Operation Pilgrim

Discussion in 'The Brigade of Guards' started by Phaethon, Jan 10, 2010.

  1. Phaethon

    Phaethon Historian

    MOST SECRET
    P.J.1 (X)

    COPY NO………..


    Revised to 20th September 1941



    OPERATION “PILGRIM”


    GENERAL OUTLINE OF OPERATION


    (NAVAL AND MILITARY INSTRUCTION NO.1)


    (Short Title P.J.1 (X)


    APPENDICIES

    (A) Orders –System
    (b) List of Naval, Military and Air Orders.
    (C) List of Charts and Maps.
    (D) Naval Forces, Transports etc.
    (E) Military Order of Battle.
    (F) Air Forces.
    (G) Position and naming of beaches.
    (H) Code names and Code words.
    (J) Evacuation of casualties.

    TIME.

    ALL times are Zone + 1

    OBJECT.

    1. To capture and hold for our own use the island of GRAND CANARY with the harbour at LA LUZ and aerodrome at GANDO.

    POLICY.

    2. Maximum opposition to the assault is assumed and although hostilities between GREAT BRITAIN AND SPAIN may not have actually started, a state of affairs is presumed to exist to warrant BRITISH forces being the first to open fire.

    INFORMATION.

    3. Will be issued separately.


    INTENTION.

    4. The intention is to make the approaches to the island under cover of such darkness as may exist, and open the assault by air attack on the enemy aerodromes with the object of destroying the enemy’s air forces on the ground. Then to reconnoitre other suspected landing grounds and attack any air forces sighted.

    As soon as their is sufficient light to distinguish objects ashore from the sea, to engage enemy shore defences with naval forces.

    (a) GANDO BAY with the object of capturing the aerodrome and of neutralising the defences so as to enable a force to pass through towards LAS PALMAS.

    (b) ARINAGA BAY (Lat. 27˚ 52’ N, Long. 15˚ 22’W) with the object of taking the defences at GANDO in the rear.

    5. Naval and air bombardment OR demonstration on or before LA LUZ and SANTA CRUZ, TENERIFE, will be carried out on the day of D.1 accompanied by demands for capitulation.

    6. During the dark period of the ensuing night D.1-D.2 an assault will be delivered on LA LUZ Harbour with the object of capturing the harbour and town (if not already captured) in accordance with P.N.0.5.

    COMMAND.

    7. The Naval Commander (Rear-Admiral L.H.K. Hamilton, D.S.O.) and the Military commander (lieutenant-General the Hon. H.R.L.G Alexander, C.B., C.S.I., D.S.O., M.C.) Will exercise joint command in accordance with the manual of Combined Operations, Chapter IV, paragraph 1 (i).

    8. Rear-Admiral Hamilton will be known as the Flag Officer Commanding ‘P’ (F.O. Force ‘P’) and Lieutenant-General Alexander as General Officer Commanding Force 110 (G.O.C. Force 110).

    9. Commodore G.L. Warren, who will be accommodates in KARANJA, will carry out the duties of Senior Naval Officer Landing (S.N.O.L) at GANDO on arrival.

    10. Commodore R.M. Goldsmith, D.S.O., R.N.R., who will be accommodated in P.S.2 …………., will act as Liaison Officer between Naval Authorities and Masters of troopships prior to sailing, consulting Commodore Warren as necessary. He will carry out the duties of Commodore of the convoy on passage.

    11. (a) Group Captain O.R. Gayford, C.B.E., D.F.C., A.F.C, R.A.F, is appointed as commander of the Royal Air Force allotted to the expedition. In conjunction with the Naval Air Arm Staff Officer he is responsible for advising the Naval and Military Commanders on the employment of aircraft, participating in the early stages of the operation while such aircraft are carrier-borne.

    When the aerodrome at GANDO has been secured it will become an R.A.F . Station with Group Captain Gayford as Commanding Officer. All aircraft operating from the station, whether R.A.F. or Naval, and ancillary units, will come under his command, during the operation. They will revert to the operational control of the Military Commander when the operation is complete.

    PRELIMINARY CONCENTRATION.

    12. Will be made under separate Orders.

    SAILING AND PASSAGE.

