So it Began.....Their Finest Hour

Discussion in 'The War In The Air' started by Gage, Jul 10, 2011.

  1. CL1

    CL1 116th LAA and 92nd (Loyals) LAA,Royal Artillery

    September 10th - September 11th 1940

    TUESDAYSEPTEMBER 10th 1940
    WEATHER:


    Clear duringthe early hours but cloud was expected to move in from the North Sea duringthe early morning and this would give rain over most areas during the day.
    OPERATIONS IN DETAIL:

    Low cloud andperiods of heavy rain over Northern Europe stopped any form of Luftwaffeair activity and any operations planned against England had to be cancelled.For Fighter Command the day was nothing but a rest day and pilots and commandleaders were trying to work out as to why Germany had decided to turn itsattacks against London. If an invasion was Germany's highest priority,why the decision to bomb London. For an invasion to be successful, Germany would have toknock out as many military establishments as possible. As ACM Keith Park stated after the war, "The decision to bomb London was Germany's greatest mistake, in those first few days of September our airfields were a shambles, pilot and aircraft strength was still at an all time low. By switching tactics and concentrating on London he will give us the time we need to strengthen our forces." There were many reasons as to why Park could do with some respite from his airfields becoming targets,the aerodromes were now functioning better than they had been for a numberof weeks, aircraft factories were still operating as normal and militaryhardware was still pouring out of the factories. The radar was functioningat full capacity and Fighter Command HQ as well as Bentley Priory wereoperating normally. These should be the targets if Germany was to continuewith its plan to make an invasion of Britain. Even the German Naval Staffcould not understand the situation, as described in their diary:
    Thereis no sign of the defeat of the enemy's Air Force over southern Englandand in the Channel area, and this is vital to a further judgment of thesituation. The preliminary attacks by the Luftwaffe have indeed achieveda noticeable weakening of the enemy's fighter defences, so that considerableGerman fighter superiority can be assumed over the English area.
    However.....wehave not yet attained the operational conditions which the Naval Staffstipulated to the Supreme Command as being essential for the enterprise,namely, undisputed air superiority in the Channel area and the eliminationof the enemy's air activity in the assembly area of the German naval forcesand ancillary shipping.....It would be in conformity with the timetablepreparations for Sealion if the Luftwaffe now concentrated less on Londonand more on Portsmouth and Dover, as well as on the naval ports in andnear the operational area....
    Excerptfrom the German Naval Staff Diary [1]

    So why turn itsattack on London. True the oil storage tanks at Thameshaven had sufferedbadly as did the London Docks, but these would have no opposition to anyplanned invasion. Suffering most were civilian properties and inconveniencecaused to the inhabitants, especially those in the East End, all majorrailway stations had been damaged but had not been completely put out ofaction. Of the attacks of the previous nights, some newspapers made comparisonsto the blitzkrieg attacks on a number of towns and cities in northern Europe,and many of the Londoner's abbreviated the name and called the attackson their city as "The Blitz" and from then on, the name stuck.
    A few Germanaircraft were detected in and around the southern and eastern coastlineof England, but most of these were on either weather or reconnaissancepatrols. Fighter Command decided to leave them alone. Bomber Command sent 248 Squadron (Blenheims) on a mission to Norway but this had to be abortedbecause of deteriorating weather conditions over the North Sea. A flightfrom 236 Squadron St Eval (Blenheims) is placed on escort duty for thesteamship Scillonian and the mission is successfully completed.

    With cloud coverpersisting during the late afternoon, radar picks up various single aircraftcoming across the Channel from 1700hrs onwards. With Fighter Command againnot responding, a number of attacks were made by the Luftwaffe. A coupleof lone bombers ventured into 10 Group territory and made some nuisancedrops. Another lone raider attacked West Malling again but causing no seriousdamage. Tangmere reported that it had come under machine-gun strafing withnearby Portsmouth was attacked by single Do17s.

    72 SquadronCroydon (Spitfires) was one of the few squadrons scrambled and attackedone of the Do215s and one was believed to have been brought down, althoughone of the Spitfires was hit by return gunfire from the bomber and hadto make a forced landing at Etchingham (Kent). Just after 1800hrs, a smallformation crossed the coast near Dungeness and targeted Biggin Hill aerodrome,but were intercepted by British fighters and one of the Dorniers of 9/KG76was shot down and the mission aborted.

    By nightfall,the Luftwaffe was again targeting London and this time they were makingfull use of the cloud cover. Also taking advantage of the weather attackswere also made on industrial areas of South Wales and on the Lancashirearea of Merseyside. London was though, the main target where over 150 bomberspounded the city once again.

    But RAF BomberCommand also took advantage of the weather conditions. 17 Whitleys attackthe Pottsdamer railway station at Berlin causing considerable damage, thenthey went on to attack the Bremen dock area while a Blenheim squadron attackedthe important bomber aerodrome at Eindhoven. Eight Heinkel He111 bomberswere destroyed, two were badly damaged and another was damaged when itcrashed into craters upon landing later.

    CASUALTIES:
    There wereno pilot casualties reported on this day.
    One Spitfireof 72 Squadron Croydon was destroyed in combat.
    Two fighterswere destroyed and three others damaged in training operations
     
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  2. CL1

    CL1 116th LAA and 92nd (Loyals) LAA,Royal Artillery

    New Zealand Roll of honour
    The following roll lists the names of New Zealand aircrew who died while serving with RAF Fighter Command during the Battle of Britain, July-October 1940. It contains 20 names - of whom 15 were killed in air operations and five as a result of aircraft accidents.
     
  3. CL1

    CL1 116th LAA and 92nd (Loyals) LAA,Royal Artillery

    September 10th - September 11th 1940
    WEDNESDAY SEPTEMBER 11th 1940

    WEATHER:

    The heavy cloud cover was expected to disperse overnight giving way to a fine day in mostareas, occasional cloud and some local showers in the midlands and the north with the exception of the English Channel and south-eastern Englandwhere cloud was expected to continue.
    OPERATIONSIN DETAIL:

    This was theday that Hitler had planned to invade Britain. But in reality, Germany was no where nearer ready for an invasion than they were three or four weeksprevious. Britain's coastal defences still stood firm along the southernand eastern coastlines, naval ports and other small seaports that werebeing used by the Royal Navy along the southern coast of England were stillintact and most of Britain's Civil Defence forces were just waiting forthe word that would put them into action. On top of this, RAF Bomber Commandhad been continually bombing ports from Calais to Boulogne and along theDutch coast destroying many of the barges that were to be used in "OperationSealion".

    RAF FighterCommand was now known to Luftwaffe Intelligence that it had not been defeatedand that most aerodromes were on standby. Adolph Hitler had no option butto re-schedule the warning of the invasion which had been scheduled forSeptember 14th, and by bombing London and other important centres it wouldbe regarded as a strategic as well as a tactical concept, and wouldbreak the will of the British people and bring the British fighters outto fight a final pitched battle. Hitler now decided that the next warningof the planned invasion would be September 24th 1940.


    The effort of the Germans to secure daylight mastery of the air over England is ofcourse the crux of the whole war. So far, it has failed conspicuously.....for him (Hitler) to try to invade this country without having secured masteryin the air would be a very hazardous undertaking.
    Nevertheless,all his preparations for invasion on a great scale are steadily going forward.Several hundreds of self-propelled barges are moving down the coasts of Europe, from the German and Dutch harbours to the ports of northern France,from Dunkirk to Brest, and beyond Brest to the French harbours in the Bay of Biscay.


    WinstonChurchill broadcast September 11th 1940 [2]


    [ Document 48: Winston Churchill speech ]


    At the time, thepostponement by Hitler was not known, as stated here by Churchill to the people, that an attempted invasion was imminent. The sector controllershad received notification from Keith Park that it was obvious that the Germans had changed tactics from two or three separate attacks during thecourse of the day, to mass raids of 300 to 400 aircraft that were coming across the Channel in two waves in quick succession. He further informedthem that with this change in tactics, that they were not to place toomany squadrons to intercept the first wave, and that enough aircraft hadto be held back to intercept the second wave which so far had proven to be larger in number than the first.
    He told thecontrollers that paired squadrons were to be used wherever possible. Spitfires were to concentrate of the enemy fighters that were at higher altitudewhile the Hurricanes are to attack the bombers and close fighter escort.With the two German waves, generally only fifteen minutes apart, Park orderedthat those squadrons brought to 'readiness' first were to attack the firstwave and their escorts. The squadrons available and at "Readiness fifteenminutes" were to attack the second wave. Squadrons held in reserve and'Available thirty minutes" were to be vectored to reinforcements to thosesquadron requiring assistance and to provide protection to industrial centresand sector airfields.

    The morningperiod was just as quiet as previous mornings of the last four days, andit appeared that things were to take the usual practice of large formationsof bombers coming over at about 1700hrs. It was a fine morning, not aswarm as many other mornings but pleasant, and many pilots just lazed aroundoutside their dispersal's doing what they usually done. Some read old newspapersor magazines, many tried to write letters home while the rest fell asleeptaking full advantage of the lull in activities. But after lunch, theirafternoon 'siesta' was interrupted by radar detection of a large build-upfrom Calais to Ostend. The Luftwaffe were to come early today.
     
  4. CL1

    CL1 116th LAA and 92nd (Loyals) LAA,Royal Artillery

    September 10th - September 11th 1940
    CASUALTIES:
    1100hrs:Stapleford. Hurricane P3525. 46 Squadron Stapleford
    Sgt S. Andrewskilled. (Crashed and burnt out for reasonsunknown after an uneventful patrol)
    1530hrs:Thames Estuary. Hurricane V7232. 46 Squadron Stapleford
    Sgt W.A. Peacocklisted as missing. (Failed to return aftercombat action. Presumed crashed into the sea)
    1600hrs:Romney Marsh. Hurricane P3770. 504 Squadron Hendon
    P/O A.W. Clarkelisted as missing. (Crashed and burntout near Newchurch after combat over coast)
    1600hrs:Croydon. Spitfire II P7298. 611 Squadron Digby
    Sgt F.E.R. Shepherdkilled. (Caught fire during combat. Pilotbaled out but aircraft crashed into houses)
    1600hrs:Off Selsey Bill. Hurricane V6667. 213 Squadron Tangmere
    Sgt A. Wojcickilisted as missing. (Shot down in Channelduring combat with Bf110s. Body never recovered)
    1615hrs:South London. Hurricane V6665. 303 Squadron Northolt
    F/O A. Cebrzynski died of injuries 19.9.40 (Shot down duringcombat. Made a failed attempted crash landing)
    1615hrs:Romney Marshes. Hurricane R2682 238 Squadron Middle Wallop
    Sgt S. Duszynskilisted as missing. (Last seen pursuingJu88 over Romney. Aircraft crashed at Lydd)
    1615hrs:Dungeness. Spitfire K9793. 92 Squadron Biggin Hill
    P/O F.N. Hargreaves listed as missing. (Failed to return aftercombat action. Presumed crashed into the sea)
    1615hrs:Tunbridge Wells. Hurricane V7240. 238 Squadron Middle Wallop
    Fl/Lt D.P. Hughes listed as missing. (Last seen interceptingJu88s. Failed to return to base)
    1620hrs:Off Selsey Bill. Spitfire N3282. 602 Squadron Westhampnett
    Sgt M.H. Sprague killed. (Shot down by Bf110s over Channel.Pilots body washed ashore at Brighton 10.10.40)
    1625hrs:South London. Hurricane V7242. 303 Squadron Northolt
    Sgt S. Wojtowicz killed. (Crashed and burnt out at Westerhamafter being shot down by Bf109s)
    1730hrs:Channel area. Blenheim. 235 Squadron Thorney Island
    P/O P.C. Wickins-Smithlisted as missing.
    P/O A.W.V. Greenlisted as missing
    Sgt R.D.H. Wattslisted as missing. (Believed shot downby Bf109 during escort mission to Calais)
    1730hrs:Channel area. Blenheim. 235 Squadron Thorney Island
    P/O N.B. Shorrockslisted as missing.
    Fl/Lt F.W. Floodlisted as missing
    Sgt B.R. Sharplisted as missing. (Failed to return fromescort mission to Calais)
    1900hrs:Smeeth (Kent). Spitfire P9464. 92 Squadron Biggin Hill
    P/O H.D. Edwards killed. (Shot down by Bf109 during combataction and crashed into woods)

    [1]John Frayn Turner The Battle of Britain Airlife 1998 p116
    [2]Wood & Dempster The Narrow Margin Magraw-Hill 1961 p344
     
  5. CL1

    CL1 116th LAA and 92nd (Loyals) LAA,Royal Artillery

    PORUCZNIKARSEN CEBRZYNSKI
    Service Number: P/1416
    Regiment & Unit/Ship
    Polish Air Force

    303 Sqdn.

    Date of Death
    Died 11 September 1940

    Age 28 years old

    Buried or commemorated at
    NORTHWOOD CEMETERY


    Service Section H Grave 187.

