved considerable time on the turn round and kept the DUKWs off the main roads to the Depots. The size of DUKWs caused problems for other traffic and their balloon tyres broke up the road surfaces very quickly. The Transhipment Area had raised platforms in the centre. At first temporary platforms were constructed using pairs of Freuhauf trailers placed end to end. These were then replaced by a semi permanent area with three rows each of three platforms constructed with salvaged timber and rails and with a flooring of Pierced Steel Planks. There was a loop road for DUKWs which drove up and the loads were unloaded onto the platform. 3ton or 10 ton lorries had a loop on the other side of the platforms and they drove up to collect the loads before taking them to the dumps. The roadways were made of broken stone or rubble. Platforms kept stores off the ground and made for less lifting on the part of the pioneer labour. Efficiency was further improved when self propelled cranes from a RASC mobile crane unit were introduced to unload the DUKWs.

    DUKWs continued operating on Sword when other craft ceased work, but the DUKW exit was moved along the coast to Petit Enfet which was almost on Juno. They continued working to the original dumps but approached them from the opposite direction. A Transhipment Area was established in this area. The Petit Enfer area was opened on 24th June.

    DUKWs at sea proved difficult targets for enemy shelling but at least one was sunk. Quite a few were destroyed or damaged in air raids or by shelling when they were in the Transport Park. Replacements were readily available.
    .


    Transport Park.
    This should have hard level ground and good cover. Ideally should be close to the Military Landing Officer’s office.

    The Transport Park was situated between the forward routes through Hermanville and Colleville, and between the two main lateral routes. It had good access to all of these roads. It was also well paced for access to the beaches where the GT companies would work, the coaster beach and the DUKW exits. The land was as level as any available and although there was not much cover it was not under direct observation by enemy artillery, having higher land to the south and east where observers might be located. Finally it was adjacent to the headquarters of the Beach Sub Area and the Headquarters of the CRASC 21 Transport Column was as near to the Beach Sub Area headquarters as it could be. Each RASC company had a separate area, each with good access, and there was space for any other units which might from time to time be attached.

    In each company area were to be found the administrative and maintenance personnel. Personnel returned here for food, rest and sleep. Each company had a kitchen and personnel had a bivouac area. Initially this had simple slit trenches but as time an ingenuity allowed more elaborate accommodation developed. Here was also to be found the workshop platoon of each company. DUKWs in particular needed a great deal of maintenance. Company headquarters kept careful records of the serviceability of vehicles and made daily returns to the CRASC so that he could report availability to Headquarters 101 Beach Sub Area for planning the following days schedule.
     
  10. Trux

    Trux 21 AG

    SWORD BEACH.
    OPERATING THE BEACH.

    SHIP TO SHORE.

    RN Ferry Service and Gooseberry 5.

    Ports throughout the world have provided protection by building breakwaters of earth and rubble protected by stonework or concrete. Time did not allow this to done at Mulberry so the simple but effective method of scuttling redundant ships (codename Corncob) was used instead. These were ships which were unfit for further service but were capable of reaching Normandy under their own power. They were then scuttled in lines off the coast to provide reasonable shelter very quickly. One Gooseberry was provided at each beach, giving three in the British sector, and all were in position by D + 4. Corncobs were aligned so that each ones bow overlapped the previous ones stern. They were held in position by tugs and then scuttled by firing explosive charges. They were then fastened together with steel hawsers. Since the superstructures of the ships remained above water an additional use was providing accommodation for staff and crews working the anchorages. Headquarters and depot ships could also moor themselves to the Corncob ships.

    This undertaking proved to be an absolute boon in the discharge of stores in heavy weather when work on the coasters into DUKWs went on without hindrance, except in the great storm of 19 to 22 June.

    Gooseberry 5 was positioned half a mile off Sword Beach and construction started on D+2. It consisted of the following nine ships sunk in an L shape:
    Becheville
    Courbet (French Battleship)
    Dover Hill
    HMS Durban (Cruiser)
    Empire Defiance
    Empire Tamar
    Empire Tara
    Forbin
    HNLMS Sumatra. (Cruiser)

    At least one of these ships mounted LAA guns from 63 LAA Battery RA.

    SS Ascanius was Depot Repair Ship which was moored at Gooseberry 5. It served as a depot ship for the flotillas of LCM which worked on Sword. The Senior Officer Ferry Craft (RN) had his headquarters ship moored alongside the French battleship Courbet. On the same headquarters ship were also the Commanding Officer 9 Port Operating Group and a Military Landing Officer from Headquarters 101 Beach Sub Area.

    One source lists Naval Party 1558 which was a Naval Administration party based on SS Ascanius, a ship of he Holt Line, 10,000 tons, 493 foot long built in 1910.

    Royal Navy Ferry Organisation.
    While the army operated Rhino Ferries and DUKWs the navy operated a Ferry Service for landing vehicles, personnel and stores using landing craft.

    LCTs.
    LCT MkIV were used to land vehicles over the beaches. They had been designed to land on the shallow gradients found on the Normandy beaches. They were not used to land stores because it was thought there was a high probability of them breaking their back when allowed to dry out.
    LCT MkIII were used for stores. They drew too much water at the bow to allow vehicles to land on the Normandy beaches but they were beached and allowed to dry out. At first they were discharged over the side into lorries but later roller runways were used to speed up unloading.
    LCT MkV were ideal for work on the beaches and were able to beach, unload vehicles and retract on a falling tide as well as a rising one.


    When carrying stores LCTMkIII and MkV were able to make one round trip per 24 hours.

    Landing Craft, Medium.
    600 LCM Flotilla with 16 LCM Mk1.
    601 LCM Flotilla with 16 LCM Mk1.
    604 LCM Flotilla with 16 LCM Mk1.
    650 LCM Flotilla with 16 LCM Mk3.
    651 LCM Flotilla with 16 LCM Mk3.
    652 LCM Flotilla with 16 LCM Mk3.
    These were manned by Royal Marines. They crossed the Channel under their own power, carrying a good supply of petrol in Jerricans. Although capable of landing vehicles they were mainly used for unloading stores and supplies. They could beach at practically any stage of the tide with ease, and carry 10 tons of stores. They could discharge their stores and retract on a falling tide.

    On other beaches problems were caused by convoys of LCM and LCVP becoming scattered and arriving at the wrong beaches. Convoy SM2 with 108 minor craft arrived at Sword intact despite the failure of its escort to arrive at the rendezvous. Under a Temporary Acting Major, Royal Marines they arrived safely and on time.

    The LCM MkI was 44 foot 8 inches long and 14 foot wide. Draught at the bows was 30 inches. Two 60hp petrol engines were used to power twin propellers. Armour was fitted to decks, steering house, bulwarks and fuel tanks. A crew of six was carried, coxswain, stoker/driver and four deck hands.

    The LCM Mk3 was a US design. It was all welded steel and was larger and heavier than the British LCM MkI. In British service it was used as a ferry craft rather than an assault craft. Length was 50 foot and width 14 foot. Draught was 36 inches at the bow. Power came from two 225hp diesel engines. A crew of six was carried in British service. Armour was limited to the control station.

    LCMs were seen as a back up to the DUKWs. The DUKW was able to work a continuous circuit from ship to shore to dump and back to the ship while LCMs needed to transfer loads to 3 ton lorries on the beach. In case there were gaps or delays in the DUKW programme a number of LCMs were kept standing by at each coaster so that unloading was continuous.

    LCI(L).
    The Landing Craft Infantry (Large) continued to be used for landing personnel. Some continued to carry troops across the Channel but they were also used to transfer troops from Landing Ships Infantry to the shore. The assault stages had shown that LCI(L) were far from ideal as personnel tended to get very wet, some were even lost by drowning. The most suitable time for the discharge of LCI(L) was an hour either side of high tide. At other times the depth of water at the bow was too great and the landing ramps too short. Beach Group personnel rigged ropes to assist personnel wading ashore. Personnel were also landed from LCM and LCT.

    Barges.
    Landing Barges Vehicle These were steel Thames barges which had been fitted with ramps at the stern. They were also fitted with engines. They were kept busy and each one could carry 50 to 60 tons of stores per trip and on average make one trip each 24 hours. They were dried out and discharged into 3 ton lorries. The ramps proved to be too weak and some barges had to discharge over the side which caused delay. Each LBV carried twelve 8 foot lengths of roller runway to ease the task of unloading. These remained with the barge.

    Three dumb barges each laden with 300 tons of mixed stores arrived on the evening of D Day. These stores were for emergency purposes only. On D+3 stocks of ammunition ran low and these reserves were called on. The barges remained until driven ashore and damaged by the storms on D+13. It was intended that the barges should be used to discharge coasters but only one was so used.



    Ferry Craft Control.
    For the first seven days it was always uncertain as to the numbers of LST or LCT due to arrive on Sword. This made pre planning at the Ferry Control Conference difficult. It was found that although Roger Green had been definitely set aside for beaching LCT carrying vehicles these craft would often beach on Queen White and Red which had been set aside for the discharge of stores.

    It was decided that a Movement Officer would act as Liaison officer to the Senior Officer Ferry Craft. This was helpful to both services. On D+5 it was agreed that a Military Landing officer should be on board the Senior Officer Ferry crafts ship with the Liaison Officer in order that a 24 watch could be maintained. The Senior Officer Ferry Craft’s ship was moored alongside the French battleship Courbert which formed part of the Gooseberry and on which the Commanding Officer 9 Port Operating Group set up his advanced headquarters. Q Movement and Transportation were able to keep themselves fully informed on all matters afloat and the Military Landing Officer on shore, who had set up a Command Post with the Principal Beachmaster, was able to keep in constant touch with the Military Landing Officer afloat by use of a VHF set.

    The Military Landing Officer ashore was able to give the Principal Military Landing Officer a complete picture of what was happening afloat at any hour of the day.


    Ferry Service.
    4 Landing Barge Flak
    36 Landing Barge Vehicle
    9 Landing Barge Emergency Repair.
    2 Landing Barge Kitchen
    4 Landing Barge Water
    16 Landing Barge Oil
    5 Fuelling Trawlers
    9 Rhino Ferries
    96 Landing Craft Vehicle Personnel
    48 Landing Craft Medium
    1 Landing Craft Emergency Repair
     
  11. Trux

    Trux 21 AG

    SWORD BEACH.
    OPERATING THE BEACH.