    13. Separate orders will be issued.

    NAVIGATIONAL AID.

    14. A submarine will be stationed off the island prior to the operation for reconnaissance duties and will act as a navigational aid off GANDO if navigational lights are extinguished.

    OUTLINE PLAN

    15. Owing to the uncertainty regarding conditions of sea and swell, and because the fuel and water situation does not permit of any lengthy postponement of the operation, it is necessary to base the plan on rough weather conditions. Commanding Officers must, however, be prepared to lower landing craft containing the first flights at sea if presented with a flat calm on the morning of the assault.

    16. The day on which the assault is made will be known as D.1, the following day as D.2. and so on. The day previous to D.1. will be D-1.

    17. Zero Hour, which will NOT necessarily be common to the two main ladings (GANDO and ARINAGA), will be the times at which the leading troops reach the beach.

    AIR BOMBARDMENT OF GANDO AND LOS RODEOS, TENERIF.

    18. The Senior Officer Aircraft Carriers will arrange for three striking forces to be available to attack the following targets:

    (a) GANDO Aerodrome, GRAND CANARY; Lat 27˚ 56’ N., Long 15˚ 21’W.
    (b) LOS RODEOS “ , TENERIFE; Lat. 28˚ 29’ N., Long 16˚ 21’ W.

    As soon as it is light enough to identify the targets with the object of destroying enemy aircraft on the ground.

    (c) Coastal Batteries at GANDO and ARINAGA, if these engage the assault ships after the naval bombardment.

    APPROACH.

    19. (a) Warships will approach the coast to their bombarding positions, which will be laid down in Naval (Bombardment) orders, arriving in their position 15 minutes before sunrise on D.1.

    (b) QUEEN EMMA will accompany the Battleship.

    (c) Ships of the Convoy under S.N.O.L will follow 4 miles astern of the warships, with destroyers ready to screen the convoy by smoke should fire be directed at it,

    (d) The Warships will continue covering fire as the convoy approached.


    20. During the approach of the convoy 6 minesweepers are to sweep and dan a channel into the Bay from the S.E. followed by the Battleship. A proportion will then be detached to sweep the anchorage.

    21. Four destroyers are then to enter GANDO BAY and take up positions for close support. They will be closely followed by infantry assault ships, M.L.C. Carriers, M.T ships and two Maracaibos. The Maricaibos will beach on their leading marks unless otherwise ordered by the joint commanders. QUEEN EMMA is to be in readiness to land No. 9 Commando when ordered.



    ASSAULT AT GANDO BAY.

    22. The assault will be made by R.M. Division with under command 29 infantry brigade.

    For details of beaches see Appendix ‘G’

    The Decision to start landing will be made by the joint commanders.

    23.(a) The R.M. division will capture GREEN, WHITE and RED Beaches and GANDO Aerodrome and will establish a bridgehead to cover the landing places. If conditions are favourable No.9 Commando will be landed at ‘A’ Beach at Zero and attack C.D. guns and GANDO aerodrome from the north.

    (b) If conditions at ‘A’ Beach are not favourable, and an opportunity presents itself during the bombardment, No. 9 commando will be landed at ‘B’ Beach before zero and will capture the coast defence guns.

    (c) One Infantry Brigade under command R.M. Division will land behind the assaulting force, and, with A.F.Vs and artillery, will advance north to capture LAS PALMAS.

    24. (a) Warships, 1 cruiser and 4 destroyers will approach the coast to their bombarding positions, which will be laid down in Naval (Bombardment) orders, arriving in their positions 15 minutes before sunrise on D.1.

    (b) The Cruiser will engage ARINAGA Battery and MONTE ARINAGA

    (c) The transports and M.T. ships under C.O. PRINCESS BEATRIX will follow in 4 miles astern of the inshore destroyers, escorted by two destroyers ready to screen the convoy by smoke should fire be directed at it.

    (d) The warships will continue covering fire as the convoy approaches.

    25. The transports and M.T. ships will close the Bay and Land.

    26. When the landing begins the 2 escorting destroyers will take up a position south of ARINAGA BAY to support the left flank of the brigade.

