Slightly OT Help identifying a 1941 photographer/aircrew crash info

I've recently chatted up my local paper & have had an article printed about my search (which I will post in my main thread), but as a result I received an email this morning from some local who is also researching a family member's war time record. I have encouraged him to join the forum, but until them wonder if you guys can help him with is quest and also help identify the Blackppol photographer for the pics I've posted. I've really sung your praises to him, so am hoping for great things


His email:
MY CASE:
Not to beat about the shrubbery, can you pretty-please leverage your new RPS status to succeed where I (as Joe Public) failed (see read-receipted message (at end) which had the 4 dated attachments - the 5th, undated one, being a KISS version I cooked up later to better present the puzzle) ?
The reason I'm clutching at this particular straw is that we can't get our front gunner's service record (official Next of Kin on wrong side of family feud !), to flesh out the start of his story, and localising him in Blackpool (completely taken over as an RAF Training Wing) will help home in on which of its schools he attended there en route to his fatal navigation exercise out of 3(C)OTU on 1 Feb 1943.

Regards,
Steve

PS (DAMP RAMBLINGS):
Our cases are similar in relating to lost Wimpys but differ in my having been able to assemble a definitive timeline ...
"Thus, to summarise my reading of the evidence so far, events panned out thus:
" 11:15 - LB222 reported an oil leak at 54:42N 01:58E and turned west
" 11:35 - LB222 sent an SOS when ditching seemed imminent
" 11:40 - LB222 ditched
" 12:30 - Support services obtained a fix on LB222's position at 54:36N 00:49E
" 12:45 - LB222 confirmed that position in a second SOS"
... culminating in exactly where my cousin-1's MkVIII ditched in the North Sea (following apparent failure of both engines due to oil starvation). Yet there is still mystery enough in why 2 ASR (Air Sea Rescue) sweeps failed to find them and how 2 of the crew washed ashore just 3-5 miles apart, 303 crow-miles (maybe twice as many drift-miles following longshore currents) away, 8 weeks later on neighbouring North Frisian Islands - whilst none of the other 4 were fetched up on our E coast by its N-bound longshore drift current.
Then I found the accident report (apparently lost in the UK but a copy of which amazingly turned up in the Australian Observer's casualty file at the NAA) which additionally stated, "The crew were thoroughly instructed and practised in dinghy drill" - inferable from the timeline's 65m between ditching and confirming their position given that a Coastal Command Wimpy, eschewing heavy/bulky flotation aids, wouldn't stay afloat that long. So why didn't our ASR spot the dinghy and how did the crew become so separated ? Logic suggests something upset the proverbial apple cart, destroying the dinghy and individually pitching the crew into the drink (where I reckon the 2 washed up must have tied themselves together - that tie, quite possibly a literal [neck]tie, failing weeks later) ...
Most recently, a couple of darkly-humorous true-life wartime ditching anecdotes having made me realise I'd overlooked minefields, I found a North Sea map firmly placing my cousin-1's ditch position well inside our defensive eastern minefield and it didn't take me long to then realise the danger of a fairly-rapidly sinking Wimpy hitting & triggering a sea-mine on its way down to Davy Jones' locker. Given how close the Navy used to play their minefield location cards to their corporate chest and given the height of such explosion plumes as I've seen on film etc so likely to overturn a flimsy dinghy, I'm now trying to find out if RAF dinghy drill played safe by having crews paddle well away from their ditched aircraft ASAP - because the alternative scenario would account for an awful lot !

 

The 2 ASR sweeps the correspondent quickly dismisses were actually:

2 aircraft diverted by No.16 Group into the crash location at the time of loss

In the afternoon of the loss, 5 aircraft of 18 group and 4 Anson from No.3 (C)OTU.

Next day 25 aircraft of No.16 Group including 5 Ansons from No. 3(C)OTU.

So in all 36 aircraft searching.

Since the crew were declared missing/presumed dead in 1943 anyone can apply for the disclosure details without need for NoK.