    SHORE TO DUMPS.
    (and Assembly Areas

    The Second Key Plan, made by the Beach Group Commander and his staff and modified as necessary by the Beach Sub Area Commander, laid out the dumps, roads and other facilities of the area to be served by the beach. The area inland of the beaches would soon become a tightly packed maintenance area providing all the supplies, stores and services needed by an army in the field.

    Under the Beach Group Commander were the Officers Commanding the various aspects of the operation of the maintenance area. These would include:
    - The Military Landing Officer, responsible for moving personnel, vehicles and stores across the beach,
    - The Officer Commanding Field Company Royal Engineers, responsible for developing the beach exits, roads and dump areas.
    - The Officer Commanding Beach Group Provost Company who would be responsible for implementing plans for the movement of all the personnel, vehicles and stores and for regulating traffic on the routes.
    Plus the Officer Commanding Beach Signal Unit and the Anti Aircraft Defence Commander.


    Traffic Circuits.
    Staff guidance laid down that traffic circuits were one of the first priorities. Clear routes from the beach exits to dumps, and return routes, must be laid out and developed. These routes must allow for vehicles running from each beach to the dump areas and for the return journey. They must allow for vehicles coming from the forward areas to collect from the dumps and to return to the forward areas. As the maintenance area developed routes for traffic between dumps may need to be provided.

    All transport plans must provide for main forward routes which lead to the dumps and then onward to the forward areas. There must also be main lateral roads to connect the beach exits and to connect forward routes. All of these routes should be capable of carrying two way traffic. This may require the construction of by passes and parallel roads.

    Other routes should have a one way system for traffic to avoid congestion and disruption. All the roads should be capable of standing up to heavy traffic and will need a considerable amount of maintenance..

    Initially 3 Division engineers developed a main forward route through Hermanville. This was a reasonably good road but rather narrow for the amount of traffic it would carry. At first it was a one way route, allowing only forward movement. As soon as possible it was developed into a two way route by widening the road over ditches, banks and hedges where convenient. It was necessary to build a by pass round the village of Hermanville itself, the old road remaining as a forward route and the by pass serving as the return route. Separate routes were provided across country for wheeled vehicles in order to preserve the road surface.

    A return route was developed through Colleville and this remained a single, one way route. Again where possible it was widened by extending over ditches, banks and hedges.

    There was also a two way route from Ouistreham to the Orne Bridges. This was to have been a main forward route but since Caen was not taken for some time it was not developed beyond the bridges at this time.

    The forward and return routes were connected by lateral roads. There was the beach lateral road which ran along the edge of the beach and connected the beach exits. This was of steel mesh trackway. Just off the beach and running along the seaward edge of the dunes was a lateral road which was in poor condition, never being intended for heavy traffic and built over sand. Some two hundred yards inland was the lateral road which ran from Ouistreham to Lion sur Mer and which had a tramway along its south side. This road connected to the side roads leading to the beach exits. It was developed into a major route for the beach area since it connected the beaches with the forward routes, with the Assembly Areas and with the dump area. On D+1 and D+2 the tramway was lifted and the stretches of embankment removed. This allowed space for two way traffic plus a space for vehicles to pull off the road. Later some stretches of this road, and some of the roads to beach exits were given a cement surface.

    The main lateral route ran from the Orne bridges through St Aubin and Colleville, past Hermanville and the main forward route and on to Douvres/La Deliverand and eventually on to Bayeaux. It then connected all three beaches. This road marked the limit of the Beach Maintenance Area and was some two miles inland.

    It was anticipated that the major tasks for RE Works units would be:
    - Road making and repair
    - Airfield construction
    - Bridge building

    The limited advance and limited space in the beach head meant that there was less demand for these works. Fewer engineer works units were landed than anticipated and those that were landed found themselves doing other tasks than those that were intended. However the limited space placed a great strain on the existing roads and road building and road repair became a major concern. Field engineer units not now needed for bridge building and airfield construction groups without airfields to build were engaged on road work.

    Initially the priority on Sword was to get vehicles and personnel ashore, through the exits and on their way forward as rapidly as possible. All movement was forward except for a limited number of ambulances carrying wounded and lorries returning empty after delivering ammunition and supplies. As far as possible return routes were kept separate and were not developed to the same degree as forward routes.

    Clearing roads of mines was a priority task. Cleared carriageways were to be marked with pairs of standard red and white gap signs every 200 yards. As soon as possible verges were to be cleared. Cleared verges were to be marked with notice boards every 400 yards and the gap signs moved out from the carriageway. Verges were to be cleared to 10 foot width only and the right verges were to be cleared in priority to the left. On D Day this work was done largely by Flail tanks with considerable help from sappers and pioneers using mine detectors or probes. Later nearly all mine clearance was by hand. Dog units were also deployed, especially where non metallic mines were encountered.

    Tracked vehicles were to have routes prepared across country so as to preserve the carriageways for wheeled traffic. Where possible tracked vehicles used the cleared verges of roads. Where possible marching parties should have cleared routes avoiding carriageways and tracked routes.


    After the initial period the main lateral road became more important. Increasingly vehicles, personnel and stores for the area inland of Sword, and for 6 Airborne Division, were landed on Juno and moved along the lateral road to their destination.

    Generally the roads were narrow, winding and not built for the constant heavy traffic that was now using them. In peacetime the roads had provided access to the coastal villages and the many holiday villas. In wartime there had been even less traffic until the enemy started construction of the coastal defences. Where possible engineers and pioneers improved the roads while they were still in use. The following work was carried out:
    - Filling in of potholes as they appeared.
    - Widening roads, sometimes filling in the roadside ditches to do so.
    - Constructing roundabouts at road junctions.
    - Constructing by passes round villages whose streets were narrow and closely lined with buildings. Generally the by pass was in one direction only, usually the forward route, leaving the village street for return traffic.
    - Routes were cleared alongside roads for the exclusive use of tracked vehicles, which could soon destroy road surfaces.

    Eventually the main lateral road was developed with separate routes of single width Sommerfeld track
    on either side of the existing road, and cleared tracks for tanks and other tracked vehicles on the outside. These were one way routes and if necessary they could diverge and by pass obstacles, including habitations. Where the lateral road crossed other routes track was laid to provide turn offs and avoid tailbacks.

    It should be remembered that although Sword beaches were closed after some three weeks the main lateral remained a very busy route. There were still dumps behind the Sword beaches and these were maintained from Juno. There was also all the normal maintenance and administrative traffic to the rear of the front line, plus all the traffic for 6 Airborne. On occasion it was necessary for whole divisions to make tactical moves along the lateral road.

    Movement Control was introduced and in order to obtain maximum use of roads it was decided that administrative traffic would use the roads during the daytime and tactical moves would be made at night.


    3 ton 4 X 4 Lorries.
    GS lorries were used to transport stores from the beach to the dumps which grew behind the beaches. On Sword the dumps were towards the west and up to two miles inland. Circuits were laid out so that as far as possible there would be separate forward and return routes. Lorries worked in sections, each under a corporal on a motorbike who led the way. Provost units were present at all junctions to keep convoys moving. Eventually the movement of stores was carried out in the daytime and other movements at night.

    Two platoons landed on the 2nd Tide and two platoons on D+1 giving a total of 132 vehicles. These were kept very busily employed and it was found that there were insufficient vehicles of this type available in order to cope with the clearance of beached craft and to maintain the discharge figures of stores required. Three platoons from Lines of Communication assisted for three days and helped clear the backlog. A platoon of 6 and 10 ton lorries also assisted from time to time. 3 ton lorries averaged 4 round trips a day while the 6 and 10 ton lorries averaged less, had difficulty in soft sand and caused road congestion by their slow speed and greater size.
     
  12. Trux

    Trux 21 AG

    SWORD BEACH.
    OPERATING THE BEACH.

    THE DUMPS.
    Sector Stores Dumps.
    On D Day Sector Store Dumps were established in the grounds of large villas just behind the beaches. There were four of these, 1 and 2 on Queen White and 3 and 4 on Queen Red. Personnel from a variety of units were to land and set up the dumps which would be open as soon as possible to receive stores arriving on LCTs and DUKWs. As soon as was practicable larger dumps were to be developed to the west of the beaches. There were large areas assigned to ammunition, ordnance stores, petrol, supplies and RE stores. Once the areas were cleared of mines, the roads developed and the dumps laid out stores were delivered to them from the stores beach, Peter, as well as from the Queen beaches. It was intended that these large dumps would be operating from H+24 hours and that the Sector Store Dumps would then continue issuing only until their stocks were exhausted and then the personnel would move to the new areas.

    The most urgently needed stores were ammunition, engineer stores and re equipment stores. Even with the Priest self propelled field guns fully loaded with ammunition and towing Porpoises it was not possible to carry all that they were likely to need. This then was top priority. In order to open the beach exits and make tracks across and along the beach considerable quantities of chespaling and steel mesh trackway were needed. Much was brought in on trailers towed by tractors and dozers. More was carried on LCTs and simply thrown over the side. More was brought in on the priority stores LCTs. Re equipment stores were not bulky but needed personnel to issue them. For personnel who had lost personal equipment kit bags of replacements were issued. While struggling ashore many engineer personnel lost their mine detectors and other equipment which also needed replacing before the troops could carry on with their tasks.

    Petrol and food supplies were less urgent since in theory personnel and vehicles carried sufficient for the first two days.

    The first stores to be landed arrived on LCTs. The first two were due to touch down at H+2 hours. Each carried 200 tons of ammunition, 20 tons of RE Stores and one ton of Re equipment Stores. Also carried on each were five three to lorries from 39 GT Company RASC, three 6 pdr anti tank guns and ten men from the Beach Groups plus personnel from 11 Ordnance Beach Detachment, 44 Ordnance Ammunition Company and 292 Pioneer Company. Two similar LCT loads were due to arrive at H+4 hours.



    LCT Serial 297 landed on Queen White. As planned it was beached and allowed to dry out for unloading. This was considered a risk, both because of the risk of enemy shelling and the inherent weakness in the LCT4 construction. This LCT did indeed break its back.
    - 5 Kings Regiment. 5 Beach Group. Three 6pdr AT guns and 10 men from the Anti Tank Platoon. Carried on 3ton vehicles of 39 GT Company RASC together with two sets of assault ramps and an airborne trailer.
    - 39 General Transport Company RASC. 5 3ton 4 X 4 GS Lorries (Austin K5) with 15 crew. Including Officer.
    - 292 Company Pioneer Corps. 13 men to handle the ammunition.
    - 44 Ordnance Ammunition Company RAOC. 5 men to supervise the storage and issue of ammunition.
    - 11 Ordnance Beach Detachment. 8 men with two handcarts, a bicycle from the Ammunition Section and one ton of Re equipment Stores to replace equipment lost on landing.
    - 8 Stores Section RE. 1 man for re equipment centre. To issue replacement RE equipment.