    United Kingdom


    • Country of ServicePolish
    • Additional InfoAwarded Polish Cross of Valour and 2 Bars.
    upload_2021-9-11_0-10-47.jpeg
     
  6. CL1

    CL1 116th LAA and 92nd (Loyals) LAA,Royal Artillery

  7. CL1

    CL1 116th LAA and 92nd (Loyals) LAA,Royal Artillery

    September 12th - September 14th 1940
    THURSDAY SEPTEMBER 12th 1940

    WEATHER:

    Cloud cover could be expected in all areas and showers turning to rain for most of the country. Low cloud would persist over the Channel areas and most of the south coast could expect showers that could be heavy at times.
    OPERATIONS:

    The morning period is virtually a non-event as far as combat action is concerned. Radar reports that a number of lone aircraft are detected well offshore both over the Channel and the North Sea. Fighter Command decide to leave these aircraft well alone as they are probably reconnaissance patrols and not doing any harm and that valuable fighters should not be placed at risk even to lone aircraft.
    By midday, a few small formations are detected, some of these break up into individual raids sometimes consisting only of one or two aircraft. In 10 Group, Warmwell despatches just one section of 152 Squadron (Spitfires) to intercept a sighting out from Swanage, the bandit is recognised a lone Ju88 but it makes full use of the low cloud and disappears.

    Shortly after, another enemy sighting is made and 238 Squadron at St Eval (Hurricanes) are scrambled. The squadron records show that one Ju88 is destroyed and another had been damaged.

    605 Squadron (Hurricanes) stationed in the north at Drem also claim one enemy aircraft destroyed, possibly a reconnaissance aircraft that had ventured too close to the coast. 213 Squadron Exeter (Hurricanes) and 602 Squadron Westhampnett (Spitfires) both claim to have damaged at least one enemy aircraft in spasmodic and isolated actions. Looking at these figures, it can be seen that the Luftwaffe at this time was keeping well clear of London and all these isolated incidents took place either in the west country or up north in Scotland.

    One unfortunate incident that happened was with Wing Commander J.S. Dewar who was commander of the airfield at Exeter. Taking advantage of the lull in combat activity, he was to fly over to Tangmere to visit friends there. He never arrived and it seems obvious that his Hurricane had been shot down after he had encountered some enemy aircraft and he decided to bale out. On the way down he was strafed by German plane or planes and shot to pieces as he dangled helplessly underneath his descending parachute.

    The bombers of III/KG51 and I/KG54 did not attack London until late in the evening, and even then was on a far reduced scale than on previous occasions. The night bombers on previous attacks often numbered between two and three hundred, but this time barely fifty made the dismal trek across the Channel in rather murky conditions. No serious damage was done, although bombs fell in the commercial area of Aldgate, Mansion House and Holborn, but the most serious threat was a H.E. delayed action bomb which fell just to the north of St Pauls Cathedral. It buried itself some thirty feet into the ground and the two officer who defused the bomb, Lieutenant R. Davies and Sapper J. Wylie of the Royal Engineers became the first military personnel to receive the George Cross for their actions.

    Other spasmodic and isolated raids occurred at Hull in Yorkshire, an area north of Wolverhampton, Liverpool and a number of small ports along the east coast of Suffolk and Essex.

    CASUALTIES:
    Time not known: Over Channel. Hurricane V7306. 213 Squadron Exeter
    W/C/J.S .Dewar killed. (Circumstances not known. Body washed ashore at Kingston Gorse Sussex 30.9.40)
     
  8. CL1

    CL1 116th LAA and 92nd (Loyals) LAA,Royal Artillery

  9. CL1

    CL1 116th LAA and 92nd (Loyals) LAA,Royal Artillery

    September 12th - September 14th 1940
    FRIDAY SEPTEMBER 13th 1940

    WEATHER:

    No sign in an improvement in the weather, and it was expected to remain unsettled with rain periods in all areas. In areas in the south and east there was a possibility that there could be breaks in the cloud to give sunny periods. Over the Channel, the heavy cloud and rain should give way to lighter higher cloud during the day.
    OPERATIONS:

    Many of the German commanders are pushing for an exact date for 'Operation Sealion' to commence. Already the weather seems to be closing in and with these deteriorating conditions it appears that any chance of a successful invasion may be out of the question if Hitler cannot make up his mind. Already, the date previously set for September 11th had been postponed, and Hitler had said that he favoured September 24th at the most likely date, but if conditions continued as they are, it would be an impossibility for the barges to cross the Channel should the expected winds that are prevalent at this time of the year accompany the heavy cloud and rain squalls.
    A meeting had been called in Berlin to commence at lunchtime, and as was usual a banquet was organised prior to the serious meeting between Hitler, Göring, Milch, Kesselring and Jodl being the most notable commanders in attendance. The Führer outlined the present situation. He made mention of the fact that the Luftwaffe still had not yet attained air superiority over the Royal Air Force, which was a rather hypocritical statement being as he had ordered Göring to concentrate his attacks on London earlier in September at the expense of continuing the raids on RAF airfields. He also made mention that more and more barges were being unloaded along the Dutch and Belgian coasts in readiness. Soon, he said, we will be moving our armies to these northern ports, armies of specially trained men, all will be ready. But, he stated, our bombers have justly tore the heart out of the British populace. London is a city burning night after night and the British air force is still terribly weak and we can continue to hit the British where it so terribly hurts.......at their beloved capital.

    The Führer spoke at length on the bombing of London, and only outlined to preparations of any forthcoming invasion and the commanders started to think that Adolph Hitler was now more concerned with the total destruction of London and that they were beginning to think that their leader was having second thoughts about any invasion of England. By the time that the meeting was over, all that the commanders had learnt was the thoughts that were coming out of the mind of the Führer, there were no fresh orders, he failed to ask for any reports on the current situation.

    In Britain, the radar operators lay in wait for the tell tale blips that would indicate enemy intrusion across the Channel. Pilots sat around waiting for the telephone to ring, but it was the same story of the last few days. A small piece of action occurred high over Hornchurch and Biggin Hill, but these were recognised as weather reconnaissance aircraft when the British "Y" Service picked up their conversations. No action was taken against these aircraft and Fighter Command allowed them to return back across the Channel without any interception.

    A Focke-Wolfe 200 is detected over Northern Ireland, the first time that the enemy has penetrated this area and proof that Ireland is not free of the war situation. The aircraft managed to drop bombs on the steamship 'Longfort' just off the coast at Belfast and also submitted an unidentified vessel to gunfire but there were no reports of damage. [1]

    For both sides, there were further tactical developments within this period. Now that the Luftwaffe had decided to abort any serious attacks on Fighter Command airfields and turned its attention on inland targets as well as London, Park had more time to assess the situation and gave them greater time to intercept the enemy. Keith Park had also sent out the instruction that squadrons should as far as possible work in pairs. The original order of this instruction went out as early as September 5th.

    On the other hand, Kesselring's views on this move by Fighter Command was that he agreed that Park's order was actually working. Not only that, Fighter Command was a much stronger organisation than the tattered remnants of a defeated defence as German sources had earlier imagined. Because of this, formation leaders had now been given the instruction, that should they meet up with what they would consider stiff opposition, they may decide and order the formation to disengage. This order was given by the German High Command.

    Again, as on the day previous, air activities were hampered by bad weather, and the Luftwaffe took advantage of this by sending single aircraft deeper into Britain than they had done during other daylight attacks on the enemy. The Air Ministry buildings at Harrowgate were attacked, so was an aluminium factory at Banbury in Oxfordshire. The large railway junction just outside Reading had been bombed the previous day causing disruptions on the Great Western line, and as previously mentioned, the first raids on Northern Ireland had occurred. [2]

    Small raids did occur during the morning period when two German bombers flying single missions towards London and coming from different directions penetrated the defences and dropped a small number of bombs which fell on Whitehall and a part of Downing Street while the other aircraft dropped bombs on the Chelsea Hospital and another fell in the grounds of Buckingham Palace, the third time the Royal Palace had been attacked and this time damaged had been sustained to the Royal Chapel.

    1200hrs: Keith Park at 11 Group Headquarters had been alerted from a message that originated from the Radio Interception Unit that German weather reconnaissance aircraft had radioed back to their bases that there was seven tenths cloud at 1,500 metres and stated that attacks could be made possible between 1,500 and 2,500 metres. The assessment that Park made, was that under the circumstances, he believed that the Luftwaffe would make spasmodic raids and have the advantage of using the cloud as a cover. He alerted the commanders of selected airfields to place at least one squadron at readiness.

    1330hrs: A number of squadron had been scrambled after reports came through that radar had picked up enemy aircraft, and that the general direction was London. Using the cloud to their advantage, it was difficult for the Observer Corps to keep track, but it did appear that the target were either Biggin Hill, Kenley or Croydon. One of the squadrons scrambled was 501 Squadron Kenley (Hurricanes) who intercepted a small force of He111 bombers and attacked. Most decided to abort but not before one of the Heinkels was shot down.

    At the same time, another small raid was centred on Tangmere. One enemy bomber was shot down by 609 Squadron Warmwell (Spitfires). Again, the raid was aborted and no damage was sustained on Tangmere aerodrome.

    It had not been a good day for the Luftwaffe. Although only a small number of aircraft were destroyed, there was no real reason that, under the circumstances they need not have made any missions at all. The first aircraft lost was at 0330hrs while on a raid on South Wales that a He111 hit the cables of a barrage balloon and crashed in the town of Newport. A He111 of 2/KG1 was badly damaged during an operational mission over England that it crashed on landing back at its home airfield. Another He111 crashed on German soil after a bombing mission, due to serious damage cause by AA gunfire and from an attack made by a British fighter. One of the Ju88s that attempted to attack Tangmere was badly damaged and crashed into the ground on landing at its home base. As well as these aircraft destroyed and two others that crashed on English soil, twenty German aircrew were killed. The only British casualty during the German attacks was one of the Hurricanes of 501 Squadron, and then, the pilot Sgt J.H. Lacey baled out and was unhurt.

    CASUALTIES:
    0700hrs: Norwegian Coast. Blenheim L5491. 248 Squadron Sumburgh
    Sgt W.J. Garfield Listed as missing.
    Sgt A. Kay. Listed as missing.
    Sgt B.W. Messner. Listed as missing. (Failed to return from reconnaissance flight over Norwegian coast)
    Night Sortie: Calais. Blenheim Z5721. F.I.U. Shoreham (Time not known)
    F/L R.G. Ker-Ramsey. Taken PoW.
    W/O E.L. Byrne. Taken PoW.
    W/O G. Dixon. Taken PoW. (Baled out near Calais. Exact circumstances are not known)
     
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  10. CL1

    CL1 116th LAA and 92nd (Loyals) LAA,Royal Artillery

    September 12th - September 14th 1940
    SATURDAY SEPTEMBER 14th 1940

    WEATHER:

    Again no sign in an improvement in the weather, and it was expected to remain unsettled with rain periods and a chance of thunderstorms in all areas. Over the Channel, the heavy cloud and rain should give way to lighter higher cloud during the day, but the chance of showers should persist.
    OPERATIONS:

    Keith Park and Air Chief Marshal Hugh Dowding confer (by telephone as there is no record of any meeting between them on this day) and they discuss the constant postponements of the intended invasion by Germany. Park again points out that he could not understand why the switch to bombing London was made when the situation at the time was a critical one for Fighter Command, and there was every chance that the Luftwaffe could have finished off with the continued bombing of the airfields. The only thing standing in the way between Germany and the invasion was Fighter Command, now, Fighter Command was almost back to full operational strength and Göring would have to start all over again if he wants to destroy the Command. Dowding mentions, that the bombing of London was his biggest mistake, and one that could cost him the war.
    By mid-September the Germans had assembled about 1,000 assorted invasion craft in the Channel ports, with some 600 more in the Scheldt. RAF bombing crippled about 12 per cent of this armada; what remained was still sufficient for the first stage of invasion as planned, but the combination of the bombing, and a sharp riposte by Fighter Command to a renewed attempt at a daylight attack on London on September 9, forced Hitler to yet another postponement of SEALION. It was deferred until the 24th, which meant that a final decision should have been made on September 14 (ten days’ notice was the German Navy’s very reasonable stipulation). With Hider, however, nothing was ever normal; the decision he actually took on that day was to bring forward SEALION to the 17th. He had been misled again by Goering, himself in turn misled by the Luftwaffe’s faulty Intelligence.
    It was not so much the evidence that was at fault — rather the ability to interpret it correctly. The 9th had shown that Fighter Command was still very much a force to be reckoned with; the 11th & 14th, however, spoke with equivocal voices. On each of these days Fighter Command and Luftwaffe losses were equal, though this was not appreciated by the Air Ministry at the time. On the 14th, particularly, to the Luftwaffe the opposition appeared scrappy and uncoordinated, and they felt that during the last few days Fighter Command had begun to collapse. This news was, of course, conveyed to the Reichsmarschall, and via the situation reports to Hitler. Both felt that the hour of destiny was approaching.


