In the 1960s Blaxland wrote a fine account of the major cuts then called The Regiments Depart - ever since the Army, Navy, and Air Force seem to be perishing slowly by a thousand cuts - each of which will enable better equipment, more capability, more flexibility - ignoring the notion that armies take casualties, equipment takes time to replace as do replacements for casualties in a professional Defence Force (or any force for that matter). My thoughts on the matter are that many politicians and civil servants have no clue on Defence matters and that many of the military leaders are now bureaucrats rather than leaders.
Kings Royal Rifle Corps Durham Light Infantry Ox & Bucks LI Kings Own Yorkshire Light Infantry DCLI HLI Royal Green Jackets Northumberland Fusiliers Royal Ulster Rifles Manchester Regiment Royal Sussex Regiment Lancashire Fusiliers The Middlesex Regiment 10th Hussars 11th Hussars 17th/21st Lancers To name but a few
It was Einstein who said that WW4 would be fought with sticks and stones - but the present day politicians appear to want the WW3 to be fought in the same way no doubt they will man the ramparts when our enemies consider how weak we have become..... Cheers
Most of the Highland regiments are no longer single entities. All in together now as the the Highlanders.
It was always thus, the Cardwell reforms of the 19th century . In some respects the changes were essential, it was oft said the British army equipped and trained for the last war it fought,not any likely future conflict. We sent an army into the field in 1914 that had been 'colonial policemen' they had neglected to train in the military and scientific approach that the Prussian military colleges had done. At any wars end units unlikely to be required were unceremoniously disbanded. Warfare and sentiment? Maybe and yes there is a place for KAPE - keeping the army in the public eye with regional links. The failure of politicians to grasp that manpower and materiel on day one (as per the 'just in time theory' buy and train when required) is not as day two and on. The leaner meaner fighting machine that came about in my time has a ring that politicians like - more commitments - no problem we have the machine! 1979 BAOR - Munster the 'moritorium' a mechanized infantry battalion, we were allowed enough fuel to take three AFV432 a mile to the wash point - three vehicles per Coy per week! Ammunition? No chance - the rumour had it that the CSMIM Company Sergeant Major in charge of Musketry had a live 84mm Carl Gustav round and the joke was raffle tickets were on sale in the mess. One Jock when asked what steps he would take in the event of Ivan attacking - replied feckin great big uns to the Ostend ferry.
Perhaps someone on the forum could oblige us with a list of famous regiments that have already bit the dust ? May I start you off ? 4th Queen's Own Hussars Ron Kings Royal Rifle Corps Durham Light Infantry Ox & Bucks LI Kings Own Yorkshire Light Infantry DCLI HLI Royal Green Jackets Northumberland Fusiliers Royal Ulster Rifles Manchester Regiment Royal Sussex Regiment Lancashire Fusiliers The Middlesex Regiment 10th Hussars 11th Hussars 17th/21st Lancers To name but a few It's much easier to make a list of those which are still intact. In fact all regiments, except Guards and (ironically the last one created) the Parachute Regiment were amalgamated at least once during the history. Two of them choose disbandment instead: the Cameronians and the York & Lancaster Regiment.
Indeed the Cameronian's did choose disbandment - a friend who is on the disbandment film( Picquet Officer- Lt Jeremy Cox)became a Major Scots Guards, said to me - 'there was a choice, there were some who wanted disbandment, there was a way back from disbandment not from amalgamation'. The regular battalion disbanded the TA badged were to survive and a battalion disbanded goes into suspended animation (and could be reintstated), then later is struck out of the army list. It was not to be - but if they did gamble it was worth a shot. The very name Ox and Bucks - the result of an earlier marriage. Royal Green Jackets became a regiment from a brigade 1960s
Almost all of these 'historic' regiments are themselves the creations of the late nineteenth century reform movement, and exactly the same complaints were made at the time - that the Army would never survive such a monstrous gutting of tradition, etc. etc. Fifty years from now, when the amalgamated regiments of today are themselves reamalgamated, the Telegraph will be be complaining about exactly the same thing, using exactly the same tired old canards. Perhaps they can dust off this article to save time ... Best, Alan
My point is that we are reaching a point where all the services have been cut to breaking point, equipment that could have been mothballed and used by second line reserves sold off for a pittance, and we no longer have the industrial base to rearm as in the 1930s and early 40s. Our elite units such as the Airborne, Marine Commandos and SF can leave and earn a much higher salary as 'contractors' - I imagine in 10 - 20 years it will be the 1st Bn Group 4 and the 5th Bn Securicor that respond to oversea commitments, with the Brigade of Guards being sponsored by the BBC - unless Channel 4 put in a higher bid for the TV Rights. The Navy is now smaller than it has ever been - I believe since Henry VIII commissioned the Mary Rose. The RAF has lost all strategic depth and struggles to cope with the Libyan commitment.