    27. The assault will be made by 1 Guards’ brigade group.

    28. The decision to start landing will be made by commander 1 Gds. Bde. and S.N.O.L ARINAGA, who will reconnoitre the Beach from one of the inshore destroyers.

    29. 1 Guards’ Brigade will capture BLUE beach and the C.D. Battery west of ARINAGA Lighthouse. It will then advance rapidly N.E. and N. to take in reverse any enemy holding out opposite GANDO.

    FLOATING RESERVE.

    30. 36 Infantry Brigade Group and certain units and details of other formations will be in floating reserve in the offing until ordered to GANDO BAY.

    NAVAL SUPPORTING FIRE

    31. Details will be shown in separate orders,

    NAVAL AIRCRAFT

    32. Aircraft carriers will operate in the South and East of GRAND CANARY 30-50 miles from land.

    33. Naval aircraft will be prepared to carry out the following duties during the operation:-

    (a) Bomber striking force.
    (b) Fighter protection.
    (c) A/S and general reconnaissance with special attention to FUERTEVENTURA and LANZAROTTE in view of their possible use as submarine and landing grounds.
    (d) Attack on C.D. guns covering the anchorage.
    (e) Tactical reconnaissance of the island from first light.
    (f) Laying of smoke screens
    (g) Spotting.

    34. (a) 232 Fighter squadron (Hurricanes) will be in Aircraft Carriers 3………….. and 4………….. and from sunrise will be at 30 minutes’ notice to fly off and carry out on sortie prior to landing on GANDO aerodrome.

    (b) From 0600 on D.1 1420 Flight (12 Blehneim aircraft) at BATHURST will be at one hour’s notice to fly to GANDO aerodrome.

    BEACH DEVELOPMENT

    35. The intention is to develop GANDO and ARINAGA Beaches initially for the maintenance of the force landing at each.

    As soon as LA LUZ and LAS PALMAS have been captured at the port is in working order, the development of the Beaches is to be discontinued.

    ASSAULT AT LA LUZ

    36. If LA LUZ has not been already captured an assault will be made on the harbour during the dark period of the ensuing night D.1/D.2 by S.S. Bde., supported if necessary by fire from H.M. ships.

    The warships detailed will cover the approach and entry into the harbour and, if any opposition is encountered, will carry out an intensive and close range bombardment to neutralise the defences during the period of entry.

    Ships will enter the harbour, preceded by minesweepers, in the following order and berth as shewn:-

    Destroyers R ………….. 12 Commando Berthing at CATALINA MOLE.
    S……………

    ULSTER MONARCH 2 commando Northern end of OLD BREAKWATER

    ROYAL ULSTERMAN 1 & 3 Commando COMMERCIAL MOLE South

    ROYAL SCOTSMAN 4 commando COMMERCIAL MOLE north

    In addition –
    QUEEN EMMA, having re-embarked 9 Commando from GANDO, anchors in OUTER HARBOUR.

    INTER COMMUNICATION

    37. Beach signal stations will be established on all Beaches, one of which will be developed later into a Main Beach signal station.

    Another Main Beach Signal Station will be established after the assault at LA LUZ.

    SECURITY.

    38. Separate instructions will be issued.

    H.R. ALEXANDER
    LIUTENANT-GENERAL

    L.H.K HAMILTION
    REAR-ADMIRAL

    (DISTRIBUTED AS ISSUED SEPERATELY)

    http://www.ww2talk.com/forum/picture.php?albumid=82&pictureid=1662
     
    Za Rodinu, Smudger Jnr and Owen like this.
  2. Phaethon

    Phaethon Historian

    IMHO one of the many things that makes this operation absolutely fascinating was the proposed use of the royal navy carriers (4 carriers in total) to provide air cover for the operation. Given the nature of the uboat centric battle of the atlantic war the ww2 RN had a bit of a reputation of being a one trick horse (Swordfish) in the rest of the worlds eyes, but the fully integrated nature of this truly combined operation really shows up what the navy was theoretically capable of. Note as well the close range bombardement of LUZ defences if the enemy had still not surrendered by D.1/D.2: a real show of strength by the RN, designed to intimidate the enemy. Also note that the only areodrome on the canary island, not the port, was the real objective. It was very obvious where the power to control the islands lay.