    John Terraine The Right of the Line Hodder & Stoughton 1985 p210
    In Berlin, Hitler called a rush conference ordering all his naval, air force and army commanders-in-chiefs to attend. This time, he made little mention on the bombing of London of the last seven days. Instead, he presented to them his plans for the all-out invasion of Britain. At last, Operation Sealion looked as though it was all systems go. The Führer was excited and full of eagerness, but nothing was said that was not already known.....except the exact date of any planned invasion.
    Hitler pointed out that the naval preparations for "Operation Sealion" was now almost complete. "All our barges are now in place, and we have more held in reserve along river banks," he said which was borne out by one of the British Observer Groups which had the day previous seen up to ten large enemy transport ships town a number of barges from Calais to Cap Griz Nez. Spitfires of the PRU had also flown over the Belgian and Dutch coasts and had also reported and photographed the collection of barges. But there again, based on the PRU intelligence, Bomber Command had bombed many of the barge installations at an average of every second night, so what was Hitler trying to pull when he said that "All our barges are in place." Maybe he forgot to add that at least one third of them were submerged at their moorings.

    "If we plan now," he went on, ".....the invasion date can be set for one week from now, given that we need five days of good weather to achieve the desired results." But then, haven't we heard that before, from Hermann Göring just prior to Adler Tag in early August. "All I need," he said, "....was five days preparation and we will be ready for the day of the Eagle."

    Hitler then went on to state that in the preparation we must make sure that the Luftwaffe has complete air superiority over the Channel and over southern England. But again, a remark that had been heard before, when issuing the order to Göring prior to Adler Tag, "Before any invasion can be mounted against England, we must first destroy the RAF both in the air and on the ground." This was the whole concept of the task given to Göring, to eliminate the British Royal Air Force.

    Finally, the on again, off again "Operation Sealion" was at last given as September 17th, which again, if we want to be critical, should have been September 19th if Hitler estimated that it would take five days of preparation. Orders were given for a full scale attack to be made prior to the lead up of the invasion, and again this was placed in the hands of Hermann Göring. An alternative date, as was mentioned earlier by the Führer could be given as September 27th. But is does seem that there was a chain of misleading events as shown above from the work by John Terraine.

    1200hrs: The Germans do what they could in an attempt to jam the British radar with electronic interference. A few aircraft managed to cross the Channel on weather reconnaissance missions. One or two raiders bombed some of the coastal resorts in the vicinity of Eastbourne and Brighton where some sixty civilians were either killed our seriously hurt. A small formation was detected over Selsey Bill and one German aircraft is reported to have been shot down. Others probed the areas of South London and bombs fell on residential areas of Croydon and Mitcham killing over fifty people.

    1515hrs: German raiders were detected crossing the coast at both the Thames Estuary and in the Deal and Folkestone areas. Bf109s escorting Do17s, He111 and Ju88 bombers. The enemy strength did not exceed 100 in both areas and a mini aerial combat session developed within 30 minutes.

    1545hrs: Again, as was becoming a common occurrence, people along the coastal stretches from Folkestone, round 'Hell Corner' to Margate saw the twisting and snaking black dots against the grey overcast with many cheered if they recognised a German plane spiral down into the sea.

    Park had reshuffled a number of his squadrons during the lull of the last few days so that Hurricanes and Spitfires could work in pairs. With most of the German raids following a similar pattern whenever crossing the Channel on a bombing mission, Park was now better prepared than ever for any raid coming in from the Thames Estuary or over the Channel between Dungeness and Ramsgate. This, coupled with the fact that most aerodromes had now been repaired and were 95% operational, radar stations were all back to normal, and all telephone lines connecting the radar stations, Observer Corps, Fighter Command HQ and 11 Group HQ were all repaired and functioning properly.

    Vectored to the Thames Estuary were 41 Squadron Hornchurch (Spitfires), 66 Squadron Gravesend (Spitfires), 73 Squadron Debden (Hurricanes), 222 Squadron Hornchurch (Spitfires), 504 Squadron Hendon (Hurricanes) and 1RCAF Northolt (Hurricanes).

    Vectored to the Kent coast near Deal were 72 Squadron Biggin Hill (Spitfires), 92 Squadron Biggin Hill (Spitfires), 229 Squadron Northolt (Hurricanes) and 253 Squadron Kenley (Hurricanes).

    1600hrs: Most of the action took place over the Estuary or over north Kent near Maidstone by the time that the British fighters made contact with the enemy. Even though the raids were small by previous standards, it was noticed that there were more Bf109s than usual indicating that the Luftwaffe were trying to draw as many fighters in the air as possible. A number of Do17s were shot down but also quite a few Bf109s also suffered. I/KGr.606 was to suffer most when two Dorniers were classed as write offs, while two others were damaged.

    For Fighter Command, 73 Squadron Debden (Hurricanes) was to suffer most after losing three aircraft and four others were damaged but were repairable, but only one pilot was killed. There were casualties amongst other squadrons.

    1800hrs: There had been a sighting over Bournemouth just prior to the evening attack, but they turned back before any British fighters could intercept. Now a number of separate raid seemed to be approaching the coast in formations of 10+, 12+, 15+, 20+ and 30+. All aircraft were detected at between 17,000 and 20,000 feet. Many of Fighter Commands squadrons had only been back a short while after the afternoon raids when they were scrambled again. The formations were intercepted just as they crossed the southern coastline and a running battle took place as far as London, but many of the raiders had turned back before their destination had been reached.

    CASUALTIES:
    1605hrs: Tonbridge. Hurricane P2542. 73 Squadron Debden
    Sgt J.J. Brimble killed. (Shot down by enemy aircraft and crashed at Parkhurst Farm Chart Sutton)
    1615hrs: Rochford. Spitfire X4275. 222 Squadron Hornchurch
    Sgt S. Baxter killed.(Badly damaged by gunfire from Bf109s and crashed attempting to land)
    1620hrs: Orsett (Essex). Spitfire R6625. 19 Squadron Duxford
    Sgt F. Marek killed. (Crashed during routine patrol. Possibly oxygen failure. No other details)
    1800hrs: Bredgar. Hurricane P5184. 253 Squadron Kenley
    Sgt W.B. Higgins killed. (Shot down in flames after combat with Bf109. Pilot did not bale out)



    2 x Hurricanes of 253 and 610 Squadrons shot down but no details are known except the pilot of the Hurricane of 610 Squadron is listed as missing. The Hurricane of 253 Squadron was shot down near Faversham Kent.
    [1] Wood & Dempster The Narrow Margin McGraw-Hill 1961pp347-8
    [2] Hough & Richards The Battle of Britain-A Jubilee History Hodder & Stoughton 1989 p272
     
  11. CL1

    CL1 116th LAA and 92nd (Loyals) LAA,Royal Artillery

    Battle of Britain Day 15th September 1940
    September 15th 1940 (morning)

    The "hour of destiny" was September 15th, a date thereafter commemorated as "Battle of Britain Day". The title has been disputed; Alfred Price, for one, says that September 15th "has singularly little to commend it.....the day when the British victory claim was furthest from the truth....." Yet, forgetting the "numbers game", it is hard to dispute Churchill's verdict that it was, in fact, "the crux of the Battle of Britain". He made that judgment in the light of his knowledge of what happened to Operation SEALION - which was, of course, from beginning to end, what the Battle of Britain was really about. The Official History sums up with clarity:
    "If 15th August showed the German High Command that air supremacy was not to be won within a brief space, 15th September went far to convince them that it would not be won at all."


    John Terraine The Right of the Line Hodder & Stoughton 1985 pp210-211

    Sunday September 15th 1940, was not only the turning point of the Battle of Britain, it was the turning point of the whole war. Every Fighter Command aerodrome in 11 Group was in some way involved, every squadron within 11 Group participated as well as the Duxford Wing from 12 Group and a number of squadrons in 10 Group were called upon to protect areas in the south west. Ground crews at all 11 Group airfields had to make efficiency a top priority in getting aircraft refueled and rearmed in between sorties, while at 11 Group Headquarters Air Vice Marshal Keith Park busily controlled the situation drawing on all his experience and expertise under the watchful eye of visiting Winston Churchill who saw first hand the development of activities on this important day. Air Chief Marshal Hugh Dowding remained at Fighter Command Headquarters keeping silent vigil over the large map below indicating to him the events and the unfolding battle that was taking place over the south-east of England.
    For Adolf Hitler and the German commanders, time was now running out. If an invasion was to take place on September 17th as planned, the lead-up would have to commence no later than today.....September 15th. The weather had shown, just how quickly it can turn at this time of year, and with winter not too far away, the German forces would have to take advantage of the better conditions that now seemed to prevail. Göring had sent out the instructions the day previous to all bomber and fighter bases that preparations for an all out assault on England was to be made on this day September 15th, bomber units were given times and flight paths of their attack. Over the last few weeks, the Luftwaffe had experimented with different flying formations, needless to say, none had really been successful, losses had still been high, but they had discovered that on the occasions that they had kept at high altitudes, they had on a number of occasions surprised Fighter Command.

    This was mainly due to the fact that the British radar was ineffective above 20,000 feet, and by flying at a height above this level they could cross the Channel undetected, but, the Germans did not know this. All that they were aware of, was the fact that those formations that flew at higher altitudes were not intercepted until they were usually well over the English coast. The most logical reason for this, thought the Germans was due to the fact that it took the British fighters much longer to gain the required height to intercept.

    The sending of advance Ju87 and Bf110 units to bomb the radar stations along the southern coastline was, in the opinion of the Luftwaffe, a waste of time. As fast as they seemed to be destroyed, they were back in operational use again, and mobile units too were brought in to replace any radar station damaged. Over the last few days, the Germans had practiced at electronic jamming, this, they believed was successful and plans were made to intensify the jamming procedure in an effort to further reduce detection.

    The spirit of the German aircrew, was still far from high. Time and time again, they had been told that the 'Glorious Luftwaffe' is ready to strike the final blow. But they had been told that in July, and again in August when Adlerangriff had been announced, and it was to be repeated yet again this September 15th. Early in the Battle of Britain, the Luftwaffe aircrews were told that the Royal Air Force would be wiped out in two or three weeks, now, whenever they fly over the British countryside they are still met with masses of British fighters in the hands of pilots that were gaining in skill and techniques. Many firmly believed that they were no nearer victory than they were two months previous.

    Failure to achieve any notable success, constantly changing orders betraying lack of purpose and obvious misjudgment of the situation by the Command, and unjustified accusation had a most demoralising effect on us fighter pilots, who were already overtaxed by physical and mental strain.
    Adolph Galland Commander

    In Britain, things were slightly different. Most of the pilots were relatively fresh unlike their German counterparts. Combat action had been very infrequent, with only one really heavy day. As mentioned previously, Fighter Command was now stronger than it had been for weeks, aerodromes repaired, planes and personnel had replaced many that had been shot down and the radar stations were all functioning at 100%.
    Park meanwhile, was prepared. He had learnt just a few days previous that there was to be a large scale attack prior to the impending invasion, only that he was unsure as to the exact date or time. Whatever attack that the Germans planned, he was sure, that 11 Group was ready even though the Luftwaffe commanders could not agree as to the actual strength of Fighter Command at the time.