10 years hence - Armee Europeenne! Back in the late 70s the Guards Division had two authors from the USA staying with each of the regiments in turn. One wrote 'The Guards are an anachronism - one foot planted firmly in the past, yet willing to embrace modern technology with equal desire to achieve professionalism'.I think that could have been said about many regiments. Who would in these times form a Parachute regiment if it was not already on the orbat? It will never be used in the form envisaged. An airborne brigade - fine, but keeping the regiment?
There's a legitimate, even pressing argument to be had about manpower and mission in the modern Army; the problem comes when these genuine issues are muddled by a spurious appeal to 'tradition.' One thing the British Army has been brilliantly successful in doing over the last three hundred years is continually reinventing itself whilst giving the impression that nothing has ever changed. It's fine and useful to respect that myth so long as one realizes that it is, at the end of the day, a myth. Best, Alan
There's a legitimate, even pressing argument to be had about manpower and mission in the modern Army; the problem comes when these genuine issues are muddled by a spurious appeal to 'tradition.' One thing the British Army has been brilliantly successful in doing over the last three hundred years is continually reinventing itself whilst giving the impression that nothing has ever changed. It's fine and useful to respect that myth so long as one realizes that it is, at the end of the day, a myth. Best, Alan That's hitting the nail right on the head, Alan. Are the British Armed Forces fit for purpose though? And if the answer is 'yes', what is the purpose they are fit for? Best, Steve.
The Army 'modernised' itself with new personnel practices which means that certain training standards have to be reached at stages through a serviceman's career, however the one thing not put into this equation was operational commitments - thus an officer or soldier whose unit has had more than it's share of operational deployments can begin to fall through the cracks. Again showing my age - when I joined in the 1960s the majority of SNCOs were WWII veterans - many of whom had been in Korea, Suez, Malaya, Aden etc. Most by then would have been in their late 40s age wise - today it is not out of the ordinary to have an RSM in his 30s prior to him being commissioned and sent on to eith be QM or on an ERE posting. Likewise even into the 1970s each unit would have a hard-core of 'old-sweats' usually Lcpls and Cpls who were hanging in there for their 22 year pension. The Regiment was much more akin to an extended family than it is today - and in some ways the richer for the old ways.
Browsing Hansard for 'Regimental System' is quite amusing. Nothing new under the sun... These aren't specifically on subject, as they focus on MOs and the formation of their own Corps, but they do perhaps show that 'things were better in my day' is hardly a new military sentiment, and that reorganisation has always been an ongoing theme... and bone of contention: I think it unfortunate that he could not have put an end to the perpetual changes in the duties of the Army Medical Officers, and that he has been unable to sec his way to make some return to the old regimental system with the destruction of which has disappeared so much of the domestic comfort, peace, and happiness of the Army Medical Officers. VOLUNTEER EQUIPMENTS. (Hansard, 13 March 1890) My hon. Friend, followed in this by some other Members, hankers after the old regimental system. Why, Sir, I was myself a subordinate officer of the War Department when the regimental system was put an end to, and the general hospital system adopted instead, and I very well remember at that time that, although it was most distasteful to regimental officers, and to those who were imbued with old traditions—and very naturally so—yet I think I am right in saying that it had the cordial support of the more progressive and more modern-idead of the officers of the Army ARMY ESTIMATES, 1893–4. (Hansard, 27 June 1893) I very much doubt whether it would be possible now to introduce the old regimental system. Moreover, the Financial Secretary to the War Office will no doubt tell us that to return to the old regimental system would cost at least £55,000. Whether the change would be worth that I do not know. I tender to the noble Marquess, the Secretary of State for War, my cordial thanks for having brought about this change, which. I hope will be of great benefit to the Service at large, and to the medical profession in particular. ARMY ESTIMATES, 1899–1900. (Hansard, 21 April 1899)
The abundance of old sweats - 'the in my day brigade' could and did hinder training and modernization the belief that active service meant experienced, it often meant that units had not kept current with other threats .The time promoted old hands, some of whom were not the best might have had a tale or two. Resentment - a young keen NCO who could run rings around them, both physically and in modern techniques would be treated with contempt - 'what have you done?' The point was it was what he was going to do that was important. Montgomery as a company commander and then CO would for the rest of his life be shunned by association members - he had implemented a system of promotion by ability, those who lost out on time promotion never forgave him. 1976 we had a 28 year old Company Sergeant Major (SG) an ex junior Gdsm, an A courser (always got an A) a superb soldier, who went on to become RSM and then special regular commission, his enthusiasm and approach got the very best out of the company and battalion There is of course a place for old soldiers, I did staff jobs in my later years luckily I am one who has an open mind - but just as we pick the young we must ensure we pick the best of the old. The army has to adapt, learn from past experience yes, but not rely on it. To call the recent cuts a defence review is laughable, when politicians say it is only fair that all must shoulder their share of the cuts - fair? It should be cuts that retain capabilty not some playground mentality of 'its not fair he got away with it!'