    Another really interesting nature of the operation was the stance towards spain. This is version P.J.1 (x) of the operation, from the 29th of september. The update of the original plan which was issued on the 20th of september. If I can figure out a way to post on here without reducing the size, i'll put the original P.J.1 on and you can compare them.

    To show you what I mean in the mean time, here's the text from the original P.J.1:

    "POLICY:

    2.A state of war with SPAIN may not exist at the time of operation, but a maximum opposition to the assault is assumed.

    3. If hostilities have not actually commenced, political considerations render it desirable that British forces should not be the first to fire."

    and here's the same bit from the newer version, just a few days later:

    "POLICY:
    2. Maximum opposition to the assault is assumed and although hostilities between GREAT BRITAIN AND SPAIN may not have actually started, a state of affairs is presumed to exist to warrant BRITISH forces being the first to open fire."

    How close did operation Pilgrim come to fruition? Well on the 1st sept 1941, force 110 was on 21 days notice to leave. Prior to this it was cancelled at the start of August, on the 10th of august operation LEAPFROG was conducted: a full dress rehersal for Pilgrim in the Orkneys.
     
  3. idler

    idler GeneralList

    Haven't actually read it all yet, but it looks like a 'well done' and 'thanks' will be in order.

    And everybody thinks we were still too traumatised by Gallipoli to even consider this sort of thing :rolleyes:
     
  4. Owen

    Owen -- --- -.. MOD

    Superb find .
    Didn't U-Boats used to call into the Canaries to resupply or is that a myth?
     
  5. Smudger Jnr

    Smudger Jnr Our Man in Berlin

    Yes a great find and post.

    Regards
    Tom
     
  6. Drew5233

    Drew5233 #FuturePilot 1940 Obsessive

    Excellent work !

    I wonder how heavily defended the islands were being Spainish.
     
  7. wtid45

    wtid45 Very Senior Member

    Fascinating stuff, that policy change is really amazing and makes you wonder what Spains entry into the war would of meant.
     
  8. Phaethon

    Phaethon Historian

    Excellent work !

    I wonder how heavily defended the islands were being Spainish.

    Of of the really great bits about this report is that I have the Spanish troop count; as well as lost of other bits of information in the intelligence report. Really interesting stuff, especially about the presence of Gestapo on the island (read what you will into that!!!!). Trouble is, it's too big to type up. So i'm going to give it a go posting it here, if this doesn't work I may need some help from some of you techy types.

    page 1

    Nope, that doesn't work. I have 10 pages here; so if anyone has any suggestions how I can get them up here and readable I'd really appreciate it.
     
  9. Drew5233

    Drew5233 #FuturePilot 1940 Obsessive

    Some food for thought questions as I read through the post:

    1. Does Alexander mention this operation in his Bio?

    2. Was the invasion to be launched from West Africa?

    3. Would Spain not attack Gib if the British invaded the island?

    Cheers
     
  10. idler

    idler GeneralList

    page 1

    Nope, that doesn't work. I have 10 pages here; so if anyone has any suggestions how I can get them up here and readable I'd really appreciate it.

    It did sort of work but the file was a bit too small to be legible.

    Have you got a pdf creation application (usually they act as a virtual printer to 'print' files to pdf)? Then you could create that on your PC and upload a single file.

    Otherwise, put the files where you can find them easily and use the 'manage attachments' option when you post. It opens a little window that allows you to browse for the files then upload them.
     
  11. Phaethon

    Phaethon Historian

    Some food for thought questions as I read through the post:

    1. Does Alexander mention this operation in his Bio?

    2. Was the invasion to be launched from West Africa?

    3. Would Spain not attack Gib if the British invaded the island?

    Cheers

    I reccomend glancing over the book operation ACLARITY regarding the circumstances between portugal and spain.

    The operation was to be launched from the Clyde in scotland. I believe some of the marine contingent was put onto the west african coast as part of operation PUMA (pre cursor to Pilgrim) or TRUCK (capturing the azores); I've read about it through third hand documents.