    I think one of the problems with German intelligence was, was that it simply did not help the Germans to fight the battle, partly because of the problems we've mentioned with their inability to tell the truth even when they knew it, but the results of this can be seen only in September when there is a conference for senior German commanders attended by Göring himself, and Bepo Schmidt. And you have the commander of one Luftwaffe unit giving his opinion that there are at least one thousand RAF fighters left in Fighter Command, and the commander of another Luftwaffe unit giving his opinion that Fighter Command is beaten.
    So the degree of confusion in the German High Command as to what was actually happening is quite obvious whereas the British, at least they knew what they were trying to achieve. The British had a slightly simpler problem. Their main objective was survival. Both intelligence organizations seriously overestimated the number of enemy aircraft they shot down, the Germans by a factor of between three and four. The British right towards the end of the battle did get slightly puzzled by the fact that they could only find the wreckage of some eight hundred aircraft whereas the numbers claimed were far in excess of that. Instead of drawing the correct conclusion which was that the fighter pilots for quite understandable reasons were over claiming the number of enemy aircraft lost.

    They tried to work out where the missing, in inverted commas, aircraft might be, and that is to why did they crash in France or in the English channel or wherever. They didn’t correctly identify the problem which was that a German aircraft shot down was often claimed by more than one pilot in the confusion of the air fighting.


    Sebastian Cox Air Historical Branch regarding the Battle of Britain
    To survive any intense attack that may be instigated by the Luftwaffe, Keith Park had, in the last few days rearranged some of his squadrons, carefully placing them in the best strategic position to provide the best defence of London that he possibly could. Of course, we must remember, that the pilots of Fighter Command had no idea of any large scale attack being made by the Luftwaffe. This information was only known by a selected few in radio interception (the "Y" Force) and the Air Ministry and of course, Dowding and Park himself. To the pilots, any change they thought was the usual relieving of tired squadrons.
    [ 1] Vincent Orange Sir Keith Park Methuen 1984 pp109-110
    [2] Michael G.Burns Bader- A Man and his Men Arms and Armour 1990 p89
    [3] John Frayn Turner Battle of Britain Airlife 1998 p128
    [4] Michael G.Burns Bader- A Man and his Men Arms and Armour 1990 p90
    [5] John Foreman Fighter Command War Diaries Air Research Publications 1998 pp25-26



    Have you checked out all the documents linked from this page
    Document 49. Fighter Command Order of Battle / Luftwaffe Order of Battle(French Bases)

    Document 50. London's Daily Telegraph on events of late september 1940

     
  12. CL1

    CL1 116th LAA and 92nd (Loyals) LAA,Royal Artillery

    Battle of Britain Day 15th September

    Sunday September 15th 1940 (Afternoon)


    This is the date after which I believe Hitler's chances will rapidly dwindle. The weather holds good in a miraculous manner but there are faint premonitory puffs of wind from the South- West and a chill in the air. Dispatches received through Switzerland say that there are the beginnings of a press campaign in Germany breaking the news to the people that England is to be subdued by blockade and bombing. If this is true, Hitler is on the downgrade. I can’t for the life of me puzzle out what the Germans are up to. They have great air power and yet are dissipating it in fruitless and aimless attacks all over England. They must have an exaggerated idea of the damage they are doing and the effects of their raids on public morale. . . . Just as I finish writing this, the heavy guns commence giving tongue and the little Irish maid comes in to turn down the bed. She went over to Victoria to see the plane which crashed there and is very pleased because she saw the dead German crew extracted from the wreckage.
    RAYMOND LEE, United States Military Attaché in London, 15th September 1940SUNDAY SEPTEMBER 15th 1940 (afternoon)
    WEATHER:


    The fine conditions of the morning was expected to give way to incoming cloud although it was expected to remain dry. This cloud was expected to be strato-cumulus providing about 8/10ths cover at a height of 5,000 feet. Wind was expected to be slight and from the north-west.
    OPERATIONS IN DETAIL:

    1300hrs: The radar stations along the Kent coast pick up movements across the Channel. It was the commencement of German bombers busily forming up for yet another raid on the British capital. Fighter Command are notified, but as there is no indication yet that the bombers are heading across the coast, it was just a 'wait and see' game, and Keith Park was content at this stage just to know the various squadron strength after the mornings combat action.

    1330hrs: It is now evident that there is a massive build up west of the Calais-Boulogne area, and it seemed that this was to be a repeat of the Luftwaffe's morning performance. The question here was......would the Luftwaffe use a greater number of bombers for this second raid. After all, the mornings raid was nothing short of a disgraceful attempt, although one must give full credit to Fighter Command in forcing the Luftwaffe to submit and return back to their bases.
    If the Luftwaffe was to use greater numbers in the afternoons raid, they would have to use a maximum fighter escort not only all the way on the outward journey, but on the homeward leg as well. They should stay in position higher and behind the bombers for the duration of the raid at the expense of the usual feints that were normally carried out as this would only consume additional fuel which, for the Bf109s was a precious commodity. The German shortage of fighters compelled the division of the attack, so that some would be used twice and so that the second attack could, and with lick, catch many of Park's fighters on the ground, re-arming and refuelling. [1]

    All squadrons that had been involved with the mornings action, were again placed at readiness and this included the Duxford Wing and the two squadrons from 10 Group. As time progressed, radar had reported that the formation had broke up into three distinct groups, and that it was possible that each group was following a short distance behind another.

    1400hrs: Even though all the squadrons had been brought to readiness, some squadrons, especially those some distance from London were still being re-armed and refuelled, and quite a few pilots were not with their squadrons. These had been shot down or baled out of their stricken aircraft and had made their way to other airfields and had telephoned in to their home bases, while some were being ferried back but had not yet arrived. Those that had got back, found the time to have a bit of lunch while their aircraft were in the hands of the ground crews. This was one of the reasons that the Luftwaffe had made this second raid so soon after midday, as they knew that it would take Fighter Command to take at least two hours to get all their squadrons back to full strength. The hoped that by the time that they crossed the English coast that most of the RAF fighters would still be on the ground.

    The German formations that were approaching the Kent coast was made up of three distinct formations. All consisted of Dornier Do17s, Heinkel He111s and Dornier 215s from KG/2, KG/53 and KG/76. Smaller gruppes came from KG/1, KG/4 and KG/26 which made up a total bomber force of 170 aircraft. These were supported by Bf110 and Bf109s as escorts and their number was in excess of 300. [2]

    Most of the bomber formations had come from airfields in the Beauvais and Antwerp areas.

    Park scrambled squadrons in almost the same order as he had done so only three hours earlier, but because the German formation had taken less time in 'forming up' the 11 Group commander had less time to get his fighters into the air, coupled with the fact that some squadrons were still re-arming and refuelling, the efficiency was not as good as it had been during the morning period.

    1410hrs: Keith Park could see the incoming raid building up quickly and immediately his sector controllers of the afternoon raid. The station controllers then notified the squadrons who were placed on "standby". 12 Group were called up by 11 Group who again requested maximum assistance just as they had done during the morning period. The same applied to 10 Group. Within a couple of minutes, following a similar pattern that had proved so successful during the morning, 11 Group "scrambled " eleven squadrons and placed the rest on "standby". At the same time, Wing Commander Woodall at Duxford, "scrambled " his Duxford Wing which comprised 19 Squadron (Spitfires), 242 Squadron (242 Squadron (Hurricanes), 302 Squadron (Hurricanes), 310 Squadron (Hurricanes) and 611 Squadron (Spitfires). The only change that Park made that differed from the morning attack, was that he held more of his fighters back giving orders that they patrol areas to the east, south and west of London. The squadrons that were vectored to the forward areas were mainly instructed to attack the enemy fighters. This was probably due to the fact that by forcing the enemy escorts into combat early, they would use up far more fuel, and the morning raid had showed him that the bombers were far more vulnerable when the reached the outskirts of London, and the net result was that Fighter Command inflicted far more damage to aircraft over London than over the Kent coast.

    1415hrs: The first of the bomber formations crossed the Kent coast between Dungeness and Dover, with the other formations behind and flying at 15 minute intervals. The actual times of the bombers crossing the coast was at 1415hrs, 1430hrs and 1440hrs. The combined formation was mainly He111s, Do17s and Do215s. The Observer Corps estimated that the total enemy bomber force was between 150 and 200 bombers. The escorts, flying as close escort and high altitude cover were the usual Bf110s and Bf109s and it is estimated that these numbered approximately 400. In total, a combined force of 600 plus aircraft heading north towards London on a front some thirty miles wide.

    1430hrs: The first engagements took place over Kent. Squadrons from Hornchurch intercepted a large formation of Dorniers south of Canterbury. Diving down in line astern they managed to destroy two of the bombers and another couple were wheeling away leaving behind a trail of thick black smoke. But they were jumped upon by Bf109s and intense combat took place between the fighters of both sides allowing the Do17s to continue their journey. Two aircraft of the Hornchurch squadrons were damaged.

    Another formation consisting of Dornier Do17s and Heinkel He111s was detected south of Maidstone, and without any Bf109 protection, they became the targets for 73 Squadron Debden (Hurricanes) who managed to destroy three of the bombers without loss to themselves. West of this attack near Dartford, 66 Squadron Gravesend (Spitfires) and 72 Squadron Croydon (Spitfires) intercepted another column of enemy aircraft where again, as with the others the combat action was intense. The Spitfires weaved in and out of the bombers managing to avoid collision in the huge traffic jam that was forming. Bombers started to take evasive action by banking either left or right. Just as another bomber formation was approaching from the south, the mêlée was joined by 249 Squadron North Weald (Hurricanes) and 504 Squadron Hendon (Hurricanes) and the large colossus of enemy bombers went into a frantic flight pattern. 73 Squadron who had engaged the formation from the outset, had now been entwined into the huge dogfight as well as 253 Squadron Kenley (Hurricanes).

    The western flank saw Do17s, He111s and Ju88s which numbered about eighty curve right from Kent, across the outskirts of Surrey and heading towards the western side of London. A terrific battle ensued as fighters from 213 Squadron Tangmere (Hurricanes) and 607 Squadron Tangmere (Hurricanes) which had been vectored to cover Biggin Hill intercepted the large formation. Again, Bf109s were seen to the south of London, but decided not to come to the aid of the bomber formation which managed to get mauled by the Hurricane squadrons. This was one of the most intense battles. The British fighter tore into the enemy like hungry cats to a flock of wounded birds.

    I started to chase one Dornier which was flying through the tops of the clouds. Did you ever see that film "Hells Angels?" You'll remember how the Zeppelin came so slowly out of the cloud. Well, this Dornier reminded me of that. I attacked him four times altogether. When he first appeared through the cloud—you know how clouds go up and down like foam on water —I fired at him from the left, swung over to the right, turned in towards another hollow in the cloud, where I expected him to reappear, and fired at him again. After my fourth attack he dived down headlong into a clump of trees in front of a house, and I saw one or two cars parked in the gravel drive in front. I wondered whether there was anyone in the doorway watching the bomber crash. Then I climbed up again to look for some more trouble and found it in the shape of a Heinkel III which was being attacked by three Hurricanes and a couple of Spitfires.
    I had a few cracks at the thing before it made a perfect landing on an RAF aerodrome. The Heinkels undercarriage collapsed and the pilot pulled up, after skidding 50 yards in a cloud of dust. I saw a tall man get out of the right-hand side of the aircraft, and when I turned back he was helping a small man across the aerodrome towards a hangar.


    Squadron leader John Sample 501 Squadron Kenley
    1450hrs:
    Even though most of the attacking bombers had been thrown off their planned flight path, many of them managed to get through to the southern areas of London. If they thought that most of Fighter Commands fighters were behind them and still engaged in combat over Kent and Surrey, they were in for a big surprise. Now, as in the morning session, they were met by 49 fighters of Bader's "Duxford Wing". Combine this with a number of other squadrons that had followed the leading bombers and two other squadrons that had just joined the action, a total of some 150 more fighters awaited them.
    Every squadron in 11 Group had intercepted, and at that moment I saw Douglas Bader's wing of five squadrons coming in from Duxford. This was the day that Goering had said to his fighters the RAF was down to their last 50 Spitfires. But they'd run up against twenty-three squadrons for a start, when they were on their way in, and then, when they got over London, with the Messerschmitt 109s running out of fuel, in comes Douglas Bader with sixty more fighters....."
    Flight Lieutenant R.W. Oxspring 66 Squadron Fighter Command

    Again, Bader ordered the Spitfires to attack the Bf109s, who for some strange reason had not left their bombers early as on previous occasions, while the Hurricanes attacked the bombers. They were at a disadvantage as they were still climbing and had not had the time to get into position. The "Duxford Wing" leader complained later that it was the case again of being called on far too late, but the real reason this time was that the Germans had formed up much quicker this time that almost caught even Keith Park off guard.
    But this was not to be the best of afternoons for Bader:

    ......the Wing was scrambled again to patrol North Weald, and Bader led them through a gap in the clouds.
    At 16,000 feet, flak bursts ahead, and in moments he saw the bombers; about forty of them, some 4,000 feet above the Hurricanes. Damn! Everything risked again because they were scrambled too late. Throttle hard on, the thundering Hurricane had her nose steeply lifted, nearly hanging on her propeller at about 100 m.p.h.
    A voice screamed: “109’s behind.”