Dinghy drill recommended staying close to the aircraft but gave the ditched crew permission to leave it when it sank.

Content of the ORB copyright TNA

Regards
Ross

 

Thanks, have passed it on

 

Well here I am, despite a bit of turbulence through the registration process , and I'd like to thank you both for your encouragement and answers so far.


My timeline above is based on Ross' pictured ORB account (you can almost see my fingerprints on it!) but resolved with disparate info from the AHB (RAF):

• "The details we have with regard to radio contact with Wellington LB222 is that at 1115hrs a message came through stating that she was returning to base with an oil leak, position at that time being 54:42N 01:58E. At 1230hrs a fix was obtained at 54:36N 00:49E, and at 1245 hrs the aircraft came through with an SOS giving their position as above. From then onwards nothing more was heard."
  (No mention of an earlier SOS, "20 minutes later", at 11:35.)
• "The aircraft was lost without trace; the last given position was 54:36N 00:49E. Two aircraft had been diverted to the last known position of Wellington LB222 but nothing was seen of the aircraft."

That may be news to you, if you hadn't already read it on my old website, but, for me, that was all done & dusted back in 2007 thanks - what's new and in want of testing now, however, is my theory that even all that ASR effort failed to bear fruit because the dinghy & crew were sadly invisible for simply having, to put it bluntly, been virtually blown to smithereens.

I'm hoping Ross can definitively cite his dinghy drill source because an RAF Museum DoRIS adviser read me a Wimpy dinghy drill this morning making no mention of either paddling anywhere or staying put (all, as he observed, rather too woolly in that respect). So, more inclined to believe Ross as probably confirming my theory (depending exactly "when", in the hardly-instant sinking process, the crew would have been galvanised into action), I'm now wondering whether (like Pilot's Notes) dinghy drill was also covered by 2-part instructions (one general and another aircraft-specific) and that, unlike DoRIS' adviser, Ross is singing from a different and altogether more relevant/general hymn sheet.

 

Glad you got it sorted Steve, why don't you introduce yourself here: http://www.ww2talk.com/forum/user-introductions/

Tell people your areas of interest and then they can start to help you

Btw have sent a response to your email

 

There are a number of points on the position and inference of ditching position that concern me from your narrative. I'll address these later.

First regarding the service record disclosure.

Rules and procedures have changed in 2009 with MoD and now, 25 years after the death of the serviceman, the same information will be disclosed to non NoK as is disclosed to NoK.

However note that this will not be a photocopy of the full service record.

Ministry of Defence | About Defence | What we do | Personnel | Service Records | Making a Request for Information held on the Personnel Records of Deceased Service Personnel

"After this period, and if it is held, in addition MOD will disclose without the requirement for Next of Kin consent: the units in which he/she served; the dates of this service and the locations of those units; the ranks in which the service was carried out and details of WWII campaign medals."

Regards
Ross

 

Regarding dinghy drill then you have made a couple of assumptions that would not have happened if drill was carried out correctly.

A number of dinghy were carried in an aircraft in different locations.

At least one in the fuselage and one externally that would inflate automatically in the event of ditching. Manual inflation was also provided.

When either was inflated it would be restrained from floating off by a lanyard fixed to the aircraft.

If possible the inflated dinghy would be brought to the lee side of the aircraft to aid getting clear of any wreckage and avoiding entaglement.

If the dinghy inflated upside down one crewmember was needed to enter the water and right it before the others boarded it from either the aircraft or the water.

It was the WOp task to bring the remaining pigeon and dinghy radio equipment from the aircraft to the dinghy.

When aboard the captain calls the roll and a search organised for any missing men. When satisfied that all are aboard then the painter is cut and the dinghy paddled clear of the sinking aircraft as soon as possible.

Any floating items of use from the aircraft are salvaged at this time.

When the dinghy has been paddled a safe distance from the aircraft, the sea drogue is thrown out to prevent the dinghy being driven away from the aircraft by the wind.