    The attack did hinge on the islands did hinge on Germans moves towards Spain, if Germany had attacked spain, or if spain had caved in to german demands then the operation would certainly have gone ahead; the force was basically waiting on an emergency standby through the summer of 1941. Whether this force could afford to wait was another matter and a heated debate started in whitehall.

    25+ german divisions on the border of spain early 1941 (and given the unknown german intentions at the time towards russia) things were not looking good. Things were made worse by the spanish governments known facist sympathies. Bear in mind a large number of allied sea lanes went around Grand Canary, and a german U boat or air base there would be disasterous.

    According to the intelligence reports (attached in this and the next post) Spain was reinforcing its defences, fully aware of the value of the islands. The longer they left it the better defences were put in place on the island. Although it's not explicitly mentioned, I think a major factor was the appearence of a number of sea mines which would have closed the harbour and sea approaches.

    You can trace the (very heated private debate) in whitehall by going to procat , searching for operation "Pilgrim" and having a look at some of the titles that come up. When I'm back from abroad I'll visit the nation archives and see if I can get any quotes from Keyes regarding his forces.

    In the mean time, attached are the intelligence reports from the appendix.
     

    Attached Files:

  12. Phaethon

    Phaethon Historian

    Here's Some more, some of force 110's weekly intelligence reports detailing the increase in the canary garrison and spains Blue division.

    Incidentally, for the report on the local populaton: have a look at attached file 1923 on the post above: very interesting.
     

    Attached Files:

  13. idler

    idler GeneralList

    Looking at James Dunning's The Fighting Fourth in response to the cuurrent E YORKS thread, there is a summary of PUMA/PILGRIM. It mentions that an advance party of ten ships and elements of all the Force 110 units was sent to Freetown to set up a base camp ready to receive the rest of the Force. The logic was that the local climate was unhealthy enough that they didn't want to risk putting the whole force there until required.

    It reads like the LSIs were based in Freetown and the remainder of the force would be ferried there in vessels better suited to the long haul from the Clyde, change ships, then attack the Canaries. Royal Scotsman, Princess Beatrix and Queen Emma are named. There is a comment that this method was considered feasible with one month's notice.

    Looking at the PILGRIM orders, I notice that Royal Scotsman was to land 4 Cdo on the Commercial Mole. Dunning recounts an exercise in Kirkwall where the ship carried out a night 'crash landing' (their term) on the dockside a la Zeebrugge.

    I wonder if the point of departure (Clyde v Freetown) is the difference between PUMA & PILGRIM? Dunning references the name change in the same breath as the departure of the advance party.
     
  14. idler

    idler GeneralList

    Have just taken advantage of the NA's free downloads to grab copies of:

    CAB 65/23/3 re: PUMA 24/07/41:
    "THE PRIME MINISTER referred to Operation PUMA.The forces for this operation had now been increased to 20,000 by the incorporation of the forces for Operation THRUSTER. The whole had been placed under the command of General Alexander. The Admiral in charge of the operation was Admiral Hamilton. Provisional arrangements had now been made for this force to leave this country about the 10th August. It would not reach its destination until nine or ten days later."

    CAB 65/23/10 re: PILGRIM 19/08/41:
    "THE PRIME MINISTER said that. President Roosevelt had been anxious to occupy the Azors, but wanted to receive an invitation from Dr. Salazar. Such an invitation, however, was unlikely to be received unless and until a German act of aggression took place against the Iberian Peninsula. He (the Prime Minister) had told President Roosevelt that we might have to carry out Operation PILGRIM in September without waiting for an act of provocation. Otherwise we should run the risk of being deprived of Gibraltar without obtaining an alternative Naval base. We should not, however, set the Operation in motion without giving most careful consideration to all the factors involved at the last moment: i.e., in about three weeks' time."

    It wasn't just about the Germans gaining a naval base, it was about us losing one.
     
  15. Phaethon

    Phaethon Historian

    I cant be sure yet but I woudl hazard a guess that the change between PUMA and PILGRIM was in regard to four critical factors: i) the number of amphibious trained troops available: more troops were needed due to an increase in (potential) enemy forces on the island. ii) Spains position towards great britain (i.e . whether the force was requested by spain or at war with spain) This latter point depended in turn on iii) the situation in russia (i.e. were the germans plannng to invade russia, england or spain?? (the latter warranting a quick strike) and iv) whether america would support (either politically or militarally) an operation against a supposedly neutral country.