    Over his shoulder the yellow spinners were diving on them and he yelled as he steep-turned, “Break up!” Around him the sky was full of wheeling Hurricanes and 109’s. A yellow spinner was sitting behind his tail, and as he yanked harder back on the stick an aeroplane shot by, feet away. Bader hit its slipstream and the Hurricane shuddered, stalled and spun off the turn. He let it spin a few turns to shake off the 109 and came out of it at 5,000 feet. All clear behind.

    Far above a lone Dornier was heading for France, and he climbed and chased it a long way, hanging on his propeller nearly at stalling speed again. Near the coast he was just about in range and fired a three-second burst, but the recoil of the guns slowed the floundering Hurricane till she suddenly stalled and spun off again. He pulled out and searched the sky but the enemy had vanished.


    Paul Brickhill Reach for the Sky Collins 1954 pp221-222
    When Bader had first spun out, he almost collided with P/O Denis Crowley-Milling, and it was while in Crowley-Milling's slipstream that he went into the spin and did not pull out until 5,000 feet. Bader was annoyed, possibly only with himself that it had happened, but not being able to gain height to attack another bomber only rubbed salt into the wound.
    The combat action over the southern and south western areas of London was intense. The formation that had been intercepted as far away as Maidstone somehow managed to straggle through, many of the Bf109s managed to stay as long as they could, but with fuel tanks getting into the danger zone, they had to break off and leave many of the bombers at the mercy of the British fighters. The German bombers, who had intended to drop their bomb loads on London itself, had jettisoned them in scattered areas in London's eastern and southern suburbs that suffered most. The most severe damage was done in West Ham, East Ham, Stratford, Stepney, Hackney, Erith, Dartford and Penge. Fighter Command now had everything that they possessed in the air, even the Station Commander of Northolt Group Captain S.F. Vincent.

    1500hrs: 303 Squadron had been ordered up at Northolt at 1420hrs and were vectored to cover the north Kent coast along the Thames. The squadron consisted of nine Hurricanes and was led by S/L R. Kellett when they sighted a large formation coming towards them. Interception was made over Gravesend. The Squadron Intelligence Report describes the action on this day:

    S/L Kellett was ordered to patrol Northolt at 20,000 ft. and took off with the nine serviceable machines. The other Squadrons had left sometime previously and 303 operated throughout alone. On reaching a height of 6000 ft. the Squadron was vectored 100 degrees and climbed over the l.A.Z. When still 2,000 ft below their patrol level, they sighted coming head on from the southeast a very large formation of bombers and fighters. The Bombers were in vics of three sections line astern with Me11Os in sq formation between the vics of Bombers. To the flanks and stepped up above to 25,000 ft. were many formations of Me1O9s. Blue Section had got rather in front of the others, and wheeling round to let them come up. S/L Kellett had to deliver a quarter frontal attack instead of head on. This he did initially with only the other two members of Blue Section - Sgt. Wojciechowski and P/O Zak. Probably as there were a lot of clouds about, the enemy imagined that this was the advance guard of a large force and began to wheel towards the east, and when the other two sections came in they turned completely to the east. After the first rush the Me11Os and the 109s fell upon the nine Hurricanes which were compelled to defend themselves individually as best they could, and escaped destruction in the clouds. As it was, four of the aircraft which returned were slightly damaged by enemy fire, one, Sgt Adruszkow’s, was destroyed, the pilot baling out unhurt at Dartford, and Sgt Brzezowski is missing.
    Intelligence Report of 303 Squadron Northolt 11 Group Sept 15th 1940

    303 Squadron was in the air just one hour and ten minutes before they returned back to Northolt. In this time, they had destroyed three Dornier Do215's, two Messerschmitt Bf110's and one Bf109. One Do215 was seen to break away from the combat action trailing smoke and losing altitude, but its fate is not known and the squadron was also credited with a probable. But only seven of the nine Hurricanes returned, with one pilot missing and another Hurricane crashing near Dartford with the pilot managing to bale out of his aircraft.

    Flying Officer R.H. Oxspring of 66 Squadron Gravesend (Spitfires) said later that every squadron in 11 Group and the five squadrons from Duxford had in some way intercepted raiders and engaged combat. For the enemy bomber crews, it was now a no win situation. They were outnumbered over their target area, so much so that accurate bombing was virtually impossible. More and more squadrons were moving into areas to cut off any retreat so that when they did decide to abort, trying to get into the protection of the cloud cover would be their only hope of survival. Group Captain Vincent wrote in his report:

    I was climbing over Northolt to watch the Northolt Wing in action, and saw approximately five miles S.W. and west of base, streamers from very high enemy fighters. When at 20,000 feet, I saw approaching from the south I saw a formation of about 18 He111s at approx. 17,000 feet with a very large number of Me109's, on each side, above and behind, mostly about 2,000 feet above the bombers.
    I was therefore able to carry out a head on attack on the bombers, breaking away below, and then one from vertically below and stalling away - I was unable to see any possible result of either attack owing to the Me109's. The bombers then turned back to the south.

    I climbed up towards the sun and tried to attack a Me109 but had to leave it owing to others coming down onto me from above, but saw three Me109's chasing a Hurricane at right angles to me from left to right, and when the Hurricane dived away (straightening out 5,000 feet below) and the Me's turned back onto their course. I was able to get in a good position on the tail of the third one. Before I opened fire I saw No.1 burst into flames, and the pilot jump out in a parachute; he had obviously been shot down by No.2 who was close in astern of him.

    I gave one very short burst of about one second at No.3 at about 200 yards and immediately pieces came off from the port side of his fuselage, I estimate, to the south of Farnborough. I could not then see No.2 as my attention was diverted by the two parachutes.

    All Me109's had light blue undersurfaces and dull grey mottled top surfaces with black crosses on fuselages.


    Group Captain S.F. Vincent Station Commander Northolt 11 Group Sept 15th 1940


    One of the Luftwaffe pilots who had to make a rather ungracious landing was the veteran Professor von Wedel. Like most of the Bf 109 pilots, they stayed with the Dorniers as long as possible, but the fuel situation forced them to leave early leaving the bombers in a very vulnerable position. On the return journey, his flight of Bf 109s were attacked by 605 Squadron Croydon, 1 RCAF Squadron Northolt and 229 Squadron Northolt all flying Hurricanes. It is believed that one of the Hurricanes of 1 RCAF Squadron followed von Wedel down, the veteran not being able to out manoeuvre the Hurricane, was hit and his Bf 109 had lost its controls. He tried in vain to make a landing on Romney Marsh, but the controls did not respond, and he made a heavy wheels up landing at a farmhouse, destroying a shed in which a mother and daughter were sitting in a car awaiting the father who was about to take them out on a Sunday drive. Both mother and daughter were killed instantly. A local policeman arrived on the scene to find a battered and bruised von Wedel wandering around in an almost tearful state, and as he apologized to the policeman for what he had done, the constable simply asked " would you like a cup of tea sir !!!!".
    Sgt P.R Eyles 92 Squadron Biggin Hill (Spitfires) picks up a Do17 heading south and attacks. A short burst at first has no impact and he has to circle round and decides to have another attack. He gains a little height then sweeps down preparing to make an astern attack. Another short burst and pieces fly off the starboard side of the bomber and the tell tale smoke from the starboard engine indicates damage. As the Spitfire banks away he jumped on from above by Bf109 but the Biggin Hill pilot reacts quickly and take evasive action. He starts to climb and has lost sight of the German fighter, and looks for the crippled Dornier below. It continues its journey and could not have suffered too much damage as it is still flying straight and level.
    The sergeant lines up his Spitfire to make another attack when he spots the Bf109 on his port side coming at him. He turns and attempts a beam attack on the 109. As they close in at an impact speed of something over five hundred miles an hour, both seem to fire at the same time, the Spitfire vibrates slightly, but does not seem to be damaged too severely, it is still responsive and all dials and controls seem to be behaving normally. Smoke poured from the engine area of the Messerschmitt and it starts to lose altitude in graceful fashion then levels out. Sgt Eyles pulls back on the stick and gains altitude. The recognizable wake of smoke heading out over the Kent coastline indicates the Dornier is making progress. The Spitfire heads in that direction, gaining height all the time. No other aircraft seem to be in the area to impede his next attack.

    His combat report states that he was well across the Channel before he caught up with the bomber where he made another attack and saw more pieces fly off the fuselage and the other engine catch fire, but seeing a number of small specs coming at him from the French coast, decided to call it a day and head back towards base only claiming the Do17 as a probable.
    Sgt Eyles was to try a similar action three days later, but was shot down by Major Moelders off the coast near Dungeness and was never seen again.

    The bulk of the fighting took place over London and its outskirts from Dartford westward, where five pairs of squadrons from 11 Group and the wing from 12 Group were all in action between ten minutes to three and a quarter past, mainly with the third formation but probably also with survivors of the other two. In the course of the action the enemy distributed a big bombload over London and its outskirts, scoring several lucky hits on public utilities and railways. At East Ham a gas-holder and a telephone exchange were wrecked; and considerable damage was done to a variety of targets on both banks of the river at West Ham and Erith. Many other riverside boroughs reported hits; but the harm done was nothing like as great as that sustained eight days before in the first of the big daylight raids on London. Again retiring by two distinct routes, the attackers were engaged on the way out by another four squadrons, including two from 10 Group. Guns of the inner artillery zone and the Thames and Medway defences were also in action and claimed a number of successes."
    Basil Collier, The Defence of the United Kingdom, HMSO, 1957

    Meanwhile, Flight Lieutenant W.G. Clouston of 19 Squadron Duxford (Spitfires) took the two sections of his squadron to attack a formation of Do17s over Shoeburyness. Making their attack in line astern they made their attacks before any Bf109s arrived. F/L Couston lined up one, and gave a series of short bursts, one of the engines of the Dornier exploded in flame and smoke. Before he lost sight of it, ten feet of the bombers wing broke away and fell earthwards causing the bomber to roll over and spiral down to a watery grave below.
    1600hrs: As the last of the bombers were being chased back across the Channel, and many of the squadrons who has fought one of the heaviest air combats of the Battle of Britain retired to their respective aerodromes, another small raid had been detected and was approaching the Dorset town of Portland. It was just a small force of about ten He111s and 10 Group scrambled 152 Squadron Warmwell (Spitfires), 607 Squadron Tangmere (Hurricanes) and 609 Squadron Warmwell (Spitfires). The enemy target was the Woolston Spitfire factory which was hit, the bombing was not accurate and severe damage was kept to a minimum. 602 and 609 Squadrons both intercepted after the bombers attacked their target, and both claimed that they had destroyed two aircraft each.

    1800hrs: A small formation of Bf110s from Erpro 210, once the crack dive bombing gruppe of the Luftwaffe, made an attack again on the Woolston factory complex. Most of the British fighters that had been up on constant sorties during the afternoon had returned to their bases and by this time were busy being rearmed, refuelled and many were undergoing their usual repairs from damage sustained during the hectic afternoon. Therefore the Bf110s were free from any attack or interception by Hurricanes or Spitfires. The task of defence was by the AA gun batteries who put up a tremendous fight in defence with accurate gunfire, which although they did not shoot down any enemy aircraft, the barrage that they put up was so aggressive that not a single bomb was dropped onto the Spitfire factory.

    As the afternoon attack came slowly to an end, one by one the often tired and exhausted pilots returned to their bases. It had been a long and hectic day, Many of the pilots stated that 'they had very close to buying it' but such was their determination that saw them through, yet each one still had to remember that he was not invincible, the thought of death was still a reality, but many put it to the back of their minds.