    Due to the number of vehicles on the beach the vehicles on the LCTs could not land for 45 minutes. A reconnaissance was made of the Sector Stores Dumps and parties were guided to the sites. Sector Store Dump 2 was heavily mined and under fire. The sappers who should have cleared the site had lost their mine detectors so ordnance personnel cleared some 80 mines. When the vehicles could land the 3ton 4 X 4 lorries drove up the beach and through the exits to be met by the personnel already ashore. They unloaded the anti tank guns using two sets of ramps carried in one of the lorries. The guns were dragged into position by the gun crews and the vehicles returned against the traffic flow to the LCTs. They loaded ammunition and drove to the Sector Stores Dumps. By H+3½ hours Sector Store Dump 2 was receiving ammunition, mainly 105mm. Sector Store Dump 1 was still under fire from snipers in nearby houses and was soon abandoned.

    LCT Serial 302 landed on Queen Red and was beached and dried out without mishap.
    - 1 Buckinghamshire Regiment. 6 Beach Group. Three 6pdr guns and ten men from the Anti Tank Platoon. Includes an officer. Carried on vehicles of 39 GT Company together with two sets of assault ramps and an airborne trailer.
    - 11 Ordnance Beach Detachment. 8 men with 2 handcarts and a bicycle from the Ammunition Section and 1 ton of Re-equipment Stores to replace equipment lost on landing.
    - 8 Stores Section RE. 1 man from. For re equipment centre.
    - 44 Ordnance Ammunition Company. 5 men to supervise the storage and issue of ammunition.
    - 292 Company Pioneer Corps. 13 men. To handle the ammunition.
    - 39 GT Company RASC. 5 3ton 4 X 4 GS Lorries (Austin K5) with 15 crew. Includes 2 NCOs.

    The experience of this team was broadly similar to that of the team for Queen White. However Sector Store Dump 3 had no mines and could be brought into use immediately. Sector Store Dump 4 was still occupied by the enemy and by the time it was available it was no longer needed. The site was cleared and kept in reserve.

    Also landing were parties each of 12 men from 5 Beach Group with 1 bicycle and 2 handcarts for the Sector Store Dumps.

    At H+210 minutes the following landed from LCIs to work in the Sector Stores Dumps.
    Queen White Beach
    5 Kings Regiment. 48 men from ‘B’ Company. To work in sector stores dump.
    292 pioneer Company. 115 men. To work in sector stores dump.
    11 Ordnance Beach Detachment. 17 men. To work in sector stores dump.

    Queen Red Beach
    5 Kings Regiment. 49 men from ‘B’ Company. To work in sector stores dump.
    292 pioneer Company. 115 men. To work in sector stores dump.
    11 Ordnance Beach Detachment. 17 men. To work in sector stores dump.

    ‘B’ and ‘D’ Companies were assigned to work in the Sector Stores Dumps.


    At H+4 hours two more LCT arrived carrying identical loads to those which landed at H+2 hours. The only difference was that the beached were clearer and the Sector Stores Dumps were already operating. Once the anti tank guns were unloaded the lorries could start delivering ammunition.

    The LCTs which carried stores only did so once. They each carried twelve 8 foot lengths of roller runway to aid unloading and when unloading was complete these were landed and taken to the Beach Stores Dump.

    Issuing of ammunition commenced at H+4½ hours. At H+5 hours No 38 wireless sets were used for communication between the Sector Stores Dumps. Ammunition was carried from the beached LCTs to the dumps by 3ton 4 X 4 lorries of 39 GT Company until preloaded DUKWs arrived about H+4½ hours and delivered direct to the dumps. One report suggests that the delays in opening the Sector Stores Dumps meant that in some cases ammunition was issued directly from the LCTs.

    Apart from the ammunition being delivered to the dumps there was a considerable quantity of 105mm ammunition in the Porpoises towed by the self propelled artillery. It was intended that the artillery units should move rapidly ashore and then continue inland. Porpoises should have been left in small dumps along the main lateral road some 2 miles inland. Few of them, if any, got that far and many had to be left on the beaches. When time allowed pioneers were sent to collect these Porpoises and their ammunition and take them to the dumps. In the early hours there was no pioneer labour to spare for this.

    Two Pioneer Companies were landed specifically to provide additional labour for discharging stores and working in the Sector Stores Dumps. ‘X’ Pioneer Company was due to land at H+3½ hours and H+4 hours. It was organised into eight parties, four parties for discharging stores LCTs and four parties for working in Sector Stores Dumps. They were then retained at Sector Stores Dumps until they closed. ‘Z’ Pioneer Company was due to land at H+5 hours. It was organised into four parties for working in the Sector Stores Dumps. They were to be released to 6 Beach Group as early as possible. Earliest time estimated as H+14 hours. In the event of course these parties were used in the Main Sector Stores Dump until the Beach Maintenance Area dumps were opened on D+4. Both companies were then available to work in the new dumps.

    11 Ordnance Beach Detachment landed on the first tide under 5 Beach group. They set up sector dumps in the gardens of villas just behind the beach. 12 Ordnance Beach Detachment under 6 Beach Group should have landed and moved to the main dump site a mile inland This was to be stocked by H+24 hours at which time the sector dumps would be run down and the personnel moved to join the main dump. In the event the sector dumps had to continue in use and the main dumps did not open until D+4


    Main Sector Stores Dump.
    The Main Sector Stores Dump did not figure in the plans for D Day but was developed out of necessity.

    The schedule for opening the large dumps in the Beach Maintenance Area could not be kept to. There were delays caused in the early stages when the strongpoint at La Breche took longer to occupy than was planned. When the reconnaissance parties from 6 Beach Group landed to reconnoitre the dump sites they found that some were still either in enemy hands or were dominated by enemy fire and that access to them was blocked by the strongpoint at Lion sur Mer. There was no alternative but to delay the opening of the new sites and in the meantime divert incoming stores to the Sector Stores Dumps. It was also apparent that the Sector Stores Dumps could not accommodate all the stores due to arrive so a new larger dump was opened. The smaller dumps continued issuing until their stocks were exhausted but all 6 Beach Group dump personnel and most of 5 Beach Group dump personnel moved to what became the Main Sector Stores Dump.

    The new site was in fact very suitable in many ways, although very cramped for all the stores and personnel due to arrive. It was a site that had been laid out in happier times for a new housing estate. It was immediately behind the La Breche strongpoint and on the south, inland, side of the first lateral road. This position was in the centre of the assault beaches and had the advantage of concrete roads which helped access to the various stacks.

    The cramped nature of the site meant that stacks of petrol and ammunition were necessarily closer together than was normally thought safe. It was also generally not acceptable to have petrol and ammunition in the same location. However there was no real alternative but there was a serious, near disastrous, fire on D+2.

    Vehicles which landed with preloaded ammunition and explosives or POL (Petrol, Oil and Lubricants) had coloured stickers on the windscreen. Ammunition vehicles had red stickers and POL vehicles had yellow stickers.

    Petrol Dump.
    237 Petrol Depot landed on D Day but as the site allotted under the Key Plan was still in enemy hands a depot was set up together with the advanced party of 238 Petrol Depot at the Main Sector Stores Dump. An Advanced Party of a Captain and three other ranks landed first. The Main Party of a Lieutenant and sixteen other ranks, with the 3ton 4 X 4 and a trailer fire pump, landed later in the day.

    The site for the petrol depot was near to the ammunition dump and there was no room for expansion. POL began to arrive and was off loaded and stacked on the ground after the area had been checked for mines. Work continued through the night. On D+1 supplies arrived steadily and issues began, with DERV for 27 Armoured Brigade being the best customers. The Coles Crane and two RE personnel which were to be attached to the unit hit a mine coming off the beach. It was written off. The Main Party of 238 Petrol Depot arrived and work continued through the night.


    Royal Engineer Stores Dump.
    The RE Dump was established alongside the Main Sector Store Dump. 8 Stores Section operated it at first. It had been planned that the dump would move inland late on D Day but like the Sector Store Dumps its new site was not clear of the enemy and the first site remained in use. 9 Stores Section would land on the second tide and act as a reinforcement. When 176 Workshop and Park Company brought the main RE Dump into operation the sector dump continued to issue its accumulated stores and issued to the Beach Groups and 6 Airborne Division.

    8 Stores Section.
    This section was to control RE stores in beach dumps. This included personnel to work in the Re equipment Centre which issued replacement equipment to personnel who had lost theirs during the landing. At H+120 minutes two men landed with the two stores LCTs and a further two men landed with the second two stores LCTs at H+240 minutes.

    A reconnaissance party for the RE Dump landed at H+45 minutes and a main body of eleven men with a bicycle and a motorcycle landed at H+90 minutes.

    The section trained and worked with 84 Field Company, loading Jahn trailers with Sommerfeld track, coir matting, pickets etc. in the UK and then issuing material to the Field Company on the beach. The plan was that reconnaissance parties would carry out a reconnaissance of four dump sites. The main body would then operate the dumps until 176 Workshop and Park Company brought the main RE dump into operation at H+15 hours. 9 Stores Section would land on the second tide and act as a reinforcement.

    Reconnaissance showed that only 1 and 2 dumps could be used as 3 and 4 were under fire from small arms, mortars and artillery. Stores were received by 1 and 2 dumps but 1 dump had to cease operating because of sniper fire. No 2 dump thus became larger than planned and moved to a new site south of the first lateral road. This dump continued in use as the site for the main dump was still in enemy hands. It had also to accept RASC, Ordnance and Medical stores until the planned sites were clear. When the main dump was set up and operating No2 dump continued to issue its accumulated stores and issued to the Beach Groups and 6 Airborne Division.

    9 Stores Section RE.
    This section had the task of landing and despatching bridging equipment from beached Landing Barge Vehicle.
    H+12 hours
    2 men with one bicycle. Advanced Party. Landed from an LCI(L).
    14 men with 1 motorcycle. Landed from an LST.