If more than one dinghy has been launched they are then tied together.

At this point the dinghy is examined for damage, inflation, chaffing etc and repairs done where necessary. Personal clothing is examined for sharp objects and ties/tight apparel etc removed.

At least one member of each dinghy is secured by a line to the dinghy as a precaution against loss in rough seas.

If seas are rough or winds chilling then the weather aprons would be rigged.

It is at this point that first aid is carried out ie after the primary duties to preserve the dinghy.

Next the plan of action would be discussed.

Included would be position in relation to land and air routes, likely air search and efficiency in prevailing weather conditions. State of w/t contact and information passed before ditching. Finally knowledge of winds, currents and tides.

The decision to remain in the vicinity of the aircraft ditching position depends on the items above but it was always preferred to have the crew stay in the position unless land or shipping was close.

Dinghy log would have been started immediately.

Signalling gear would be checked and prepared for instant use. Fluorescine sea marker would be deployed immediately and repeated at intervals.

The absence of radio contact from the dinghy, lack of sea markers, pidgeon release etc strongly suggests that the dinghy was not deployed.

Regarding the dinghy drill then this was in two parts. One specific for the aircraft type and covered crew ditching positions, location of emergency equipment, evacuation routes. The other part was common to all aircraft and covered the actions to right a dinghy, board it and subsequent actions. AP129 gave an overview but various AS/R publications/posters gave the rest for specific/general. Wet drill was carried out at OTU units.

Regards
Ross

 

Regarding the flight, you say "done & dusted back in 2007 thanks", but I think that you should revisit this with an open mind.

The ORB states that the aircraft was tasked on N3 and has the annotation "Appendix C"

Appendix C gives:
Exercise N3 of O.F.E.4 - 732 N miles - 6.40 hours
Base - 53.25N 00.27W - Cromer Knoll (53.16N 01.18E) - 55.10N 02.00E - 56.10N 00.00 - Holy Island (55.42N 01.47W) - 56 17.5N 00.30W - 56.20N 00.20E - 54.10N 01.30E - 54.12.5N 01.00W - Base

Plotting this route will give where the aircraft should have been.

Looking at the DR position when the emergency was declared of 54.42N 01.58E suggests that it was on the leg from Cromer Knoll.

Your first post gives the sequence

"Thus, to summarise my reading of the evidence so far, events panned out thus:
" 11:15 - LB222 reported an oil leak at 54:42N 01:58E and turned west
" 11:35 - LB222 sent an SOS when ditching seemed imminent
" 11:40 - LB222 ditched
" 12:30 - Support services obtained a fix on LB222's position at 54:36N 00:49E
" 12:45 - LB222 confirmed that position in a second SOS"




but the next post has

• "The details we have with regard to radio contact with Wellington LB222 is that at 1115hrs a message came through stating that she was returning to base with an oil leak, position at that time being 54:42N 01:58E. At 1230hrs a fix was obtained at 54:36N 00:49E, and at 1245 hrs the aircraft came through with an SOS giving their position as above. From then onwards nothing more was heard."
  (No mention of an earlier SOS, "20 minutes later", at 11:35.)
• "The aircraft was lost without trace; the last given position was 54:36N 00:49E. Two aircraft had been diverted to the last known position of Wellington LB222 but nothing was seen of the aircraft."

Both have a different sequence of events that do not match with each other or with common procedure.

Please consider this;

When faced with an emergency that effects the operational task of the aircraft, it was the Captain's duty to immediately use w/t to report the emergency and current position.

This he did at 11.15 hrs in DR position 54:42N 01:58E. He states returning to base what is not given is his intended landfall and return course.

As soon as he had declared an emergency he would be handled by the AS/R organisation. One of the first tasks would be to confirm his position and to suggest a return course, via one of the many approved exit/entrance gaps in the UK coastal defences.

The only fix described is at 12:30 hours in position 54:36N 00:49E.

