Hi, In the first part of this book Operation Compass is featured. Was this an example of British commanders showing the tactical dash normally unassociated with the British army, or was it an example of a poor defensive force? Ali
Originally posted by Ali Hollington, In the first part of this book Operation Compass is featured. Was this an example of British commanders showing the tactical dash normally unassociated with the British army, or was it an example of a poor defensive force? Hello Ali, Yesterday, my response was "cut off at the pass" by the action of a hacker lacking the courage to come out from under the stone to identify him/herself. Operation Compass, under the leadership of the charismatic Lt.General Sir Richard O'Connor, was a resounding success, a superb example of derring-do. Not only did it raise the morale of the folks back home, but proved that an attacking force did not have to outnumber defenders occupying postions well prepared and and protected. Tactical dash normally unassociated with the British army? Perhaps not a characteristic of those who held senior positions in WW I, but certainly one held by leaders who followed later. Officer cadets found Sandhurst to be a tough place, with much of the discipline of the trainees being left to themselves - as one source put it: "A man's contemporaries are his fairest judges." The reasoning for this approach being a self-willed, spirited, young man could learn wisdom as he grew older (if he survived the course) whereas, a cadet lacking these traits could not learn the "dash that won battles." Cheers, Gerry
Tactical dash normally unassociated with the British army Just trying to start the debate-I feel that Op Compass is an excellent example of rapid exploitation of the tactical situation. attacking force did not have to outnumber defenders occupying postions I have been reading the official history's coverage of Op Compass and this really shines through, engaging the main defences and then probing for and then bashing in through weak spots. In the official history it also notes the sometimes determined defence of the Italian troops, counter to the perception of them being low rate troops. So linking the above together, I feel that Op Compass was an amazing example of offensive action, possible not so well know today as the public conciencse much prefers costly defeats or at least a near run thing. Ali
The British Empire troops in Egypt -- 7th Armoured, 4th Indian, et al., and soon after the 6th Australians, included some of the finest troops of their respective nations. The 7th had trained and served for years in Egypt, and took desert warfare seriously. The 4th Indian and 6th Australians were the first divisions sent by both countries into battle, and they included both nations' veteran outfits. All three had high morale, sound training, and took subjects like maintenance and logistics seriously. It's important to note that 4th Indian soon went to East Africa, 6th Australian to Greece, and 7th Armored was out of the game after the Compass campaign due to exhaustion of men and equipment. When Rommel hit Libya, he went through 2nd Armored, a new outfit. Shortly after that, O'Connor was captured, along with Neame. When 7th Armored was re-committed for Brevity and Battleaxe, the division's Matilda tanks ran into superior German technology (88mm guns) tactics (combined arms kampfgruppes) and leadership (Rommel).
I must confess to owning this book but never having the time to read it through, but this gives me a good reason, so if nobody minds I will kick this book off in the next day or so and provide my own input as i work through it
Originally posted by Lee Wisener@Apr 28 2005, 12:53 PM Going to get into this tonight, I am doing well so far, I am on page 1 [post=33694]Quoted post[/post] You'll be glad you did! I'm enjoying the book very much myself, thanks to Gerry's kindness. Since this is a part of the war that I have read very little about to date, much of this info is new to me. Regarding Operation Compass, it certainly started out as well as anyone could have hoped. Inflitrating the Italian lines at SidiBarrani and hooking behind them for the kill was a master stroke, and it must have been quite a blow to the morale of the overconfident Italians. Within a month, the Australians were in Tobruk, which would later become a "sort of lodestone" of the North African campaign, as Auchinlek would later put it. A month beyond that, the British had smashed the Italians in the Beda Fomm ambush. That was another impressive feat of arms, with the 7th Armored passing behind the Green Mountains to set up the ambush as the Aussies chased the Italians into the trap. (I have a hard time getting my brain around 130,000 prisoners taken in one action). Overall, Compass was an almost unqualified success, IMHO. It was a brilliant example of tactical maneuver and planning, something the British would be sorely lacking later in the campaign against Rommel's thrusts. The one question in my mind that prevents it from being an utter success is the failure to drive on & capture all of Libya before Rommel could prepare a counterstrike. However, this is largely not the fault of O'Connor, who's troops were drained off for other fronts, forcing him into a holding action.