    9 Stores Section landed as planned on the second tide and initially unloaded bridging equipment from the LBV using labour from 5 Kings Regiment and mobile cranes from the Port Maintenance Company. On D+3 the section completed unloading bridging material and then gave assistance to No 8 Stores Section at the RE Sector Stores Dump at La Beche.

    The Fire at the Main Sector Stores Dump. D+2.
    At around 1200 hours on D+2 a single German aircraft flew along the beach and dropped its bombs. One bomb hit a DUKW loaded with petrol in Jerricans. Burning petrol quickly spread fire to grass and to camouflage netting on ammunition stacks. The ammunition began to explode further spreading the flames to other stacks which were of necessity close together. The normal procedure would be to allow the fire to burn itself out but the ammunition in the dump was the only ammunition ashore at the time and was urgently needed for 3 Division which was fighting inland. A party under the Beach Group commander fought the fire by dragging camouflage netting off the stacks, beating out grass fires, moving vehicles and then moving ammunition stacks to create a fire break. Half the dump was destroyed and the lateral road was closed for several hours. The Beach Group commander was severely wounded



    Beach Maintenance Area.
    A large area to the west of the assault beaches was set aside on the Second Key Plan for the dumps of the Beach Maintenance Area. There were a number of distinct dumps but all shared certain characteristics. The area was open farmland cultivated in strips. There were tracks running through the area which in dry weather provided access for vehicles. The ground was fairly firm and well drained and did not need trackway laying in dry weather.

    It was laid down that dumps should not be along a main road as this tended to lead to congestion, but should have good approach roads to connect to the main roads. Dumps should have a separate entrance and exit to avoid congestion. Within the dump traffic should be one way, with a clear traffic circuit. Stacks should be close to the traffic circuit to allow easy loading and unloading. Traffic bays should be made to allow traffic to pass while lorries are standing at the stack.

    All the dumps were late in opening since the area set aside for them was still in enemy hands. Beach dumps had to operate until D+4. When fully developed and operating normally the dumps were conveniently situated for the DUKW beach exit and for the area of Peter Red Beach which was used to beach stores coasters. The DUKW exit in particular remained in use after the rest of Sword Beach was closed. The dumps were also conveniently placed in the centre of I Corps area and on the main lateral road which led to Bayeaux, the area around which accommodated the greatest concentration of dumps etc. The area from the beaches to the dumps and within the dumps had a considerable number of roads which, although narrow and poorly surfaced at first, were developed into acceptable one way routes.

    A complication was that while 101 Beach Sub Area was responsible for organising the dumps of the Beach Maintenance Area and the delivery of stores to the dumps, from D+5 No1 Army Roadhead under 2nd Army was responsible for issuing from the dumps.

    The Ammunition Dump.
    Ammunition is the most important commodity landed and entails the heaviest tonnage. The ammunition dump should therefor have priority with regard to the site and traffic circuit. It must be readily accessible by transport from forward areas. 44 Ordnance Ammunition Company established the ammunition dump in the area between the first and second laterals and immediately to the west of Hermanville and the main forward route. This was the most accessible dump area both for stores being delivered by DUKW or 3ton 4 X 4 lorry from the beach and for lorries collecting ammunition for forward units.

    The Ammunition Dump occupied the largest of the dump areas and there was ample space to lay out stacks with adequate spaces between them.


    Ordnance Stores Dump.
    The Ordnance Stores Dump should be close to the Ammunition Dump for ease of administration since both are operated by the RAOC.

    Ordnance stores were crated in wooden cases which were limited to a size and weight that could be man handled by the pioneer labour attached. The cases could be stacked to act as storage bins and a list of contents was fixed on the lid. Stores were divided into:
    - Landing Reserves intended to replace equipment lost during the landing. This included survivor packs for issue to personnel who had lost their personal equipment.
    - Beach Maintenance Packs which were scaled to suit the units involved in the landing.

    The Ordnance Beach Detachment is assisted by two RAF sub sections from the RAF Beach Section, one for RAF explosives and one for RAF equipment.


    Petrol Dump.
    All petrol was landed in Jerricans. The Petrol Dump should have stacks that are well dispersed, be on level ground and have a good traffic circuit. Ideally petrol should be kept away from ammunition. Petrol was obviously vulnerable to air attack and shelling and fires were almost inevitable if the cans were hit or punctured. By D+1 there were two Petrol Depots Type "C" in each of the beach sub areas to receive and issue fuel.

    Supply Dump and Detail Issue Depot.
    There are no special requirements but if water is to be issued there should be a convenient supply. Supplies in transit to forward units were sent out in bulk as were other loads. Where supplies were to be issued to local units they were issued against ration returns by a Detail Issue Depot.

    RE Stores Dump.
    RE and RE (transportation) stores. These dumps will be sited adjacent to the beach. These stores are heavy and require at least one good road.

    Beach Dump.
    A small dump of supplies, water and petrol is required on the beach to replenish landing craft.
     
  13. Trux

    Trux 21 AG

    SWORD BEACH.
    OPERATING THE BEACH.

    MORE DUMPS ETC.

    Detail Issue Depots RASC.
    Detail Issue Depots handle supplies, mainly rations. Two such units landed and operated on Sword, 96 Detail Issue Depot with 5 Beach group and 138 Detail Issue Depot with 6 Beach Group. Both units operated in the same supplies dump and their war diaries are almost identical.

    An advanced party of an officer and 2 men landed from LCI(L)s on D Day. The party from 96 Detail Issue Depot landed at around H+200 minutes on Queen White and the party from 138 Detail Issue Depot landed later in the day. The main parties arrived on LSTs on D Day but could not be landed until D+1. Main parties consisted of two officers and 27 men plus a vehicle party of a 3ton 4 X 4 and three men.

    The advanced parties organised a supplies dump at No 3 Sector Stores Dump and the first stores arrived at 0600 on D+1. Issues were not planned to begin until later on D+1. On D+2 the dump was bombed, a petrol fire started and the personnel had to be evacuated. They returned at 1700 hours to salvage kit and stores. A new dump was opened in the Beach Maintenance Area. On D+4 it was possible to move to the original Key Plan site. This move was delayed since the site was still in enemy hands.

    Rations were issued daily, mainly to 3 Division units and units attached to it, plus the Beach Sub Area Units. Issues steadily increased until they had reached 100,000 rations daily by the 17th June and 55 Base Supply Depot was installed and took over issues to larger units.


    176 Workshop and Park Company RE
    The Park element of the company was divided into four Advanced Park Sections, two to land on Sword and two to land on Juno. They were to land in the early stages of the assault and establish RE Stores Dumps. They were then to start operating the dumps at the earliest possible moment, assisted by Pioneer labour. They would continue to function as the main RE Stores unit until the arrival of Engineers Stores base Dump, much later. The workshop element would arrive later but not on Sword.

    Sword had two Advanced Park Sections. These were to have landed on the 2nd tide with the task of operating the main RE stores dump in the beach maintenance area. In the event a reconnaissance party of a Lieutenant and 3 men landed from an LCI but the main party did not land until D+2.

    Reconnaissance party.
    Lieutenant and three men.

    Main party.
    2 15cwt 4 X 2 with 4 crew.
    42 men.
    Landed on Queen Beach on D+2 and went to a bivouac area at Lion sur Mer. They then set up the eastern RE Store Dump for CRE I Corps, with labour from 129 Pioneer Company.

    The Advanced Park Sections were to set up a main RE dump near La Deliverande. This was still in enemy hands on the night of D/ D+1 so RE stores were handled through No2 Beach Dump until it was clear. The main dump would become the dump handling engineer stores for Moon area (the area behind Sword).

    The Eastern Store Dump was open for receipts on 10th June and closed for receipts on 20th June.


    237 Petrol Depot.
    In the days before D day 237 Petrol Company received its equipment of gravity conveyor rollers, pumps and tanks. Its 4 X 2 3ton GS was exchanged for an Austin 4 X 4 3ton GS and its Utility for a Willys Jeep.

    On D Day an Advanced Party of a Captain and three other ranks landed first. The Main Party of a Lieutenant and sixteen other ranks, with the 3ton 4 X 4 and a trailer fire pump, landed later and contacted the advanced party. The site allotted under the Key Plan was still in enemy hands so a depot was set up together with the advanced party of 238 Petrol Depot some 150 yards off the beach. A Rear Party of 20 other ranks and a Jeep would arrive on MTC 943 on D+1.

    The site for the petrol depot was near to an ammunition dump and there was no room for expansion. POL began to arrive and was off loaded and stacked on the ground after the area had been checked for mines. Work continued through the night.

    On D+1 supplies arrived steadily and issues began, with DERV for 27 Armoured Brigade being the best customers. The Coles Crane and two RE personnel which were to be attached to the unit hit a mine coming off the beach. It was written off. The temporary site became dangerous as more supplies arrived and a new site was requested. None were available. The Main Party of 238 Petrol Depot arrived and work continued through the night.

    A further request was made for a new site on D+2 and the Staff Captain from Beach group Headquarters and the Officer Commanding 237 Petrol Depot made a reconnaissance of the surrounding areas. A new site was selected and stores began to pour in. At 1230 the enemy bombed the depot, a loaded DUKW was hit and within 60 seconds there was a disastrous fire which spread through the petrol and ammunition dumps. Officers attempted to move transport and the Officers Commanding 237 Petrol Depot and 6 Beach Group were injured.

    On D+3 all personnel were assembled under a major from 21 Transport Column to set up a POL, Detail Issue Depot and ammunition dump at Hermanville.

    On D+4 the depot was again hit by bombs and incendiaries. There was a fierce fire but it was limited by the dispersal of stacks. ‘D’ Companies from both 1 Buckinghamshire Regiment and 5 Kings Regiment assisted in moving adjoining stacks. 237 and 238 Petrol Depots move to the new site, leaving a rear party to close down the old site. The new site is a large flat area with crops growing in strips. Arranging the dispersal of POL is a priority and stores are on the ground by 2000. Issues continue at the old site with the new one receiving. 237 Petrol Depot receives a Weasel and two motorcycles from 101 Beach Sub Area as emergency transport.

    On D+5 the depot is rapidly expanded with stacks of between five and seven tons spread over the cultivated strips. Dispersal gives necessary protection but also adds to the control difficulties for traffic and labour. There remains a shortage of labour.