Your first timeline gives this as 50mins after the aircraft had ditched, 1 hour 15 mins after emergency declared. Your second timeline has no mention of ditching time.

I would have expected a fix shortly after (max 5mins) emergency declared.

However if the nav DR position at 11:15 hrs is used in combination with the fix position of 12.30 hrs then validity can be checked for approximate ground speed. If this is in the order of reduced power setting of the Wellington then it would be reasonable to assume that the aircraft was airborne during the interval. It will also suggest a return track and planned landfall.

My next concern is the SOS at 12:45 hrs giving the same position as at 12:30 hrs.

Either the DR position in this message is incorrect or the aircraft has been orbiting for 15 mins. There is no inference that this message has been sent by the dinghy radio.

It was common practice that the Captain should send an SOS if possible from height before starting to ditch. This was to maximise radio range and to enable a number of fixes to be made on the signal.

Before moving to ditching stations the WOp was tasked with clamping down the transmission key to enable a constant signal to be fixed during the descent to ditch.

Neither of your time lines suggests that the DR position was fixed to become the ditching position.

Also one of the pigeons was to be air released with the DR ditching position message and time.

As far as I can see from the timelines quite a bit of info is missing and all that can be said is the time the aircraft was last heard on w/t and its last fixed position. Nowhere is a ditching position defined or estimated.

The emergency was slowly developing so plaucitity of information would not be expected.

Regards
Ross

 

I think that you should revisit this with an open mind.
You're absolutely right, of course, and I'm going to need some time in order to do so before returning with a considered reply. Plus I need to read up the FAQs on how this forum works - how to keep tabs on this thread, for a start, as the RSS feed (clearly nowhere near as comprehensive as that of another forum to which I'm subscribed) failed to alert me to your excellent replies to my last post.

Part of the problem is probably my trying to keep my input brief and to the point. Not expecting Nicola to post my 'damp ramblings', I'd only intended them as a very sketchy e-mail PS by way of comparison to her uncle's case - not very fair on you IMHO. Thus, when you pictured one of my sources [the ORB], my first thought was to balance the equation by quoting the AHB's contradictory input from my old web page on the subject. What I left out, for brevity (being unable to simply link to my currently-unhosted show & tell web page concentrating on this incident), was my illustrated resolution of all the evidence I had at my disposal then - and that's exactly what I'll need to review, esp. considering your input, before sharing it with you here in its full context. Suffice it, for now, to say that:

• I plotted everything (inc. all 10 N3 waypoints) in Google Earth (see my LB222 album)
• LB222 was heading for RAF Thornaby (not back to Cranwell)
• Headwind taken into account (along with minimum stalling, maximum and probable airspeeds) to 'window' progress (min, max & likely)
• For official source completeness, my subsequent (as of Apr 2011) 3rd one is the accident report's summary which read,
  Duration of flight since last take off: Hours "2" Minutes "30 (Approx.)"
  "This aircraft became airborne from Cranwell at 10.22 hrs. on the 1st. Feb. 1943. engaged on a Nav. exercise. At 11.15 hrs. a message came through stating that she was returning to base with an oil leak, position at that time being 54.42 N 01.58 E. At 1230 hrs. a fix was obtained, 54.36N 00.49E, and at 1245 the aircraft came through with an S.O.S. giving their position as above. From then onwards nothing more was heard. Two aircraft were diverted to their last known position, but nothing was seen."

Thanks again until then,
Steve

 

Sorry, didn't mean to cause any problems, but not knowing which part of the text was important to the info you wanted, I decided to post everything

 

I've been looking into the immediate reaction to the fix and SOS.

It would appear that No.16 Group tasked additional aircraft on the afternoon of the loss.

I have not yet trawled through No.18 Group ORBs so cannot confirm that No.18 Group supplied 5 aircraft.

1/2/43 No.143 Sqn AIR 27/978
In the afternoon two aircraft took off for an ASR job starting their search 30 miles off Flamborough Head out to 60 miles nothing sighted.