    The book "Operation ACLARITY" suggests the name was changed from a cat like first strike to a name that the americans could identify with; something that politically makes sense. They turned it into

    Although I agree that losing Gibralta was a critical factor, below is the complete article from CAB 65/23/3 re: PUMA 24/07/41. I have highlighted the bit that suggests that operation PUMA was in regards to enemy (i.e. spain or the axis) gaining a strong base on the island which would threaten allies shipping.

    "THE PRIME MINISTER referred to Operation PUMA.
    The forces for this operation had now been increased to
    20,000 by the incorporation of the forces for Operation
    THRUSTER. The whole had been placed under the command
    of General Alexander. The Admiral in charge of the
    operation was Admiral Hamilton. Provisional arrangements
    had now been made for this force to leave this country
    about the 10th August. It would not reach its destination
    until nine or ten days later. The actual decision as to
    whether the operation should be carried out must, of
    course, depend upon the situation at the time, and the
    operation could be called off any time up to, say, the
    20th August. He thought, however, that we must now take
    General Franco's speech as an indication of hostility to
    us, and that we should be well advised to make certain
    of securing the Canary Islands before we were anticipated
    by the enemy.
    There were considerable Spanish forces in the
    Islands, and there would probably be hard fighting. But
    the Commanders of the forces were satisfied that the
    operation held a good prospect of success.
    The Prime Minister said that the alternative
    of postponing the operation until September had been
    considered, but the weather then was much less likely
    to be favourable. He thotight that the course of events
    in Russia was more likely than anything to have a
    determining influence on Spain's attitude.
    The force proposed was sufficient to enable us,
    if we were successful in capturing the Canary Islands,
    to deal later with other Atlantic islands."

    I suspect the "other Atlantic islands" are close by islands like ibitha, or the azores. Maybe the troops for Thruster were the troops based in Africa?
     
  16. Phaethon

    Phaethon Historian

    Having spent a day in the national archives today one of my aims was to try and unearth a bit more about some of the mysteries surrounding operation Pilgrim. Namely the aim of the operation and the differences between PUMA and PILGRIM. I have to say the story is a bit of a political one and full of political intrigue!

    Now bear in mind that I’m probably shooting myself in the foot here; this should really be in my book. But Owen started this; and I wouldn’t have known about Pilgrim at all if it hadn’t been for ww2talk, so here is a short piece I’ve put together using the online documents from the national archives to answer some of the most important questions: A most fascinating account of the battle that never was!

    *

    (1) Objectives of PUMA/PILGRIM:


    It seems as though PUMA was seen in two different lights. Some saw it as a response to German aggression, with a move by some members of in parliament that this should be the preferred course of action:

    “the operation should not be attempted without provocation.”3

    “It is not in our interest to throw the western Mediterranean into the melting pot, deliberately to exclude ourselves from the continent of Europe; to cut out own communications with the middle east”3

    but there is no longer any doubt that in reality PUMA/PILGRIM was really being planned as a first strike against Spain, before it could join the axis or before the Germans seized the islands, which controlled the vital trade routs and therefore the war in the Atlantic.

    Rodger Keyes (head of combined operations) was the man pushing PUMA.
    "...extracts from letters and minutes from the joint chiefs of staff which record my ceaseless efforts to organize a strike force for immediate use."2

    And despite his extreme opinions, he had some degree of political support; not in the least from Admiral Hammilton, the joint commander of force 110.

    “The Spanish islands belong to a potential enemy”1

    “Nothing would raise British prestige higher at this moment than the seizure of the Spanish Atlantic islands. The Americans would, I am sure, be deeply impressed and pleased at last we were one move ahead of Hitler.”1

    “With regards to the Atlantic islands I urged that the preparations for the capture of PUMA should be proceeded at once and take precedence over any other action in that area since it is the only island which could be made into a battleship base” 2 (24th April)

    “The vital importance of denying the Atlantic islands to the enemy and seizing them for our own use”1

    Shockingly there seemed to be an understanding that striking first would precipitate the inevitable loss of Gibraltar.