    Laying out the depot, planning future demands and issues, and receiving fuel continues. On D+8 95 Pioneer Company arrive as labour. There is a shortage of equipment since much was lost in the dump fire and has not been replaced. It is suggested that fuel tanks and pumps can be taken from wrecked LCI(S)s on the beach but they are not suitable. By D+11 receipts of POL slacked and signing in the depot is undertaken with the close co operation assistance of 245 Provost Company.

    From June 19th bad weather halts receipts and rain affects the circuits. A pioneer road making party lays hard core on half of the depot circuit.

    For the first week in July sees a change in the operation of the depot. Until this time all fuel had been received and issued in Jerricans. Now all fuel was delivered in 40 gallon barrels. These were more difficult to handle and fuel had to be transferred from the barrels to Jerricans. In turn this meant that a supply of Jerricans had to maintained. Empty Jerricans should have been routinely returned from units but this had been erratic. Extra personnel had been allocated to handle the returns and units asked to be careful to return empty cans.

    On 14 July 237 Petrol Depot moved to 2 Canadian Corps.


    Notes. 15 June a Mustang III crashed in the depot. The pilot had baled out and no damage was caused. On 8 July an RAF radar unit opened up between the POL and BSD sites.


    11 and 12 Ordnance Beach Detachments.

    On June 3rd 11 ordnance Beach Detachment boarded an LCT to find that 200 tons of ammunition and RE stores had been improperly loaded and left no space for vehicles. After much adjustment, and hard work, the vehicles were loaded together with 56 men under a major.

    As the first LCTs approached the beach they were shelled. LCT 303 was hit causing a fire in the engine room. The fire was extinguished by flooding it. LCT 297 broke its back on beaching. Due to the number of vehicles on the beach the vehicles on the LCT could not land for 45 minutes. A reconnaissance was made of the Sector Stores Dumps and parties were guided to the sites. Sector Store Dump 2 was heavily mined and under fire. The sappers who should have cleared the site had lost their mine detectors so ordnance personnel cleared some 80 mines. By H+3½ hours Sector Stores Dump 2 was receiving ammunition, mainly 105mm. Sector Store Dump 3 had no mines. Sector Store Dump 1 was still under fire and does not seem to have been used. Sector Store Dump 4 was cleared and kept in reserve.

    Issuing of ammunition commenced at H+4½ hours. At H+5 hours No 38 wireless sets were used for communication between the Sector Stores Dumps. Ammunition was carried from the beached LCTs to the dumps by 3ton 4 X 4 lorries of 39 GT Company until preloaded DUKWs arrived and delivered direct to the dumps. By the end of the day each dump had 450 tons of ammunition.

    On D+1 the Sector Store Dumps operated well, receiving and issuing. There was continued sniping at Sector Store Dump 2 from houses on the sea front. Ordnance personnel used PIAT and Bren fire. Sector Store Dump 3 was under mortar fire. As the sites on the Key Plan were still occupied ammunition and Landing Reserves were delivered to Sector Store Dump 3 which was expanded but dangerously over crowded.

    On D+2 receipts and issues continued at the Sector Stores Dumps. Sniping was finally dealt with by using an AVRE. Enemy bombing caused a fire at the petrol dump at Sector Stores Dump 3 and this spread to the ammunition dump. 120 tons of ammunition was lost and work ceased for several hours.

    On D+3 12 Ordnance Beach Detachment opened a Forward Ammunition Depot on the Key plan site. This was receiving only with issues continuing from the Sector Stores Dumps. Landing Reserve Set 1 was complete and Set 2 was 50% complete and stores were issued from them to replace losses on landing.

    On D+4 the Ordnance Beach Detachment Stores Depot finally opened on the site originally planned. This proved an excellent site. Although it was signed by the enemy as being mined there were in fact none. Enemy dug outs were used as offices and trenches as bivouacs. All issues were now from Sector Stores Dump 3 until stocks were run down.

    The movement, working from a split site and the heavy demands for stores meant that personnel were only getting four hours sleep in 24 hours. To simplify issues it was arranged that as far as possible brigades would make bulk demands. On D+6 the new Stores Depot was well advanced and it was decided to close the temporary dumps and open the Main Dump for issues on D+7. New signs were erected. 11 Ordnance Beach Detachment Ammunition Section left the Sector Stores Dump and moved to the Main Ammunition Dump under 12 Ordnance Beach Detachment.

    D+7 was a busy day. There was a continuing heavy demand for stores issues. Transport was supplied to move the remainder of the temporary dump to the Main Dump. The Returned Stores Depot was opened. A shift system was introduced which gave personnel eight hours off duty.

    Normal working continued and two RAF personnel and two RAMC personnel were attached to handle specialist stores. From the 19th bad weather meant that there were no receipts but issues continued. The respite was used to sort returned stores. On the 27th the first returned stores were sent to the UK in the form of gas cylinders and chemical carboys.
     
  14. Trux

    Trux 21 AG

    SWORD BEACH.
    OPERATING THE BEACH.


    Transit Areas and Assembly Areas.

    The troops of the assault division landing on the first tide went straight into action or forward to their Unit Assembly Areas. They were under the control of their own officers, some of whom were designated Unit Landing Officers.

    After the initial assault each individual was issued with a card telling him what to do on landing. These cards were issued by the unit in the marshalling area in the UK. Cards for use on D day itself were modified to suit the requirements of the formation and were to be handed in to the Officer Commanding Transit Area. After D Day they showed the section of the Assembly Area to which the individual should report. The cards also showed what action the unit or sub unit was to take on leaving the Assembly Area. If the situation demanded that the unit was to take a different action from that shown on the card then the Officer Commanding the Assembly Area was informed and he instructed the unit accordingly. From the transit areas onwards personnel and vehicles were normally moved in formed bodies but every man was instructed as to what he should do if detached from his unit.



    The Transit Area.
    This was close to the beach and here personnel and vehicles were collected, formed into groups and then sent forward under unit control to their Unit Assembly Area. There were separate transit areas allotted for personnel, tracked vehicles and wheeled vehicles. As far as possible these three categories used separate beach exits and followed separate routes until they reached their unit.

    All marching personnel (those not carried in or on a vehicle), except assaulting troops or those with a definite task to carry out on the beach, proceeded to Personnel Transit Areas. They were directed to these areas by Beach Group Provosts. In the area they handed in their life jackets and if necessary received replacement equipment from the Re Equipment Store. They were then organised under an officer or NCO of their unit and then marched off as ordered. They usually marched to the Assembly Area allotted to their unit but some were to march to other areas for tactical or administrative reasons. In any case the marching parties cleared the Transit Areas as quickly as possible.

    In the vehicle transit areas drivers removed Phase B waterproofing which involved removing the waterproofing from sparking plugs, distributors and breather hole plugs. Vehicles could run for only a very short distance without doing this but could then run for a maximum of 200 miles without a full de waterproofing. As soon as drivers had removed the waterproofing materials they were ordered to move to the Assembly Areas in small groups under an officer or NCO of their unit.

    The Unit Assembly Area.
    This was further inland and on the forward route to the brigade or battalion objective. Here all personnel and vehicles of the unit were assembled and sorted into their tactical groupings. Units landing on the first tide detailed representatives to report to the wheeled and tracked vehicle transit areas to direct all vehicles landing on the second tide to the Unit Assembly Areas. All vehicles landing on the second tide proceeded to the wheeled or tracked transit area. They were de waterproofed and then be directed to the Unit Assembly Area in unit parties under an officer or NCO. The Divisional Check Post controlled the forward movement under the control of the Assistant Provost Marshall.

    Assembly Areas.
    Assembly Areas were set up and operated by 6 Beach Group. The areas were cleared of mines, the approach roads cleared and signs erected. They were situated inland of Ouistreham and stretching towards St Aubin. Here they were conveniently placed to receive vehicles and personnel from the beaches of Queen and Roger, which were developed for this purpose, and to send them forward along the road towards Caen and the River Orne bridges. There was a delay in opening the Assembly Areas caused by the enemy still occupying the allotted areas throughout D Day. On D+1 temporary assembly areas were organised just inland from Roger Green.

    Assembly Areas were allotted for the assembly of personnel and vehicles landing on D+1 and afterwards. Each area was divided into sections and each section and sub section was given a code name. Initially the Assembly Areas were used as follows:
    ‘Foot’ was for 3 Division Troops.
    ‘Toe’ was for 27 Armoured Brigade Group.
    ‘Heel’ was for 185 Brigade Group.
    ‘Ankle’ was for 9 Brigade Group.
    ‘Finger’ was for 8 Brigade Group.
    ‘Homer’ was for I Corps and 6 Airborne Division.
    There were also ‘Fielding’ and ‘Defoe’ plus an area for RAF. Later the areas could be used for other formations.

    In the Assembly Areas formations were collected into formed bodies and then moved forward to formation concentration areas or previously arranged rendezvous. Units should have left the Assembly Area as soon as they were complete and usually within twelve hours. Wherever possible guides met units at the Assembly Area Reception Points and led the units forward to their destination.

    Phase A waterproofing material was removed as opportunity offered. Waterproofing hardware was to be salvaged and returned to Ordnance Beach Detachments.

    From D+2 all documents would be handed in at the Assembly Area.
     
  15. Trux

    Trux 21 AG

    SWORD BEACH.
    OPERATING THE BEACH.

    Traffic Control.
    In the assault stage of the landings Traffic Control was in the hands of 3 Division Provost Company. Each Brigade had a provost section attached to it and there were a further three sections which were to be deployed in the headquarters and administrative areas of the division. The brigade sections were responsible for directing the units of their brigade from the beach exits to their forward locations. The sections moved forward with their brigades leaving the Beach Group provost units responsible for traffic control. Divisional provosts placed small signs directing traffic and backed them up with pointsmen, though at this stage all traffic should have been forward.

    Beach Group Provosts.
    Good traffic control was as important as good roads for ensuring the smooth flow of vehicles. Sword deployed two Beach Group Provost Companies each of a HQ and four sections. 241 Provost Company from 5 Beach group as he first ashore. This was a normal company as far as personnel was concerned but since they were to remain in the beach area they did not have the same mobility. Each section had
    1 Jeep.
    1 15cwt GS 4 X 4.
    2 motorcycles.
    2 bicycles.
    15 men and a handcart

    One beach section landed on each of Queen White and Queen Red. Two Beach Corporals from each section landed at H+20 minutes. The Officer Commanding a Lieutenant and the two beach sections landed at H+45 minutes. A Lieutenant and the two dump sections landed at H+120 minutes. A 3ton 4 X 4 was due to land with the first wave of LSTs.