"G" Beaufighter T3427 Time up 15:15 Time Down 17:50
"W Beaufighter V8199 Time up 15:15 Time Down 17:50

1/2/43 No.254 Sqn AIR 27/1515
"W" Search in formation with W/143, G/143 and Z/236.
Time Up 15:19 Tme Down 17:50
54 23N 00 29E commenced search through position 54 40N 01 14E to 54 53N 01 01E - 54 35N 00 17E. Nothing seen

1/2/43 No.236 Sqn AIR 27/1448
Search for dinghy completed without success with one (sic) aircraft of No.143 and No.254 Sqn.

A/B North Coates in company with two Beaufighters of No.143 Sqn and one of No.254 Sqn. Parallel track search off Flamborough Head carried out. No sighting.

A/c landed at Waltham.

Ross

 

I've been looking into the immediate reaction to the fix and SOS.

Thanks for that, I recently posted my inadequate ASR findings over here in Collers' main thread but your input clearly requires that to be revised.

As for revisiting my analysis, because it obviously pays to incorporate data since arising, here's a good place to mention my having stalled for want of accurate minefield plotting data. I've so-far-inconclusively put out a feeler in 'Navy Mine Laying' and PM request to see if Drew5233 could stretch to a copy of TNA ADM 239/304 (1941 North Sea chart 736 showing position of British & German minefields) but it now occurs to me that you may already have one to suit? Otherwise it's a case of waiting for my currently-slim 'TNA to do list' to grow fat enough to warrant another visit...

Rgds, Steve

PS Nicola: Water under the bridge - out to sea by now

 

Sorry Steve but I have not had a need for a chart of the mined areas so do not have one to hand.

By 1943 the AS/R organisation was in it's stride when it came to missing aircraft searches The following is typical and was adjusted to suit specific needs.

Unlike Bomber Command aircraft Coastal Command aircraft carried a code/cypher machine during ops and so could transmit and receive secure messages.

It was this capability that enabled operational aircraft in the vicininty to be diverted. I have not been able to identify these yet as the nil result would not usually warrant a specific mention in their ORB narrative.

After a fix other Operational bases in the area would be contacted and tasked with an immediate search. CC Ops units were preferred as they had trained eyes but other training aircraft on the same exercise route were also used.

Depending on the area/distance from shore then also tasked with a "Crash Call" would be RAF HSL and RN Coastal Forces ML vessels. The HSL tended to be on standby at buoys where the Fairmile D launches were typically on patrol.

If the aircraft/crew were still missing after a night then the Operational and Training units would be supplemented by the dedicated AS/R aircraft units and GPO signals sent to shipping.

So I would look to other Operational units in addition to the dedicated AS/R squadrons to find the additional search aircraft.

As a last resort it was not unknown to broadcast a message "in clear" giving a last known position in the hope that the Luftwaffe/Kreigsmarine would undertake a rescue. A reply would be given, again "in clear" eg Dinghy with two British Sergeants picked up.

No.279 Sqn ORB AIR 27/1609
Confirms Hudsons V, B and D on patrol 2/2/43 Time Up 09.00 Time Down 12:20 No sighting.

No operational flying was undertaken by the unit on the 3rd Feb

No.280 Sqn ORB AIR 27/1611
2/2/43
"Y" - Anson AX607, "E" - Anson AX646 and "D" - Anson AX648 confirmed airborne 09:00 hrs. Parallel track search 1/4 mile visibility .

3/2/43
Ansons E and R Parallel track search. The positions quoted for the buoy and message decode to 54 00N 03 08E (NGPB 0008) and 54 07N 03 47E so this search area may not be related to the Wellington loss. Again 1/4 mile visibility is listed.

No.280 sqn ORB records a visibilty on the 1st Feb as 1/2 mile at 300 feet. This may be a contributing factor to the efficency of the searches undertaken.

