heres one for you and there will no doubt be different views. there's alot of factors of why Germany lost the war. Battle of britain Hitler turning east the russian winter The U.S etc but on a scale how would you rate the effect of sabotarge i think it was a major factor as although Germany conquered most of Europe it created resistance groups in most countrys the telemark raid set them back 10 years and the amount of armour they must have lost due to de-rail ment must have been great. is it true that Germany was out produced in Tanks by russia and aircraft by britain during the war could this have been due to resistance groups in norway/poland etc
I never really feel the resistance achieved much. Despite certain succesful acts of sabotage the military or strategic impact was usually very small. I suspect they caused more trouble for their own people than benefit, debate certainly continued amongst the British CIGS as to whether they were worth supporting at all, but who could blame occupied people for resisting? I feel the myth of the resistance was largely created post-war to salve France's feelings of inadequacy about Occupation. Military Sabotage a different thing though, don't really know enough about telemark to comment on it's ultimate value but the raid on St. Nazaire strikes me as a most successful demonstration of small(ish) unit sabotage. A lot of these raids seem to have more to do with national morale and prestige at a time when victory seemed a long way off rather than any genuine strategic value.
I think Resistance Groups also caused alot of heartache to their own population in the form of reprisals. Lidice, Czechoslovakia and Oradour-sur-Gland, France for example. I'm not trying to do them down, as they were very brave men and women.
I never really feel the resistance achieved much. Despite certain succesful acts of sabotage the military or strategic impact was usually very small. I suspect they caused more trouble for their own people than benefit, debate certainly continued amongst the British CIGS as to whether they were worth supporting at all, but who could blame occupied people for resisting? I feel the myth of the resistance was largely created post-war to salve France's feelings of inadequacy about Occupation. Military Sabotage a different thing though, don't really know enough about telemark to comment on it's ultimate value but the raid on St. Nazaire strikes me as a most successful demonstration of small(ish) unit sabotage. A lot of these raids seem to have more to do with national morale and prestige at a time when victory seemed a long way off rather than any genuine strategic value. I agree. The major instances of effective sabotage were usually performed by commando units from the forces in allied territory, if possibly assisted by members of the local resistance. The tactical and strategic effect of these raids can possibly be brought into question, but the moral value cannot. The main effect of the resistance in most countries was to ensure that the Germans didn't feel too safe while in the rear areas, and ensure that troops were used to guard much of the infrastructure in these areas. Let us not forget that the troops used to guard these areas were not front line troops, lessening the effect of the resistance to the actual war effort even more. The intelligence value of the information passed back to the allies may have been very good, but this was tempered with the fact that no matter how good it was it was always treated with suspision by the handlers who had to collate it. They classed it as an unreliable source. This reduced its usefulness, which is a shame as the gathering and transmission of the intelligence cost many good lives.
I think the Yugoslavs for all their infighting gave a good account for themselves. Reprisals may have worked on some of the population, but Tito's troops were for the best living in the hills. The Germans knew what would happen if they caught out or isolated especially at night and knew the partisans would take no prisoners. If the German soldier was captured he was good as dead, if not shot on the spot. Reprisals though they took place had little effect in these instances. When the Chetnks surrended to the Allies they can't have given thought to what would happen when they were returned handed over to a Tito run/ruled Yugoslavia. As concerns SOE, I find it hard to believe that the Dutch resistance was compromised and still valuable agents were parachuted in only to captured as soon as they hit the ground and no one thought to check. A Dutchman under German duress was sending messages deliberately making errors to draw attention that something was wrong. At this end it didn't even raise the slightest suspicion. With the likes of that incompetence costing brave men and women's lives, it is small wonder in my opinion that the contributions of the brave agents in occupied Europe didn't the full credit and support they needed.
I think the Yugoslavs for all their infighting gave a good account for themselves. I completely agree. Forgot about them. A 'partisan' movement that definitely had real Military Impact. Mind you the Handschar probably hindered the Germans quite succesfully as well..and they were part of the army.
Not sure about Sabotarge, But Sabotage was an vital tactic used by both sides in WWII. From Partisan, Underground, Marquis, and Special Forces sabotage provided an important fifth column action to hinder a countries ability to wage war by tying down assets that could be used at the Front.
I never really feel the resistance achieved much. Despite certain succesful acts of sabotage the military or strategic impact was usually very small. I suspect they caused more trouble for their own people than benefit, debate certainly continued amongst the British CIGS as to whether they were worth supporting at all, but who could blame occupied people for resisting? I feel the myth of the resistance was largely created post-war to salve France's feelings of inadequacy about Occupation. Military Sabotage a different thing though, don't really know enough about telemark to comment on it's ultimate value but the raid on St. Nazaire strikes me as a most successful demonstration of small(ish) unit sabotage. A lot of these raids seem to have more to do with national morale and prestige at a time when victory seemed a long way off rather than any genuine strategic value. Terror that was a part of German antipartisan strategy was a major question for all responsible underground movements. But I wouldn’t be so skeptic about an impact of sabotage and partisan activity. Consider thousands of damaged or destroyed locomotives, platforms, trucks, engines, shells, grenades, cut communication lines, intelligence information gathered by members of resistance etc, etc. And don’t forget about precious time – something extremely important for Germany.