    “… The main argument for doing “Puma” is the “Germans are occupied in the East, let’s take the initiative in the west. Otherwise the Germans will come down into Spain eventually and make Gibraltar untenable.”3

    However the government appeared to understand the risks, moreover some even condoned it!

    “It may be said that out action in attacking PUMA will precipitate an attack on Gibraltar which will make it untenable for our fleet. But for the Battle of the Atlantic the possession of the Islands is infinitely more important than our ability to keep ships at Gibraltar, and in my opinion, the temporary abandonment of the harbour can be faced….[shortened]… since we make so little use of passage through the Mediterranean from west to east.”1
     
  17. Phaethon

    Phaethon Historian

    2) Differences between PUMA and PILGRIM:

    PUMA relied on a lighting fast strike; PILGRIM relied on overwhelming force… As a result one of the key factors involved in PUMA was surprise, attacking during a time when there was no moonlight and the tide was right.

    “The original PUMA was a coup de main by a small highly trained force carried in fast ships. PUMA considerably increased became PILGRIM consisting of 59 SHIPS some of slow speed.”2

    “The strengthening of the defences would probably also defeat the original plan to rush the harbour at night and land commandoes from small transports on to the quays, since in my opinion, the approach of the large armada of pilgrim force, including several slow ships, precludes any prospect of tactical surprise”4

    With a larger armada, including a number of carriers, there was hope that the islands would surrender.

    “I consider we could obtain possession of the island if an overwhelmingly powerful naval force, with carriers in supporting distance, appears of the harbour and an ultimatum is delivered demanding the surrender of the island” 4
     
  18. Phaethon

    Phaethon Historian

    (3) Reasons for a first strike:

    It seemed the longer they waited the greater the chance of failure.

    “Procrastination is the thief of time "time is half a victory which, being lost is irreversable." We might almost lost the battle of the atlantic if the germans establish themselves in the atlantic islands." 2

    “Further, if it is considered imperative to wait indefinitely, until either the Germans infringe Spanish neutrality, or persuade Spain to join the axis, the attack cannot be mounted to deliver the assault in less than about 17 days, during which the enemy will have time to forestall us, and the capture of PUMA against the defences and air force, which the Germans will have had time to organize will become a very formidable operation.”1

    Further documents at TNA seem to confirm this: British intelligence had observed an increase in defensive/offensive capabilities of the island; the introduction of a veteran brigade, sea mines, land mines, wire, AA units, and the entire stock of bombs at MAJORCA sent to the canaries. Critically a lot of these defences seemed to be being installed around GANDO air base, the chief target of force 110!

    Perhaps more important to the proceedings though was the arrival of German officers to inspect the defences, Spanish contact with Gestapo, Spanish officers being shown around German conquests in Europe, and unconfirmed sightings on the 12th of July of enemy aircraft at RIO DE ORO and IFINI: only 125 miles from Grand Canary.

    “…Eight months ago it would have been far easier than it is now.”1

    “…if the expedition does not sail in time to deliver the assault on the 1st June, the prospects of surprise will diminish rapidly.”1

    “it is thought that by September the defences of the island will probably be too strong”

    (4) Reasons for delay:

    Yet despite this need for urgency PUMA was never conducted, neither was PILGRIM. This was for a number of reasons; firstly the idea of creating a new enemy

    “Puma” strikes me personally as a desperate throw for an over-valued stake.”3

    Then there was the hope of bringing the Americans into the war

    “If the Americans, who after all, are so deeply concerned could be induced to co-operate in a naval demonstration on a very large scale, I think there is every prospect of securing the island without alienating Spanish supporters in spain and south America by killing a large number of Spaniards.”4

    Also, PILGRIM required a lot of ships which needed to be available:

    “… It should be remembered, too, that we have not the means to carry a larger assault force – all the vessels [Vessels of sufficient speed to give a fair prospect of tactical surprise] and assault landing craft are already included in the PUMA force.” 2

    Secondly, forces defending the UK were stretched and it was feared that PILGRIM would tie up forces elsewhere.