A patrol is typically a generic description for a Coastal Operational flight. Search is usually paired with a descriptor of the type e.g. Parallel Track or Creeping Line Ahead.

Ross

 

Thanks again Ross,

Sorry Steve but I have not had a need for a chart of the mined areas so do not have one to hand.

Just a passing thought so no biggie. B)

But, just to underline the relevance of minefields having now refound the Oxford LAA's March 2006 newsletter, this might a good place to share one of those "darkly-humorous true-life wartime ditching anecdotes" I mentioned up front - George Wood's whole talk here reported by one of the audience with the relevant ditching episode and minefield bit suitably emphasised:

George Wood was a wireless operator and rear gunner in Hampden Bombers during the war and amazed the assembled group with his ‘matter of fact’ descriptions of life in those dangerous times.

The spring of 1939 found George, aged 18, in 612 Squadron Auxiliary Air Force based at Aberdeen before moving to Dyce as an untrained WOP (Wireless Operator). Formal WOP training took place at Yatesbury for 6 months before a 4 week course on gunnery. The Hampden bomber is unusual in that there was not room for a co-pilot and the navigator had to double up as the reserve in case of problems. The aircraft had upper and lower guns and a bomb load of 2000 lbs with a range of 1000 to 1200 miles at a cruising speed of 165mph. George trained on the Hampdens at Cottesmore before being posted to Scampton with 49 & 83 Squadrons. George was a Sergeant and operated in the lower gun position. The first mission was to have been Manheim but the weather was bad over the target and when they returned, the weather was also bad back at base! They diverted to Tangmere but overran the runway during the landing, wrecking the aircraft and completed the journey by train! One amusing occurrence George related was that the carrier pigeon they carried for emergency communication had been frightened enough to lay an egg!

Another raid near Brest was to drop sea mines along an inlet the French call a ’gillet’. 12 Hamden’s were scheduled for this operation but soon after setting out they flew into cloud. When they cleared the cloud, they found they were on their own but decided to continue to the target. With high ground to each side of the inlet, liberally defended by guns which could fire down into anything venturing along the water, and the attack profile of having to fly at 100 feet to drop the mines, George commented that it all got a bit intense.

George flew to Berlin in the Hampden, which took 8 hours and also flew to Hamburg 6 times in 5 weeks. On one of these trips they were hit by flak and one engine had to be shut down with 300 miles to go. To try and stay in the air as long as possible they threw everything they could overboard but continued to gradually descend. 500 feet over the Channel, 100 feet over the Essex coast before ‘bellying’ in.

George explained that the RAF had a counselling system for those who had such frightening experiences – they all got drunk!

In 1945 they were to fly on a mission to Dusseldorf to drop four 500 lb bombs, using an aircraft made from 3 crashed machines. Soon after take-off they realised that the aircraft would not climb properly and then one engine exploded and the propeller came off! After 2 spins they had to ditch in the Channel. They managed to get aboard the emergency dinghy and prepared for rescue. Unfortunately, their distress signal was not received but they did not realise this. George had the water container used in those days as part of the emergency rations to show us; a hot water bottle! Along with a tin of Horlicks and some chocolate they had to sit it out on one of the hottest few days of the war. After 3 days of seeing other aircraft and attempting to signal to them but with no success they realised that it may be a long time before rescue. Although the flares in the dinghy didn’t work, they did have a mirror. Food, such as it was, and water was severely rationed. They saw a Wellington bomber and tried to signal to it with the mirror but it must have been so depressing to watch it fly away without seeing them.

To pass the time they played a rather bizarre game of getting into the sea and seeing who could stay under the water the longest! During this game one of them felt something, which turned out to be a sea mine – they were in the middle of a minefield! They saw two high speed launches approaching from the east which had to be German ‘E’ boats and they thought they would be captured. The boats turned away though, probably because of the minefield.

With the choppy sea filling the dinghy with sea water, they had to keep baling but the more important situation was that the air was escaping from the tubes and also had to be re-inflated on a regular basis.