Still with the italians at the moment, but I must say a great read so far, I did not realise that the Italians were so badly armed and that Mussolini was such a poor or should I say cowardly leader. Or at least thats how I am reading it at the moment.
Originally posted by Lee Wisener@May 3 2005, 04:41 PM Still with the italians at the moment, but I must say a great read so far, I did not realise that the Italians were so badly armed and that Mussolini was such a poor or should I say cowardly leader. Or at least thats how I am reading it at the moment. [post=33922]Quoted post[/post] Mussolini was not a good war leader. When major decisions had to be taken, he was busy arranging how he would be covered in next day's newspapers, deciding when Roman cops would shift to summer uniforms, or with his mistress Claretta Petacci. He had very little understanding of what was really going on. But he was a shrewd enough politician to put himself in power and stay there.
Could the British have continued their advance if troops hadn't been diverted elsewhere? I remember seeing O'Connor being interviewed in a documentary and he seemed confident they could of. Incidently-time to move onto the next part-unless I'm the only one slacking Ali
Originally posted by Ali Hollington@May 5 2005, 03:38 PM Could the British have continued their advance if troops hadn't been diverted elsewhere? I remember seeing O'Connor being interviewed in a documentary and he seemed confident they could of. Incidently-time to move onto the next part-unless I'm the only one slacking Ali [post=34087]Quoted post[/post] They would have had logistical problems in propelling the advance all the way to Tunisia, but had O'Connor and his command team not been pulled out of Libya, 2nd Armored would have done better in its first action against Rommel. 7th Armored was worn out from the advance and needed to rebuild its losses. 6th Australian needed a break, too. 4th Indian was in East Africa. However, if 6th Australian and 2nd New Zealand not been sent to Greece, they would have been a more formidable opponent to Rommel than 2nd Armored. However, 9th Australian did hold Tobruk in its first action.
Originally posted by nolanbuc+Apr 30 2005, 04:46 AM-->(nolanbuc @ Apr 30 2005, 04:46 AM)</div><div class='quotemain'><!--QuoteBegin-Lee Wisener@Apr 28 2005, 12:53 PM Going to get into this tonight, I am doing well so far, I am on page 1 [post=33694]Quoted post[/post] You'll be glad you did! I'm enjoying the book very much myself, thanks to Gerry's kindness. Since this is a part of the war that I have read very little about to date, much of this info is new to me. Regarding Operation Compass, it certainly started out as well as anyone could have hoped. Inflitrating the Italian lines at SidiBarrani and hooking behind them for the kill was a master stroke, and it must have been quite a blow to the morale of the overconfident Italians. Within a month, the Australians were in Tobruk, which would later become a "sort of lodestone" of the North African campaign, as Auchinlek would later put it. A month beyond that, the British had smashed the Italians in the Beda Fomm ambush. That was another impressive feat of arms, with the 7th Armored passing behind the Green Mountains to set up the ambush as the Aussies chased the Italians into the trap. (I have a hard time getting my brain around 130,000 prisoners taken in one action). Overall, Compass was an almost unqualified success, IMHO. It was a brilliant example of tactical maneuver and planning, something the British would be sorely lacking later in the campaign against Rommel's thrusts. The one question in my mind that prevents it from being an utter success is the failure to drive on & capture all of Libya before Rommel could prepare a counterstrike. However, this is largely not the fault of O'Connor, who's troops were drained off for other fronts, forcing him into a holding action. [post=33793]Quoted post[/post] [/b]Agreed. Libya and Tunisia were at Wavell's mercy and then Churchill drained off forces to defend Greece and Crete. The British certainly kicked a$$ at Beda Fomm, their forces although numerically inferior were far superior to the Italians. Mussolini has a lot to answer for, having failed miserably to equip his army properly. The Italians get a lot of flak about being inferior as an army but I cant help thinking that if they were properly equipped and motivated they would have put up a better showing than they did. their Elite Divisions such as the Ariete Division gained a god reputation as excellent fighters, albeit with terribly bad weaponry. The book is a fascinating read. I have been through it once already and intend to read it again, now I know people here are discussing it.