    The exits were complete by H+4 hours and traffic on the laterals, apart from the vicinity of the gun areas, was flowing well by H+8 hours. Up to 25% of the signing equipment was lost in the landings but pointsmen following the advancing troops manned all points up to and including the ‘B’ lateral (Ouistreham to Lion sur Mer) by H+6 hours, the time at which the Beach Sub Area took over responsibility for the beach area from 3 division.

    At H+8 hours a Lieutenant with the Second in Command of 5 Beach Group commenced a Beach Maintenance Area reconnaissance but the ‘C’ lateral was still being contested and the planned dumps in the Beach Maintenance Area could not be prepared. The Officer Commanding 245 Provost Company had now landed and a new Traffic Control plan was agreed, to be put into execution at 0800 on D+1. On D Day 241 Company lost two men killed and six wounded.

    245 Provost Company were delayed in landing and eventually landed at 1000 hours on D+1. They took over the Beach Maintenance Area circuit at 1600 hours and were lent a Lieutenant and one section of 241 Company to complete signing. 245 Provost Company was to be responsible for the Beach Maintenance Area under 6 Beach Group and had slightly different equipment to that of 241 Provost Company. An advanced party of 2 men, Officer Commanding and batman, landed on foot at H+7 hours with the Reconnaissance Group for 6 Beach Group.
    2 Jeep towing 2 handcarts with 4 crew. Priority 1 for landing.
    4 Carrier Loyd personnel with 8 crew.
    10 men with 10 motorcycles.
    2 Jeep with 4 crew.
    2 Jeep towing 2 handcarts with 4 crew.

    On D+2 Assembly Areas were set up on the road to Ouistreham. On D+3 second stage signing was completed. On D+4 the RSM and six corporals of 241 Provost Company were on town duties in Ouistreham. New big signs were erected over the next three days and the companies then settled down to static duties. On June 21st 241 and 245 Companies exchanged areas and a new Traffic Control plan was introduced.

    Ideally Provost Units should be composed of men capable of carrying out all the duties normally expected of police, plus military police duties and be fit for front line active service. There were also Traffic Control Sections which were composed of men below the standard required for front line service and many were older civil policemen who had previously been exempt from military service. They were responsible for traffic control and signing of routes in the transit, assembly and dump areas.

    During build-up the problem of maintaining an easy flow of traffic was complicated because a modern mechanised army was attempting to manoeuvre on a system of narrow and badly maintained roads which had been designed to carry the slight traffic of an agricultural area. Towns quickly became bottlenecks. The problem was eventually partially solved the alternative routes and road improvements described above but also by
    instituting a system of movement control. In the absence of a firm plan for traffic control, movement tended to take place during the hours of daylight, leaving the roads relatively free at night, but after the institution of movement control all operational traffic was timed to take place during the hours of darkness, when administrative traffic was less heavy.

    On D day and early on D+1 there were problems because Provost personnel had not received all their stores. These were scheduled to land on vehicles being carried on LSTs which had been delayed in unloading. Road signs at first were very scarce. By D+4 good signs were been made using local materials. Later the position was reversed. During the build-up period the congestion of formations, depots and installations in the beach-head produced a confusing multiplicity of signs. Provost became responsible for co-ordinating all route signing. Each company set up a sign factory operated in the initial stages by its own personnel but later by Pioneers, civilian carpenters and sign writers.

    Traffic Posts were established at road crossings, usually where roads to the dump from beaches and forward areas meet. They also served as Straggler Posts. Provost personnel had lists of units and convoys etc together with the priority assigned to each. They kept military traffic moving smoothly and controlled access by civilian traffic. The latter was not much of a problem in the beach area. Traffic Posts were also provided with telephone communications to enable them to be kept up to date on movements, and to report problems.

    A platoon of RAF police assisted with traffic control since they had little to do. It was hoped that airfields round Caen would be captured very early. This did not happen so there was little need to land RAF stores over Sword. Since no RAF balloons were flown for the first two weeks the balloon personnel also assisted with traffic control.

    On 27th June Royal Marine Provosts relieved Army MPs of some duties on ships and with naval beach areas.

    601 Company CMP (Vulnerable Points) landed from the first wave of LSTs after H+7 hours. One section landed to guard vulnerable points, particularly dumps. It was not mobile, having only a 15cwt 4 X 2 as transport.
    1 15cwt 4 X 2 GS, Bedford, with 2 crew.
    13 men.

    73 Company CMP (Traffic Control) was due to land late on D day but did not land until D+1. One section landed for Traffic Control in the Beach Sub Area.
    1 15cwt 4 X 2 GS, Ford.
    6 Motorcycles with 6 crew.
    7 men.

    1 Provost and Security Unit, ‘C’ Echelon. RAF provided a detachment to work with Beach Group traffic control in landing RAF personnel and vehicles. Sword was not intended to handle much RAF traffic. It was due to land on the second tide on D Day.
    1 Jeep.
    1 3ton Tender, Crossley.
    5 men.

    Provost units had many other responsibilities which are described elsewhere. These included guarding Prisoners of War, policing the civilian population, guarding attractive stores against pilfering and enforcing military discipline in general.
     
  16. Trux

    Trux 21 AG

    SWORD BEACH.
    OPERATING THE BEACH.

    ON THE BEACH.
    Beach Control.

    RN Beachmaster.
    The High Water Mark (the furthest point the water reaches at high tide) is the dividing line between Navy and Army control. Of course the two work in very close cooperation. Right on the beach will be the Main Beach Signal Station (MBSS). This is a joint Army and Navy unit allocated to the Assault Brigade. Advance parties land with assault battalion headquarters. It provides communication with ships and craft and serves as the main link with the shore. After the assault the Main Beach Signal Station will man the following waves.
    - Landing Wave. This maintains radio telephone communication with control craft etc. It is used for controlling the movement of craft off the beaches.
    - Unloading Wave. This is used for radio telephone communication with control craft and parties boarding MT ships and coasters to carry out unloading. It is used for messages concerned with the discharge of cargoes.
    - Naval Beach Wave with links to Deputy Senior Officer Assault Group on Headquarters Ship, Naval Officer in Charge on shore and to other Main Beach Signal Stations. A Simplex wave for Morse.
    - VHF Lateral link. A duplex speech wave between MBSS.

    In addition there is the Common Landing Wave which will control movements of all groups of Landing Craft arriving or departing after the initial assault when within five miles of the shore.

    Headquarters Naval Officer in Charge.
    Headquarters Naval Officer in Charge will be situated close to the Beach Group Headquarters so that communication with it can be by telephone or in person and will not require wireless communication. On Sword the NOIC established his headquarters some ¾ mile inland at a crossroads just north of Hermanville. The Headquarters of 101 Beach Sub Area was also here as was that of 3 Division until it moved further inland. This site had good communications and a clear view overlooking the beaches, the approaches and Gooseberry 5. It would also be well sited for VHF wireless communications.

    Headquarters Naval Officer in Charge will have the following links:
    - Naval Beach Wave to the Main Beach Signal Station and thence to Deputy Senior Officer Assault Group on a Headquarters Ship.
    - Shore to Shore Wave to Combined Force Headquarters in UK. This will not be in place in the early stages and communication with the UK will be via Headquarters Ships.
    - VHF Link to RN Radar. This link is provided by the Radar unit.
    - VHF Link to RAF Group Control Centre. Provided by Naval Liaison Office (Air) Signals Section.


    Royal Navy Beach Masters were responsible for activity up to the high tide mark. In effect this meant that they controlled naval activity including
    - calling in landing craft to the beach using radio, signal lamps and loudhailers.
    - unloading landing craft according to priorities
    - providing salvage parties to recover damaged landing craft, stores and equipment
    - providing fire fighting parties which used DUKWs with trailer pumps in them.

    Shipping remained under the control of the relevant Royal Navy organisation until released to the Beach Master.

    Each Beach Commando had a Principal Beach Master who worked closely with the Beach Group Commander, a Deputy Principal Beach Master who commanded the day to day running of the Beach Command, and three Beach Masters, each responsible for a beach party and a section of the beach.

    Each Royal Navy Beach Commando was linked to an army Beach Group, which was responsible for a brigade landing beach above the high tide mark.


    The Naval Officer in Charge receives lists of vessels and their loads by Morse or teleprinter from the UK. In the early stages this is simplified because the vessels and craft are preloaded and the landing tables already prepared. The Naval Officer in Charge coordinates the landing and unloading of vessels with the Principal Military Landing Officer at Headquarters Beach Sub Area. (On Sword there was some confusion and although the lists were prepared they were sent on a low priority and were not received for some days.)

    The detailed arrangements for landing and unloading are arranged by the RN Principal Beach Master and the Military Landing Officer at Beach Group level.

    The RN Beachmaster is responsible for the management of the beaches. He will:
    - assign landing areas for different types of craft, including army DUKWs and Rhinos.
    - Assign landing places to individual incoming craft.
    - Inform the Control Craft by Landing Wave when incoming craft can be released and proceed to the beach.
    - Guide individual craft to their correct landing point. For this purpose flags, signal lamps and loud hailers can be used.

    All craft using the beach come under the Beachmasters control including Ferry Craft.


    Naval Beach Signs.
    For the guidance of incoming craft RN Commandos erected a variety of signs. Some of these were intended for the early stages when there could be considerable confusion. On Sword it was thought that they were attracting artillery fire by providing good ranging points and some were taken down.

    The centre of each beach was marked by a nine foot square the same colour as the beach (Green, White, Red). It had a six inch white border and had the sector letter in white. At night a light of the same colour of the beach flashing the sector letter in Morse was used.

    The limits of all beaches were marked by a white rectangle twelve foot by four foot. These were placed horizontally on the left limit and vertically on the right. The limits of Red and Green beaches were marked with twelve foot by four foot of the appropriate colour displayed alongside the white rectangle and with the same orientation. At night the limits of the beach were marked by two lights the same colour as the beach placed eight feet apart. They were placed horizontally on the left and vertically on the right limit.