On the 6th day they ran out of water but did see three Blenheims although these also did not see them. On the 7th day a Hampden flew over and also failed to spot them.

On the 9th day another Hampden approached from the east and this time they did mange to be seen. The Hampden dropped a Lindholme Dinghy and circled them for a while. Soon after, an air sea rescue launch appeared pulled alongside them. They didn’t have the strength left to get into the launch and had to be lifted in. George understated their condition saying they were just sunburnt and dehydrated but I reckon they must have been in a seriously bad way.

George and the rest of the crew then had to undergo another evening of “counselling”!

George was posted to Upper Heyford to train more crews on the Hampden. He did take part in the 1000 bomber raids which required all the serviceable aircraft from around the country to be used. I hadn’t realised that this included Coastal Command as well as the training units.

George also trained the Americans in the signals being used on operations in Europe. He completed his time in the RAF in Rangoon after 6.5 years of service.

It was an honour to have heard George recounting just a small part of his time in the RAF and we can only thank him for defending the freedom we now enjoy and for allowing us to share his experiences. George is now 86 years old but is as lively as a youngster and a real gentleman.

Steve

 

Hi Steve,

The tale is true but Hampdens on Ops in 1945?

It happened to X3134 which took off on 30th June 1941 from Scampton.

Sgt B Woolston,
Sgt P McKay,
Sgt E B Chandler,
Sgt G Wood

"09/07/41 These four airmen were rescued by RAF launch on this day, having been adrift in their dinghy for 8 1/2 days with only 1 1/2 pints of water, 36 Horlicks tablets and a little chocolate between them. Though several aircraft passed near to them, they had only mirrors with which to signal, and eventually were sighted by a Hampden aircraft from RAF Station Waddington. All were in remarkably fit condition, though weak"
AIR27/480

Athough Sgt Wood says the E-boats were turned back by minefields Walrus AS/R treated both Allied and Axis ones with equal contempt. As did the RN in the Tees estuary.

16/01/41
Hudson P5151

P/O B J R George
Sgt A A Cross
Sgt J Chester
Sgt F Hughes

Suffered an engine failure, lost height and ditched 2.5 miles off Redcar at 11:14 hrs. The suspected location of ditching was in a minefield and was searched by naval vessels. All are commemorated on the Runnymede Memorial.

31/10/42
Whirlwind P7064

F/L J E van Shaick DFM

le Touquet. Hit by flak. Rescued by Walrus W3076, (P/O T E Hilton, F/Sgt L Seales) from a minefield in the Channel about 2 miles off Boulogne

25/11/42
Sunderland DV972

F/O D B Agate RCAF
F/Sgt B A Harper RCAF

Practice heavy take off and depth charge dropping tests. One depth charge exploded on impact with the water when being dropped. The starboard float, aileron and elevator were smashed and numerous holes punched into the hull and wings. The Sunderland was ditched into the Bristol Channel in position 210 degrees, St. Annes Head, 37 miles and began to sink rapidly at 15:30 hrs. The crew abandoned the aircraft in dinghies before it sank five minutes later. Unfortunately the Sunderland had been ditched into a minefield but this did not deter a Walrus landing to take the survivors aboard. The overloaded Walrus was unable to take off but waited until an ASR Pinnace from Padstow arrived and transferred the airmen safely.

Regards
Ross

 

The tale is true but Hampdens on Ops in 1945?

My main point was that an aircrew could be oblivious of ditching in a minefield (for whatever easily-imagined reason) and therefore imperilled by perhaps not paddling far enough away from their kite as it went down.

Beware further analysis. George's yarn may well have 'grown legs' over the decades (probably earning him a fair few free bar-room pints). The reporter may have got things a bit muddled for only hearing it once. And nowhere does it claim they ditched a Hampden on that occasion - just saw one on each of days 7 & 9. Finally, re "Sgt Wood says the E-boats were turned back by minefields", not "were" but "probably" - i.e. possibly even a 2+2=5 guess.