    Some of us would die within the next few days. That was inevitable. But you did not believe that it would be you. Death was always present, and we knew it for what it was. If we had to die, we would be alone, smashed to pieces, burnt alive, or drowned. Some strange, protecting veil kept the nightmare thought from our minds, as did the loss of our friends. Their disappearance struck us as less a solid blow than a dark shadow which chilled our hearts and passed on.
    Squadron Leader Peter Townsend 85 Squadron RAF (later Group Captain)

    But the day belonged to Royal Air Force Fighter Command, they were unaware of it then, but they had achieved something on September 15th 1940 that would go down in world history. Their guts, determination and courage was at long last to pay off, they would turn the tide in controlling the skies over south-east England. This day was to belong to them, and in future years was to become known as "Battle of Britain Day".
    "This time, for a change, we outnumbered the hun, and believe me, no more than eight got home from that party.
    At one time you could see planes going down on fire all over the place, and the sky seemed full of parachutes. It was sudden death that morning, for our fighters shot them to blazes.
    Squadron Leader Douglas Bader 242 Squadron RAF Fighter Command


    CASUALTIES:
    For this day only, to indicate the severity of the days combat actions the full casualty list is displayed.
    Aircraft shown in red are those that were lost or destroyed

    1140hrs: Croydon. Hurricane L2122. 605 Squadron Croydon
    P/O R.E. Jones unhurt. (Shot down in combat with Do17s and Bf109s. Pilot baled out of damaged aircraft)
    1150hrs: Sevenoaks Kent. Hurricane N2537. 229 Squadron Northolt
    P/O G.L.D. Doutrepont killed. (Crashed onto Staplehurst Railway Station after being shot down by Bf109s)
    1200hrs: Sevenoaks Kent. Hurricane V6616. 229 Squadron Northolt
    P/O R.R. Smith wounds to leg. (Baled out after combat with Do215 and Bf110s)
    1210hrs: Tunbridge Wells. Hurricane P3080. 1 RCAF Squadron Northolt
    F/O A.D. Nesbitt wounded. (Shot down by Bf109. Baled out)
    1210hrs: Tunbridge Wells. Hurricane P3876. 1 RCAF Squadron Northolt
    F/O R. Smither killed. (Attacked and shot down by Bf109. Pilot failed to bale out)
    1215hrs: London. Hurricane P2725. 504 Squadron Hendon
    Sgt R.T. Holmes unhurt. (Baled out after aircraft damaged by Bf109 crashed in Buckingham Palace Rd)
    1215hrs: Canterbury. Spitfire R6767. 92 Squadron Biggin Hill
    Fl/Sgt C. Sydney unhurt. (Returned to base with damage to wing after combat with Bf109s)
    1220hrs: Maidstone. Hurricane P3865. 73 Squadron Debden
    P/O R.A. Marchand killed. (Crashed into farm at Teynham after being shot down by Bf109s)
    1225hrs: London. Hurricane L1913. 504 Squadron Hendon
    F/O M.E.A. Royce unhurt. (Returned to base with oil cooler problem after combat action)
    1230hrs: Thames Estuary. Hurricane P3642. 257 Squadron Debden
    P/O C.F.A. Capon unhurt. (Made forced landing at Croydon after combat action)
    1230hrs: London. Spitfire R6690. 609 Squadron Warmwell
    P/O G.N. Gaunt killed. (Crashed in flames near Kenley after being hit by gunfire from Bf110)
    1230hrs: London. Hurricane N2599. 46 Squadron North Weald
    Sgt C.A.L. Hurry unhurt. (Returned to base with damage to mainplane)
    1230hrs: Thurrock Essex. Spitfire P9324. 41 Squadron Hornchurch
    P/O G.A. Langley killed. (Crashed into building after being shot down by Bf109s)
    1230hrs: Middle Wallop. Spitfire K9997. 609 Squadron Warmwell
    P/O E.Q. Tobin unhurt. (Crashed into airfield truck on landing approach)
    1235hrs: Thames Estuary. Hurricane P3620. 257 Squadron Debden
    Fl/Lt P.M. Brothers unhurt. (Landed at Biggin Hill for safety check with damage sustained in combat)
    1235hrs: Ashford. Hurricane V7433. 501 Squadron Kenley
    S/L H.A.V. Hogan unhurt. (Damaged in cooling system after combat with Bf109s. Made forced landing)
    1245hrs: London. Hurricane V6576. 242 Squadron Coltishall
    Fl/Lt G.E. Ball unhurt. (Made forced landing with damaged aircraft after combat action)
    1245hrs: Ashford. Hurricane P2760. 501 Squadron Kenley
    P/O A.E.A von den Hove d'Ertsenrijck killed. (Aircraft exploded in mid-air after hit by gunfire from Bf109)
    1245hrs: Kent. Hurricane P2903. 303 Squadron Northolt
    P/O W. Lokuciewski leg wounds. (Returned to base after receiving damage by Bf109)
    1258hrs: South London. Hurricane N2481. 504 Squadron Hendon
    P/O J.T. Gurteen killed. (Shot down by enemy aircraft and crashed at full throttle into residential house)
    1430hrs: Marden. Hurricane L2012. 605 Squadron Croydon
    P/O T.P.M. Cooper-Slipper injured. (Hit by gunfire from Do17. Collided with E/A losing wing. Pilot baled out)
    1430hrs: Thames Estuary. Hurricane R4087. 310 Squadron Duxford
    Sgt J. Hubacek slight injuries. (Baled out after aircraft was hit by Bf109 gunfire)
    1435hrs: S.E. London. Hurricane V6566. 249 Squadron North Weald
    P/O K.T. Lofts unhurt. (Crash landed at West Malling after attacked by Bf109 while attacking He111)
    1440hrs: Rye Kent. Hurricane P2884. 242 Squadron Coltishall
    Fl/L G. ff Powell-Sheddon slight injuries. (Shot down by Bf109 while attacking Do17 and baled out)
    1445hrs: North Weald. Hurricane P2954. 302 Squadron Duxford
    Fl/Lt T.P. Chlopik killed. (Shot down by enemy aircraft. Baled out but died on landing)
    1445hrs: Thames Estuary. Hurricane R4085. 310 Squadron Duxford
    P/O A. Hess unhurt. (Shot down in flames by enemy aircraft and pilot baled out safely)
    1445hrs: S.E. London. Hurricane N2705. 504 Squadron Hendon
    F/O M. Jebb died of injuries 19.9.40. (Crashed at Dartford after combat with enemy aircraft)
    1445hrs: South of London. Hurricane L1973. 1 RCAF Squadron Northolt
    F/O A. Yuile wounded. (Returned to base with severe damage after combat with He111 and poss Bf109s)
    1450hrs: Ashford. Spitfire R6606. 92 Squadron Biggin Hill
    P/O R.H. Holland slight injuries. (Injuries sustained on landing after baling out of damaged aircraft)
    1450hrs: S of London. Spitfire II P7303. 611 Squadron Digby
    F/O T.D. Williams unhurt. (Returned to base with severe damage after combat with He111)
    1500hrs: Dartford. Hurricane P3939. 303 Squadron Northolt
    Sgt T. Andruszkow unhurt. (Baled out after being hit by gunfire from Bf109)
    1500hrs: Ashford. Spitfire P9513. 92 Squadron Biggin Hill
    P/O A.C. Bartley unhurt. (Returned to base with damage after combat with Do17)
    1500hrs: Over Channel. Spitfire R6991. 19 Squadron Duxford
    Sub/Lt A.G. Blake unhurt. (Made forced landing in Kent after combat action)
    1500hrs: Maidstone. Hurricane P3515. 242 Squadron Coltishall
    Sub/Lt R.J. Cork unhurt. (Made landing at Rochford. Damage to cockpit and wings in combat with Bf109)
    1500hrs: North Kent. Hurricane R2685. 303 Squadron Northolt
    P/O M. Feric unhurt. (Returned to base after aircraft damaged by gunfire from Bf109s)
    1500hrs: North Kent. Hurricane V7465. 303 Squadron Northolt
    S/L R.G. Kellett unhurt. (Returned to base with damaged aircraft after action with Bf109s)
    1500hrs: Hawkhurst. Hurricane P3113. 213 Squadron Tangmere
    Sgt R.T. Llewellyn badly wounded. (Shot down in combat with Bf110s and baled out)
    1500hrs: Kenley. Hurricane P2836. 238 Squadron Middle Wallop
    Sgt L. Pidd killed. (Baled out after being shot down by enemy aircraft but was dead on landing)
    1500hrs: Kenley. Hurricane L2089. 238 Squadron Middle Wallop
    P/O V.C. Simmonds unhurt. (Returned to base with damage to aircraft tailplane after combat)
    1500hrs: Off Gravesend. Hurricane V6673. 303 Squadron Northolt
    Sgt M. Wajciechowski unhurt. (Returned to base after aircraft damaged by gunfire from Bf109s)
    1505hrs: West Malling. Hurricane P3920. 238 Squadron Middle Wallop
    Fl/Lt M.V. Blake unhurt. (Aircraft damaged in combat and had to make a forced landing)
    1505hrs: Gravesend. Hurricane P3577. 303 Squadron Northolt
    Sgt M. Brzezowski Listed as missing. (Believed crashed in Estuary after combat with Bf109s)
    1505hrs: North Weald. Hurricane P3935. 302 Squadron Duxford
    Sgt J. Kowalski unhurt. (Aircraft damaged by enemy aircraft and returned to base)
    1505hrs: Kingswood Kent. Spitfire X4324. 603 Squadron Hornchurch
    F/O A.P. Pease killed. (Shot down by unknown enemy aircraft. Pilot did not bale out)
    1505hrs: Over Channel. Spitfire X4070. 19 Squadron Duxford
    Sgt J.A. Potter taken POW. (Ditched damage aircraft off French coast and captured by German military)
    1505hrs: Gravesend. Hurricane V6684. 303 Squadron Northolt
    F/O W. Urbanowicz unhurt. (Returned to base after aircraft damaged by gunfire from Bf109s)
    1505hrs: Gravesend. Hurricane L2099. 303 Squadron Northolt
    F/O W. Zak unhurt. (Returned to base after aircraft damaged by gunfire from Bf109s)
    1510hrs: Kenley. Hurricane P3462. 238 Squadron Middle Wallop
    F/O C.T. Davis unhurt. (Managed to return to base with damaged aircraft)
    1510hrs: Kent. Spitfire R7019. 603 Squadron Hornchurch
    S/L G.L. Denholm unhurt. (Hit by gunfire from Do17. Baled out of damaged aircraft)
    1510hrs: Rye Sussex. Spitfire R6922. 609 Squadron Warmwell
    F/O J.D. Dundas unhurt. (Returned to base with severe damage after combat with Do17)
    1510hrs: Over Channel. Spitfire P9431. 19 Squadron Duxford
    Sgt H.A.C. Roden slight injuries. (Crash landed after combat with Bf109)
    1515hrs: Appledore. Hurricane V6688. 607 Squadron Tangmere
    P/O P.J.T. Stephenson injured. (Collided with E/A after attack on Do17. Pilot baled out)
    1520hrs: Beachy Head. Spitfire X4412. 602 Squadron Westhampnett
    Sgt C.F. Babbage unhurt. (Made forced landing at Shoreham with damage by gunfire from Do17)
    1530hrs: Over Channel. Hurricane V6698. 253 Squadron Kenley
    P/O A.R.H. Barton unhurt. (Damaged in combat with Do215s. Forced landing at Hawkinge)
    1635hrs: Kenley. Hurricane P3833. 238 Squadron Middle Wallop
    P/O A.R. Covington unhurt. (Exhausted fuel tank and made forced landing near East Grinstead)
    Unknown time: Boscombe Down. Hurricane P3660. 56 Squadron Boscombe Down
    Sgt T.R. Tweed killed. (Failed to come out of spin during dog fight practice over base)



    Document 51
    SEPT 15th 1940
    ( THE CONCLUSION )
     
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    CL1 116th LAA and 92nd (Loyals) LAA,Royal Artillery

    LANGLEY, GERALD ARCHIBALD

    Rank:
    Pilot Officer
    Service No:
    81641
    Date of Death:
    15/09/1940
    Age:
    24
    Regiment/Service:
    Royal Air Force Volunteer Reserve

    41 Sqdn.
    Grave Reference
    Grave 1300.
    Cemetery
    ABINGTON (SS. PETER AND PAUL) CHURCHYARD
    Additional Information:
    Son of Archibald Frank Martin Langley and Mary Elizabeth Langley, of Northampton.