    “…I should have hoped that it might now be possible to prepare plans for a more important venture or ventures to take place is about a months time, if nothing can be contrived sooner. If the main obstacle to such an operation is believed to be constant preparedness for PUMA, I suggest that we should carefully weigh in the defence committee the balance of advantages between readiness for this operation and the ability to strike against the German occupied coastline in the near future.” 7

    The debate as to whether to not to go ahead reached a critical point near September: a time when the tides and the moonlight dictated that PUMA could not be conducted. Well before this deadline it appears to have been decided that the political debate was unlikely to be resolved before spain strengthen its defences sufficiently enough for the small PUMA force to handle. Instead a superior, better trained force was needed, and PILGRIM was borne.

    “It was originally arranged that PUMA force would be ready to sail on the 17th May, but now apparently it will not leave until the 22nd- or be able to carry out the operation before 1st June – the last day of the next dark period- because this date is governed on which the ARK ROYAL can be made available to take part”1

    However; in a twist of fate by building up enough forces to defeat the Spanish defences in PILGRIM, the need to attack in September was eliminated.

    Since it was this deadline that kept the argument for a first strike alive PILGRIM ironically had the side effect of negating the need to invade immediately and finally, after much debate, Churchill finally put the nails in the coffin of any pre-emptive attack.

    “We have now found a way of being able to execute this if necessary after the month of September has passed and indeed during the winter months. We shall not therefore be forced to move unless provocation has been given beforehand, either by German invasion of peninsula or Spanish connivance in undue infiltration or actual Spanish attack on Gibraltar. This makes things much easier and also will present a better footing for any action you might take elsewhere. Meanwhile we are keeping forces at about ten days notice. Trouble may well arise in latter part of September.”5

    As a result Keyes was forced to apologize in order to save face.

    “I fully recognize that it would have been, and still is, impossible for the government to jeopardise the security of Gibraltar by premature action elsewhere.”6

    However the admiral was still adamant that PUMA should have taken place.

    “In the light of my practical experience I am strongly of the opinion that the naval and military hazards of PILGRIM- which is quite a different proposition to the original puma- are very considerable” 6

    The final word on the matter is reasonably amusing.

    “It is interesting to note the doubts which Sir roger Keyes expresses, though they were, I should have thought, equally applicable both to the original war plan and his own suggestion. This, I fear, would not work in the way he anticipates. I do not think any further reply to the admiral is required.”8

    However this playing down of Keyes and his extreme views re: Gibraltar does not do justice to how far PUMA/PILGRIM actually got to fruition. Remember they were at one point on 20 days standby, with the ships, and equipment.

    It now seems pretty likely that the failure of operation LEAPFROG: A practice invasion prior to Pilgrim taking place in the Orkney Islands on the 10th/11th of August, of which it was said:

    “The weather was unfavourable but it was decided to go through with the job. Every form of mistake that had ever been made in opposed landings was repeated in spite of the intensive training to which the whole force had been subjected” (H.E.Horan)

    gave the political neysayers the chance to postpone the operation indefinitely and get rid of Admiral Keyes, and his views of dragging spain into the war, out of the political picture.


    1(image ref: 421) Rodger Keyes 9/5/41
    2 (image ref: 422) Rodger Keyes 12/5/1941
    3 (Image ref 425) 9/7/1941
    4 (Image ref 414) 11/9/1941
    5 (Image ref 413) Winston Churchill 28, viii, 1941
    6(Image 416) Rodger Keyes 17th Sept 1941
    7(Image 424) Sir Anthony Eden 8th July 1941
    8(image 417) I think the signature is Maisky Sept 20th 1941
     
    Owen likes this.
  19. Owen

    Owen -- --- -.. MOD

    Superb research, cheers.
     
  20. idler

    idler GeneralList

    Very good stuff - thanks for the preview...
    I'd suggest the politics also extended to the need for Keyes to find or create a worthwhile role for Combined Ops, so you'd expect him to talk up the threat. No bad thing - I imagine a lot of the PUMA/PILGRIM planning contributed to IRONCLAD (Madagascar) with its similar concerns.
     

Share This Page