    Transit beacons to guide craft were five foot sided equilateral triangles. These were placed one behind the other with the apex of the rear beacon apex down and the front beacon apex up. When the two were lined up the craft were on course for the correct beach. Where more than one transit was required, or numbered beaching berths were desired, each pair of beacons had a number painted in black, number one being on the right. At night fixed amber lights were used.

    Beaching positions for individual craft or flotilla officers were indicated by a square yellow flag waved from side to side by a member of the Beach Masters team. At night a light flashing the letter ‘Q’ was used.

    Danger points on the beach were marked by a red flag. A red light will be used at night.

    Hydrographic Signs.
    Survey craft were early arrivals and these used a variety of equipment to locate wrecks, rocks, sand banks or depressions.

    Wrecks, shoals or obstructions were marked with a buoy made of cross planks with a five foot wooden upright. The upright was painted in one foot green and white bands and flew a square green flag. At night a green light was shown. All landing craft were fitted with a buoy which automatically floated above a craft if it should sink.

    Wrecked landing craft which were uncovered by the tide were marked by the Beach Party by a fifteen foot pole painted with one foot green and white bands and flying a green flag. A green light was shown at night.

    If required channels were marked by cross plank buoys with a five foot upright. Port hand buoys had a black pennant and a white light. Starboard hand buoys had a red and yellow diagonal square flag and a red light.

    Survey Craft and teams displayed signs when working. On shore yellow poles with a yellow burgee were used. Afloat a cross plank buoy with a yellow burgee was used.


    Landing Craft Recovery Unit.
    Three Landing Craft Repair Units were assigned to Sword. One landed on each of D Day, D+1 and D+2. They worked under the Beach Master, who assigned them a place on the beach from which to operate.

    The function of these units was to refloat stranded minor landing craft and to carry out such emergency hull repairs as may be necessary. REME Beach Recovery Sections, Royal Navy Beach Commandos and Royal Marine working parties were available to assist in this work. It was essential that the beach be kept clear and that the maximum number of minor craft should be kept operational to operate the ferry service from ships offshore.

    Each LCRU was commanded by an Engineer Officer RN assisted by a Warrant Officer Shipwright. And some twenty ratings.

    Each unit had the following equipment
    1 X Caterpillar D8 Crawler Tractor with Hyster winch.
    1 X Le Tourneau Crane on tracks. Towed and powered by the D8 tractor.
    1 X 3 ton 4 X 4 GS Lorry.
    1 X Trailer pump, Dennis. Towed by 3ton 4 X 4.
    1 X Jeep.
    1 X Trailer with portable electric welding set, welding table and an oxyacetylene welding and cutting set. Towed by Jeep.
    Salvus breathing equipment and underwater cutting gear. Carried in 3 ton lorry.
    On D Day most units also had a DUKW.

    In addition three Landing Barge Emergency Repair were allotted to work with each LCRU. These could be beached.


    Mobile Land Repair Unit.
    MLRU were more comprehensively equipped to carry out repairs on larger landing craft. Each was commanded by a Lieutenant Commander (Engineering). The Complement was 4 officers and 69 ratings, mostly artificers and craftsmen.

    The functions of the MLRU were listed as
    To assist in the recovery and repair of major landing craft on the beaches.
    To assist in the maintenance of RN vehicles. Parts and additional help was to be given by REME.
    To provide emergency repair facilities in a captured port until the base engineer officer’s organisation was fully established.

    The unit was divided into Advanced Section and Rear Section. They were timed to land on D+2 with the Advanced Section landing on the first tide and the Rear Section landing on the second tide.

    The MLRU was comprehensively equipped for its task. Advanced Section vehicles included.
    3 ton Workshop Lorry with lathes and drills, 3 ton Battery Charging Lorry, 3 ton Stores Lorry, 3 ton Diving Lorry, 3 ton Office Lorry, 3 ton Shipwrights Lorry, 15cwt Water Truck, 15cwt Welding Truck, 15cwt AA Truck, Humber Utility, Trailer pump, Jeep, Motorcycle and nine Trailers.

    Rear Section vehicles included:
    3 ton Workshop Lorry, 3 ton Mobile Crane, five 3 ton Stores Lorry, 3 ton Petrol Lorry, 3 ton Office Lorry, 15cwt Air Compressor Truck, 15cwt Water Truck, 15cwt Welding Truck, 15cwt AA Truck, Humber Utility, 3ton GS Lorry,
    Motorcycle and eleven Trailers.

    No 3 MLRU was to land on Juno but was also to operate on Sword Beach. A party was sent to work on Ouistreham harbour. The main task was to clear the harbour basin and to ensure the operation of the lock gate to the Caen Canal. No 4 MLRU was to land on Gold to undertake similar tasks to No 3 MLRU but at other ports on the British beaches.

    There was also a ‘P’ Party of divers for underwater clearance tasks.
     
  17. Trux

    Trux 21 AG

    SWORD BEACH.
    OPERATING THE BEACH.

    ON THE BEACH.
    Beach Recovery.
    Beach Recovery Sections.
    The first REME elements ashore were the Beach Armoured Recovery Vehicles of the Beach Recovery Sections which landed immediately after the assault to be closely followed by D 8 crawler tractors and wheeled recovery vehicles. "Drowned" vehicle parks were established near the beaches for drowned tanks, guns and "B" vehicles. These vehicles would eventually be collected and dealt with by the Light Aid detachments and Workshops of their formation.

    The roles of the Beach Recovery Sections were listed as:
    - Keep the cleared passage from the water line to the advanced area of the beach group area clear of broken down equipment so that the flow of assault troops was unimpeded. In the early stages only narrow passages could be cleared through beach obstacles and minefields (not that there were any mines on Sword Beach).
    - To remove equipment that was badly damaged by immersion in sea water and blocking the exits from landing craft. Vehicles were adequately water proofed against the submersion of normal landing from craft but unevenness in the sea bed led to some vehicles driving off into deeper water. Some drivers also stalled on leaving the craft. Casualties on the craft were removed by the sections if they were blocking the exit but otherwise casualties returned to the UK.
    - To convey drowned vehicles to a drowned vehicle park. A small detachment from the sections organised the parks but it was the responsibility of the ‘owner’ formation to dry out, repair and collect the vehicles.
    - Assist in the refloating of lightly beached landing craft. Stranded or damaged craft were the responsibility of the Navy.

    The sections were only used in the beach area. It was suggested that 21 Beach Recovery Section should operate in the Beach Maintenance Area as well but it was decided that the Light Aid Detachments and RASC recovery units were capable of carrying out necessary recovery work inland.


    Beach Recovery Sections were allotted one per Beach Group. Each section had:
    Headquarters of
    Captain
    WOII AQMS
    Clerk
    3 cooks
    Batman
    5 drivers
    General dutyman
    Amphibious Jeep
    Jeep
    3ton 4 X 4 GS Austin
    DUKW
    2 X motorcycle

    Attached
    3 other ranks for engineer equipment
    2 serjeants for AVREs
    3 other ranks.

    A Drowned Vehicle Park consisting of a Staff Serjeant and 4 other ranks plus personnel attached from the LADs of units in 3 Division.

    Two sections each of
    3 Sherman III Beach Armoured Recovery Vehicle, each with a crew of serjeant, corporal and three men.
    3 Tractor Crawler Class I D8 with a crew of 2 men.
    1 Breakdown Tractor, Scammell with a crew of three men.
    1 Breakdown Tractor, Mack with a crew of three men.
    1 Breakdown Tractor, Ward La France with a crew of three men.

    This gives a good variety of equipment to meet the variety of recovery needs. The BARV was a deep wading, and armoured, tug and ideal for recovering vehicles actually in the water. They could also push vehicles or landing craft. The D8 was armoured to the same degree and had a more limited wading ability but it did have a powerful winch which the BARV lacked. It could shackle a cable to vehicles in the water and winch them to safety. The Scammell and Mack both had a winch and a recovery crane. Both also had low pressure balloon tyres which could be deflated to give a good grip on soft sand. An earth spade had been developed especially for beach recovery work since normal earth anchors would not hold in sand. The Ward La France with six wheel drive and dual rear tyres had a better grip on firm ground and its twin cranes could be arranged to allow a sideways pull.

    Repair of vehicles and the recovery of vehicles from the rest of the Beach Group Area is the responsibility of a workshop from one of the assault brigade or beach area units.

    REME involvement on D Day falls into two parts. Unit Light Aid Detachments and formation workshops land with their units and formations and move inland with them. They do not recover vehicles on the beaches.

    The Corps Composite Workshops including attached specialist personnel for dealing with such equipment as AVRE and Flails accompanied by the light recovery sections landed on the first and second tides of D-day.


    20 Beach Recovery Section attached to 5 Beach Group landed on the first tide. One platoon landed to work on Queen Red and one platoon on Queen Red. The Sherman III Beach Armoured Recovery Vehicles had priority with three landing at H+45 minutes and a further three landing at H+120 minutes. The armoured and waterproofed Caterpillar D8 crawler tractors and Scammel Heavy Break Down Tractors also landed at H+120 minutes. All the section was ashore by H+360 minutes except for the two Ward La France Breakdown Tractors which landed from the first wave of LSTs.

    The Scammel was used at one stage to tow carriers and anti tank guns through a beach exit since they found it difficult without assistance. The BARVs found that they could not recover all the damaged or drowned armoured vehicles before the tide came in and the depth of water halted work. Remaining vehicles were marked as wrecks using red flags to warn incoming landing craft.

    21 Beach Recovery Section was attached to 6 Beach Group and landed from LSTs. The vehicles were due to land on the second tide but delays meant that they were not all landed until D+2. An advanced party of the Officer Commanding and three men landed with 6 Beach Group reconnaissance party from an LCI(L). The remainder of the section was spread across eight LSTs which had all arrived off the coast by 1800 hours. As both the landing of vehicles by Rhino Ferry and LCT and the opening of the Beach Maintenance Area were delayed it was decided that 21 Beach recovery Section would be put to work on Queen Red as they arrived. On D+2 when the entire unit was ashore one platoon remained to work on Queen Red and one platoon moved to operate on the newly opened Roger Green.

    At least one of the Class I Trawler Tractors was a TD18 instead of a Caterpillar D8.

    The War Diaries only list vehicle casualties for 21 Beach Recovery Section but 20 Section would presumably be similar. On the 11th a BARV and a Scammell were drowned. On the 12th a BARV was damaged when it hit a mine while towing the drowned BARV. On the 17th a D8 Tractor was drowned.