- the difference between the historical cuts even back in the 1970s and today is that the majority of MPs had seen some form of military service as a 'rite of passage' in the days of Empire and expansion, followed by two World Wars which really upset the military status-quo - ie Lt Cols at 24 years old etc. When they went on to other careers or into politics they had a grasp of how the military amchine works - which very few of today's political leadership do. I know democracy is a blunt instrument and an imperfect one but an answer might be that a pre-requisite for minsiterial rank in the Defence Ministries should be some prior military service same to sit on the defence sub-committees.
I believe that the following problems greatly affect the military establishment at the moment: 1. Political Correctness - not seen as rather friendly spending on the military. 2. Capability Gap - we will struggle to scale our forces for any intervention of any scale, leaving us with glaring holes in the armed forces 3. Barely any teeth - absolutely stonking great tail 4. Ineptitude of Higher Command - I am pretty convinced that most politicians and Generals are exceptionally niave over the realterm implications of technology on warfare 5. Politicisation of Generals - to the level where asserting themselves kills of future careers 6. The prominence of BAE in defence acquisition and offering former Officers jobs 7. Lack of foresight to anticipate casualties to a small force and the effect that this will have upon quality and morale 8. Age: Far too many high ranking officers are too old to keep up with technological innovations and engage effectively in discussions regarding their realistic use - hence they get sold down the river by tech savvy Defence salesmen and give us wonderful lemons.
- the difference between the historical cuts even back in the 1970s and today is that the majority of MPs had seen some form of military service as a 'rite of passage' in the days of Empire and expansion, followed by two World Wars which really upset the military status-quo - ie Lt Cols at 24 years old etc. When they went on to other careers or into politics they had a grasp of how the military amchine works - which very few of today's political leadership do. Both claims are interesting, but I suspect dubious. So far as military experience goes, it's important to remember that the two or three generations born between about 1890 and 1940 were highly unusual in British history, in that they experienced mass conscription. The situation we're living in now, when few civilians have any direct experience of military life, is the norm, not the exception. Even within the 1890-1940 cohorts, it's debatable whether many MPs really learned much about "how the military machine works" from their brief exposure to its lower ranks. It's true that there was - and is - a long tradition of patrician adolescents serving in the Brigade of Guards for a few years after public school, but whether the 'lessons' they learned from that subaltern experience were functional ones in the long run is open to question. (Indeed, that's the problem with vocational experience - you will learn lessons, to be sure. But are they the right lessons?) Certainly the record of secretary-of-states for war doesn't suggest any clear moral. Perhaps the single best reformer of the War Office in the Twentieth Century was Leslie Hore-Belisha, who had very limited military experience of his own (a few years in the wartime Army Service Corps) and who was despised by the military mandarins for it. Best, Alan
Alan perhaps the most popular Defence Secretary since WWII was Jim Callaghan who had served in the Navy during WWII - its not the depth of knowledge that counts its the basic understanding of what it is like to serve, and what the military and navy require to function, hence Hore-Belisha being a success.