Steve

 

Re the rescue of the crew of Hampden X3134

My own research on 144 Squadron has brought to light an account of an air sea rescue on the 9 July 1941 which would suggest the rescue aircraft came from Hemswell and not as quoted in AIR27/480 Waddington. -

Sgt Don Whiting was an experienced Hampden pilot having flown operations with 144 Squadron since February 41. On the 9 July, he flew an air sea rescue search crossing the Wash and out along the Norfolk coast. With his own crew being rested after an eventful operation to Brest a few nights earlier, he was accompanied by a scratch crew in Hampden AD762 and accompanied in the air by two Huricanes which left him shortly before reaching his search position. He began a square search at 07.32 hours and spotted a dinghy with four aircrew on board at 08.20hrs, East of Great Yarmouth. He dropped a spare dinghy which landed inflated, followed by rations when only 20 feet above the sea and was able to observe both the dinghy and rations were collected. A fix was sent and on instruction AD762 remained overhead for four hours. Guiding the approaching Rescue Launch by repeatedly firing the colours of the day.The dinghy occupants were safely taken on board at 12.23hrs.

With the survivors safely collected AD762 returned to Hemswell landing at 01.45 hours.

Further sources including that of the pilot of X3134, Sgt B Woolston, have confirmed Hampden AD762 was indeed the Hampden that brought about their rescue.

John

 

Hi All

Have finished significant research into the death of my Uncle Pilot Officer John Isaac Hoyle RAFVR service no 188894- 426 squadron Linton on Ouse, in who was KIA on the early morning of 18/12/44 he was flying on ops over Germany with a Canadian crew and his aircraft was hit by flack. John lost his life with another crew member F/O Fox (Canadian) the rest of the Canadian crew baled out and were taken POW. Please can anyone help to obtain a photograph of the downed aircraft remains which came down at Sterkrade Germany. I have the crew report that confirm they saw the downed aircraft whilst being captured by the Germans and being marched past the crash site I am sure the German authorities must have recorded the event and taken photographs and a report written however despite extensive searches am unable to find this photographic evidence. If you are able to help in any way I can provide further information from the crew report into the incident.

Hope someone can help or point me in the right direction

Best regards

John Soulsby

 

Please, both Johns, refrain from hijacking threads to your own tangential ends in lieu of starting your own ...

Woodhead's post does, however, pose one question that resonates here - what, precisely, was meant by "return" and its variants? It's natural to expect "back from whence the traveller came" but maybe they just meant to Blighty or any of the Group's several airfields rather than anything so precise as a particular airfield. Out from Cranwell, for instance, LB222's pilot announced he was returning yet actually then headed ~40° further N toward Thornaby - this from my defunct/outdated web page ...
"westwards toward RAF Thornaby - 131m away and 21m nearer than their true RAF Cranwell base (152m away along the blue line). Presumably they were unaware of RAF Catfoss only 105m away (closest of all !). RAF North Coates belonged to another Coastal Command group (16 Group as opposed to their 17 Group) who's Air Sea Rescue base was RAF Bircham Newton."
... under a map showing North Coates (116m away) near enough its "blue line" to have acted as a safety net en route to Cranwell. I've theories why they might have done so but they're not particularly relevant here.

FTR: I've written up notes, partly covering this in response to Ross' review request, and would like to attach them ASAP but I'm having trouble squeezing them down to fit the forum's 2MB PDF limit for which, if reducing their resolution doesn't do the trick and preferring not to split them, I'll probably have to tediously transcribe up to 7 of the 8 illustrations bumping the PDF version up to 4.4MB. I uploaded it to 4shared but it seems they've recently scotched anonymous downloads one of the key reasons I began using their 'service' !!! Hence watch this space ...

Cheers, Steve

 

... and, righty ho, the wait is over - I've finally managed to satisfactorily screw my notes down small enough to get the ball rolling again ...

Rgds, Steve