    On the 17th the unit headquarters and bivouac also moved to Bella Riva. On 22nd an ammunition coaster was hit and set alight. It is recorded that all units were evacuated except 21 Beach Recovery Section which remained to assist, presumably getting vehicles away from the scene.

    On July 3rd the unit moved to Luc sur Mer where it was later divided with one platoon going to join 24 Beach Recovery Section on Gold and one joining 22 Beach Recovery Section on Juno. By early August it was reported that the equipment was wearing out. The BARVs were suffering from clutch failure, a Ward La France had brake seizure and a Mack had seized wheel bearings.

    Records for 20 Beach Recovery Section are thin but they seem to have continued operating on Sword until early July. They are next recorded as working at Arromanches on beach recovery and the removal of static anti aircraft equipment from Arromanches, Port en Bessin and the Gooseberries.
     
    Aixman likes this.
  18. Trux

    Trux 21 AG

    SWORD BEACH.
    OPERATING THE BEACH.

    Beach Sub Area Amenities.

    Beach Group Headquarters.
    5 Beach Group Headquarters was established in the centre of Queen Beach, right on the boundary between Queen White and Queen Red. This was also on the edge of the Cod strongpoint so that there was some delay in setting up communications. A Beach Group Command Post was established on the edge of the dunes. Later a Beach Group Main Headquarters was established just off the beach. The Military Landing Officer’s Office and Main Beach Signal Station were near by. Each of the two Beach Companies working on the beaches established their Headquarters in the centre of their respective beaches.

    When 6 Beach Group landed they moved inland and the Headquarters was established on the approach to the area set aside for dumps. 101 Beach Sub Area established its headquarters just north of Hermanville. The Naval Officer in Charge also established a headquarters here.


    Drowned Vehicle Park.
    This was established between the Queen White and the first lateral road. This was close to the wheeled vehicle exits. The first REME elements ashore were the beach armoured recovery vehicles of the Beach Recovery Section which landed immediately after the assault, to be closely followed by D 8 crawler tractors and wheeled recovery vehicles. These recovered vehicles which had stalled or drowned, got stuck in sand or clay and thus kept the beach exits clear. The Beach Recovery Sections and the Drowned Vehicle Park personnel were not responsible for the repair of drowned tanks, guns and "B" vehicles. This was the responsibility of the units and formations to which the equipment belonged.

    Each Brigade in 3 Division, 8, 9, 185 and 27 Armoured landed a party of 20 men under an Artificer Warrant Officer to work in the Drowned Vehicle Park. The party from 27 Armoured Brigade landed first some time after H+7 hours. 8 Brigade landed a party at H+12 hours from an LCI(L) carrying 6 Beach Group personnel. 9 and 185 Brigades each landed a party from LSTs after H+12. Each party consisted of craftsmen carrying hand tool in a special back pack with a quick release in case the landed in deep water. As the vehicles in the Drowned Vehicle Park were repaired and returned to their units the personnel from the Brigade Workshops returned to their parent units.

    Separate parties landed later to carry out repairs on the flails of 30 Armoured Brigade and the AVREs of the ARRE. Mechanical Equipment units provided their own repair and maintenance.


    REME Workshop.
    This was established on the first lateral road at Lion sur Mer, in the dump area controlled by 6 Beach Group. Recovery Sections from I Corps Recovery Company and the REME Workshop were responsible for all recovery and repair in Moon Beach Maintenance Area. Workshops had attached specialist personnel to deal with the specialist equipment, including AVRE and Flails.

    Field Dressing Station and Beach Dressing Station.
    The Beach Dressing Station was established on the edge of the beach while the Field Dressing Station was further inland. A Main Dressing Station was established on the down route through Hermanville. The Casualty Evacuation Post was established just behind the beach near the end of the down route through Coleville. Later a Casualty Clearing Station was established on the main lateral road.

    By the end of June there were only two Field Dressing Stations belonging to the Beach Sub Area still operating in Moon. These were near Hermanville. All casualties were now evacuated through Juno and the I Corp medical units were concentrated around Douvre, near the boundary between Moon (Sword) and Star (Juno).

    A Casualty Evacuation Post was set up at the eastern end of Roger Green Beach. Figures for casualty evacuation were:
    D Day, D+1 and D+2. 722 casualties.
    D+3. 23 casualties.
    D+4. 283 casualties.
    D+5. 53 casualties.
    D+6. 56 casualties.
    D+7. 196 casualties.
    D+9. 76 casualties.
    D+10. 22 casualties.

    After D+10 all casualties coming through this sector or from the Forward Area were evacuated through Juno.



    Bivouacs.
    Bivouacs for the Beach Companies and Port Operating Companies were near the shore. Bivouac areas were laid out and cleared of mines but it was usually left to personnel to dig trenches, command posts etc. As these were on the dunes the digging was not arduous but it was necessary to shore up the sides of trenches. Troops normally showed some initiative in this and there were trenches reinforced with the metal from deep wading equipment, packing cases and porpoises, and lined with parachutes. A tent over the top made a snug home. Many units soon found that the cellars of vacant houses and villas were even better.

    Some units made use of enemy trenches and dugouts. This was not generally recommended since the enemy knew their exact location if they felt inclined to shell them.


    Prisoner of War Cage.
    The Prisoner of War cage was constructed on the down route between Coleville and the beach. Here POWs were kept until shipped to the UK. Guarding the cage was the responsibility of Vulnerable Points Provost personnel, who had guard dogs.

    Numbers of POWs evacuated were:
    D Day, D+1 and D+2. 722 prisoners.
    D+3. 23 prisoners.
    D+4. 283 prisoners.
    D+5. 53 prisoners.
    D+6. 56 prisoners.
    D+7. 196 prisoners.
    D+9. 76 prisoners.
    D+11. 22 prisoners.
    After D+11 evacuation of prisoners through Sword ceased.

    Prisoners of War were used a labour on the beaches, especially in the early stages at low tide for obstacle clearance and in the discharge of stores from craft and barges. Escorts for Prisoners of War were provided from the UK. These arrived on designated LSTs from D+1. The evacuation did not always go smoothly since the LSTs could not always wait for the prisoners and escorts. Escorts had to go ashore, locate the prisoners and get them back to the LST. This often took longer then planned and since it was not known when the LSTs would arrive the prisoners were not always ready.

    In the early stages no documentation was carried out until prisoners arrived in the UK. Many were of nationalities other than German, mainly Russians or Poles.

    The processing of Prisoners of War and the organisation and administration of the cage would eventually be the responsibility of 218 Prisoner of War Camp. The fist personnel landed on the second tide of D Day. Ten men landed from LCI(L) with 6 Beach Group around H+12 hours. A further 17 men landed with Headquarters 101 Beach Sub Area from LSTs some time later.


    Salvage.
    A Salvage Dump was established where the forward route through Colleville met the main lateral road. This was operated by Pioneer Corp personnel attached to the Beach Groups. Salvage from the various dumps was collected here for return to the UK.

    At this time salvage was limited to returnable and reusable items. RASC units routinely collected ammunition boxes and unpacked but unfired ammunition. These items were taken to the ammunition dump where some items could be repacked and reused. Ammunition boxes were mostly returned to the UK for reuse. Ordnance dumps collected gas cylinders and chemical carboys which were returned to the UK for reuse. Casualty Clearing Stations RAMC collected equipment and weapons from casualties and in the early stages these could also be returned. Mae Wests were collected at Transit Areas and returned to the UK.

    Later much equipment would be collected, sorted and returned from the Airborne Division. This included special airborne equipment no longer required by the division, especially parachutes. Recovery of parachutes however was not good. Many ‘disappeared’ before they could be recovered and were put to use as ladies lingerie or as lining for trenches and dugouts.


    Water Point.
    A considerable amount of water was needed for the personnel operating the beach maintenance area and for those passing through. The normal water supply was based on concrete water towers which were filled by electric pumps. All of these were out of action until civilian electricity supply could be restored. This would be after the capture of Caen. There were numerous springs but it proved difficult to find a single source with sufficient water.

    On D+1 a water Point Type A was established at Hermanville using a good well. This was developed as the main water point. On D+2 a second water point Type A was established on the Caen Canal at Ouistreham but this was later abandoned as the water was brackish. The equipment was moved to a well at Ouistreham. A third water point was established at St. Aubin on D+3. 3 Division had established a good water point at Colleville and this was taken over by the Beach Sub Area. All RE units carried some water purification equipment and most had the Stella purification trailers so that water could be taken from streams.
     
  19. Tom OBrien

    Tom OBrien Senior Member

    Hi Mike,

    A massive thanks for continuing with this effort, you are doing a fantastic job. Not surprisingly though, there are discrepancies in the original documents. For example, you wrote:

    "172 Infantry Brigade Company.
    For 185 Brigade.
    This company carried ammunition for 185 Brigade. This brigade was to advance as rapidly as possible to Caen and beyond. Being mobile it needed its Ammunition Point to keep up with it. The lorries of 172 Company transported the ammunition and then formed a reserve on wheels. As vehicles issued ammunition and became empty they returned to Sector Dumps to replenish.

    H+240. 7 3ton 4 X 4 GS, Austin land carrying ammunition for 185 Brigade Ammunition Point.
    H+360. 4 3ton 4 X 4 GS, Austin land carrying ammunition for 185 Brigade Ammunition Point."

    However, the war diary of 172 Inf Bde Coy (WO171/2402) describes it a little differently:

    Capt. A.A. Hall to land with an A.P. behind 9th Br. Inf. Bde. landing on D day.
    Lieut. S. Keane to do a similar job with an A.P. behind 185 Br. Inf. Bde.

    3 June 1944
    O.C. with 20 Mines vehicles embarked Gosport 1900 hours, Lieut. S. Keane with 6 A.P. vehicles embarked at Brighton. Capt. Hall, with 6 A.P. vehicles embarked on L.C.T. Nos. 405/6/7/8/9/10.

    Please keep up the good work though, are you going to record the landings for every day until the beach closed... :biggrin:

    Regards

    Tom
     
  20. Trux

    Trux 21 AG

    Tom,

    You are correct of course. We know that one section landed at H+240 to provide an ammunition point for 185 Brigade and that another section landed at H+360 to do the same for 9 Brigade. This does not seem to be reflected in the original tables.

    I am at present communicating with a forum member who is researching this.

    Mike
     

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