Sadly it was not the deed in itself, it was the knowing by the enemy that any target or infrastructure could be sabotaged and effectively resulted in huge manpower requirements to protect those areas. Trouble is it was only post '43 with the introduction of the STO in France (which swelled resistance numbers far more than any ideological wish to fight Germany) that this was really the case. Up until then the appropriate Garrison deployed for policing any occupied area was quite capable of dealing with most resistance without the need for any real drain on 'frontline quality' troops.
Terror that was a part of German antipartisan strategy was a major question for all responsible underground movements. But I wouldn’t be so skeptic about an impact of sabotage and partisan activity. Consider thousands of damaged or destroyed locomotives, platforms, trucks, engines, shells, grenades, cut communication lines, intelligence information gathered by members of resistance etc, etc. And don’t forget about precious time – something extremely important for Germany. In a similar vein to my reply to Spidge, I couldn't deny that damage was done, but I think generally it's effects were more of a boon to morale than real damage to the Enemy. As has been said, the information from resistance groups was largely seen as untrustworthy, and as for time; it is debatable that good work was done in delaying the German advance to Normandy - but the SOE, OSS etc. had a hell of a time coordinating this activity, and seem to feel much more could have been done. And do the results sit well in balance with the response they provoked from The Nazi's?
Trouble is it was only post '43 with the introduction of the STO in France (which swelled resistance numbers far more than any ideological wish to fight Germany) that this was really the case. Up until then the appropriate Garrison deployed for policing any occupied area was quite capable of dealing with most resistance without the need for any real drain on 'frontline quality' troops. Sorry Von Poop you misinterpreted as I never said "frontline troops" but "all" the areas that were required to deal with these threats "behind the lines". These had to be increasingly bolstered to keep pace and counteract this activity. As the German machine "owned" most of Europe, they could not reciprocate on an equal scale to allied areas.
As regards partisans the Russian partisans should also receive mention. Up to a quarter of a million partisans were operating in what is now Belarus. Whilst their effectiveness may be questioned they tied down numerous German formations most notably 8th SS Kavallerie Divison "Florian Geyer" which operated in the Pripet Marshes.
As an aside, does anyone know if the magnificent Nancy wake or 'White mouse' is still with us? I remember her selling her medals and the last reference I can find in a quick web-shufti is to her recieving the Honour and pension from Australia.
As an aside, does anyone know if the magnificent Nancy wake or 'White mouse' is still with us? I remember her selling her medals and the last reference I can find in a quick web-shufti is to her recieving the Honour and pension from Australia. I understand she is living in England with "accommodation and spending money" being supplied by no other than Prince Charles. She would be 91 or 92?
As regards partisans the Russian partisans should also receive mention. Up to a quarter of a million partisans were operating in what is now Belarus. Whilst their effectiveness may be questioned they tied down numerous German formations most notably 8th SS Kavallerie Divison "Florian Geyer" which operated in the Pripet Marshes. Interesting is that all of these jagdkommandos, bandenkampfverbändes and other anti-partisan forces were often supported by eastern volunteer formations.
Interesting is that all of these jagdkommandos, bandenkampfverbändes and other anti-partisan forces were often supported by eastern volunteer formations. Those were the "Hiwis," or "Hilfsfreiwilliger," who came from Soviet POWs, who signed on with the Nazis either to oppose Stalin or get themselves out of the horrific POW camps. The Germans later fielded whole battalions of "Osttruppen," mostly against the Western forces, as well as Yugoslavian guerrillas. They also created the RONA Army under General Vlasov. There's a lot more on this, but I don't have it at hand at the moment.
Trouble is it was only post '43 with the introduction of the STO in France (which swelled resistance numbers far more than any ideological wish to fight Germany) that this was really the case. Up until then the appropriate Garrison deployed for policing any occupied area was quite capable of dealing with most resistance without the need for any real drain on 'frontline quality' troops. As an example, this is a OoB of one of the biggest anti-partisan operations in Poland Sturmwind II (June 1944): 154th Reserve Division 174th Reserve Division 318th Regt. of 213th Security Division 115th Landesschutz Regiment 4th SS Police Regiment Gendarmerie Batallion 1 (mot.), elements of Kalmücken-Kavallerie-Korps, air support: 6 Ju 87 Stuka bombers and air-recon plane. 25-30 000 men (against 4500-5000 Polish and Soviet partisans). As you can see, its reserve or police forces, but from time to time, even Waffen SS units, like SS Viking, were involved.