    P/O G.A.Langley of No 41 Squadron baled out of his Spitfire I (X4325) safely after combat with a Ju 88 on the 11th of September 1940 over Sevenoaks at 16:35hrs. He was on patrol on the 15th of September 1940 in his Spitfire I (P9324). He was shot down and killed by a Bf 109 near Thurrock at 12:30hrs.
    La-pilots


    [​IMG]
     
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    Page 43: September 16th 1940

    [​IMG]

    By the time that most people had either emerged from their Anderson's or had risen after another rather uncomfortable nights sleep, the daily newspapers were busy informing them of the events of the previous day. The 'Daily Telegraph' stated that "Of the 350 to 400 enemy planes launched in two waves against the capital and south-east England, 175, or nearly 50 per cent were shot down according to returns............The Germans loss yesterday was their highest since Aug 15, when 180 were shot down. On Aug 18 they lost 153. In personnel their loss yesterday was over 500 airmen against 20 RAF pilots.' The 'Daily Herald' told a similar story, but added that AA gunfire had brought down four of the 175 German planes. On the subject of the RAF victory, they went on to say that in both of the raids, the gallant pilots and squadrons of the RAF harassed the bombers so much that those that were not shot down, were harried and chased right back to the Channel. The Germans had encountered their most gruelling reception so far.
    Of course, the figures had done wonders for British morale, newspapers and radio had a field day, but just like their German counterparts, all the figures had been completely blown out of all proportion. We have now learned that the true figure was that 56 German aircraft had been shot down and the Royal Air Force lost 27 Hurricanes and Spitfires. But if the British public really wanted proof that day, they only had to go down to the open fields of Kent and Sussex to see the scattered remains of bent and broken aircraft, and most of them were German.

    But at the meetings held this morning, on both sides of the Channel, two completely different attitudes were emerging over the analysis of the previous days combat actions.

    Keith Park, the C-in-C of 11 Group, even though the success of the previous days events had exhilarated him, he still felt that improvements could be made, he was not going to rest on his laurels as there was always the chance that Goring would send his Luftwaffe over again with an if not stronger force. He was concerned that individual squadrons were failing to rendezvous at the right times at given vectored positions. That paired squadrons were meeting up with each other far early and too low for that matter. And he also showed concern that paired squadrons were not committing themselves to the task that paired squadrons were supposed to do. 'In paired squadrons' he said, ' Hurricanes are to go after the bombers and the Spitfires must attack the fighter top cover.' Reports had got back to the 11 Group commander many Spitfires had been seen attacking the bombers while in other instances Hurricanes had been struggling with Bf109s. But this was not always possible:

    The philosophy of taking on German bombers and fighters was based on the fact that the Hurricanes should attack the bomber formations and the Spitfires the fighter cover. Of course it never worked out like that. Either you weren't together with the Spitfires when the raid happened or, by the time the first flight went in to attack the bombers, the fighters were already coming down—so one of you had to play rear guard action and take on the fighters. This usually fell to my lot, although I did get mixed up with bombers on occasions.
    If you had the time and the height, you got into a favourable position up-sun—but again that didn’t usually work out, because one was always scrambled on the late side. This was because, until the controllers were certain that it was a raid and not a spoof to draw you into the air, there was no point in launching you. If it was a spoof, by the time you were refuelling, the main raid would come—and this was what the controllers were trying to avoid.


    Flight Lieutenant P.M. Brothers 32 Squadron Fighter Command
    The new instruction sent to squadrons was that Spitfire squadrons, especially those at Biggin Hill and Hornchurch should rendezvous in pairs, at height if the weather was clear and below the cloud base if the weather was overcast, then increase altitude to meet and attack the enemy high fighter screen. He wanted several pairs of these Spitfire squadrons to be put up, while there should be ample Hurricane squadrons to be assembled in pairs close to the sector airfields. Further to this, the Northolt and Tangmere squadrons should be dispatched as three squadron wings to intercept the second and third waves of the attacking bombers. With instructions like this, do we see a hint of a smaller version of the 'Big Wing' that Park and Dowding were so very much against. [1]

    In Germany, if Göring was disappointed, Hitler was furious. London, on the 15th, was supposed to have been decimated, the capital was supposed to have been flattened and in flames and the people were supposed to have been bombed almost into submission. The fighters of the Royal Air Force were to have been knocked out of the sky, after all, the Luftwaffe had send more than enough aircraft to put an end to Fighter Command once and for all. In actual fact, London did not receive the full scale bombing that was intended, but, compared with the number of German aircraft that had orders to bomb London, damage was only slight. The German fighters had no chance of destroying Fighter Command because they were met with far more fighters than they anticipated, and pilots that, after the lull of the previous week fought with renewed vigour and enthusiasm. Couple this with the attack on the night of the 15th and 16th by Bomber Command who repeated their raids of the previous night and sent 155 bombers to attack all the Channel ports along the French, Belgian and Dutch coasts including a large attack on the docks at Antwerp where the hundreds of barges were docked in preparation for the planned invasion of England. [2]
    Göring called a meeting of his Luftflotten commanders on this day. "The British air force is far from finished, their fighters proved that yesterday. Their bombers are continually attacking our barge installations and although we must admit they have achieved some form of success, but I will only say and repeat what I have said before, and that is our orders to attempt full scale attacks on London, instead of the destruction of their air force will not achieve the success we need, it will only act as our demise." A thought that was indeed shared by one of Germany's best fighter pilots:

    Our greatest mistake was not keeping the pressure up on the airfields of southern England. Göring thought that he was master when he said that he was now in charge of the battle. He thought he was losing too many aircraft in attacking the RAF airfields, they were always there, not in great numbers, but they were always there. He thought that by trying to bomb London by night, he knew that Britain had no night fighter squadrons, he could devastate London and the people of Britain would be crying for mercy. This was his greatest mistake. He himself gave the RAF room to breathe, time to reorganize, time to rebuild. The result was, we were losing the Battle of Britain.
    Major Adolf Galland III JG/26 referring to the battle on September 15th 1940

    But it was always the fact that 'someone else was at fault' Adolf Hitler placed the blame on Goring for the way that the attacks had been implemented. Göring in turn gave criticism to his fighter pilots because they did not give adequate protection to the bomber force, and in turn both fighter and bomber forces of the Luftwaffe initiated bitter arguments between each other. The bomber forces argued that much of the time forming up over the French coast was because the fighter escort failed to rendezvous at the correct time, while the fighter units claimed that it was the time that the bomber units took to form up over the airfields and that they had wasted precious time and most importantly precious fuel which shortened the amount of time that they could spend over England. [3]
    Göring decided that further daylight attacks on the British capital (and other British cities and towns) was right out of the question. His conversation with the Führer that morning was one that Hitler displayed his disappointment of the events of the previous day, there was no mention of future plans. His decision now, was to continue where he had left off prior to Hitler's intervention with his directive No.16, only his task was now made even harder because Fighter Command was now stronger than ever before, and the success of September 15th had given the leaders and the pilots of 11 Group renewed confidence. He would continue with daylight bombing of RAF fighter aerodromes and fighter production factories, this way, as before he could hope to destroy Fighter Command on the ground as well as in the air, just as he had planned in early July. To keep Hitler happy, he would mount a campaign of night attacks on London for as long as possible, knowing full well that the British fighters had no answer to night fighting. (London was continued to be bombed for a further fifty-seven consecutive nights).
     
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    Page 43: September 16th 1940
    MONDAY SEPTEMBER 16th 1940

    WEATHER:

    Much cooler conditions coming in from the North Sea. Most areas can expect heavy cloud cover and rain in all districts that was expected to be heavy at times. The forecast was general for all areas.
    OPERATIONS:

    The thought of any major raid on Britain was obviously out of the question. Conditions were in fact disastrous and only a few small feints were intercepted and the odd reconnaissance aircraft. The largest was an impending raid towards North Kent targets, but nothing really developed.
     
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    Page 43: September 16th 1940
    Ten German aircraft did crash while on operation sorties, but who takes the credit for their destruction?

    Heinkel He111H ?: Crash landed at Dreux airfield after combat operations over the Channel.
    Heinkel He115 8L+GH: Believed to have lost bearings after operational sortie, Crashed at Aberdour.
    Heinkel He115C S4+CL: Ditched in North Sea after suffering engine failure during operational sortie.
    Junkers Ju88 F6+HM: Failed to return after operational sortie over English coast.
    Junkers Ju88A 9K+AH: Shot down by ground defences over southern England during night operation.
    Junkers Ju88A B3+HH: Crashed in flames near Coventry after hitting balloon cable.
    Junkers Ju88A ?: Crashed and burst into flames at Evreux after combat operation.
    Junkers Ju88A ? Crashed with severe damage after night operation at Melun-Villaroche.
    Junkers Ju88A F1+BM: Crew baled out of aircraft over Arlon that was damaged during combat operations.
    Junkers Ju88C R4+AH: Failed to return after night sortie over eastern England.



    1940hrs to 0430hrs on Tuesday: A number of night bombing raids took place starting a little earlier than normal. Wave after wave approached the city of London with very little respite. In all, 170 German aircraft dropped over 200 tons of high explosive. The targets followed a pattern very similar to that of the early bombing raids, and that was the London dock area, the residential districts of West Ham, East Ham, Hackney, Bethnal Green and Shoreditch. Others dropped their loads on the southern boroughs of Southwark, Bermondsey and Brixton, and in the west at Finchley, Willesden and Stanmore.
    More formations of German bombers made their way to Liverpool and Manchester, while others targeted Coventry, Birmingham and Bristol. The people of Britain were now to take the night bombing in their stride, from now on, the evening movement down to the shelter was to become a part of the daily ritual, for it was in these often cold and damp places, often cramped that people were to spend as much time down in their 'Anderson' as they did in their home. In London itself, the deep underground stations of the 'tube' became the night time mecca for thousands. Beds and bunks lined the station platforms, and this too became so much a ritual for thousands, many of the voluntary services brought down pots of tea and plates of food, and as time went on entertainers and bands joined in and many an enjoyable concert was held deep down below the surface of London. In other towns and cities, the story was very much the same. The lifestyles of the people was now beginning to change, but the thing was now, for how long could the people last. The period of the "Blitz" was about to begin.

    CASUALTIES:
    There were no British deaths recorded on this day.

    [1] Wood and Dempster The Narrow Margin McGraw-Hill 1961 p355-6
    [2] Middlebrook and Everitt The Bomber Command War Diaries Midland 1995
     
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    Page 44: September 17th 1940
    Tuesday September 17th 1940




    Since first light on August 15th until the last squadron of Fighter Command landed on September 15th, the intensity of the air combat was at its peak. 201 Fighter Command aircrew had been killed during this period and 495 aircraft had been destroyed. This was an average of 6.29 pilots killed each day and 15.47 valuable aircraft lost or destroyed on a daily basis. If we take a look at the Luftwaffe figures, one can understand as to why Göring was not impressed. The Luftwaffe lost 1,132 aircrew and 862 aircraft. This averaged out at 35.37 aircrew lost each day and 26.93 aircraft lost or destroyed every day for the last 32 day period.
    It was also during this 32 day period that things were at their most difficult and daunting for the Germans. First of all, they made the fundamental alteration regarding strategy, which did not benefit themselves but played into the hands of Fighter Command where it appears that it gave them a new lease of life. It was prompted by the overall success of Keith Park's policy of refusing battle, as far as possible, with German fighters and concentrating against their bomber force. [1]

    We must also appreciate the fact that Germany was not producing the amount of new aircraft at the same rate as they were in Britain, a feat that all accolades must go to the Minister for Aircraft Production Lord Beaverbrook. If the battle were to continue for the next 32 days with the same amount of attrition, then the Luftwaffe would surely be a spent force. Aircraft production in Britain, despite the number of attacks on the aircraft factories, still managed on many occasions to produce more aircraft on a daily basis than were being shot down.