I feel that it's the case that the reserve units made much more brutal anti-partisan units than the SS. It's the case that if you are strong, have a reputation for being a good soldier, there is less need to prove yourself when it's not really needed. The "Osttruppen" had to be more brutal to prove their loyalty and that they were as good as the SS. Like a schoolyard bully, if you have limited power you use it to the maximum in order to keep the weaker kids in control and look strong to those actually stronger than you. It's sad, but it seems to be human nature.
I realise that discussion in this thread ended years ago. However I stumbled upon it while looking for something else and feel I have some thoughts to vent. Below are my impressions of the relevance of resistance and sabotage in Nazi-occupied Norway. For the majority of the Norwegian population the German occupation was a massive provocation. A widespread resistance movement evolved in all layers of the society. Most of all it was a silent revolt against nazification. Its birth was sporadic and spontaneous, but gradually it became more organized. Small signs of unity became important. The King - Haakon 7 - was loved by his people and the use of his monogram was widespread. The vast majority of the nation was anti-nazist and the protest was so widespread and well organised that the usual nazi means of oppression, like mass arrests, were ineffective. National feelings were very deep and resulted in a hatred that evoked a strong urge for action. At an early stage contact with England was established, which enabled resistance fighters to send and receive messages by radio. SOE assisted the organisation of general resistance as well as direct actions. Vast amounts of materiel, including weapons , were transferred from the Allies, mostly dropped by air. Sabotage actions resulted in visible damage, contributing to maintaining morale. Reprisals were never used extensively, and when they were, they rather increased than decreased the willingness to resist. Most sabotage actions probably had more of a symbolic than a realistic value. The importance of symbols should however not be neglected. The famous (in Norway, at least) resistance fighter and leader Gunnar Soensteby – today the nation’s highest decorated citizen – states that the only Norwegians who made a real difference to the outcome of the war were the merchant sailors. Approximately 40 000 sailors served on merhantmen during the war. Almost 4 000 of them died. The true tactical significance of the destroyment of the heavy water plant and the stocks of heavy water remains debated. The Nazis were probably much further from developing an atomic bomb than feared by the Allies at the time. On the other hand, the SOE memorial unveiled at the Embankment on October 2009 has this to say: THE HEROES OF TELEMARK IN 1943 NORWEGIAN COMMANDOS SPONSORED BY THE SOE RAIDED THE ENEMY OCCUPIED NORSK HYDRO PLANT IN THE TELEMARK REGION OF NORWAY THIS SUCCESSFUL RAID SABOTAGED THE MACHINERY THAT WAS PRODUCING HEAVY WATER WHICH IS USED IN THE MANUFACTURE OF THE ATOMIC BOMB THANKS TO THOSE HEROIC NORWEGIAN COMMANDOS THE ENEMY’S ATTEMPT YO DEVELOP THE ATOMIC BOMB WAS THWARTED. In Oslo a group led by national icon Max Manus and others performed a number of successful sabotage actions. Some examples: By placing limpets onto German ships in the heavily guarded harbour literally under the feet of the Nazis, several ships were sunk or damaged. Of great importance for morale was the sinking of the so-called ‘slave ship’ Monte Rosa, which deported Norwegian Jews to concentration camps in Germany and brought fresh troops back. The Donau was sunk with 450 horses, hundreds of vehicles, some cannons and five companies of Mountain troops. When the airplane factory at Korsvoll was bombed, 25 Me 109 airframes and 150 engines were destroyed. An operation of considerable importance was a series of attacks performed in 1944, destroying the files of the Work Service Force. All young men had been registered there and fears were rising that they would be sent to the Eastern Front. In retrospect SOE ‘s assessment (according to MacKenzie) was that the “Oslo Group” had been the most effective saboteurs in Europe. Its members were heavily decorated by the Allies with DSOs, MCs and MMs, in addition to national decorations. SIS agents such as Oluf Reed Olsen and Gunvald Tomstad took incredible risks by establishing intelligence networks and radioing crucial information to England on outbound German convoys and other activities. In February 1945 the daring operation “Polar Bear 6 E” took place. Eleven tugs and one rescue vessel in the mouth of the Oslo Fiord were kidnapped right under the noses of the Nazis and sailed to a Swedish harbour. This effectively stopped any German sailing in the tricky waters on the East side of the Oslo Fiord for a considerable time. My conclusion Due to a number of factors, some of them closely related to Norwegian history, culture and topography, resistance in Nazi-occupied Norway was widespread and the Nazi rule never accomplished complete control of the country. Some of the sabotage actions did considerable damage to the German war machine. Above all, brave civilian sailors continuing on the convoys helped keeping the lifeline over the Atlantic open. PS I currently plan to do and post a thorough description of the Telemark sabotage, which I have so far not found on the forum. (Please provide adequate advice, anybody !) I also plan to tell the story of Gunvald Tomstad. (He joined the Norwegian Nazi Party in order to hidethe fact he was radioings intelligence for the SIS. His neighbours, convinced he was a true nazist, came very close to assassinating him.)