    When Beaverbrook became Minister of Aircraft Production on 14 May, the planned production of fighters for that month was 261 machines. The actual output for the month was 325. For June the planned programme was 292; the actual output was 446. In July and August the improvement still continued: the total planned production was 611 but the total actual output was 972. Already by early July the supply of fighters had become so satisfactory that it was decided to allocate an additional four aircraft to each of thirty Hurricane and six Spitfire squadrons — though, unfortunately, there were not the pilots to go with them.
    Hough & Richard's The Battle of Britain - A Jubilee History Hodder & Stoughton 1989 p102

    Then, if we look at total fighter production between week ending August 17th and week ending September 14th we will see that 43 Defiants were produced, 271 Hurricanes, 186 Spitfires, 26 Buffalo's and 3 Westland Whirlwinds giving Fighter Command a total of 1154 serviceable fighter aircraft. This is an average daily total output of 36.06, meaning that Beaverbrook's factories were producing a little over twice as many fighter aircraft that were being shot down. [2]
    Even though these figures appear to be excellent, we have to appreciate the fact that Fighter Command did lose a considerable number of aircraft from mid August to mid September, coupled with the fact that hundreds more had been damaged and were undergoing repairs. We are fortunate in having these figures available to us, but at the time, such accurate figures were not available and unless German intelligence was on the 'mark' they would have had no idea of the situation, except for the fact that there were four or five times more British aircraft to meet the German armada of bombers than they had anticipated.

    During the morning, just as the Luftflotten commanders were giving instruction of the impending days raids, and the crews were being briefed, a communiqué came through stating that "Operation Seelöwe" had yet again been postponed. It was due to the present circumstances, and the message was obviously under the direction of Hitler, he being the only one who could announce such a decision. Later, the German General Staff sent a message by radio to the commanding officer handling the loading and supply of troop-carrying aircraft in Holland. It gave the commanding officer the authorization to dismantle all of the air-loading equipment at all the Dutch airfields. Without this vital equipment, there could be no such invasion, and by the withdrawal of the air-loading equipment and possibly the barges at Antwerp, it appeared that this postponement was more like an abandonment.

    In the deciphering rooms at Bletchley Park, the message was intercepted by Ultra loud and clear. Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Cyril Newhall stated to his ministry that with this great news of the air-loading equipment being ordered to disband, and with the unreliable weather conditions that could be expected for the remainder of the year, any planned invasion would now not take place, not in 1940 anyway. Again the Air Ministry put this down to their success of September 15th. (Some resources state that on this day, that Hitler abandoned the invasion indefinitely, this is not the case, the invasion was only postponed, but because of the coming winter, it was assumed that it would not take place during the rest of 1940). In Germany, Hitler's new directive stated that Operation Sealion could still be expected, even as late as October, but only if the air and weather conditions permitted, otherwise such an invasion could not now take place until 1941.
     
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    CL1 116th LAA and 92nd (Loyals) LAA,Royal Artillery

    Page 44: September 17th 1940
    TUESDAY SEPTEMBER 17th 1940

    WEATHER:

    Cold with squally winds especially in the Channel areas. Rain periods were to be expected in the south with the chance of a thunderstorm. The possibility of bright intervals expected during the afternoon.
    OPERATIONS IN DETAIL:

    There was very little activity during the morning period. Radar had picked up several small blips over the Channel, but these being either enemy aircraft flying singularly or in pairs were ignored by Fighter Command as they were probably just weather or photo-reconnaissance aircraft and caused no threat. One enemy bomber came very close over the town of Dover and the air raid warning sounded but the bomber flew along the coastline for a while before turning back out over the Channel towards its base.
    1400hrs: A formation of Ju88s were detected heading in a northerly direction over Bristol. There target was believed to be the factory areas of north of Bristol. 152 Squadron Warmwell (Spitfires) were scrambled to intercept. One of the Ju88s was hit and it was further harassed by the Spitfires until it crashed near Warminster south-east of Bath. The pilot was killed while three others were captured, one of them being a Gruppe Commander.

    1500hrs: With the brightening of the weather allowing better visibility, a large formation was detected crossing the Channel from Calais. As they crossed the coastline between Dover and Dungeness, the Observer Corps had trouble identifying them reporting that it was a large formation at great height. They could very well be forgiven, because the enemy formation was only flying at 15,000 feet, but they were a large contingent of Bf109s heading across the Kent coast.

    11 Group dispatched at varying times a number of squadrons, most of them Hurricanes. 1RCAF Squadron Northolt (Hurricanes), 17 Squadron Debden (Hurricanes), 19 Squadron Duxford (Spitfires), 41 Squadron Hornchurch Spitfires), 73 Squadron Debden (Hurricanes), 213 Squadron Tangmere (Hurricanes), 257 Squadron Debden (Hurricanes), 303 Squadron Northolt (Hurricanes), 501 Squadron Kenley (Hurricanes), 603 Squadron Hornchurch (Spitfires) and 607 Squadron Tangmere (Hurricanes) some sources state that up to twenty squadrons were dispatched, but records were not available.

    While it is not actually known where the target area was to be, the formation of Bf109s, accompanied by a small number of Ju88 bombers were heading in the general direction of Sheerness and Tilbury, and over the Kent countryside, quite a number of bombs were dropped indiscriminately indicating that a number of these Bf109s had taken to a new role of carrying bombs. But over various areas of mid Kent, heavy air combat actions began to take place.

    17 Squadron, 73 Squadron and 253 Squadron, the all Hurricane squadrons from Debden were vectored to the Hendon and Northolt area. Orders were to patrol Hendon at 20,000 feet. Apparently no contact was made with the enemy, and only 73 Squadron reported that a visual sighting was made, but the enemy was flying at approximately 33.000 feet and did not appear to be escorting any bombers. The Debden controller instructed 73 Squadron not to increase height and stay at 20,000 in the patrol area. On arrival at base later, all squadrons reported that no contact was made with the enemy.

    1530hrs: One of the combat areas was in the Dover area. Heavily involved was 41 Squadron Hornchurch who took on a large formation of Bf109s. Two of the 109s became sandwiched between 41 Squadron Spitfires and trailing smoke dived down to low levels in a bid to make good their escape. Both of these managed to return to Wissant without any further attack being made on them.

    Over "Hells Corner" another Bf109 was to break away and attempted to return to its base after receiving damage, but the damage was too severe and it had to make a forced landing, but three other 109s were not so lucky. Two were shot down and crashed into the Channel, another was destroyed when it crashed near Deal, but not after the squadron sustained some bruising from the German fighters. At 1535hrs, F/O J.G. Boyle's Spitfire was hit by gunfire from a 109 over Manston, and had to return to Hornchurch. At 1540hrs, P/O J.N. Mackenzie's Spitfire was severely damaged and while the pilot was unhurt, it is believed that his aircraft was beyond repair after it crash landed. P/O H.H. Chalder was another who had to return to base while P/O H.C. Baker had to make a forced landing at Stelling Minnis after he took a hit while in combat over Manston.

    1540hrs: The action here was with 501 Squadron Kenley who took on some Bf109s over Ashford. They were not as lucky as 41 Squadron as P/O Bennions describes their only success of the day:

    After the commencement of the engagement, I found myself about 2,000 feet below a section of 5 Me109s. Two of the Me109s dived down onto me and I evaded by turning sharply right; then one dived away and as I turned to follow three more came down on me. After turning and twisting violently, I spun out and, on pulling out I found that one only had followed me down. I turned to engage and he disappeared into the clouds. I climbed back to 15,000 feet and sighted a loose formation of four Me109s circling. I attacked the rear one from the inside of a left hand turn and, after a short burst, I saw pieces fly off the aircraft, which then rolled over and spun inverted for about 8,000 feet and then dive straight into the ground midway between Canterbury and Herne Bay, near a very large wood.
    Combat Report of P/O G.H. Bennions 501 Squadron for September 17th 1940

    501 Squadron was to lose two Hurricanes in this engagement. One of them was Sgt J.H. Lacey who managed to bale out of his stricken aircraft, while the other was Sgt E.J. Egan who went down with his Hurricane that had burst into flames. Both incidents occurred over Ashford.
    19 Squadron also got into the action and over north Kent was credited with two destroyed Messerschmitts. As it turned out, both were shot down by Sub Lt "Tony" Blake, who as it happens turned out to be the Navy's highest scoring fighter pilot.

    Evening: The usual raids began to commence at about 2000hrs. The first raids were on London where continuous waves of bombers pounded the city.

    For nearly two weeks, London had taken a beating. Each night was now becoming a sort of ritual having to go down to the shelter in the back garden each time the air raid siren went off. Sometimes you could hear the steady drone of bombers as they came over and the dull short thud of explosions. Sometime you wouldn't hear any engines at all, only thud, thud, thud of the AA guns, then just as you thought that you heard what could have been a steady drone of engines, you would hear a dull whistle getting louder and louder then the ground shook as a bomb exploded, maybe a few houses away or maybe a few streets away. Sometimes you heard nothing, the raid was not over your part of London, but one could see the waving tall shafts of light as searchlights tried to locate the bombers, and the sound of exploding bombs could be heard miles away.
    Pauline Harper (nee Davison) remembers the 'Blitz'

    Later in the evening, Junkers Ju88s went on a bombing spree over Merseyside. Again, the bombing was either not accurate or the Germans just dropped their bombs anywhere as long as they were over the city. There were plenty of industrial and dock areas that could be bombed, but the residential areas were also taking a beating and again, many lives were lost. The cities of Newcastle and Durham were also hit, but many houses were damaged and destroyed. Reports of bombs landing in open country was again reported well away from towns and cities.
    Victory came at 2345hrs to one of the Defiants of 141 Squadron converted to night fighter operations and based at Biggin Hill. A number of Junkers Ju88s were detected crossing the coast near Dover and 11 Group dispatched a flight from 141 Squadron. Interception was made north of Ashford and Sgt Lawrence and Sgt Chard began their attack on B3+OL. The badly damaged bomber finally crashed in a residential street in Maidstone killing all the aircrew.

     
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    CL1 116th LAA and 92nd (Loyals) LAA,Royal Artillery

    Page 44: September 17th 1940
    17th September 1940
    CASUALTIES:
    1540hrs: Ashford. Hurricane P3820. 501 Squadron Kenley
    Sgt E.J. Egan killed. (Shot down in sudden attack by Bf109. Aircraft burst into flames. Pilot did not bale out)
    1540hrs: Beltring. Hurricane P3933. 607 Squadron Tangmere
    Sgt J. Lansdell killed. (Shot down during combat with Bf109. Failed to bale out)
    1600hrs: Faversham. Hurricane V7529. 504 Squadron Hendon
    Sgt D.A. Helcke killed.(Lost control during attacking practice and failed to bale out)
     
  20. CL1

    CL1 116th LAA and 92nd (Loyals) LAA,Royal Artillery

    Wednesday September 18th 1940



    It now appeared that the Royal Air Force were starting to gain the upper hand, but even though London suffered serious damage and hundreds of casualties from September 7th onwards, the battle was far from being over, although the turning point could be said, happened on September 15th. Adolf Hitler may have postponed the invasion once again, but the intensity of day and especially night raids were about to increase.
    Göring was under instructions to continue bombing attacks on the British capital although personally, he would have like to revert back to destroying the fighters, the airfields and ground support installations of the RAF, but unlike the British chain of command, he was under instructions from Hitler personally. Daytime attacks would still continue, and by increasing Bf109 and Bf110 escort duties to the bombers, he could hopefully destroy at least some of Fighter Command by forcing them to send fighters into the air, but with instructions to concentrate on the industrial areas of London's East End and bombing London itself, it was going to be a big ask if the targets were not the fighter aerodromes themselves. Night time bombing would continue, and this was to become more widespread with greater intensity and with more high explosive bombs followed by thousands of incendiary bombs.

    Keith Park was now under pressure to pursue the tactics of flying his squadrons in pairs. The instruction was given by the Air Ministry, mainly under pressure by those in favour of the "Big Wing" theory and as it had turned out, that the British tactical position had improved greatly. [1]

    The flying of squadrons in pairs was more of a compromise on the part of Park who refused to send up the number of squadrons as Douglas Bader and Leigh-Mallory had wanted, although it must be admitted that Bader's "Big Wing" was destroying large numbers of enemy aircraft when given the opportunity. The combination of the "Big Wing" and other squadrons flying in pairs proved how successful the method was during the British victory on September 15th. We were not to see the last of paired squadrons yet.

    During the early hours of the morning, Bomber Command flew a number of sorties which comprised of some 194 aircraft. Seventy-five per cent of the bombers were attacking the Channel ports as they had done throughout September, with special emphasis on Antwerp targeting the barges that would be used in any impending invasion. 187 of the bombers despatched reported successful missions with only two Hampdens being lost during the night operations. [2]

    Page 45: September 18th 1940
     

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